Listening to the troops on the ground

Mephisto

Philosopher
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It looks like we're going to listen to the troops on the ground, but only when they tell us what we want to hear. Does anyone feel a draft in here? ;)

Top general: Army 'will break' without more troops

POSTED: 5:17 p.m. EST, December 14, 2006

WASHINGTON (AP) -- As President Bush weighs new strategies for Iraq, the Army's top general warned Thursday that his force "will break" without thousands more active duty troops and greater use of the reserves.

Noting the strain put on the force by operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the global war on terrorism, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker said he wants to grow his half-million-member Army beyond the 30,000 troops already added in recent years.

Though he didn't give an exact number, he said it would take significant time and commitment by the nation, noting some 6,000 to 7,000 soldiers could be added per year. (Watch why one former adviser thinks more troops and new commanders are in order )

Officials also need greater authority to tap into the National Guard and Reserve, long ago set up as a strategic reserve but now needed as an integral part of the nation's deployed forces, Schoomaker told a commission studying possible changes in those two forces.

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves next spring is expected to recommend policy and budget changes for reserve units.

"Over the last five years, the sustained strategic demand ... is placing a strain on the Army's all-volunteer force," Schoomaker told the commission in a Capitol Hill hearing.

"At this pace ... we will break the active component" unless more reserves can be called up to help, Schoomaker said in prepared remarks.

http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/12/14/us.iraq.ap/index.html
___________

Let's see, where can those extra troops come from? The Reserves? No, they're stretched thin . . . The National Guard? Nope, they're taking their turns too. Hmmmmm, where can we get a bunch of young men and women to fight and possibily die in a foreign country, in an unpopular war?
 
It looks like we're going to listen to the troops on the ground, but only when they tell us what we want to hear. Does anyone feel a draft in here? ;)
Hmmmmm, where can we get a bunch of young men and women to fight and possibily die in a foreign country, in an unpopular war?
Canada. Let the Impressment begin.

*ducks as the barrage of empty Molson's bottles fly*

On a related note, I heard on the news a few days ago a Marine who came back this summer. He served in Al Anbar province. His comment about joint US/Iraqi patrols: "The local Iraqis were far more scared of the Iraqi Army/Police than they were of the Marines."

Interesting observation. I wonder if the ISG understands what that means.

DR
 
:) Well, you were smart enough not to insult the Australians - those Foster cans hit like a quart of oil. ;)


Sure, when they're full...but what's the chance of that?:D


In answer to DR's question about whether the ISG understands...same chance as getting hit with a full can of Fosters.
 
Top general: Army 'will break' without more troops

POSTED: 5:17 p.m. EST, December 14, 2006

WASHINGTON (AP) -- As President Bush weighs new strategies for Iraq, the Army's top general warned Thursday that his force "will break" without thousands more active duty troops and greater use of the reserves.


New Strategies for Iraq. I wonder where I heard that one before? Oh yeah, remember the National Strategy for Victory (in Iraq) from the White House dated November 30, 2005?

http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html

My guess is that the link won't survive much longer. So here's a snippet of the strategy to win - which I believe it's safe to say isn't working. So I wonder what will be the new way forward since the "Build Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society" part of the Nov 2005 strategy isn't working?


Our Strategy for Victory is Clear
We will help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq with a constitutional, representative government that respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. To achieve this end, we are pursuing an integrated strategy along three broad tracks, which together incorporate the efforts of the Iraqi government, the Coalition, cooperative countries in the region, the international community, and the United Nations.
The Political Track involves working to forge a broadly supported national compact for democratic governance by helping the Iraqi government:
Isolate enemy elements from those who can be won over to the political process by countering false propaganda and demonstrating to all Iraqis that they have a stake in a democratic Iraq;
Engage those outside the political process and invite in those willing to turn away from violence through ever-expanding avenues of participation; and
Build stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions that can protect the interests of all Iraqis, and facilitate Iraq's full integration into the international community.
The Security Track involves carrying out a campaign to defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency, developing Iraqi security forces, and helping the Iraqi government:
Clear areas of enemy control by remaining on the offensive, killing and capturing enemy fighters and denying them safe-haven;
Hold areas freed from enemy influence by ensuring that they remain under the control of the Iraqi government with an adequate Iraqi security force presence; and
Build Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society.
The Economic Track involves setting the foundation for a sound and self-sustaining economy by helping the Iraqi government:
Restore Iraq's infrastructure to meet increasing demand and the needs of a growing economy;
Reform Iraq's economy, which in the past has been shaped by war, dictatorship, and sanctions, so that it can be self-sustaining in the future; and
Build the capacity of Iraqi institutions to maintain infrastructure, rejoin the international economic community, and improve the general welfare of all Iraqis.
This Strategy is Integrated and its Elements are Mutually Reinforcing
Progress in each of the political, security, and economic tracks reinforces progress in the other tracks.
For instance, as the political process has moved forward, terrorists have become more isolated, leading to more intelligence on security threats from Iraqi citizens, which has led to better security in previously violent areas, a more stable infrastructure, the prospect of economic progress, and expanding political participation.
Victory Will Take Time
Our strategy is working: Much has been accomplished in Iraq, including the removal of Saddam's tyranny, negotiation of an interim constitution, restoration of full sovereignty, holding of free national elections, formation of an elected government, drafting of a permanent constitution, ratification of that constitution, introduction of a sound currency, gradual restoration of neglected infrastructure, the ongoing training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, and the increasing capability of those forces to take on the terrorists and secure their nation.
Yet many challenges remain: Iraq is overcoming decades of a vicious tyranny, where governmental authority stemmed solely from fear, terror, and brutality.
It is not realistic to expect a fully functioning democracy, able to defeat its enemies and peacefully reconcile generational grievances, to be in place less than three years after Saddam was finally removed from power.
Our comprehensive strategy will help Iraqis overcome remaining challenges, but defeating the multi-headed enemy in Iraq -- and ensuring that it cannot threaten Iraq's democratic gains once we leave -- requires persistent effort across many fronts.
Our Victory Strategy Is (and Must Be) Conditions Based
With resolve, victory will be achieved, although not by a date certain.
No war has ever been won on a timetable and neither will this one.
But lack of a timetable does not mean our posture in Iraq (both military and civilian) will remain static over time. As conditions change, our posture will change.
We expect, but cannot guarantee, that our force posture will change over the next year, as the political process advances and Iraqi security forces grow and gain experience.
While our military presence may become less visible, it will remain lethal and decisive, able to confront the enemy wherever it may organize.
Our mission in Iraq is to win the war. Our troops will return home when that mission is complete.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html
 
It looks like we're going to listen to the troops on the ground, but only when they tell us what we want to hear.

Which "troops on the ground" are you refering to? Schoomaker? He's not "on the ground", he's in Washington. And I'd be careful if I were you about placing so much emphasis on what the "troops on the ground" think: reenlistment rates for soldiers who have served in Iraq are higher than those who have not, suggesting to me that they don't feel the same way about this war that you do.
 
Which "troops on the ground" are you refering to? Schoomaker? He's not "on the ground", he's in Washington. And I'd be careful if I were you about placing so much emphasis on what the "troops on the ground" think: reenlistment rates for soldiers who have served in Iraq are higher than those who have not, suggesting to me that they don't feel the same way about this war that you do.

Is that true? Reference?

Assuming it is true, I wonder why? Comrade loyalty? Patriotism?

Interesting.
 
Is that true? Reference?

Hard numbers seem hard to come by (most news stories are quite sparse with any actual figures), at least in quick google searches, but here's a typical news story on the topic, for what it's worth:

http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-07-17-soldiers-re-enlist_x.htm

"Re-enlistment rates the past three years have been at least 6% above the service's goals for the 500,000-member active Army."

Assuming it is true, I wonder why? Comrade loyalty? Patriotism?

I suspect because they think their work is worthwhile.
 
Hard numbers seem hard to come by (most news stories are quite sparse with any actual figures), at least in quick google searches, but here's a typical news story on the topic, for what it's worth:

http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-07-17-soldiers-re-enlist_x.htm

"Re-enlistment rates the past three years have been at least 6% above the service's goals for the 500,000-member active Army."



I suspect because they think their work is worthwhile.

I'll do some digging later (about to head out for awhile). But 6% above the services goals, and re-enlistments are higher for those that have been to Iraq than those that haven't, are two differant statements.

Got my interest though :)
 
Canada. Let the Impressment begin.

*ducks as the barrage of empty Molson's bottles fly*

On a related note, I heard on the news a few days ago a Marine who came back this summer. He served in Al Anbar province. His comment about joint US/Iraqi patrols: "The local Iraqis were far more scared of the Iraqi Army/Police than they were of the Marines."

Interesting observation. I wonder if the ISG understands what that means.

DR

If they are sunni then being scared of the police is understandable. The Iraqi army doesn't appear to have the problem in that area to the same extent but is not ideal.
 
Hard numbers seem hard to come by (most news stories are quite sparse with any actual figures), at least in quick google searches, but here's a typical news story on the topic, for what it's worth:

http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-07-17-soldiers-re-enlist_x.htm

"Re-enlistment rates the past three years have been at least 6% above the service's goals for the 500,000-member active Army."


I suspect because they think their work is worthwhile.

Come on. Anybody that has ever been a soldier - or airman in my case - knows that soldiers primarily fight for their buddies. Not for some so called worthwhile cause. I bet that most of the reasons for the high reinlistment rate is primarily not wanting to desert their buddies that will ultimately be shipped back to Iraq.
 
Hard numbers seem hard to come by (most news stories are quite sparse with any actual figures), at least in quick google searches, but here's a typical news story on the topic, for what it's worth:

http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-07-17-soldiers-re-enlist_x.htm

"Re-enlistment rates the past three years have been at least 6% above the service's goals for the 500,000-member active Army."



I suspect because they think their work is worthwhile.

Did some digging :)

From the various articles I read (try googling "Army Re-enlistment rates" to see the list) I have the impression that there are certainly those that feel they are making a difference, and that want to see the job completed. The fact that the Army is offering larger bonuses for re-enlistments, and that those bonuses are tax free if you re-enlist in Iraq or Afghanistan, I think, plays no small part though. I would have loved to have got my re-enlistment bonuses tax free! And while not mentioned much in the reading I did, I'm sure there is some degree of comrade loyalty involved. It may not be the total driving force, but I think it figured into the decisions of many of those that re-enlisted.

But it is interesting, and I think says a lot for our all volunteer force, that re-enlistment rates are as high as they are!

Damn, we got some good folks out there in our military! Makes me proud!

Now if we can just get some worthy leaders for them :/
 
Damn, we got some good folks out there in our military! Makes me proud!
Me too.

Now if we can just get some worthy leaders for them :/
That would require more voting, patriotic, citizens who don't treat our troops as torturers and/or baby-killing rapists on their return from the war zone. :(
 

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