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A Dualist's Take on Materialism

malfunktion

New Blood
Joined
Jun 11, 2003
Messages
14
Been having this debate with a Christian friend about the viability of a purely materialist world for a while now. Thought I'd share one of his most recent responses and see how the randiites react in comparison to myself. Youre seeing this in the middle of a debate but I think you can get an idea of the concepts being debated. The backbone of my friend's whole argument begins with the assertion:

Material constantly changes.
The self exists and never changes.
Therefore, the self is not material.

Anyways, here's his latest response:

--please read the whole thing once before responding--

Unfortunently, your desires for a materialist world are too strong to battle even the clearest form of truth: the self. I feel like I've done my best here. You guys just don't want to believe in something that leaves room for an immaterial realm of existence because you want to define everything in a material manner.

The definition of the "I" is not a material definition, just like that of "pain." If you believe in "pain," then try defining it in a purely material manner. You can say that when my leg is cut some chemicals send signals into my brain giving me knowledge that my leg has been cut, but what is it in those chemcials that "hurts?" "Hurting" is not present in the chemicals. At a material level, the best thing we can describe is the information, call it "leg is cut", being sent to the brain. The chemical information "leg is cut" is not sufficient because my knowledge of a wound on my leg is much different than my sensations of a wound on my leg. I experience the information "leg is cut", in a first person perspective, as "pain." But how do we define pain? We can only explain it from a first person perspective. Pain might be defined as that which I experience when I have the knowledge that something is physically or emotionally messed up. Yet look at that definition. It lacks everything you are asking for me to create as a definition for the self - all it consists of is "experience" tied to reality. But that lack of material essence does not mean that the definition is lacking something necessary! Just because we can't attach a rigid material definition to something so clearly experienced like pain, does not mean we have missed something. We're just bridging the gap in belief between the material world and the immaterial world. Now take this first person observation of pain a step futher: who is experiencing pain?

That's all I'm doing. I'm taking chemical knowledge a step further and asking: who has this knowledge? The answer, I must admit, is not a "wonderful" material answer.

I gave this definition earlier and I think it's still quite clear:

Quote:
My personal identity, therefore, implies the continued existence of that indivisble thing which I call myself. Whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am not a thought, I am not an action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers. My thoughts and actions, and feelings, change every moment - they have no continued, but a successive existence; but that self or I, to which they belong, is permanent, and has the same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, actions, and feelings, which I call mine.



I'm not defining the "I" as material. If you honestly don't think the "I" exists in this way, then you'll need to explain the permenance of these ever useful "my experiences," "my thoughts," "my personality," comments. If your definition of the "self" works with your purely material belief system, then be happy that you've resolved an anceint problem with materialism. In fact, you better write a book!

--

Quote: Malfunktion
If the "self" is independent of material isn't that an unnecessary speculation?



I don't think I've made this claim. The self experience is bodily. I am tied to a material reality even though this "I" is immaterial.

Quote: Malfunktion
Our brains (material) hold images of the past (memories) and tie us to past experiences.



Ok, so who views those images? Who experiences those memories? When memories are lost, am "I" lost as well or is it just my memories? And as a pointless bit of info, there is not a "viewing screen" by which sights and memories are experienced in the human body. We're wired to receive input, but we don't have a screen to display it on. Sights are seen by those who have no material screen. Maybe another imaterial truth?

Quote: Malfunktion
"I" becomes meaningless without a definition. Without a definition it is just a letter.



You say this ONLY because I'm not defining it as material. I'm defining it based on the way it is experienced. Just like pain.

Quote: Malfunktion
If "I" has no connotations to go with it, it becomes completely nonsensical.


If by connotations you mean experiences, then I think you're right. Fortunently, the "I" has experiences such as behavior and knowledge.


Quote: Malfunktion
I dont understand how you can you argue the "I" remains the same when individual perceptions are constantly changing.



Walk around your room once and ask yourself: did "I" remain the same when my individual perceptions changed?

If it truly works well in your belief system that your "I" changes when you walk around the room, then I'd like to encourage you to write a book about it becauase this view has been completely unacceptable to a community that has laws. I'd buy your book.

Quote: Malfunktion
What remains the same besides the letter "I?"



Letters represent. What do you want me to say the "I" is Mal? Something you can see? Something you can touch? All the things you can see and touch do not remain the same. The "I" is immaterial permancence that is experienced in a material reality. You'll continue to believe I'm not defining "I" as long as you continue to believe that only those things which are "material" exist...and you won't be a very good student in your quantum physics class either.


Oh yeah and What is "consciousness?"


Is it obvious yet that material permancence does not pan out?


Quote: Malfunktion
What about instances where people are technically dead i.e. heart surgeries, drug overdoses, and then come back to life? Do they retain the same "self?"


I don't think someone died who is living.

Quote: Malfunktion
Do you think there is evidence (philosophic, or otherwise) to suggest that the "self," "soul," "consciousness" exists independent of the body or is this a gut feeling?



If by evidence you mean the most obvious truth or first person perspective or the perspective which investigates all other evidence, then yes, I think there is evidence to suggest a self. Philosophical evidence, sure, that's what we're doing here. Gut feeling? Well, the self has the "gut feeling" so yeah, I'd say it's a gut feeling as well.


"I" is metaphysical, yet nothing I know of the metaphysical is detached from my knowledge of the physical or material.

Sitting in a car, I am completely detached from it. I don't feel it when someone hits my car with a bat. All I have in my car is knowledge and this doesn't seem to be the case with my body. I can't get out of my body and walk around the classroom I'm teaching in. My body seems to be a necessary part of my "I" experience.

Most dualists differentiate the "I" and the material like they would a man sitting in a car. I just don't think experience lends us this differentiation.

Quote: Malfunktion
So are you saying the "self" exists before you were born or right at conception or what? What reasoning do you use to get to this state


I think the self and the material the self exists with come to be right at conception. I say this because as we mature, our self remains the same. So with that view, you see that the whole is prior to the parts, right? Sperm and egg => human. I'm not ruling out epiphenomenalism - the view that complexity of material gives rise to the metaphysical.

The reason for a self existing at conception is quite personal: I cannot accept abortion as an option for irresponsibility. Maybe this is just pragmatic in the sense that it fits with the morality I live out, in fact, it is. I have a lot of reasoning that certainly gives light to the benefits of holding this view of the self.

If we draw a line somewhere after conception to demonstrate life or "selfness," we instantly enter into a violation of what I would consider the value of humanity. I look at humanity and decide the we should continue to exist because I think we have the highest potential to benefit the continuation of life in general. For this reason, I think we should place an incredibly high value on the process by which humans exist. We are vital. If we take a line and determine human life is only valuable after it, we're not placing the process towards life as a sacred value. We must care for life to have life. Devaluing human life is in essense our own demise....so I've decided not to do it. To increasingly value human life is to be moral, not absolutely, but in part. I am evaluating parts that will mature to resemble the human body. In my assesment, they are incredibly valuable. Placing the same priority on these parts as I might a fully mature human body is more moral than devaluing their worth. Something about the human body is sacred and should be cared for. Call it reciprical action, a soul, life, the self...whatever, I think our laws (against murder) are based upon this sacredness of humanity and I want to encorage this to continue. I want to increasingly value humanity.

P.S. I think the downfall of the Christain worldview has been some misconception about "living for a life that is to come." You'd probably totally agree with what I'm singing these days as a Christain: I want to serve the goodness in humanity. I have a somewhat bitter attitude towards some of the advice that Christains in my area have unemotionally offered, which is the same advice we all give at times. Like when someone is in pain: "Oh, don't worry, you'll be better in the future." This detachment from the moment pain occurs is so unkind, so unfriendly, but in it is a hint of goodness: hope. I think we ought to hope, but friendship isn't about basting eachother with hope apart from reality. We ought to morn together when things suck without some pompus remark like, "I know that in the end God is doing this for your best interests" or "don't despair, this is just temporary." Oh my gosh, just saying that get's me fired up! It might be an appropriate remark looking back, but in the moment it just seems so careless....almost like we'd only say something like that to make ourselves feel better for what is happening to someone else. --- After we get through this discussion, the absolute truth discussion, and the Plato discussion, I plan to post some stuff about Christianity in the religion forum.

Quote: Malfunktion
What is a purely material entity? Are no living entities purely material?



No living entity is purely material. I'd includ plants as living. I may even include desks and rocks one day, but so far I haven't seen any reason to do that. It seems that only living things naturally strike me as containing a permanence through change. Desks and cars certainly don't strike me that way. A purely material entity is devoid of any metaphysical substance.

Quote: Malfunktion
Note: this discussion is going nowhere fast without a working definition of "self" or "I."


Note: this discussion is going nowhere fast as long as you continue to assume everything needs a material definition.
 
malfunktion said:
no comments on anything? oh well seemed interesting to me.

Lot to digest here..

I would like to see if anyone could assign a material existance to pain... That is quite intriguing..

However, as a pseudo materialist, I still recognize the lack of material evidence for a lot of sub atomic activity..

I accept that we just haven't got there yet.. Doesn't mean there is ( or isn't ) something ' para ' about it..

Of course, with understanding, nothing is ' para '...
 
I can't be bothered to read this thread, but someone here might need to take a visit to room 101. I hear that O'Brien is a pretty bright guy. He had a very large vocabulary. They gave us a test.
 
His primary argument against materialism seems to be a) abstract "ideas" not being able to exist in a material world and b) materialism has not fully explained conciousness.

for (a), I would point out that a materialistic world is both very apt at represeting static abstract ideas (ie, a book, like moby dick). and dynamic abstract ideas, like a computer program, or the processes within a brain. These abstract ideas, such as equations, books, images, etc, would exist regardless of a materialistic world, but they get represented in (and often exploited by life) a materialistic world.

b) is really a non starter, because immaterialism hasn't explained conciousness either, unless you consider hand waving an explaination.
 
Material constantly changes.
The self exists and never changes.
Therefore, the self is not material.

I should hope the "self" changes, but perhaps for some who never really progressed intellectually from being a toddler, this is actually true.

I'm certainly very different than I was ten, twenty and thirty years ago. Therefore, *I* change.

But we can resolve this to some extent by modelling the brain as a computer, and the "self" as the software.

The brain models "self", and models the world around it in a simplified format compatible with "self", based on sensory inputs. "Self" operates on its model, and body operates more or less as modeled to "self". Aforementioned stream of sensory inputs act as feedback to "self".

We know enough about brains that severing or otherwise damaging fairly consistant regions in fairly tiny ways can effect enormous changes on "self". Such as "self" not being able to remember things, or "self" not being able to perceive things, or "self" behaving very differently. Fortunately for the people who study brains, there is a never ending flood of people with strokes, head trauma and diseases of various descriptions to study, so generally nobody had to be deliberately harmed to gain this information.

In a pre-massive integration computer, similar interesting bugs could be caused by disconnecting, shorting, or otherwise tinkering with the hardware. When there were logic gates made of discreet and visible components, there were quite a lot of things that could (and did) go wrong.

In general, software doesn't "exist" as a tangible thing. But you know it's there. The electronic theory the computer was built on, and the machine that operates on that state, and direct experience with the side-effects of changing that state says the state is there in the computer.

Some of the switching, processing and storage in human brains still hasn't been nailed down and fully reverse-engineered.

People have been building electronic circuits and computer simulations based on modelling neuron theory, and and they appear to work well.

http://www.google.com/search?q=circuit+modelling+neuron

Came up with lots of interesting hits.
http://snnap.uth.tmc.edu/links.htm
http://butler.cc.tut.fi/~malmivuo/bem/bembook/10/10.htm
http://www.ini.unizh.ch/projects/posters/mark0.pdf

So, we have basically the basic logic gates worked out, and can even simulate parts of bug brains.

This would be on a par of understanding and, or, xor, not and some CPU state theory, and still need to extrapolate the whole telephone system of the rest of the planet.

So, no we don't know everything about how it all works. But the amount of information is non-zero, and increasing. The known information will probably follow an exponential curve as applications for the knowledge are found.

In short, it's not true that what isn't known right now can never be known. It's only true that it isn't known right now.

If processing power and fabrication density continue to increase at a rate comparable to what 'Moore's Law' generally predicts, (and why shouldn't it if they can break the '3D' barrier?) it is conceivable that simulations comparable in complexity to what happens within a human brain could be modelled within 12~20 years, according to whose model of 'neuron' modeling is accurate enough, and the amount of connections that can be crammed between those 'neurons' wins through.

Of course, the capacity to run the simulation, and the simulation its self are like the logic gate to the internet, a whole other matter.
 

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