If a politician is prohibited from securing another term in office, then he has a powerful incentive to acquire as much bribery dollars as possible during his current term. Thus his greed makes him more vulnerable to special interests.
In a system where politicians have the power to do contrary to what they promised to voters under elections, bribery is an obvious temptation. The system is rotten no matter how you look at it.If a politician is prohibited from securing another term in office, then he has a powerful incentive to acquire as much bribery dollars as possible during his current term. Thus his greed makes him more vulnerable to special interests.
In a system where politicians have the power to do contrary to what they promised to voters under elections, bribery is an obvious temptation. The system is rotten no matter how you look at it.
Indeed, democracy is the worst way to govern a country. Except for all the other ways..
Paraphrasing Churchill.
In a system where politicians have the power to do contrary to what they promised to voters under elections, bribery is an obvious temptation. The system is rotten no matter how you look at it.
However, that institutionalized/legal bribery is useless to a term-limited politician who cannot run for another term. The only bribes he can benefit from are those which can get him jailed. If he is really greedy he will still take them, but not all politicians are. (Actually I would say most politicians are greedy for power, not money.) So term limits make a politician less vulenrable to special interests, not more.Bribery is so fully institutionalized that you can publish in newspapers stories of election candidates receivingbribesdonations from billionaires, and neither of these is charged for what they are participating in.
I've heard an argument that term limits would make people more vulnerable to special interest groups. I personally think this is nonsensical, but what do others think?
However, that institutionalized/legal bribery is useless to a term-limited politician who cannot run for another term. The only bribes he can benefit from are those which can get him jailed. If he is really greedy he will still take them, but not all politicians are. (Actually I would say most politicians are greedy for power, not money.) So term limits make a politician less vulenrable to special interests, not more.
In almost every profession, we understand that expertise is developed over time. So why do we believe that anyone can walk off the street and craft legislation that will create effective public policy?
Expertise at what though? And is that really the goal? I always thought the goal in the american system was to limit the power of government as much as possible while getting the basic jobs done. Experienced congressweasles do the opposite. They dont get anything important done, yet continue to limit our freedoms
In almost every profession, we understand that expertise is developed over time. So why do we believe that anyone can walk off the street and craft legislation that will create effective public policy?
One of the expertises that develops is milking the system. And the primary function starts to become keeping the gravy train rolling.
Expertise in dealing with law does not need to come from being in office for a long time, indeed, for a lawmaker, being open to consult people with expertise is probably a much more important skill.
Interestingly, the term limits on the president are largely accepted across the political spectrum as a good idea ... why should other elected positions be different?
If a politician is prohibited from securing another term in office, then he has a powerful incentive to acquire as much bribery dollars as possible during his current term. Thus his greed makes him more vulnerable to special interests.
On the other hand, with term limits, offices change hands more often, meaning that more people need to be bought, meaning that bribery becomes more expensive.
| I'm one of those who abhors term-limits, including Presidential. A politician's term should be limited by the voters, if he deserves to be voted out of office. When legislated term limits come in, my right to vote for the representative of my choice goes out the window. Something else that this country mandates that I think is unconstitutional. And it really burns me. |
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Legislative Branch
Changes in the rules of the House and Senate have been adopted in 2007 regarding negotiations for future private employment by Members and certain staff. In the Senate, the general rule is that Senators may not begin private employment negotiations, or have arrangements for subsequent private employment, until their successors have been elected.36 In the House, the general rule is that Members may not begin private employment negotiations, or have arrangements for subsequent private employment, while still serving in the House.37<snip>
Legislative Branch—Representational Activities
The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 added post-employment restrictions for Members and certain senior congressional staffers, effective January 1, 1991, and these have been amended by the lobbying and ethics reform legislation, titled the “Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007.”42 Under the criminal provisions of this statutory law, individuals who were Members of the House are prohibited from “lobbying” or making advocacy communications on behalf of any other person to current Members of either House of Congress, or to any legislative branch employee, for one year after the individual leaves Congress. Members of the Senate are prohibited from similar post-employment advocacy, but for a period of two years after leaving the Senate.<snip>
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36 Senate Rule XXXVII, para. 12(a).
37 House Rule XXVII, cl. 1 (P.L. 110-81, Sections 301 and 532), as amended by H.Res. 5, 111th Congress.
38 Senate Rule XXXVII, para. 12(b). “Lobbying activities” referred to are those defined by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, and thus would include behind-the-scenes advice and assistance to support “lobbying contacts.” See 2 U.S.C. § 1602(7).
39 House Rule XXVII, cl. 4.
40 Senate Rule XXXVII, para. 12(a); House Rule XXVII, cl. 4.
41 Senate Rule XXXVII, para. 12(c); House Rule XXVII, cl. 2.
42 P.L. 110-81, September 14, 2007.
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