SpitfireIX
Philosopher
I completely agree.It's not my intent to imply that an unlawful act (violation of procedure) is necessarily malicious. I believe that many such acts are not intended as malicious, even when done intentionally.
This raises an interesting question. Were these officials properly trained and then just ignored their training, was their training so utterly deficient that such a gross miscarriage of justice as occurred in this case was bound to happen eventually, or was it something in between these two extremes. I strongly suspect that it was in between, with the police likely tending toward poor training, and the judiciary [ETA: likely] tending toward failing to follow what they'd been trained the law was.However, it is the responsibility of the state (Italy, in this case) to be sure that the police, prosecutors, and judges are trained, and this training must achieve a high standard of compliance with procedural law, otherwise, miscarriages of justice are likely.
That's what I was getting at, although I probably should have tried to make my point clearer. You asked what the implications of police officers' being able to assert incompetence as a defense to their illegal activities; what I was attempting to illustrate is that, often, there would be few additional implications, as there is no criminal penalty for the illegal activity.The assignment of blame for Knox being denied a lawyer is not necessarily relevant, because, to my knowledge, there is no criminal law in Italy for that violation of procedural law. The remedy for the denial of a lawyer is to throw out (court declares inadmissible) the alleged evidence (incriminating statements) gathered when there was no presence of the lawyer. Obviously, both the police and Mignini were responsible for Knox being denied a lawyer during the interrogations and the period immediately after them. Whether the police denied Knox a lawyer on Mignini's instructions is unknown to the public; of course, he was the supervisor of the police team for the investigation.
Your example actually isn't on point, and, in hindsight, mine may not be, either. You're talking about a situation where a person doesn't know he or she is trespassing, rather than a situation where he or she doesn't know trespassing is illegal.At least in US law, it is assumed that the person accused knows the law, unless there is some good reason otherwise. Thus, if one is accused of trespassing on US government property, if there were no signs and perhaps fences in relevant places to warn someone, an accusation of trespassing would very likely be dismissed by a court. If speed limit signs were not posted in relevant places, then your example could be a good one.
I was thinking of a situation in which a local ordinance is passed setting an unreasonably low speed limit along a certain stretch of road, and said speed limit is then either not posted or very poorly posted (e.g., sign mostly concealed behind heavy underbrush). So, yes, technically, the speeder would be ignorant of the law (the speed limit in that area). However, anyone with a valid drivers license is presumed to know that the speed limit has to be obeyed. So, again in hindsight, I'd say this would be more a case of knowing the law but being unaware one was breaking it, rather than not knowing the law.
Cases where ignorance of the law is allowed as a defense for ordinary people, in certain circumstances, include:
- Advice of counsel (your attorney gave you the wrong information)
- Advice from the government (an agency gave you the wrong information)
- The government gave everyone the wrong information (e.g., official hunting regulations list an incorrect bag limit)
There was a case I remember quite a while ago (about 40 years, I think), where a man in Ohio was criminally charged in the death of his son in a car accident, because the boy wasn't in a car seat, which was required by a recently passed state law. The man's defense was that he didn't know about the law because he was illiterate and didn't own a TV. He was acquitted, but IDK whether that's because the jury actually bought his argument, or they just felt sorry for him.
IANAL, but I think even a zealous prosecutor would have had trouble making any criminal charges stick, even if one of the police officers or the interpreter had suddenly gotten a guilty conscience and corroborated Amanda's account of what happened.However, for the Knox case, the alleged criminal violations under Italian law would have included the use of threats (the alleged threats of prison and not being allowed to see her mother) and violence (the alleged hits on her head) to obtain statements, filing a false official document (possibly based on the truncated wording quoting Knox's text message to Lumumba that Mignini used in the arrest document), and calunnia (falsely accusing someone, known to be innocent, of a crime). I'm basing these charges on the Boninsegna MR (as I recall it) - note that in order to charge Knox with calunnia against the police and Mignini, an Italian prosecutor needed to identify in Knox's testimony before the Massei court the crimes that she was implicitly accusing the police and Mignini of committing.
I wouldn't say she was known to be innocent; I believe that ought to refer to factual innocence. If mere legal innocence opened one up to a potential charge of calunnia, very few people would make accusations, even upon very strong evidence, for fear of being charged if the accused were to be acquitted. I will certainly say that they had no reasonable basis upon which to accuse her.If there's a question as to why the police knew Knox to be innocent, that is the kernel of the matter. Knox was known to be innocent by the police and Mignini during the interrogation because she had not been finally proven guilty by an Italian court. That's based on the Italian Constitution and Italian procedural law. Those thinking that the police and Mignini, because they may sincerely have strongly believed Knox to be guilty could not have committed calunnia against (that is, framed) Knox simply don't accept or don't understand this principle of the presumption of innocence. If her statements during the interrogation were coerced - in violation of CPP Article 188 - then her statements cannot be used because they were gathered contrary to law (CPP Article 191). This would mean that the arrest document was false in that respect as well, another instance of the criminal act of filing a false official document as well as an act of calunnia.
I am, however, actually willing to give the police and Mignini the benefit of the doubt and say that they are probably not to be to be blamed for the fact that Amanda's failure to show grief in the way that they, as Italians, expected that she ought to have, aroused their suspicions.
Of course, that in no way excuses Mignini's idiotic theories ("Only a woman would cover the body"), the incompetent investigation, and the abusive and criminal interrogations of Amanda and Raffaele.
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