a_unique_person
Director of Hatcheries and Conditioning
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/04/11/1081621835663.html?from=top5
I think that saying goes "War is diplomacy by other means". Just having superior firepower is not enough to resolve a conflict.
And another view on American blunders in strategy
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/04/07/1081326788920.html
I have heard that "sand-ni%%ers" is a common expression.
Finally, now that the US is in, who is going to help it out?
Who will rescue the US?
April 12, 2004
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/04/11/1081621832400.html
I was told off for metioning the poor language skills of the US in the conflict right at the start. Looks like I was right after all.
Senior British commanders have condemned American military tactics in Iraq as heavy-handed and disproportionate.
One senior officer said that America's aggressive methods were causing friction among allied commanders and that there was a growing sense of "unease and frustration" among the British high command.
The officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, said part of the problem was that American troops viewed Iraqis as untermenschen - the Nazi expression for "sub-humans".
Speaking from his base in southern Iraq, the officer said: "My view and the view of the British chain of command is that the Americans' use of violence is not proportionate and is over-responsive to the threat they are facing. They don't see the Iraqi people the way we see them. They view them as untermenschen. They are not concerned about the Iraqi loss of life in the way the British are."
I think that saying goes "War is diplomacy by other means". Just having superior firepower is not enough to resolve a conflict.
And another view on American blunders in strategy
Trail of blood leads back to American blunder: military experts
The seeds of the growing resistance were sown when the US decided to disband the Iraqi army in direct opposition to British policy, according to senior military and intelligence sources.
Just before the war, Britain's top military officer at the time, Admiral Sir Michael (now Lord) Boyce, directed his commanders to negotiate with senior Iraqi officers. The idea was for officers in the Iraqi army and Republican Guard to maintain order under British supervision.
British sources described the move to disband the Iraqi army as a huge error. The decision was taken by US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, under pressure from right-wing elements in the Bush Administration, they say.
It is clear that British policymakers are still seething at the American decision. The British plan was based on intelligence reports, that many Iraqi commanders would switch sides as soon as British and US troops entered the country. Though the Iraqi army crumbled and fled before the invading troops, it was not too late, British sources insist, for the Iraqi units to regroup and help maintain order. But any chance of success that Lord Boyce's directive might have had was shattered by Washington's decision shortly after the war to disband the Iraqi army.
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/04/07/1081326788920.html
I have heard that "sand-ni%%ers" is a common expression.
Finally, now that the US is in, who is going to help it out?
Who will rescue the US?
April 12, 2004
America is slowly learning that it is Iraqis who will decide their own future, says Martin Woollacott.
Since the end of the Second World War, a cycle of military victory and defeat has been evident in American politics. It has taken the country from the apex of its military strength in 1945 to near disaster and then qualified victory in Korea, and then to failure in Vietnam, victory in the Gulf War, and now to Iraq. In each phase, but particularly after Vietnam, the impact of defeat has been to set in train a rebuilding of American military strength and, eventually, its confident and sometimes over-confident reassertion in a new situation.
The formative years of the men who have shaped the foreign policy of George Bush's Administration were influenced by the humiliation of defeat in Vietnam, and by the idea that if only the country's military power had been properly exerted, without condition or obstacle, Vietnam could have been won.
Iraq has become a test case for this concept of untrammelled military power, and it is proving a difficult one. With the excitement of the armoured race to Baghdad now a distant memory, the Bush Administration finds itself face to face, perhaps even more than its predecessors in Vietnam, with what could be called the essential meagreness of the military instrument. It can be a key that opens the door for other kinds of action, but it cannot substitute for them. Playwright George Bernard Shaw observed that any political arrangement that depends on soldiers is not likely to continue long.
The truth in Iraq has, from the start, been that the American "occupation", like most occupations, has never meant any kind of close military control of Iraqi society. Even if close control was desirable, American and other coalition troops are not present in sufficient numbers - nor do they have the language and other skills that would enable them to exercise it.
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/04/11/1081621832400.html
I was told off for metioning the poor language skills of the US in the conflict right at the start. Looks like I was right after all.