Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

[UndercoverElephant]

This is a post from another thread which nobody picked up on so I'm posting it here.

What all this boils down to is very simple, and it's not actually about materialism per se. It is about our natural tendency to believe that the objects we percieve are part of a self-existing world that is external to our perceptions of it. However, the previous sentence appears to contain a contradiction.

Q1 for materialists) Does the external world exist independently of our perceptions of it? A: Yes
Q2 for materialists) Can we perceive the external world? A: Yes

If you try to answer yes to both questions then you are saying we can percieve a world which is independent of our perceptions of it. But if it is independent of our perceptions of it how could we possibly have perceptions of it? Anyone got any suggestions?

Or does anyone want to defend the claim that you should answer no to either question i.e.

A1) The external world is not independent of our perceptions of it. (our perceptions "reach out" to it?)
A2) What we perceive isn't the external world (sense-data, perhaps?)

?

The questions aren't problems on their own. The problem comes when you want to answer yes to them both. Physicalists generally want to answer yes to them both.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Earthborn posted (in another thread)

I think the answer to that little conundrum lies in the fact that Q1 asks the wrong question.

The question is wrong? No, I'm sure I asked the question I wanted to ask.

but I would rather ask: "Is the mind independent of the physical world?"

I know you'd rather ask that. But that isn't what I asked, quite deliberately.

The answer is quite obviously 'no'. For one thing the mind is influenced by its perceptions of the physical world.

That question is being discussed elsewhere. This thread is about these questions, not that one.

So is the physical world independent of the mind while the mind is dependent on it?

I didn't mention the word "mind", quite deliberately.

Anyone want to answer the questions I actually asked instead of telling me I should have asked something else?

 

[Upchurch]

Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

This is an awkward phrasing. If something is external to (or outside the range of) our perceptions, it would be impossible for us to perceive it for no other reason than the definition of "external to our perceptions".

What all this boils down to is very simple, and it's not actually about materialism per se. It is about our natural tendency to believe that the objects we percieve are part of a self-existing world that is external to our perceptions of it. However, the previous sentence appears to contain a contradiction.

Q1 for materialists) Does the external world exist independently of our perceptions of it? A: Yes
Q2 for materialists) Can we perceive the external world? A: Yes

You change the question.

The original statement was "a world external to our perceptions". Q1 is "a world independant of our perceptions". These are two different "worlds". We may perceive a world external to ourselves, but by definition, we cannot perceive a world that external to our perceptions.

Which do you mean? An external world, or a world external from our perceptions?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

From previous experience, I would highly recommend that you carefully define perceive before getting too far along in this thread. Do it in the context of every single metaphysic you plan on slinging about, too.

~~ Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

And don't allow external. That already implies dualism (internal/external dichotomies).

 

[Upchurch]

Oh, my. This thread has a lot more history than I want to get into, doesn't it?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You have no idea.

~~ Paul

 

[CFLarsen]

If you try to answer yes to both questions then you are saying we can percieve a world which is independent of our perceptions of it. But if it is independent of our perceptions of it how could we possibly have perceptions of it? Anyone got any suggestions?

Why wouldn't we be able to?

 

[Tricky]

To dreeeeaaaam the impossible dreeeeaaaam....

 

[Upchurch]

If you try to answer yes to both questions then you are saying we can percieve a world which is independent of our perceptions of it. But if it is independent of our perceptions of it how could we possibly have perceptions of it? Anyone got any suggestions?

Well, since I've already got me feet wet...

Your shifting defintions here, too. Just because the existance of an external world is independant from our perception of it does not imply that such an external world is independant from our perception.

In essense, the materialist can say yes to both of your questions because our perception is irrelevent to the "external" world's existance.

(I put "external" in quotes because a strict materialist wouldn't consider there to be a such a distinction. Nor would an immaterialist, I suppose.)

 

[roger]

You are using "independent" in two different (and conflicting) ways, Geoff.

No, the world does not depend on our perceptions.
Yes, we can interact with the world using our perceptions.

And unasked, but yes, that interaction could possibly alter the world we perceive (e.g. bounce a sonar wave off of something, that something will absorb a bit of energy from the sonar, but looking at a sunlit object wouldn't alter anything since you are receiving reflected waves).

I awknowledge the paragraphs 2 and 3 are assertions, but they were written merely to underscore the confusion you are engendering with the unacknowledge dual use of "independent".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

OK,

Looks like I'm going to have to be a bit clearer about what I am asking. Let's start again.

1) We percieve objects (tables, chairs, etc....). We will call these "the objects of perception"

2) There is a world, external to humans (it existed before we evolved, it exists when we aren't looking), which is made of things like tables and chairs. Even with a materialistic definition of "mind", this would still be true, since there are no tables and chairs inside our skulls.

3) Presumably, the tables and chairs we perceive and the tables and chairs in the external world are the same tables and chairs.

Everyone happy with that?

 

[Upchurch]

3) Presumably, the tables and chairs we perceive and the tables and chairs in the external world are the same tables and chairs.

Everyone happy with that?

Nope. The perception of tables and chairs are not the same as the tables and chairs themselves. Indeed our perception of tables and chairs may change (due to lighting or what have you) while, presumably, the tables and chairs themselves do not.

 

[CFLarsen]

OK,

Looks like I'm going to have to be a bit clearer about what I am asking. Let's start again.

1) We percieve objects (tables, chairs, etc....). We will call these "the objects of perception"

2) There is a world, external to humans (it existed before we evolved, it exists when we aren't looking), which is made of things like tables and chairs. Even with a materialistic definition of "mind", this would still be true, since there are no tables and chairs inside our skulls.

3) Presumably, the tables and chairs we perceive and the tables and chairs in the external world are the same tables and chairs.

Everyone happy with that?

What is your question?

 

[roger]

3 seems loaded with language that is ripe for misuse. I would say

3) we are (usually) perceiving the tables and chairs.

"Usually" to account for conditions such as hallucinations.
"same" deleted because it seems to open the doors for a dualistic interpretation.

Geoff, instead of humans and chairs, how about a computer and a voltage? Or a thermometer and temperature? It's your thread, but i'd say all three cases are the same, and it's easier not to get tripped up with dualistic assumptions in the non-human cases.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What is your question?

My question is "Are you happy with that?"

 

[Upchurch]

Oh, and once this last point is cleared up, could you also re-state your OP point in this clarified understanding of terms?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Nope. The perception of tables and chairs are not the same as the tables and chairs themselves.

So there are two lots of tables?
Or there are there external tables and perceptions of tables?

Indeed our perception of tables and chairs may change (due to lighting or what have you) while, presumably, the tables and chairs themselves do not.

Indeed.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

3 seems loaded with language that is ripe for misuse. I would say

3) we are (usually) perceiving the tables and chairs.

"Usually" to account for conditions such as hallucinations.

What are we perciving during hallucinations? Brain states? Nothing? Sense-data?

"same" deleted because it seems to open the doors for a dualistic interpretation.

So sometimes the objects of perception are external objects and sometimes they aren't?

Geoff, instead of humans and chairs, how about a computer and a voltage? Or a thermometer and temperature? It's your thread, but i'd say all three cases are the same, and it's easier not to get tripped up with dualistic assumptions in the non-human cases.

I am particularly interested in the objects of perception.

Geoff

 

[c4ts]

This is a post from another thread which nobody picked up on so I'm posting it here.

What all this boils down to is very simple, and it's not actually about materialism per se. It is about our natural tendency to believe that the objects we percieve are part of a self-existing world that is external to our perceptions of it. However, the previous sentence appears to contain a contradiction.

Q1 for materialists) Does the external world exist independently of our perceptions of it? A: Yes
Q2 for materialists) Can we perceive the external world? A: Yes

If you try to answer yes to both questions then you are saying we can percieve a world which is independent of our perceptions of it. But if it is independent of our perceptions of it how could we possibly have perceptions of it? Anyone got any suggestions?

Or does anyone want to defend the claim that you should answer no to either question i.e.

A1) The external world is not independent of our perceptions of it. (our perceptions "reach out" to it?)
A2) What we perceive isn't the external world (sense-data, perhaps?)

?

The questions aren't problems on their own. The problem comes when you want to answer yes to them both. Physicalists generally want to answer yes to them both.

I do not follow your logic. Elaborate. You assume a lot about perception that you do not explain or ask about.