Malware Potentially Implicated in 2008 Fatal Plane Crash in Spain.

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Defense tech article.

El Pais article.

The plane’s onboard computer that should have alerted the crew by an audible alarm that the flaps and slats were retracted — NOT in the proper position for takeoff — failed to do so, multiple times. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board preliminary investigation found that no audible alarm had been heard.

The central ground computer system and apparently the onboard air monitoring system were infected with Trojans. Neither notified that the flaps were incorrectly placed causing the deaths of 154 passengers years ago.

One of the comments says:
The technicians inspecting the aircraft pulled a circuit breaker to isolate this fault. It is THEORIZED that this circuit breaker was not returned to its proper position and that it neutralized the aircraft's take off warning system (TOWS). The TOWS would have provided audio warning that the aircraft's flaps and slats were not in the optimal position for take off and no such aural warning was sounded.
Does anyone have a source to that information?

Not sure if this belongs in the social/current events section. :confused:
 
At the end of the day, the blame rests entirely with the flight crew. Every stage of flight has an associated checklist, and checking proper flap extension is a major item on those checklists.

Yes, the malware problem should be fixed and might have averted the accident, but this is not something that should be relied on. Every pilot gets his/her start on small planes, and these often have no significant warning systems of this kind. It's the pilot's job to ensure the plane is fit for flight, and the checklists are there to back up the fallible brain.

- Dr. Trintignant
 
Even with checklists, the tech-crew are supposed to do a walk-around and a thorough hand-check of all systems.
 
Even with checklists, the tech-crew are supposed to do a walk-around and a thorough hand-check of all systems.

Yeah, that too. On small planes, the PiC does the walk-around, though I guess on commercial jets the ground crew handles that.

But in this case I don't think it would have made a difference. The flaps/slats were in working order; it was only the warning system which was inoperative. There were actually two separate checklist opportunities for checking the flaps before takeoff, one of which required a physical verification, and the crew ignored both.

- Dr. Trintignant
 
The frustration I feel with malware authors when my grandfather's PC gets infected due to their social engineering/deception kinda gets put into perspective. I realize that the real chain of responsibility likely lies in the airline, their maintenance practices, possibly the pilots, etc, but oi, these people who write software that purposely screws with other people's property in order to allow them to make a few bucks.

Truly scum of the earth. You write software that intentionally screws up computers for your own ends, you gotta figure that your software is going to end up on a critical system somewhere and put people's lives in jeopardy.
 
A couple of thougths:

First, how exactly would a flight computer get infected with malware? I would have thought such computers would be a specialized bit of kit and not run a standard operating system that could get infected with your typical malware/virus/what have you found on the web. Nor would I have thought there'd be folks writing malware and similar apps directly targetting flight computers.

Second, a circuit breaker not being properly reset is a mechanical issue, not a computer software issue.
 
A couple of thougths:

First, how exactly would a flight computer get infected with malware? I would have thought such computers would be a specialized bit of kit and not run a standard operating system that could get infected with your typical malware/virus/what have you found on the web. Nor would I have thought there'd be folks writing malware and similar apps directly targetting flight computers.

Second, a circuit breaker not being properly reset is a mechanical issue, not a computer software issue.

I think the important part here is the ground computer system. It probably assisted mechanics with what tasks had been done, and what tasks needed to be done for a given aircraft. With it malfunctioning, they probably had to fallback to a system they were not familiar with or was not kept up to date.

Of course, computers can malfunction for any reason, not just malware.

ETA: ah, rtfa showed that the system in question was supposed to notify mechanics when 3 identical faults had been entered for an aircraft over a given time period. The system should have alerted them to a possible problem with the circuit.
 
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The article is sensationalistic and misleading.

The malware they're talking about wasn't on any of the computers on the airplane. It was on the computers which the airline company used to keep track of faults and maintenance. Implying that malware directly caused a fault of the flight control systems is dishonest.
 
Thanks for all the info! :)

The article is sensationalistic and misleading.

The malware they're talking about wasn't on any of the computers on the airplane. It was on the computers which the airline company used to keep track of faults and maintenance. Implying that malware directly caused a fault of the flight control systems is dishonest.

Even if the malware wasn't present on the onboard computing system, a technical flaw caused the aircraft to not alert the pilots.
 
The reason the onboard systems didn't alert the pilots that the flaps and slats weren't in takeoff configuration appears to be due to a circuit breaker having been pulled during earlier troubleshooting and then not reset. Less a technical flaw, more a failure on several parts to properly follow procedures. Malware on the company's central record-keeping computers might have cause them to not notice a pattern of mechanical problems with this airplane, but that's at best an indirect contributing cause, and I suspect that cutting of corners to save costs in the maintenance department had a lot more to do with it.
 
OK,

Commercial Airline Captain here,

Sorry, but there is some total BS both in the quoted articles and the responses, showing a simple lack of understanding of Aircraft systems and operations.

The MD-80 series of aircraft (of which the aircraft in this accident belonged) where the more recent versions of the '60s vintage DC9 series of Aircraft.

Airline aircraft production rates are low by the standards of most manufactured goods (the most numerous Airliner in the world, the Boeing 737, has chalked up only 5 000 sales since it first came onto the market in 1967.). As such, designs tend to get tweaked and modified rather than completely redesigned, as the amortization of development costs is over a very small number of units.

As such, the flap/slat warning system in the MD-80 in a purely analog, simple logic system. It basically works on an "and" gate switch with inputs from the throttles and the flaps and slats. If the throttles are advanced beyond a certain angle and the flaps are not in a takeoff position, it sounds a horn. A very simple, WW2 technology system, with not an IC in sight, and NO opportunity for a "Trojan" virus to come into play.

Indeed NONE of the computers in even the most up to date airliners (such as the Boeing 777 which I fly) have any form of computerized system that operates a common OS or is EVER exposed to the internet.

Short of a targeted malevolent piece of software programmed by someone with proprietary knowledge of the aircrafts systems, there is NO way a virus is going to effect the aircraft.

This accident occurred because the (very simple) flap/slat warning system (actually known as the Take-off Configuration warning) had been disconnected in compliance with an MEL (Minimum Equipment List) procedure, as it shared a circuit with another, malfunctioning warning system. This happens when there is a failure of a non-critical system. this defect may ne carried for a limited amount of time provided the crew is made aware and alternate procedures are in place.

In this case the crew, who were hurried and under pressure, made a subsequent error in not selecting the correct flap setting for take-off, with obviously tragic results.

As to malware on a company system leading to the accident- bollocks! The flap system was disabled immediately prior to the crash take-off, and no reference to any central data-base would have been necessary. To me, that sounds like attempted arse-covering by the company.

Just one more comment-

Even with checklists, the tech-crew are supposed to do a walk-around and a thorough hand-check of all systems.

Perhaps the most stupid comment I've ever read in relation to aircraft operations- Yes we do a walk-around. It would have made no difference in this case as flaps are selected AFTER engine start.

But what the hell is a "Hand check of all systems" supposed to mean? I don't get up on the wing of my airliner and check the fuel, oil, and hydraulics by hand, nor do I put my tongue across the points of the aircrafts 10 generators to see if they really ARE putting out 220Volts at 400Hz.

I have a bunch of nice gages to do that for me....
 
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Just one more comment-



Perhaps the most stupid comment I've ever read in relation to aircraft operations- Yes we do a walk-around. It would have made no difference in this case as flaps are selected AFTER engine start.

But what the hell is a "Hand check of all systems" supposed to mean? I don't get up on the wing of my airliner and check the fuel, oil, and hydraulics by hand, nor do I put my tongue across the points of the aircrafts 10 generators to see if they really ARE putting out 220Volts at 400Hz.

I have a bunch of nice gages to do that for me....
OK, so I was "abbreviating". You have described what you really do so I won't elaborate on my comment.
 
Sorry if that sounded harsh, Zep, no offense intended. Lot's of rubbish get's written about Aviation and I might be a bit "Hair trigger" on the subject.
 

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