A proof that p-zombies are logically incoherent.

[Interesting Ian]

A proof by PixyMisa that is, not by myself.

Just to remind or inform anyone who doesn't know. A p-zombie is an apparent person who acts and looks in every way like a normal human being, but who is in fact wholly lacking any consciousness whatsoever.

The proof here is not simply that they do not in fact exist, but that the very concept of a p-zombie is logically incoherent. That is to say that if "someone" acts exactly as if they are conscious, then by definition they are conscious.

Why is this question important? Well it pertains to the whole question of materialism since -- I would argue -- reductive materialists would necessarily have to believe p-zombies are logically incoherent.

But in a more straightforward sense it is important too. How do we know whether a computer is conscious? Well, if p-zombies are logically incoherent, that is to say that if "someone" were by definition conscious should their behaviour be indistinguishable from a person's, then it also follows that a robot, or better still an android, whose behaviour was indistinguishable from a human being's would also by definition be conscious. So presumably would a computer whose responses could not be distinguished from a person's.

PixyMisa's proof follows in the next post.

 

[Interesting Ian]

POSTED BY PIXYMISA

Here's my proof that Ian is a p-zombie:


A p-zombie is exactly like a human in all ways except that it isn't consciously aware, right?

So if you ask a p-zombie if it is consciously aware, it will say that it is - because otherwise it would be trivially distinguishable from a real human and contradict the very definition of the term.

And if you ask a p-zombie what it is thinking or feeling, it will be able to report on those internal processes exactly as a human would. It can detail feeling happy or sad or lost or exalted, it can describe its experience of redness or blueness or greenness. It can describe its internal experiences in a way that exactly match the way a conscious human would describe their internal experiences.

In other words, it is under the illusion that it is conscious. But that illusion acts exactly the same as consciousness itself. To an external observer, the p-zombie exhibits all the signs of consciousness. The p-zombie itself knows perfectly well that it is conscious, just as you and I do.

Therefore p-zombies are conscious, and we are p-zombies.

P-zombies exhibit all the external and internal properties of consciousness, so there are conscious. The distinction between p-zombies and consciousness is a distinction without meaning.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by PixyMisa :
A p-zombie is exactly like a human in all ways except that it isn't consciously aware, right?

So if you ask a p-zombie if it is consciously aware, it will say that it is - because otherwise it would be trivially distinguishable from a real human and contradict the very definition of the term.

And if you ask a p-zombie what it is thinking or feeling, it will be able to report on those internal processes exactly as a human would.

II
Internal processes? Not conscious processes it doesn't since by definition it is not conscious.

It can detail feeling happy or sad or lost or exalted, it can describe its experience of redness or blueness or greenness. It can describe its internal experiences in a way that exactly match the way a conscious human would describe their internal experiences.

In other words, it is under the illusion that it is conscious.

No.

Since it is not conscious then by definition it cannot be under the illusion about anything.

The rest of your "proof" follows from you begging the question here.

 

[Mercutio]

Ian--have you seen the videos of the Brain, Mind, & Consciousness Conference? I have posted this link so many places around here--forgive me if this is the 17th time you have seen me do so. The second (I think) speaker of the second video segment is Susan Blackmore, speaking on "the grand illusion of consciousness". I think you would enjoy the talk, and the evidence. Actually, I think you might like the entire set of talks, but that one in particular speaks to the p-zombie issue.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Yes, p-zombies are logically incoherent.

The concept of a p-zombie presumes that there is something other to consciousness than the perception of being conscious.

In fact, the way I understand it, the concept has been constructed in order to try to isolate this aspect of counsciousness that is more than the perception of being conscious. The realization that the concept is illogical indicates that the idea that consciousness is more than the perception of consciousness is false

Hans

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian--have you seen the videos of the Brain, Mind, & Consciousness Conference? I have posted this link so many places around here--forgive me if this is the 17th time you have seen me do so. The second (I think) speaker of the second video segment is Susan Blackmore, speaking on "the grand illusion of consciousness". I think you would enjoy the talk, and the evidence. Actually, I think you might like the entire set of talks, but that one in particular speaks to the p-zombie issue.

No I haven't seen them. I shall do so.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Yes, p-zombies are logically incoherent.

The concept of a p-zombie presumes that there is something other to consciousness than the perception of being conscious.

There is indeed nothing to consciousness apart from the perception of consciousness. But p-zombies are not conscious, nor therefore, by definition, do they perceive they are conscious.

In fact, the way I understand it, the concept has been constructed in order to try to isolate this aspect of counsciousness that is more than the perception of being conscious. The realization that the concept is illogical indicates that the idea that consciousness is more than the perception of consciousness is false

I'm not sure that I understand what you mean by "perception of consciousness". Do you merely mean our realisation of own consciousness? I'm presuming that you do, in which case, no, it provides no argument against p-zombies.

 

[Mercutio]

No I haven't seen them. I shall do so.

I think you will like them. I certainly hope so.

I do suspect that you will be quite irritated by the behaviorist on the panel. His talk...let's just say I wish it had been me giving it.

 

[PixyMisa]

There is indeed nothing to consciousness apart from the perception of consciousness. But p-zombies are not conscious, nor therefore, by definition, do they perceive they are conscious.

Except that they do perceive that they are conscious.

If you ask a p-zombie if it is conscious, it will affirm that indeed it is.

You can ask the p-zombie any question you like regarding its conscious experience, and it will answer iexactly as would a person who is conscious.

Where are those answers coming from? They can't be coming from the outside world, because consciousness is a subjective experience. They are coming from inside the p-zombie. But the answers exactly reflect the answers of a conscious being, so the p-zombie must necessarily have an internal process that, to the p-zombie, looks exactly like consciousness.

Which means that it perceives that it is conscious.

Which means that it is conscious.

Which contradicts the definition, which is why we say the concept is incoherent.

 

[Darat]

Isn't the point of the p-zombie argument that it is incoherent? I thought that was what it was meant to show?

 

[MRC_Hans]

There is indeed nothing to consciousness apart from the perception of consciousness.

Agreed.

But p-zombies are not conscious, nor therefore, by definition, do they perceive they are conscious.

Yes, since they are indistinguishable from humans they must perceive themselves to be conscious.

I'm not sure that I understand what you mean by "perception of consciousness". Do you merely mean our realisation of own consciousness? I'm presuming that you do, in which case, no, it provides no argument against p-zombies.

It does, because there is no difference between a p-zombie and a human. We both perceive (or realize, if you prefer) to be conscious. To have a difference, you must postulate the existence of some property of consciousness that we do not perceive.

Hans

 

[Interesting Ian]

Except that they do perceive that they are conscious.

You misunderstand what a p-zombie is. A p-zombie by definition is not conscious. Therefore a fortiori it cannot think it is conscious since to think or perceive you are conscious is by definition to be conscious.

If you ask a p-zombie if it is conscious, it will affirm that indeed it is.

By definition of what a p-zombie is, this is a false utterance.

You can ask the p-zombie any question you like regarding its conscious experience, and it will answer iexactly as would a person who is conscious.

Where are those answers coming from?

Where does the cuckoo sound come from in a cuckoo clock? From physical laws and the way the clock/p-zombie's body is constructed.

They can't be coming from the outside world, because consciousness is a subjective experience. They are coming from inside the p-zombie. But the answers exactly reflect the answers of a conscious being, so the p-zombie must necessarily have an internal process that, to the p-zombie, looks exactly like consciousness.

Nothing looks like anything to a p-zombie -- it is not conscious. Yes there are internal processes -- but only physical processes. Such processes account for what it says. But no consciousness is entailed (nor even remotely suggested come to that!).

 

[Interesting Ian]

Isn't the point of the p-zombie argument that it is incoherent? I thought that was what it was meant to show?

Eh??

It is argued by many reductive materialists that the concept of a p-zombie is incoherent. Arguably they must maintain this because otherwise (arguably) reductive materialism fails.

Why?

Well because all there is to the world is everything we can in principle perceptually perceive. We can perceive brain processes, and behaviour, so therefore it must literally be either brain processes or behaviour which actually constitutes consciousness i.e consciousness is literally brain processes or behaviour.

But if this is so then given the behaviour (or brain processes), consciousness by definition is present. Thus it necessarily follows that p-zombies are necessarily logically incoherent.

Another way of putting this is that the logical possibility of p-zombies begs the question of materialism.

You see?

 

[Darat]

Yes Ian, I'm glad you agree with me (doesn't happen that often).

 

[drkitten]

The p-zombie itself knows perfectly well that it is conscious, just as you and I do.

Very good so far, Ian.

Now what you haven't proven is that this "knowledge" (more accurately, belief) is actually true.

P-zombies exhibit all the external and internal properties of consciousness, so [they]are conscious.

Does not follow. Be more explicit.

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
But p-zombies are not conscious, nor therefore, by definition, do they perceive they are conscious.

Hans
Yes, since they are indistinguishable from humans they must perceive themselves to be conscious.

No. They are indistinguishable from what we can perceptually perceive through the 5 senses. In other words they are physically indistinguishable. But they are not the same because a real person is conscious and a p-zombie is not.

II
I'm not sure that I understand what you mean by "perception of consciousness". Do you merely mean our realisation of own consciousness? I'm presuming that you do, in which case, no, it provides no argument against p-zombies.

Hans
It does, because there is no difference between a p-zombie and a human. We both perceive (or realize, if you prefer) to be conscious. To have a difference, you must postulate the existence of some property of consciousness that we do not perceive.

I hold that we don't perceptually perceive consciousness at all eg no one experiences my love for another person, they only witness the outward signs of it in the expression in my face and my behaviour.

If you mean "perceive consciousness" in the sense of being immediately acquainted with our own consciousness (Descartes "I think therefore I am") then, by definition, the p-zombie "perceives "no such thing. He says he does, he acts as if he does, but those things are not numerically the same as consciousness (of course most reductive materialists maintain otherwise, but the whole p-zombie argument assumes reductive materialism is false).

 

[Beerina]

Except that they do perceive that they are conscious.

If you ask a p-zombie if it is conscious, it will affirm that indeed it is.

You can ask the p-zombie any question you like regarding its conscious experience, and it will answer iexactly as would a person who is conscious.

Well, humans can drive their responses by observation of their actual own, internal conscious state. Can we think of any questions that would trick a P-zombie that it could not answer without having consciousness? Neglect for the moment it might be able to memorize answers -- we could ask a person who is a mechanic what a modern carbureator is like internally, and get a good read on whether they're really a mechanic or not.

 

[Interesting Ian]

The p-zombie itself knows perfectly well that it is conscious, just as you and I do.

drkitten
Very good so far, Ian.

I'm pretty sure I didn't say that. A p-zombie doesn't know anything. Necessarily it doesn't because to know something requires consciousness.

Now what you haven't proven is that this "knowledge" (more accurately, belief) is actually true.

P-zombies exhibit all the external and internal properties of consciousness, so [they]are conscious.

Does not follow. Be more explicit..

I never said these things.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Well, humans can drive their responses by observation of their actual own, internal conscious state. Can we think of any questions that would trick a P-zombie that it could not answer without having consciousness?

Well if you could then this would mean that our behaviour is not simply the result of physical laws.

Both real people and p-zombies do what they do because of physical laws. It's just that the former are conscious and the latter are not.

In order for a p-zombie to be logically possible we have to assume that consciousness is conceptually distinct from physical processes i.e it begs the truth of reductive materailism.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Peoples' arguments thus far are begging the question by simply assuming reductive materialism is true. What is required is that people first of all suppose consciousness to be conceptually distinct from physical processes, and then demonstrate how this leads to an inconsistency. Otherwise no justification will have been forthcoming to justify the assertion that p-zombies are logically impossible