SpitfireIX, the reason that Knox's 5 - 6 November interrogation statements were allowed for the calunnia trial was NOT because of the civil trial for calunnia taking place at the same time (essentially) and before the same panel of judges (professional and popular). I point this out because prior to 2019 I thought this might be true myself - the Italian judicial system being different in many ways from that of the US.......
She should have had a lawyer way before then. Further, she should have had one when she signed the statement, which is why the Court of Cassation threw it out for the murder and rape charges (although, because of Italy's unfair dual civil and criminal trial system, it was allowed in anyway for the calunnia charge), and why the ECHR threw it out for the calunnia charge.
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What I found out in 2019 was that the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation (CSC) had ruled in a case prior to Knox's that a statement made by a person questioned or interrogated without a lawyer, while unusable against that person in court as evidence of another crime, is indeed usable against that person if the statement itself is a crime. I found this out because that is what the Italian government told the ECHR, as described in the final ECHR judgment Knox v. Italy, paragraph 142. This is the statement of the Italian government as presented by the ECHR; Google Translation; I've added the 3 words of text in square brackets:
142. The Government observed that the statements made by the applicant on 6 November 2007 in the absence of legal counsel had been declared unusable in relation to the offences under investigation, namely the murder of M.K. and the sexual violence committed against him. They [the Italian Government] explained, however, that according to the settled case-law of the Court of Cassation (judgments nos. 10089 of 2005, 26460 of 2010 and 33583 of 2015), spontaneous statements made by a person under investigation in the absence of legal counsel could in any event be used where, as in the present case, they constituted an offence in themselves. In their view, this was compounded by the fact that the applicant had had the assistance of a lawyer from the moment the first indications of her responsibility for the murder of M.K. appeared.
The ECHR did not accept the reasoning of the Italian Government. Indeed, the fact that the use of Knox's statements were due to a general case law provision weighed against that use in terms of ECHR case law, as explained in paragraphs 152 - 157 of the ECHR judgment (Google Translation; short texts in square brackets are mine):
153. The Court [ECHR] notes that, although the domestic courts concluded that the impugned statements could not be used against the applicant for the offences of murder and sexual assault, as the Government indicated, in accordance with domestic case-law (see paragraph 142 above), those same statements could have been used, in the absence of counsel, insofar as they themselves constituted a criminal offence.
154. It [the ECHR] further reiterates that restrictions on access to a lawyer for compelling reasons are permitted during the pre-trial phase only in exceptional cases, and that they must be temporary in nature and based on an individual assessment of the specific circumstances of the individual case (see Beuze, cited above, § 142).
155. In the present case, however, the Government refers to a case-law interpretation permitting the use of spontaneous statements made by a person subject to investigation in the absence of legal counsel when they constitute an offense in themselves.
156. Even if this argument were to be interpreted as a "compelling reason" within the meaning of its case-law, the Court notes, however, that the case-law interpretation relied on has general application. Moreover, the Government have not established the existence of exceptional circumstances that could have justified the restrictions imposed on the applicant's rights. It is not for the Court to seek them on its own initiative (Simeonovi, cited above, § 130).
157. The Court therefore finds no compelling reason that could justify the above-mentioned restrictions in the present case.
Source: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-189422