Fresh appeal applied for in the Lockerbie case

Rolfe

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Rolfe
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It’s official, and I’m allowed to talk about it now. This morning the application for a new appeal against the conviction of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi for the Lockerbie bombing was submitted to the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission at the commission’s Glasgow headquarters. The signatories to the application are 20-odd close relatives of the victims of the Pan Am 103 crash, and six of Megrahi’s close family.

http://lockerbiecase.blogspot.co.uk/2014/06/lockerbie-victims-relatives-join-with.html

There’s a long way to go, though. First the SCCRC have to establish that it’s even appropriate for them to look at the material, considering the time that has elapsed and that a previous appeal was abandoned by the appellant. Then they have to decide whether the material submitted to them (and anything else they may find out for themselves) shows a reasonable probability that there might have been a miscarriage of justice. If it gets that far the appeal judges themselves are allowed to disagree with the SCCRC about the appropriateness of the referral, and throw it straight out without hearing the case. Only if they accept that the referral was appropriate does it actually get into court.

After that, the court hearing itself should be the easy bit!

If it doesn’t get to court because the Scottish authorities decide they don’t want to rock the boat, this has interesting ramifications. First, it goes against the public stance of the Scottish government, who have said that they would welcome a new appeal as the only way to resolve this long-standing and contentious issue. And second, it would open the way for an appeal outside Scotland under European human rights legislation.

Main grounds of appeal are fourfold.

  1. That Megrahi was not the man who bought the clothes packed in the bomb suitcase. (This was the central plank of the appeal that was abandoned.)
  2. That the bomb suitcase was not introduced into the baggage system at Malta airport (where Megrahi was that morning) but at Heathrow airport, London (where he most definitely wasn’t).
  3. That the fragment of printed circuit board (PT/35b) alleged to have come from one of a small batch of electronic timer units made especially for the Libyan military was not from a PCB made by the manufacturer of the Libyan timers.
  4. That many pieces of evidence which could have been very helpful to the accused were not disclosed to the defence. This includes the “secret intelligence document” David Miliband slapped a Public Interest Immunity certificate on in 2008, and documents concerning the metallurgical analysis of the PCB fragment which would have allowed the defence experts to realise it wasn’t from one of the Libyan instruments at the time of the original trial.
This appeal goes further than the previous one, in that it includes clear grounds which demonstrate Megrahi to be factually innocent, rather than merely being concerned with demonstrating that the case against him was implausible and laden with reasonable doubt. If it is proved that the bomb was in a suitcase seen at Heathrow airport by three different people well before the connecting flight it supposedly travelled on from Malta landed, this damns the original police inquiry as having been catastrophically off the rails from the very earliest weeks of the investigation.

It also damns the entire international brouhaha that has happened since, from the pressure on Libya to admit guilt, through the farcical trial at Camp Zeist, the conviction of an innocent man, the extortion of billions of dollars in compensation from Libya, the shenanigans surrounding the deal in the desert and the compassionate release, to the use of Lockerbie as part of the justification for intervening in the Libyan civil war to overthrow Gaddafi.

There are some words to describe this debacle, but the auto-censor would get the lot.

Rolfe.
 
 
rjh01 said:
I just wonder what happens if the appeal is successful? Who actually did the bombing?
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I think we probably know the answer to that. The group who were the main suspects from 1988 to 1990. The problem was that the police investigation was looking in the wrong place, at the wrong modus operandi. If you're looking for the right people in the wrong place, you aren't going to find them.

The investigation more or less ran into the sand in 1990, but rather than re-group and examine whether they should be looking at a different modus operandi, they went on digging in the same place but looking for different suspects. It all gets a bit murky about that point to be honest, and I don't think we'll find out exactly what went on until the conviction is quashed.

However, it's now clear that Heathrow airport was the scene of the crime, and that Heathrow airport was never properly investigated in that context during the original inquiry. Given the strength of the circumstantial evidence pointing to the original suspects, Occam's Razor suggests that an investigation into Heathrow would find the elusive evidence of that gang being active there on the day of the disaster.

It's been a long time, and more time will pass before the Scottish authorities will give up on their Libya fantasy. It may be too late to bring the real perpetrators to justice. On the other hand there have been cases in the past where the wrong person was convicted, subsequently freed, and the real culprit then caught and convicted many years later. The murder of Lesley Moleseed is an obvious example, where there was a 30-year gap. So I don't entirely rule it out.

Rolfe.
 
Sounds like a local case. David Eastman was convicted of killing a top cop (Colin Winchester) about 19 years ago. Now the forensic evidence used to convict him has been shown to be seriously faulty. The cops became convinced of his guilt early on in the investigation and did not investigate all possibilities. And David sacked several lawyers so he did not have the best possible defence. Now the courts have to decide on what to do.

Here is a link.
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/la...riage-of-justice/story-fni0ffnk-1226937952520

Another famous case in Australia is that Linda Chamberlain got convicted of murdering her baby. Again faulty forensics was used to convict her. Turns out it was a dingo that killed the baby, who has never been found.
Link http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Azaria_Chamberlain


My point is that for one reason or another innocent people get convicted of very serious crimes partly because of faulty (even by the standards of the day) detective work. This sort of thing should never happen but it does. Millions of dollars wasted.
 
There are numerous case in which the detective set on a person , because of some behavior they think the perp did it, and they never set for an alternative, heck some prosecutor do the same, still accusing exonerated convict of having raped/murdered despite the DNA evidence absolving the person. There are enough news article about exonerated persons where the reaction of the prosecutor and cops is dismay and disagreement.
 
Oddly enough, though, that's not what happened here. The cops were certain they knew who had done it at a very early stage, and they were almost certainly right.

The belief that Megrahi had done it was a late development, over two years after the disaster.

Rolfe.
 
I don't envy the original police investigators, having to process this case given the enormous almost unimaginable political pressure for a quick resolution.

It looks like Rolfe has done some very good work here. Congratulations!
 
A group of Palestinian terrorists called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command. They had the expertise in making bombs to bring down airliners in flight - they'd done it before. Their leader was one Ahmed Jibril. The organisation worked in cells and it was a cell in Neuss, near Dusseldorf, that was implicated in this. Key members were Hakez Dalkamoni, Marwan Khreesat (the bomb maker) and a rather shadowy semi-detached figure known as Abu Elias.

It appears that the near-dormant cell was revived in October 1988, when several members congregated in Neuss and Khreesat started buying interesting bits of electronics. The German police were on to them though, and they were apprehended with a booby-trapped radio in the back of their car - about 17 members were arrested altogether. However, all but two were released almost immediately and the others not long afterwards. It's quite a long story and is told very well in a book called The Fall of Pan Am 103 by Emerson and Duffy, written at the time when these guys were still the prime and only suspects.

The theory, which has a fair bit of intelligence evidence to support it, is that this group was re-formed as a result of Jibril accepting a commission from the Ayatollah Khomeini to bring down one or more (in some accounts five) US airliners in revenge for the shooting down of IR655 in July 1988 by the USS Vincennes. So they weren't in this case working for "the cause" but merely as mercenaries. £10 million is said to have been the price, and bank transfer records are said to support this.

There is a huge amount of information about all this and I'm really just skimming here. I don't have any smoking gun to prove it was that group, but the probability is extremely high. If it wasn't them, we have to postulate two unconnected groups separately working to bring down a US airliner, at the same time, and we only know about the group that wasn't successful.

Rolfe.
 
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newyorkguy said:
I don't envy the original police investigators, having to process this case given the enormous almost unimaginable political pressure for a quick resolution.

It looks like Rolfe has done some very good work here. Congratulations!
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Thanks for the kind words. You might also credit a number of other JREF members with special mention to Caustic Logic for worrying away at it for a long time and LittleSwan for appearing out of the blue and putting the last and most important piece in place.

I take your point about the original investigation, but from where I'm sitting it wasn't like that. They had all the evidence they needed to show that the bomb had originated at Heathrow, in January 1989. A month after the crash. However, it appears they simply blanked it and went running off to Frankfurt and then Malta instead. Why did they do that? It was an easy solve, and they totally missed it. Indeed, there are places where they seem to be deliberately turning away.

I really want to know what was going on in these guy's heads. A clue that was positively a gift from heaven was handed to them on 3rd and 9th January (a baggage handler actually saw the bomb suitcase in situ and was able to describe it), and they simply didn't follow it up. Instead they insisted the bomb was on the connecting flight that didn't arrive for another hour after the time the baggage handler saw the suitcase.

Why? It looks awfully like political pressure from somewhere not to have Heathrow found to be the scene of the crime. A possible speedy solve was sacrificed to that objective.

Rolfe.
 
....and LittleSwan for appearing out of the blue and putting the last and most important piece in place.
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Thank you... but the only thing I did was looking at some stupid photographs. You and CausticLogic deserve most of the credits.
 
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I think there was some high-level brainwave synchronisation going on at the very end. I honestly didn't realise the suitcase jigsaw was there and was soluble. You did. You nagged me to get copies of those photos. You spotted that the Schauble case was important.

You also realised what the seven orphan fragments were. I kept arguing with you and not entirely following what you were saying, but you were absolutely right.

On the other hand, I take the credit for spotting the Carlsson case and PK/139. I'm coming round to the idea that PK/139 may be the most important piece of evidence found as regards solving the positioning question. And then Buncrana (whom I should also have mentioned above, what was I thinking of) started it by pointing out that the damage to the McKee case was illustrated in the SCCRC report.

I knew before all that that the bomb suitcase had to have been the one Bedford saw, as a logical necessity. Without the suitcase jigsaw, I don't think anyone would have followed the argument. The pictures are compelling.

How are you getting on with the Indian Head material?

Rolfe.
 
Solving puzzles is my daily job.

How are you getting on with the Indian Head material?
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Yes, I promised you something...

Well, some facts about the Indian Head tests.

1. The results are poorly documented.
2. There is no sign at all of an scientific approach. Every test was carried out with different amounts of Semtex at different positions. It's very difficult if not impossible to figure out what those positions were.
3. They screwed up test #4, the only test in which the bomb suitcase was laying on the floor.
4. According to mr. Bell the results of test #5 came closest to replicating the actual damage, but in test#5 there is no fragmentation of the horizontal strut. So what is meant by "closest"? Does it mean "very close" or "still not so close".
5. Test #7 is interesting in that they simulated a row of suitcases in the back of the container. Comparing the results of this test with the actual damage to the suitcases and container floor shows what the position of the bomb was, t.i. not in the position of test #7.
 
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Solving puzzles is my daily job too! Just puzzles made of flesh and bone (or molecules, depending on which hat I'm wearing), rather than inanimate objects. I think that's why we've both ended up here.

There have been times in the past year I have been absolutely dying to discuss aspects of this case with you, but I know you've been so busy and there are things that shouldn't be discussed on an open forum anyway. If you're less busy at the moment, you could send me an email.

Your assessment of the tests is very much what I had concluded for myself, although I was working from second-hand reports, not having the time to analyse these results in detail. On first principles, surely it's obvious you can tell nothing for certain if every test is different, and especially if you change more than one variable every time.

Did they only account for the row at the back in one test? To me that is such a key point, and in the end the thing that really convinced me there could not possibly have been some mysterious undocumented vanishing suitcase under the bomb suitcase. Do tell me more about that one!

Feraday's apparent favouring of his "first postulated position" with the bomb suitcase handle-up in the overhang is also weird. It's not just the position where the handle was found that rules that out (he didn't seem to realise that until Peter Fraser told him at the FAI, or to take it on board when he was told), it's the pattern of damage to the airframe itself. I don't know how Indian Head covered that aspect.

I don't suppose anyone even thought of the position where the left-hand side of the bomb suitcase was elevated into the bottom of the angle of the overhang section? The position it was actually in? That does have the interesting attribute of not having the bomb suitcase "in contact with the floor of the container" as Feraday claimed it hadn't been, at least in the sense he probably meant, which was flat against it.

Of course none of that was presented in court. The fact that the tests had been done was mentioned in passing, as if to imply that they weren't actually pulling all this stuff out of their backsides, but no detail was given even of what the tests had been, never mind the results or what could reasonably be concluded from them.

I'm really quite interested in the way so many of the forensics guys were prepared to say they were sure there was another suitcase under the bomb suitcase, 100% absolutely, and that includes two or three of the AAIB guys as well as RARDE personnel. What were AAIB inspectors doing making that judgement anyway - that wasn't their area. It all sounds suspiciously co-ordinated. Feraday even asked for the transcript of the Fatal Accident Inquiry to be changed to say this wasn't a probability, he was "adamant" about it.

The degree of incompetence blows my mind every time I think about it.

Rolfe.
 
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Did they only account for the row at the back in one test? To me that is such a key point, and in the end the thing that really convinced me there could not possibly have been some mysterious undocumented vanishing suitcase under the bomb suitcase. Do tell me more about that one!
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Just look at the results of test #7. All you need is common sense. They used 570 gram Semtex H, suitcase on the second layer, 5 suitcases on the backrow (numbered 1,2,3,4and 5), IED facing the back row of suitcases, IED just above the horizontal strut overhanging the suitcase on the floor of the container. They didn't use a real 747 cargo floor. The container was resting on a sheet of plywood

Results:
1)Major damage to suitcase #1 (the "Carlson" case), although not so severe as the damage to the real Carlson case, some damage to suitcase #2 (the "McKee" case), although much higher than the damage to the real McKee case, virtual no damage to suitcases #3, 4 and 5).
2)No fragmentation of the horizontal strut, despite a 570 gram charge.

Conclusion: the lockerbie bomb was not in the same position.
 
Got it. (I'm afraid I sent you the files on these tests and left you to it. I was already aware of the conclusions, and just went with the summing-up.)

So, they were aware that these upright suitcases on the back row existed. I never even knew that for sure before. And they took them into account in a single test. Interesting.

They put five cases along the back. That's how many we think there were, too. That is seven cases in all, in the Heathrow-loaded part. But only six legitimate cases were routed into that container at Heathrow. So already there is tacit acknowledgement of a seventh undocumented case being present in that group. (I don't think you can fill the back row with only four cases.)

They recorded the damage to cases 1 and 2. That's only useful if you have the actual cases in the 1 and 2 positions to compare it to. Which they had. However, did they know they had them? The information was readily available, but I have seen no evidence they were aware of this.

Case 1 had to be Carlsson's, inevitably, because of his arrival time. Case 2 had to be one of McKee's or Gannon's, again because of the arrival time. Since the Gannon case and the McKee Tourister were only lightly damaged, it had to be the McKee Samsonite. This is not rocket surgery.

I see no evidence they were aware of this, or ever compared the results of test 7 to the actual cases in these positions.

Not only that, Feraday in his report continually referred to the handle-up-in-the-overhang position as his favoured position for the bomb suitcase. That doesn't seem to be the game they were playing at that stage though. Weird, because Feraday's report post-dates these tests.

In October 1990 Peter Fraser pointed out to Feraday that the recovery of the bomb suitcase lock inside "a case that was in contact with the floor of the container" disproved his handle-up theory. (Actually, by definition that would have to be the case in position 3.) Feraday played dumb and said he "was not party to" the arrangement of the cases in the container. Which is a bit of a facer in itself. I mean, why not? He said that would of course put a different complexion on the matter. But then there's no sign of him ever looking into that, and the final (1991) version of his report is unchanged as regards the wording favouring the handle-up position.

Constantly, I get the impression of a serious lack of analytical skills in the team tasked with looking into this. I can't believe anyone could be so stupid, but at the same time the whole thing has an absence of guile that suggests these people would have had trouble tying their own shoelaces, never mind figuring out where the bomb suitcase was located.

Rolfe.
 
Ah, you've been all hiding in here!

First, this is excellent news of the application for a fresh appeal. The inclusion, at no small risk to themselves given the ongoing conflict in Libya, of the Megrahi family is a huge boost to any prospect this applications success.

I'd very much hope the SCCRC can also arrive at a decision in a relatively short timeframe. The bulk of the spade work has been done, and although there is a number of new matters to consider, really no more than 12 months should be ample. I think the really tricky bit comes even if the application is supported by the SCCRC. Then, despite the body tasked with the very institutional function to oversee potential MOJ's occurring, those faced with perhaps undermining fellow judges, can simply deny the case heard, in the interests of "finality". Politician-speak if ever there was.

Still, with the continuation of PE1370, that no small matter is still lurking with intent.

As it so happens I came across this gem of a photo of test #7:

http://archives.syr.edu/panam/images/ead/marquise_12-1480.jpg


A number of very interesting point to note here I think. The small bags stuffed in an unusual place, assisting the IED bag's position, the rotation of the suitcase, and the Hardshell on the bottom layer. Not something like miss Coyle's.

More photos here: http://archives.syr.edu/panam/other_collections/pa103_o_marquise.htm
 
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