At least that's what it calls itself.
It's self-explanatory and interesting. A foreseeable dichotomy, I think.
Anyway, I am unable to link to it as we have it over here only on the Intranet. I am posting it in its entirety but will remove it if Hal or another mod feels I should. My only modification to the document was to remove the initial graphic logo as I suspected it would muck up in the posting, and removal of info from the one table because the table won't post, either, so now it's just info lined up as if it were in a table but it's not, so there. Oh, yes, I also put in some spacing to make it easier to read, but probably not consistently. Here it is:
It's self-explanatory and interesting. A foreseeable dichotomy, I think.
Anyway, I am unable to link to it as we have it over here only on the Intranet. I am posting it in its entirety but will remove it if Hal or another mod feels I should. My only modification to the document was to remove the initial graphic logo as I suspected it would muck up in the posting, and removal of info from the one table because the table won't post, either, so now it's just info lined up as if it were in a table but it's not, so there. Oh, yes, I also put in some spacing to make it easier to read, but probably not consistently. Here it is:
First National Survey of Iraq – How the Study was Done
The Department of Sociology at Oxford University and Oxford Research International co-operated in the completion of this part of the study. The University of Baghdad facilitated a research licence, while the University of Dohuk became survey HQ. Staff, graduates and students from both Universities implemented this project. All stages of the research were managed and supervised by Oxford Research International staff. The survey completed 3,244 interviews in all parts of Iraq. This is the first truly representative national study in the recent history of the country.
Sampling
Sampling was based on the 2001 Statistical Abstract of Iraq and the 1997 census. Where available UN/WFP data from January 2003 was used. The theoretical goal was to ensure that every resident of Iraq 15+ had an equal chance of being selected for interview, irrespective of where they lived. This way, true representativity was ensured. Practically, the survey used multi stage random probability sampling to select sampling areas and respondents. Each stage targeted administrative sub units in descending order of size. Sub-units were selected, and interviews were allocated proportionate to population size (PPS).
Administrative Unit N=
Governorates (Muhafda) 12 of 18
Districts (Qadha) 35 of 67 in selected Governorates
Sub-Districts (Nahia) 47 of 93 in selected Districts
Settlements (Mahallah) 70 in urban and rural areas
Sampling points 129
Multiple starting points were randomly selected at each sampling point. Households were targeted by random route/random interval. Respondents within households were selected using the Kish method.
Training
Fieldworkers were trained for 60 hours and instructed in theory and practice of social research. They participated in mock sessions to practice interviewing techniques, and underwent thorough ‘on the job’ training in the first days of fieldwork
Fieldworkers
A total of 46 fieldworkers were employed to complete this project: 4 Team Leaders, 7 Supervisors, and 35 Interviewers
Quality control
The project operated a three call back system and never replaced unavailable respondents within the same household. More than 20% of all completed interviews were validated with supervisor back checks
Data processing
Data entry was carried out using a double-entry procedure. In addition, an SPSS syntax checked for consistency errors
Dangers in the field
Researchers and fieldworkers faced significant risks while completing this project. Interviewing in Baghdad was frequently suspended due to changes in the security situation. Two fieldworkers were arrested in Erbil and Basra. Interviewers temporarily left Falluja after an explosion. Fieldworkers were repeatedly questioned and sometimes attacked by suspicious respondents, police and security forces
First National Survey of Iraq – Selected Initial Findings
This outline aims to be timely and therefore only contains selected initial findings, mainly based on simple statistics such as percentages. Some of these findings may not stand the test of secondary statistical analysis, which will be computed in the weeks and months to come
1 - Happiness, Living Standards and Optimism [1]
Feeling content (Q2)
People in Iraq are not particularly unhappy with their lives (average score 5.7 on a scale of 1 10). Historically, life satisfaction in 71 countries around the world [2] stood at an average mean score of 6.8, with some countries scoring as low as 3.7 (Moldova) and 4.0 (Ukraine). Neighbouring Turkey scored 6.3, South Africa and South Korea 6.0
Income (Q80)
Monthly net household income averages US$124. Less than 2% have incomes above US$500. 22% have to make do with US$50 per month or less
People judging their standard of living (Q7a)
Three quarters of respondents think their standard of living is either average (64%) or slightly above average (11). 7% see themselves ‘a lot below average’
Economic optimism (Q7b)
Overall, people expect their standard of living to rise over the next 12 months with ‘a bit above average’ answers increasing more than threefold
2 - Life Areas and Sense of Control
What people say is important in their lives (Q1)
Family (98%), religion (94) and work (83) lead the field of ‘very important’ life areas. Leisure time is not of great importance at this stage; politics, to most [3] is ‘not at all important’ (both genders: 36; men: 29; women: 43)
People feeling in control of their lives (Q10)
In spite of everything, most people feel in control of their lives (average score 6.6 on a scale of 1-10). 19% say they have ‘complete control’. Only 7% report ‘no control at all’
3 - Trust in Others
Trusting other people (Q9 and Q21)
Social trust in the country is eroded: nearly 90% of respondents say ‘you have to be very careful in dealing with [other] people’ (Q9). Other than their immediate families, on aggregate scores people feel close to religious groups (62% [4]), their friends (27), and their relatives (28)
4 - Faith in Institutions
Confidence in institutions (Q18)
In contrast to all other institutions, Iraq’s religious leaders command the trust of the people (70% confidence [5])
People have no confidence in US/UK forces (79%) and the Coalition Provisional Authority – CPA (73). 8% say they have a ‘great deal’ of faith in US/UK troops. They also mistrust Iraqi political parties (78). While still largely mistrusted, the UN scores relatively best among non Iraqi institutions (35% confidence)
Split trust is handed to the New Iraqi Army, ministries in Baghdad, the Governing Council, the Iraqi Media Network TV, and the police. Local leaders (Mukhtars) receive a 54% vote of confidence
5 – In People’s Own Words [6]: Best and Worst Thing in Past and Future
The road travelled - Saddam, the War and US/UK troops today (Q3 and Q4)
When asked to report in their own words the best and worst experience of the past 12 months, Iraqis overwhelmingly agree on two answers, dwarfing all other responses: the ‘best thing’ people say was the ‘demise of Saddam’s regime’ (42% [7]); the ‘worst thing’, ‘the war, bombings and defeat’ (35)
Interestingly, there appears no obvious link between best and worst thing. The very troops which liberated Iraqis from Saddam are the most mistrusted institution in Iraq today [8] (Q18)
In the past 12 months, 14% bemoan the loss of a loved one, 8% the loss of security, 5% the experience of Saddam’s regime and less than 1% its collapse
The road ahead – the next 12 months (Q5 and Q6)
Again on a free response, Iraqis most agree (40% [9]) that peace and stability is the key to their future. Other ‘best things which could happen in the next 12 months’ include ‘a better life’ (17), an independent and/or democratic Iraqi government (7), an Islamic government (less than 1). On an anecdotal note, one person among 3,244 respondents says ‘dying for Islam’ would be ‘best’
For the next 12 months, people overwhelmingly worry about their security and the spectre of drifting into chaos (36%) or civil war [10] (15). Another 15% say that ‘occupation forces not leaving Iraq’ is the worst thing which could happen, while less than 1% worry about occupation forces actually leaving
6 - First Priorities
Priorities for Iraq’s way ahead (Q17a/b)
Unsurprisingly, the number one priority for Iraqis is regaining public security (67%). This overwhelming response miniaturises any other first priority choices: rebuilding the infrastructure is at 9%; 4% say their first priority now is increasing oil production
Of ‘no priority at all’ is ‘dealing with the members of the previous government’ scoring 91%
7 - The Responsibilities of Government
The role of government (Q14)
Iraqis say that a broad range of social functions including fighting crime (98%), creating jobs (96), providing housing (93) are the job of government, not of individuals and families
Taking care of the aged and childcare is split (53% say: government)
Religion and moral beliefs: not the job of government (Q14)
‘Ideals and morality’ (71) and, importantly, ‘religious guidance’ (70), are considered the responsibility of individuals and families and not government. This challenges the assumption that Iraqis want a religious regime
8 - Iraqis and the World of Politics
Interest in politics (Q19 and Q20)
A majority of Iraqis are not interested in politics (60%), reflecting life area findings (Q1)
The throes of transition have not greatly politicised Iraqis: while 24% say their political interest has increased over the past 12 months, 13% say it has actually decreased (net increase 11%). For the majority (63), it has stayed the same
Politics, if anything, a male domain (Q19)
70% of women are not interested in politics, 50% of men are
‘Talking politics’, voting and political violence (Q15)
A mere 39% of Iraqis have talked about politics with other people. 43% would ‘never’ do so
A great majority (80%) reject violence as an acceptable form of political action
Well over a quarter (27%) are sure they would never vote. 40% are undecided
9% admit to [ever] having joined a political party or action group. 77% would never consider doing this
7% have demonstrated. 69% would never do so
9 - Political Choices
Inclusion not exclusion (Q12)
Overwhelmingly, Iraqis want their government not to exclude people but to represent all the main groups in society (86%). A mere 5% say inclusive government is not important at all
The political blend (Q11a)
When asked to agree or disagree with a range of political systems and actors that Iraq needs now, people overwhelmingly chose an Iraqi democracy (90%). A mere 3% ‘strongly disagree’ with democracy now
Many people agree on more than one option, making none of the political actors mutually exclusive [11]. Therefore, people produce a diffuse blend of political actors including ‘a strong Iraqi leader’ (71%), ‘a government made up mainly of experts and managers’ (70), and religious leaders (60).
No role in Iraqi politics is granted to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by Paul Bremer (64% disagree), and people are also sure that Iraqi military leaders have no political future (74)
People are virtually split about the prospect of a UN transition government with a small majority (54%) disagreeing with the idea. Whatever the individual choices, Iraqis appear to want to be ruled by Iraqis
The hard choice (Q11b)
Forced to choose only one form of government in 12 months time, respondents choose democracy (35%) over a strong Iraqi leader (29)
A ‘government made up mainly of religious leaders’ is chosen by 12%, the current Iraqi Governing Council by 8%
The longer term (Q11b/c)
In the 5 year term provisional government options decrease, while support for an Iraqi democracy grows (by 8% to 43%). Other choices including strong and religious leaders remain similar
Ideas about Democracy (Q13)
95% of Iraqis do not think that democracy is a Western construct ‘which will not work in Iraq’
People also reject suggestions that democracies are bad at running the economy (83%), are ‘indecisive’ (75) or cannot maintain order (74). In fact, people agreed that democracy ‘may have its problems but is better than any other form of government’ (84)
Party system (Q16)
With 71% of respondents declining to mention any party they would vote for, and those who did, mentioning 38 different political parties, Iraqi voters mirror an embryonic as well as fragmented party system. While people affirm that an Iraqi democracy is the right system, most cannot identify specific political actors
The relatively few people (29%) who do make party choices, predominantly support a myriad of either Islamic or Kurdish political parties
