Lockerbie: London Origin Theory

[Caustic Logic]

I know, there are already quite a few Lockerbie threads here, and several of them recent. Apologies to the forum at large for the inconvenience. But there's one important issue above the others that deserves a thread of its own.

My own knowledge of the London origin theory and the evidence behind it is a bit of a weak spot for me, so maybe someone else could give us a scholarly run-down of the case for Heathrow introduction. Well, since the plane was loaded from empty at Heathrow before taking off, obviously the bomb went on board there. Obviously what I mean is that it originated with terrorists on the ground in London, not interlined from the German feeder or any other plane.

As far as I know, this is what we have supporting this as the method

Explosion time: the plane detonated app. 38 minutes after takeoff on reaching 31,000 feet. This fits perfectly with the usual time of a "Khreesat" altimeter bomb, if it went on at Heathrow.

Bedford's suitcase: The only brown hardside Samsonite suitcase anyone besides Giaka claims to have seen relating to Flight 103, was reported by luggage handler John Bedford in just the right container the bomb detonated in. Officially, it's a coincidence and that bag apparently vanished.

The Heathrow Break-in: Reported by a security guard, corroborated by others - a padlock hacked open at the luggage handling area where 103 loaded from, a long 18 hours before the plane left. Played a role in Megrahi's first appeal. Has some confusion worth discussing...

When we get to this one, the useful original article from The Mirror is a little harder to find, so here's an archived version I'v found until we can get something better.
http://plane-truth.com/Aoude/geocities/latest27.html
(about 2/3 down, "Our documents prove...")
And BTW, we've never discussed Carl Davies here yet. He ran plane-truth.com, which has come in handy at times like this. Maybe not worth it...

And that's about it as far as I know. It's more than I'd expect, really. I just re-read Baz's pretty awesome article on the subject, and it' a decent point for others to start. Mainly, check the Bedford section, it's a long article. Curiously, he doesn't mention the break-in evidence at all.
http://e-zeecon.blogspot.com/2008/11/lockerbie-heathrow-evidence.html

And yes, this also to help me sort out the issue, best sources, details, etc. for my new site.

 

[Caustic Logic]

I'll start with Bedford's suitcase story as it was reported, as it was told at trialThis is from a summary by the Lockerbie Trial Briefing Unit, for 25/08/2000, On day 44 of the trial, "the last day of evidence before the expected testimony of Giaka on Monday" I'll try to trim it down a bit and highlight some interesting bits.

For those who don't know, Kamboj is the other worker that Bedford says placed the mystery suitcase (along with another, gray Samsonite). Kamboj denied it. No one has fessed up to placing the bags Bedford saw.

Mr Kamboj, a security agent with Alert Management in 1988, based at Terminal 3 in Heathrow, gave evidence. In December 1988 he worked in the interline shed and was responsible for scanning the baggage from connecting flights other than Pan Am flights. In the interline shed was situated a scanning machine. After baggage had passed through the scanning machine a security tag was placed on the bag. The scanning machine was an x-ray which was black and white. Both airline and security workers were in the interline shed. The airline staff gave the baggage to the security staff for scanning. If the suitcase was destined for a Pan Am flight sometimes either Alert Security or Pan Am staff would take the bag off the belt. Following scanning the airline worker would put the bag into a container. There would normally be 2 staff members from Alert in the interline shed. 1 worker would watch the screen and the other placed a sticker on the bag. The witness said that Alert staff would sometimes place bags into containers if it was a quiet time or the airline worker was in the rest room or away, but this was not the normal routine. Mr Palmer was working in the interline shed with Mr Kamboj that day.
The witness did not remember Mr Bedford working in the interline shed that day. He remembered that a Pan Am flight was due to leave for New York that afternoon. By late afternoon it was quiet in the interline shed. Mr Palmer and the witness finished at the same time. The witness was asked to accept that Mr Bedford was working that day and he then confirmed that it was Mr Bedford's job to load the Pan Am luggage that afternoon. The witness said it was possible that he had helped Mr Bedford by loading 2 bags but that he didn't remember. He accepted that if Mr Bedford said this he would accept it, but that the bags would have gone through the appropriate security procedures....
It was not easy to identify a suspicious item using the [scanning] machine. If an item looked normal no action would be taken. If abnormal it would be sent to the gate to be investigated. He also said it would be normal to see an electrical item every day.

In cross-examination Mr Davidson asked the witness if he recalled having a break that afternoon and on his return to the shed Mr Palmer left for the day. He said he did not. He confirmed it would be usual for a container to be loaded in the interline shed with bags bound for New York and then that container would meet the Frankfurt flight. Mr Davidson then asked if it was normal for the container to be taken first to baggage build up for some time before going to meet the Frankfurt flight. Mr Kamboj said he was not sure. He confirmed that the interline area was open and was not sure if it was locked at night. He could not recall if he was the last person to leave the interline shed that night. He confirmed that the bags reached the machine on a belt which started outside the shed and that he had not seen security there. He denied that he had been aware of the 'Toshiba Warning' before December 1988 or that he had been asked to look out for a fake Toshiba radio. He was asked again whether he ever loaded luggage onto a container. He said he remembered being interviewed by the police but did not recall what he said.

A police interview on 6 January 1989 was referred to wherein the witness said that Mr Bedford had brought a metal tin into the interline shed to transport luggage for flight PA 103. He told the Police that he did not place any luggage in that tin. In a statement made to Police on 28 December 1988 the witness did not refer to putting any bag in the container on 21 December 1988 and stated that this would not be done as it was not part of his job. The Fatal Accident Inquiry transcript revealed that when giving evidence at that time, the witness said he would not have put bags into the tin container. Mr Davidson referred to the statement by the witness during the examination in chief by the Advocate Depute where he indicated that if Mr Bedford's account of 21 December included that he, Mr Kamboj placed 2 bags into container 4041 that he would accept this. This clearly contradicts statements given around the time of the disaster to the Police and the court at the Fatal Accident Inquiry.
Mr Kamboj did not recall what shift Mr Bedford worked that day or seeing the container leaving the shed. He did not recall being asked by Police officers how many bags came through Interline that day or how many were in Mr Bedford's container that day. Previous statements were referred to where the witness said he thought that there were 5 cases in Mr Bedford's container when he drove it away but that this was just a guess.

Mr Taylor, under cross-examination, referred to the lack of security at the interline shed which would have allowed anyone to drop a bag onto the belt which carried luggage into the shed to be x rayed. The witness accepted that this was the case. The witness stated that the information he gave to the police and the Fatal Accident Inquiry was truthful and accurate.

The judges asked Mr Kamboj if only Pan Am bags would come into the interline shed. The witness said that bags for all airlines would be carried on the same conveyor belt. Pan Am flights are identified by the Pan Am tag and these are picked off by the airline employees and sometimes security employees when they are beside the x-ray machine. Mr Kamboj said he did not remember seeing Mr Bedford leaving the shed with the container.

Mr Bedford then gave evidence that bags were loaded ...

Okay, that's enough for one post. I note right off that Kamboj recalls very little, seems really vague, and at every opportunity accepts that security was lax, open, people could do this or that, who knows... It doesn't feel totally level. Anyone else?

 

[Buncrana]

Sorry, some of this is from a post just made on the MST timer thread. (Anything to get my post count up...up..up!! )

I remember reading somewhere (I'll try and locate it) that Khreesat's devices recovered in Neuss were not triggered and ready to be used. They were if you like an initial prototype. The report was that four Khreesat devices had been recovered, but one device was thought to have evaded the raid by the Germans.

If true, it woud facilitate the transportation of the device from Norway, Gothenburg or Neuss much simpler, and from what we know, the device was difficult to spot, even when x-rayed without removing the entire casing of the radio embedded with the bomb. Not that I ever had anything x-rayed while driving and crossing the English Channel or the North Sea on a ferry. I hardly ever had my passport checked nevermind my baggage x-rayed when I made the journey to and from Europe in the 80's. I've no doubt it'd be somewhat different today.

If the PLFP, or the Iranians, had someone working airside at Heathrow in any capicity, sympathetic to their 'revenge mission', although preferably someone with baggage loading knowledge, I really don't think it would be difficult at all to slip them a suitcase, triggered with the bomb, with the instruction to place it as late as was possible in the loading procedure into a container that will be as close to the planes outer fuselage as possible. If the Iranian Airlines gate was also adjacent to 103's, then access to the Pan Am flight loading containers and with the appropriate knowledge of how these would be loaded, would be dare I say, pretty uncomplicated to insert the suitcase containing the bomb.

Was the break-in at Heathrow to allow someone access to drop the suitcase off to their contact? Was the break-in a diversion to attract attention away from elsewhere at the time it was reported? It had been suggested that some airside employees would use this route as a short-cut going back to landside areas of Heathrow. However, the break-in, as it was reported, had occured from landside gaining access to the highly restricted airside areas of the airport. Although, as has been evident, security at Heathrow was lamentable, where hundreds if not thousands of airside passes were unaccounted for.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Sorry, some of this is from a post just made on the MST timer thread. (Anything to get my post count up...up..up!! )

You could try a little light conversation in a different sub-forum. Maybe a movie you like?


Good observations re: the ease of getting a bomb to the airport and to a container. On the right container, I doubt many people would know both which container had "that bag" and also where the container would be placed. But that would allow you to target a certain part of the fuselage. Otherwise, they all have an outward facing-side.
See this video, 4:35 mark for the best visualization. Then, as you can see, it doesn't take that much damage. And that's why you cannot let bombs get onto planes.

Okay, so back to how...

Was the break-in at Heathrow to allow someone access to drop the suitcase off to their contact? Was the break-in a diversion to attract attention away from elsewhere at the time it was reported? It had been suggested that some airside employees would use this route as a short-cut going back to landside areas of Heathrow. However, the break-in, as it was reported, had occured from landside gaining access to the highly restricted airside areas of the airport. Although, as has been evident, security at Heathrow was lamentable, where hundreds if not thousands of airside passes were unaccounted for.

Indeed. What was up with anyone mentioning "shortcuts" as if that matters? Who takes bolt cutters with them so they don't have to go he long way? It's silly. Distraction might be a thought, except I think a distraction's supposed to happen somewhere else, while this was where the plane loaded from, right? Terminal 3 ... under construction, people were coming and going. I guess I shouldn't begrudge Mr, Kamboj for noting that.

I believe he's supposed to be of Turkish origin. Does anyone know that?

 

[Caustic Logic]

Above, I asked about Mr. Kamboj's possible Turkish ethnicity. I thought I'd read that somewhere but couldn't find it again if so. here is apparently a "Kamboja" people or culture from antiquity, NW India and into Central Asia.
His middle name seems rather Indian to me. And he's in London. So okay... I was wondering about the possibility that the early talk of Turks at Frankfurt (from Pan Am people, Mike Jones no less) helping sneak in the bomb was some kind of code for Heathrow. It was a weird thought. Sorry.

I am going over the trial testimony of both Kamboj and Bedford. One has a clear memory of what happened, the other doesn't. One told police clearly he didn't put no bags in there while the other says he says he did. In court Kamboj just doesn't remember now. If Bedford says he says that, then okay, he did help. He did not lie to police. He doesn't remember.

And Bedford's not entirely different. He doesn't recall the color. He recalls that he did once, and he recalls what color that was. But he doesn't now actually remember the color. This part was most interesting:

Q All right. I want you to look at another page now with me, please, image 2300. And you'll see that this is still a portion of your evidence.
A Yes, sir.

Q Can we look a little further down on that page, please. Do you see just below letter "D" the question: With regard to the suitcase that you saw lying down flat to the left side of the container, I would like you to think back as best you can. Could that suitcase have been a blue suitcase with a maroon or brown trim? And your answer was: I couldn't say.
A Yes, sir.

Q Then the question continued: You don't know whether it was or not? - No, sir. - But it could have been? - It could have been.
A Yes, sir.

day 44, p 6493 re-exam by Mr. Turnbull

If these were questions posed by police to Bedford, isn't that bad procedure? It would seem to indicate they wanted him to stop being so sure about the color. He did soften a bit, and so Turnbull, deputy of LA Boyd (right?) draws our attention to it. Look, once, he was badgered to be less than totally sure it was really a brown hardside Samsonite. Fine, so it's not 100% but he has always repeated that, the "differences" were in the range brown-maroon. Not blue with trim.

Also, when Heathrow was eliminated, and it was decided the bomb bag was too high up to have been from any other than 103A from Frankfurt, can anyone help me remember what they cited as justification? The blast didn't damage the floor, so it had to be higher up, and all the bags loaded at interline were on the bottom? How many was it?

 

[Caustic Logic]

Well this thread has failed so far. Nonetheless, it's a place to work out some details I'm hazy on. First, I'd like to pin down where the scientists decided the explosion was centered. It's not as straightforward to pin it down as I hoped.

Here's the best photo I could find (external)
http://www.life.com/image/89964534
What are the dimensions on this thing? Five or six feet high? A bit wider (inboard to outboard?)
Did it have interior shelves/levels like the video below shows? Or was it just open space, with cases stacked?
Air Crash Investigation (end of part 3)
The outboard part has the slanted part creating an "overhang" - this would go up near the curved fuselage. So here the sde we're facing wouuld be forward-facing, inside the plane. If I'm not mistaken, they show the opening on the wrong side - it would be the rear side, and this side would be the 'back' wall to you as you were loading.

Paul Foot wrote of the suitcase(s) placed by Kamboj, as told by Bedford:

Moreover, Mr Taylor insisted, the case ended up in the precise position a) where an explosion in it would cause the maximum damage and b) exactly where the forensic evidence suggested it was at the time the bomb exploded.

Lockerbie, the Flight From Justice, p 19

The maximum damage would be along the outboard wall, on the slanted portion of floor, or stacked a bit above that. The witness saw it set, I think, on the flat floor on the "front" side (loading side? So aft side rel to the plane?). Mr. Claiden at al decided it was near the floor but had something under it, so couldn't be that bag at all.

"Baz" says:

… According to the Air Accident Investigation Report the centre of the explosive event was 10” from the floor of the container 12” from it’s left hand wall and 15” from the front (sloping) wall of the container.

I checked the AAIB report I have, and it says on page 40:

2.4 IED position within the aircraft
From the detailed examination of the reconstructed luggage containers,
discussed at paragraph 1.12.2.4 and in Appendix F, it was evident that the IED had been located within a metal container (serial number AVE 4041 PA), near its aft outboard quarter as shown in Appendix F, Figure F-13. It was also clear that the container was loaded in position 14L of the forward hold which placed the explosive charge approximately 25 inches inboard from the fuselage skin at frame 700.

An appendix F explains further, but it's not appended. If the space between container and fuselage were ten inches than the 15 inch thing is verified, but that's not clear either. We have 25 inches from the skin.

Mr. Protheroe of (AAIB?) later turned around at trial and claimed the math was wrong and the explosion was only 12 inches from the skin! (This is discussed in Day 10, 25 May. Bollier says this means it was floating just outside the container I think. I don't trust this type of revisionism, but I'm open to fudging. Was it closer?

As for it not being on the floor, Mr. Claiden talks about that in his testimony, trial day 11. From his reports:

... the reconstruction of the floor of container 4041 revealed an area of severe distortion, tearing, blackening, localised in its aft outboard quarter ... Within container 4041, the lack of direct blast damage (of the type seen on the outboard floor edge member and lower portions of the aft face structural members) on most of the floor panel in the heavily distorted area suggested that this had been protected by, presumably, a piece of luggage. The downward heaving of the floor in this area was sufficient to stretch the floor material far enough to be cut by the cargo bay substructure and distort the adjacent fuselage frames. This supported the view that the item of baggage containing the IED had been positioned fairly close to the floor but not actually placed upon it.

So it was pushed down by the force, but didn't show the signs of direct explosives contact. I wonder how much it matters if he was visualizing them laying flat on their sides stacked, or upright on their spines? A suitcase spine plus the filling above it might be enough to block pitting/etc. on a small patch of floor directly under it... I don't know.

The discussion from there of the damage to different sides, plus the container damage we can see in that photo, do show the blast center was low in the container - 2 feet up at absolute most. That's lower level luggage. Note the floor is not included in that photo. If it just looked buckled rather than blasted through, there'd have to be something under it.

What does anyone else think?

 

[Caustic Logic]

Interesting I should first find this right now:

http://abcnews.go.com/video/playerIndex?id=9443716

Interesting 1989 ABC News segment - it's got full rotation photos of the container, plus Ted Koppel!

 

[Rolfe]

I don't think the thread is a failure, I just think it's discussing something relatively uncontentious.

Having read more of the evidence, I'm clearer about what Mr. Bedford says he saw. He had put the first 5 cases on their spines, however the two mystery cases were actually lying flat. I think this may be why the court thinks these cases would inevitably have been on the bottom layer.

I just don't see this as being so inevitable at all. Likely, yes, but it's still perfectly possible that cases could have been rearranged a bit while the Frankfurt stuff was being stacked, so that one of these two cases ended up on the second layer. Indeed, one point I wonder about is whether any of the baggage loaders doing that job might have been part of the terrorist plot, and deliberately positioned that case with the bomb as close to the side of the container as possible. That could easily have involved putting it on top of another case.

The judges accepted that the Bedford suitcase had indeed been moved away from the position Mr. Bedford saw it in, because if it had remained there it would have been damaged by the explosion and so appeared in the forensic record. Nevertheless, while they decided it had probably been moved "to a far corner of the container" (yes, baggage handlers just love moving 20kg suitcases from one end of a container to the other for no good reason....), they continued with their assumption that it couldn't have been moved one layer up.

Looking at it simply, it seems bloody obvious the Bedford suitcase was "the primary suitcase". My only question is whether it would have been enough for the unknown person who put it in the container to have placed it where he did, or whether it would really have been necessary to have one of the loaders handling the Frankfurt baggage co-operating with the plan. If it was indeed moved from the bottom to the second-bottom layer at that stage, either one of the loaders was in on it, or the terrorists were very lucky it wasn't moved to the other (inboard) side of the container.

Nevertheless, when considering that point, we have to bear in mind that even the amount of control over positioning given by putting the bag in AVE4041 at Heathrow is more than would have been achievable if it had simply been sent on its journey at Malta or Frankfurt. The official version relies just as much if not more on the bag's lethal positioning having been pure chance.

The evidence suggests, we're told, that the primary suitcase was on the second layer, on top of an American Tourister suitcase that had come off PA103A. Some of the measurements contradict each other though (including Mr. Protheroe's calculations). I've seen references to estimates of the height of the explosion that would put it in the bottom layer. It's the lack of pitting and the state of the American Tourister that are used to argue against this. It's difficult to know which data-set is most reliable, given the state of the stuff after the explosion, the fall from 33,000 feet, and lying around the Scottish countryside for up a week or two before being brought in. Oh, and probably some of it never being found.

What I can't see, given that Mr. Bedford's evidence was accepted, is anything that conclusively, or even to a high degree of probability, prevents that suitcase being the bomb bag. And I'm just gobsmacked at the attitude of the judges on this point.

The only other point I was toying with was whether it was possible that the bits of bronze Samsonite recovered at Lockerbie could have been the Bedford suitcase, but not the bomb bag. That in fact the actual bomb bag had been more or less obliterated, and the items believed to be from the bomb bag were actually somewhat further away but their appearance misinterpreted. Several people have suggested this, but I don't really think it flies.

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

I don't think the thread is a failure, I just think it's discussing something relatively uncontentious.

Actually I think there's room for a closer look. Brown Samsonte - are we quiite certain he wasn't originally compelled to say so back when they didn't know how embarrassing... ah, never mind.

Having read more of the evidence, I'm clearer about what Mr. Bedford says he saw. He had put the first 5 cases on their spines, however the two mystery cases were actually lying flat. I think this may be why the court thinks these cases would inevitably have been on the bottom layer.

Well I believe he said 4 or 5 bags along the back, Kamboj places two more, and then he takes it off with what most summarize as 6-7 bags. But the range is wider than that. Bedford in court said:

Q Are you able to give me any more indication than that as to how many bags were in it?
A Probably about eight or ten bags, sir. [p 6452]

And Kamboj said in court (disavowing the extra two)

Q You have said on previous occasions I think that you thought that the bin contained about five cases when Mr. Bedford drove it away. Do you see that?
A Yes, sir.

Q And you answered: Yes. The questioner says: Can you actually remember the precise number of cases, or is it just a guess on your part? And you say: It is just a guess.
A Yes, sir.
Q And was that the truth, so far as you could recollect it at that time?
A Yes, sir.[Day 44 6428-29]

I want the dimensions, at least approximate, so I can do a rough analysis of how many bags could fit in rows across the floor. Two bags laying on their sides might gat moved, or the ones up on their bottoms might be moved instead and laid flat. The bags in front could be uprighted and slid left or right to make more room. They might have been placed on top of or under the back row bags. There are only so many likely scenarios (and not too many unlikely ones either) that could be considered with the damage, etc.

I just don't see this as being so inevitable at all. Likely, yes, but it's still perfectly possible that cases could have been rearranged a bit while the Frankfurt stuff was being stacked, so that one of these two cases ended up on the second layer. Indeed, one point I wonder about is whether any of the baggage loaders doing that job might have been part of the terrorist plot, and deliberately positioned that case with the bomb as close to the side of the container as possible. That could easily have involved putting it on top of another case.

Well if someone placed it in the container back where Kamboj was working alone in the interline shed, that would presumably mean two people compromised to help, one to place it and one to move it. That's the dangerous part, where they realize it's not drugs but a bomb if it has to be in a certain area. Somehow I doubt they would do this.

Personally I think they fudged down the explosive power, partly to explain the large debris they got. Either it was a quite powerful bomb, 400 grams or more, or both bags were possibly bombs. They did match or closely so and were slipped in at the same time. The investigation found no clue of two bombs, but they also found a lot of wrong things.

The judges accepted that the Bedford suitcase had indeed been moved away from the position Mr. Bedford saw it in, because if it had remained there it would have been damaged by the explosion and so appeared in the forensic record. Nevertheless, while they decided it had probably been moved "to a far corner of the container" (yes, baggage handlers just love moving 20kg suitcases from one end of a container to the other for no good reason....), they continued with their assumption that it couldn't have been moved one layer up.

That is a double standard, but not entirely. Bags may well be slid around to make room, and if the bottom layer is not yet filled, they may stay there. But as soon as someone's stacking them flat, all best are off. It could be as simple as someone took the two Kamboj (?) bags, stacked them so the bomb one was on top of the other. If they were so stacked, left at front, and slid to the left, tha would fit perfect I think for what was found - lower, aft, outboard.

Looking at it simply, it seems bloody obvious the Bedford suitcase was "the primary suitcase". My only question is whether it would have been enough for the unknown person who put it in the container to have placed it where he did, or whether it would really have been necessary to have one of the loaders handling the Frankfurt baggage co-operating with the plan. If it was indeed moved from the bottom to the second-bottom layer at that stage, either one of the loaders was in on it, or the terrorists were very lucky it wasn't moved to the other (inboard) side of the container.

I like saying "uknown person." It makes me feel less nervous about naming a person who seems to have actually been the breach.

The evidence suggests, we're told, that the primary suitcase was on the second layer, on top of an American Tourister suitcase that had come off PA103A. Some of the measurements contradict each other though (including Mr. Protheroe's calculations).

Hmmm - that's a convenient decision that most likely wasn't warranted. How do they know above from below? Spherical propagation, hello?

The only other point I was toying with was whether it was possible that the bits of bronze Samsonite recovered at Lockerbie could have been the Bedford suitcase, but not the bomb bag. That in fact the actual bomb bag had been more or less obliterated, and the items believed to be from the bomb bag were actually somewhat further away but their appearance misinterpreted. Several people have suggested this, but I don't really think it flies.

Rolfe.

As you know I've proposed a possibility kind of like that. It's a thought exercise I haven't tossed yet, but I'm not standing any wiegt on it either. If the bomb was super-powerful, then perhaps these brow bits are too big. Maybe it was the OTHER Bedford bag!

They were [both] hard suitcases, the type Samsonite make. One was brown in colour, and the other one, if it wasn't the same colour, it was similar

The two bags thing IS tripping me out. What are the chances if they didn't come from the same people?

 

[Caustic Logic]

I did a little research. It looks like Maid of the Seas was a 747-121 model, which is designed to hold 30 LD1 style containers. These have the following measurements:
(base width / overall width _ depth _ height)
156 / 234 _ 153 _ 163 cm
(61.5 / 92 _ 60.4 _ 64 in)
Awesome. This allows me to finally create a visualization to work from. I'm less sure on suitcase sizes, which will vary. I roughly measured the trial exhibit case containing the radio box - I took the box as 17" and the suitcase therefore a hair 24 inches, or so, wide. Approx 16 inches high. The cases Dr. Wyatt loaded in his container, if it's got a height of 64 inches, average around 7.5 inches in depth.

So if we start with five bags placed handles up along the back by Mr. Bedford, and two placed on their sides at the front (to the left I think) it would look something like this:

Bedford may have gone left-to-right or r-l, but right to left made more sense to me. Quite arbitrary. There may have been less or more cases in there when it was driven off. As many as ten (back row filled). Bedford's memory could have been off somehow even back then. He said the two bags took up the remaining floor space, which is only roughly true from this.

I'm actually not sure what all use this visualization is, but I think it might help us consider what might happen next. If you received a container arranged something like this, at baggage buildup, and were placing items from 103A or elsewhere what would you do to rearrange these? There are many possibilities, but only so many.

Hmmm...
ETA: Here's one possibility - all cases present were re-stacked on their flat sides and then piled on top of. Any scenarios anyone would like to see mocked up?

 

[GlennB]

One tiny thought re loading technique -
Aircraft do bank a fair bit at times. Presumably loaders don't want cases toppling or sliding during flight, so will tend to fill the containers in layers width-wise whenever possible rather than have incomplete layers scattered about each container?
That's what I would do anyway, but then I've never loaded a plane.
Carry on

 

[Rolfe]

Where in that mock-up is the place where the explosion happened? Can you show us the assumed position of the bomb bag when it was loaded?

I think there's a limit to how much "what-if" analysis we can do on the information we have about this. I doubt if it was ever suggested to Mr. Bedford that he saw a brown Samsonite though, because absolutely nobody involved in that investigation on the British side wanted Heathrow to be implicated, at any stage.

My main question is, assuming he really did see a brown Samsonite as described, is there any pressing argument that says it either couldn't have been the bomb bag, or was unlikely to be the bomb bag? I really don't think there is.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

This is the best place for this comment I suppose. Lockerbie-interested people need to go to the January Stundies thread and vote for no. 7. It's Charles Norrie from the Robert Black blog, and he currently holds a narrow lead.

He has theorised that the bomb went on board at Heathrow, but not in a suitcase. He knows an "Iranian gent" in a dark suit and a long dark coat sidled in at midnight through the broken padlock, and sabotaged the actual baggage container. Which was already there, 18 hours before the plane's departure, and which was already, because of some baggage logictics system Charles has reasoned must be the way it's done, identifiable as a container that would be on PA103.

Oh yes, and it was the CIA who masterminded this, to allow the Iranians to achieve their revenge for the Vincennes incident in a controlled manner.

Never mind that the container doesn't show the sort of damage consistent with having had a bomb fixed to its structure, and the chances of such a device going unnoticed all day by the people handling and loading the things is minimal.

Charles has his theory, and he now sits back and insists that it's up to everyone else to prove him wrong by finding out whether the baggage container assignment system really was the way he has theorised it was. This isn't his job you know, Popper says it's the job of the challenger to find the evidence to support the theory.

And yes, you can't start with the facts, that's unscientific. You have to start with your theory. Then, apparently, you wait to see if anyone else bothers to check your facts for you, and if they don't, your theory must be right!

He deserves this award.

Rolfe.

 

[Buncrana]

You know, in order to ensure that the bag was positioned in just the correct position in it's container in order to cause the right amount of damage, penetrating the baggage container and fuselage, there are a plethora of very problematic hurdles for the culprit(s) to overcome. Not least if you just plant it on at Malta!

So, in addition to the three changes of aircraft, three airport security systems to negotiate, the time of year and the weather in northern europe to contend with, the prosecution would also add to this list that the villian simply crossed their fingers and hoped it would also find the crucial position when loaded, unloaded, loaded, unloaded and then loaded for a final time. Seriously, they must think we all button-up the back.

I've been thinking. Bolt cutters, or whatever was used for the breach that was reported by Ray Manley, (he himself remarked "bolt cutters" presumably given the substantial nature of the padlock on the door) would not be something that anyone could just stroll around an airport with. Even back then in 1988, despite security being somewhat laxer than today, I imagine it would still attract unwanted suspicion. However, with the apparent refurbishing works that were on-going at Heathrow's Terminal 3, adding to what already appears the rather disorderly security of the airport, I suppose a construction worker, or someone with the appearance of a worker, would not draw attention to the fact they were wandering around an airport with bolt cutters, or something similar which would be required to break the lock on the security door. They presumably would not attract suspicion even if seen in the vicinity of the baggage sheds either.

The break-in, if thought as having a bearing on the bombing, does draw attention away from those actually working on loading 103 towards an 'outsider' gaining unauthorised entry to introduce the bomb into the system. Perhaps aided by someone else who would then place the bag, after noticing the arrival of 103a so close to the departure of 103, while the interline shed was unsecure and unattended. But not abslolutely essential with the knowledge that security is non-existent and those baggage loaders seem to have no great concern in securing the baggage area under their responsibilty.

As we know, either way, this break-in, whether of any consequence to the bombing or not, was never followed up after Manley's report to the police, as the UK and Heathrow authorities desperately attempted to conceal and shift blame away from their authority. If that kind of event (the break-in) happened today, most certainly flights from that terminal, and possibly the whole airport's operations, would be suspended.

Peter Walker, a luggage supervisor explained that luggage from connecting passengers who were not on Pan Am flights would be stored in an interline shed whereas baggage of checked in passengers would be stored in baggage build up. He told the court that his office was adjacent to the baggage build up area and that outside this area was a road which was used as short cut by terminal 3 staff. This combined with the fact that refurbishment work was taking place at this time resulted in the area being busy.

Flight 103a from Frankfurt to London arrived at Gate 16 in Terminal 3 at approx 1737 and required to be unloaded and those bags continuing onto 103 to be quickly identified, removed and reloaded onto103 in time for the proposed departure at 1800. As it was, it left the gate at about 1815approx.

Given this tight schedule, I assume the rest of the luggage collected from those who checked-in at Heathrow and those who had arrived via other connecting flights, was already loaded and in position on Maid of the Seas, with exclusion of AVE4041 and some other containers which weren't full and could receive a number of the bags from 103a. The arrival of 103a being so close to the anticipated departure of 103 would possibily allow that these late and final containers to be loaded in such a manner they would all be along the outer fuselage, near the cargo door, as loading was concluded. Inserting it near the bottom of the container (ideally the very bottom layer) could possibly improve it's chances of not being noted, and less reason for it to be repositioned by any handler, while unlikely they's reposition all the bags in the container.

Looking at these photographs of the reconstruction of 103, I do wonder about the conclusions as to the strength and amount of semtex used. These appear to show far greater destruction than is often referred to, although as I'm clearly not an expert on these matters, and I appreciate much of the damage may have been caused by the subsequent decompression after the bomb had exploded.

http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/89964538
http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/78998051

In the Police interview on 10 January 1989 Mr Walker stated that he had been asked about an AVE container that came from interline baggage to the build up area. In the statement, he says that he understands it was brought but he could not recall seeing it in the baggage build up area. The transcript of his evidence at the Fatal Accident Inquiry records him saying that bags were brought from the interline shed to his office by his supervisor Mr Bedford. They were in a container which was left outside his office where he didn't have a clear view of it. He said the Mr Bedford had told him there were approximately 6 bags in this container.

There seems to be no conclusive evidence as to the number of bags that the container was holding as it was loaded onto 103, who saw it on the move or examined it's contents, but perhaps if the amount of explosive force we're led believe was just enough to pierce the fuselage, was acually much greater, then to ensure the bag was merely in a container which would be positioned near the outer skin of the aircraft would be sufficient.

Lockerbie Trial Briefing Unit, 24 Aug 2000 - www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_78568_en.doc

 

[Rolfe]

You know, in order to ensure that the bag was positioned in just the correct position in it's container in order to cause the right amount of damage, penetrating the baggage container and fuselage, there are a plethora of very problematic hurdles for the culprit(s) to overcome. Not least if you just plant it on at Malta!

So, in addition to the three changes of aircraft, three airport security systems to negotiate, the time of year and the weather in northern europe to contend with, the prosecution would also add to this list that the villian simply crossed their fingers and hoped it would also find the crucial position when loaded, unloaded, loaded, unloaded and then loaded for a final time. Seriously, they must think we all button-up the back.

Well, whenever any of the mob who defend any Official Theory as a spinal reflex comes by, they say, terrorists make mistakes and do stupid things, why theorise on the principle they thought of all those things. Maybe they just got lucky.

Right....

Unless one of the loaders working on the PA103A transfer was involved, that final positioning had to involve a degree of chance. The Heathrow loading hypothesis at least minimises that to a credible degree.

I suppose the concepts that the bomb was attached to the plane itself (de Braeckeleer / Bollier) or to the baggage container (Charles) probably rate a mention, but although they would allow precise positioning, they seem very improbable for other reasons.

I've been thinking. Bolt cutters, or whatever was used for the breach that was reported by Ray Manley, (he himself remarked "bolt cutters" presumably given the substantial nature of the padlock on the door) would not be something that anyone could just stroll around an airport with. Even back then in 1988, despite security being somewhat laxer than today, I imagine it would still attract unwanted suspicion. However, with the apparent refurbishing works that were on-going at Heathrow's Terminal 3, adding to what already appears the rather disorderly security of the airport, I suppose a construction worker, or someone with the appearance of a worker, would not draw attention to the fact they were wandering around an airport with bolt cutters, or something similar which would be required to break the lock on the security door. They presumably would not attract suspicion even if seen in the vicinity of the baggage sheds either.

The break-in, if thought as having a bearing on the bombing, does draw attention away from those actually working on loading 103 towards an 'outsider' gaining unauthorised entry to introduce the bomb into the system. Perhaps aided by someone else who would then place the bag, after noticing the arrival of 103a so close to the departure of 103, while the interline shed was unsecure and unattended. But not abslolutely essential with the knowledge that security is non-existent and those baggage loaders seem to have no great concern in securing the baggage area under their responsibilty.

As we know, either way, this break-in, whether of any consequence to the bombing or not, was never followed up after Manley's report to the police, as the UK and Heathrow authorities desperately attempted to conceal and shift blame away from their authority. If that kind of event (the break-in) happened today, most certainly flights from that terminal, and possibly the whole airport's operations, would be suspended.

While it seems almost inevitable that the break-in was connected to the bombing, you're riight that it's not necessarily as simple as the bomb / bomber having got in that way. I'm not sure I find the idea of a distraction / red herring to an outside job terribly convincing, but it's certainly one possibility.

Flight 103a from Frankfurt to London arrived at Gate 16 in Terminal 3 at approx 1737 and required to be unloaded and those bags continuing onto 103 to be quickly identified, removed and reloaded onto103 in time for the proposed departure at 1800. As it was, it left the gate at about 1815approx.

I believe it was even tighter. I understand Maid of the Seas pushed off from the gate only a minute or two late. Not late at all, by airline standards. The 15-minute delay was on the tarmac, waiting for the runway to be available, as it was a busy time.

Given this tight schedule, I assume the rest of the luggage collected from those who checked-in at Heathrow and those who had arrived via other connecting flights, was already loaded and in position on Maid of the Seas, with exclusion of AVE4041 and some other containers which weren't full and could receive a number of the bags from 103a. The arrival of 103a being so close to the anticipated departure of 103 would possibily allow that these late and final containers to be loaded in such a manner they would all be along the outer fuselage, near the cargo door, as loading was concluded. Inserting it near the bottom of the container (ideally the very bottom layer) could possibly improve it's chances of not being noted, and less reason for it to be repositioned by any handler, while unlikely they's reposition all the bags in the container.

This raises something I'd wondered about, but don't know the answer to. Were all the luggage containers ranged in those odd-shaped spaces right next to the skin of the aircraft? I have a feeling they might have been - a way to take advantage of the space available. It may be that any container would have done, I'm simply not sure.

I don't know whether the actual fore/aft positioning mattered so much. Might have done, but I've never seen it discussed. There's a lot of talk about "the absolutely worst spot it could have been in" so far as breaking up the plane is concerned. However, I'm curious as to what proportion of the bags on the plane would have been in a position to do more or less the same thing. If they were arranged just inside the skin, only about 2 bags deep - half of them?

Looking at these photographs of the reconstruction of 103, I do wonder about the conclusions as to the strength and amount of semtex used. These appear to show far greater destruction than is often referred to, although as I'm clearly not an expert on these matters, and I appreciate much of the damage may have been caused by the subsequent decompression after the bomb had exploded.

http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/89964538
http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/78998051

A great deal of that was indeed caused by decompression and airspeed. There are some diagrams in the AAIB report that show just how much was thought to have been caused by the bomb,

A lot of the rest depends on how honest and how accurate the tests carried out at Indian Head were. I don't necessarily suspect them of being rigged, although some people point to these tests as the possible origin of material that was later planted.

However, the point of the tests was to confirm exactly where the bomb was, and how big it was - not necessarily to determine what the effect would have been of the same size device in a different position. The overall conclusion was about 450g Semtex I think, and in addition Feraday (I think) said he couldn't get more than (I think) 600g in the radio before it started to come through the speaker grilles.

I still don't know if anyone can be sure the plane wouldn't have been badly damaged if the bomb suitcase had been one layer in rather than right against the skin though. All they tell us was that it was as cloe as it could be to the skin, where it actually was.

There seems to be no conclusive evidence as to the number of bags that the container was holding as it was loaded onto 103, who saw it on the move or examined it's contents, but perhaps if the amount of explosive force we're led believe was just enough to pierce the fuselage, was acually much greater, then to ensure the bag was merely in a container which would be positioned near the outer skin of the aircraft would be sufficient.

Lockerbie Trial Briefing Unit, 24 Aug 2000 - www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_78568_en.doc

And I'm not sure that all the containers weren't in that category. I think I need to look at the AAIB report again.

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Alright, we are getting somewhere now.

As far as the explosion center, the AAIB said it was 25" from the hull, abd Baz says 15" from the container's outboard wall. Considering 10 or maybe 12 inches maximum between container and fuselage, this is reasonable. Clearly it was somewhere in the 30 or so inches of slanted floor. Mr. Claiden said it was overall in the lower, aft, outboard quadrant. Baz gives 12 inches from the aft wall. So that would be something like this:

I didn't anticipate that, but it was in the best spot, which is kind of a lacky break maybe? Did they even check the floor in that section? I'd guess it showed lack of explosive damage by virtue of being gone?

Glenn B. - it's true we should consider possible methods of loading. I think left to right or reverse would be equally plausible, but back first, then front makes more sense. Here's another "trial loading" that could put the bedford bags along that sloping floor. Someone may have rearranged them starting from the left and the slanted space first - stack Bedford's bags flat 2-3 high, two rows deep, with the maroony brown bags starting the slant fill.

And Buncrana - good notion on the bolt cutters. Yes, bolts will actually need cut, so some Pterrorist guy could just put on a hardhat, walk in, and when no one was looking, cut the lock. A second gy presumably, in a suit maybe with the TWO bags, could slip in and hide them where they told their insider he could find them, approve the x-ray, and collect, say, $300,000 for "drug smuggling."

As for the explosives, if the bag is where they say, 300-350 grams might have done it after all. But it may be more - I'd use more. The plane damage is deceptive - I think the bomb damage was just a small hole, maybe 10 feet across, and decompression/wind turbulence would tear it apart from there.

And all containers are near the skin - two rows only. Here's a cross-section - different model, same concept.

 

[Rolfe]

CL, could you double-check what you've done there? It just seems to me the finding of the court, from Bedford's evidence, was that the mystery bag was originally seen in the container very close to the location of the actual explosion - hence the theory that it had been "moved to some far corner of the container", to explain the fact that it wasn't among the damaged items.

By the way, there's a detailed description of the state of the floor of AVE4041 in the AAIB report. It wasn't missing, it was heavily bent downwards under the explosion so that it hit off the floor of the cargo container and split.

Rolfe.

 

[Buncrana]

The break-in could be yet another of the weird coincidences that surround this disaster, but given that Manly clearly wasn't in the habit of reporting this kind of break-in (sure he noted that sometimes these doors would be used by staff taking shortcuts returning landside when they were guarded by security personel, but were locked at night), and certainly not in the manner of someone using some form of tool in order to breach into secure airside.

The fact that the police, (and probably the crown office) suppressed this damning information for all those years does suggest they themselves feared it may well have some bearing on the bombing, or at the very least highligh the poor security at the airport and thus focusing the investigators around Heathrow.

If you accept the break-in had something to do with the explosion about 18hrs later, it does beg the question, why 103 and not any of the numerous earlier Pan Am flights? Certainly, the attack was primarily aimed at America, (whether you assume it was Libya, PLFP or Iran) and presumably a flight bound for the US as oppose to any other destination on Pan Am's routes. But why not PA107 to Washington which left earlier that afternoon at about 1320? What was particular to 103? Well, there have been many theories in that respect, from the US agents on board to the UN representative being set-up by the South Africans, but these all lack clear and plausible reasoning why you'd choose a whole aircraft if these were you prime targets.

 

[Buncrana]

CL - many thanks for your diagrams which have helped visualize the baggage arrangements and the formation of the container thought to have contained the bomb.

Here's another couple of diagrams which may aid us:

PanAm103_Loading Plan12_12_88

This diagram above also shows damage sustained by the explosion by the container immediately behind the priamry container. ie AVN7511.

Baggage Container Graphic_AAIB

These diagrams and much more are available here -
AAIB Appendix (PDF file)

 

[Rolfe]

Could this be where the drug-running comes in? If Jibril or whever masterminded it was aware of the "controlled deliveries" and that PA103A/PA103 was being used that day, he may have hit on PA103 in the belief that the authorities might be reluctant to investigate certain aspects of that flight. And/or, indeed, that attention might focus on the Frankfurt connection rather than on Heathrow. While in fact the bomb was introduced at Heathrow after all.

I'm very very curious to know the reasoning behind the very early announcements to the press that the bomb didn't go on board at Heathrow (and so Heathrow security was in the clear). This is very very strange. For a start, the bomb obviously did go on board at Heathrow, as Maid of the Seas was loaded from empty there after her pre-flight checks that should have revealed any sabotage that might have happened at an earier stage (which would have been in California anyway). And on top of that, the announcement was made very very early - surely before they could have been certain none of the interline bags in AVE4041 were implicated? I'm even doubtful if the significance of AVE4041 could really have been appreciated by the time they were all saying, no, Heathrow is in the clear!

Rolfe.