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The CIA struck a deal with the Saudis to monitor the hijackers and not tell the FBI?

Allen773

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I’ve heard speculation of this nature from people like Richard Clarke and some angry FBI agents who remain bitter over the failure of the CIA to share critical information about two of the eventual hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar. The basic idea is that the CIA was covertly trusting Saudi intelligence to “flip” these two Saudi al-Qaeda operatives.

Supposed evidence for this is the assistance given to Hazmi and Midhar by a handful of men alleged to be Saudi spies upon the hijackers’ arrival in California, and the reported financing of those men by then-Saudi Ambassador to the United States Bandar bin Sultan (a well-connected man in Washington, to say the least) and his wife. These reports are documented to varying extents in the “28 pages” of the Joint Congressional Report, the 9/11 Commission Report, and media sources.

I am personally skeptical of a lot of this, but I remain open; on balance, I find it plausible but unlikely. I’m not sure what others here think, but I suspect there is a mix of views.
 
The question I'd ask is why they would do that? Why would they ask the Saudis to monitor those people and not share the info with the FBI. Sure, there was a failure in information sharing. But to make that error intentional and not an artifact of the walls built between the different goals of the intelligence agencies requires a robust explanation and some proof.

It's not plausible. Doesn't pass the sniff test.
 
Yes there was a communications disconnect between the FBI and the CIA, this has been documented and hopefully fixed. However I don't see anything nefarious about this other than the failure to share information.
 
The question I'd ask is why they would do that? Why would they ask the Saudis to monitor those people and not share the info with the FBI. ...

I think the argument goes that if the FBI knew of criminal activity[1], they would be forced to intervene and perhaps arrest, which would have gone against the alleged CIA interest of "flipping" them.




[1] Being a member of a terrorist organization is a crime, I think, although I am not an expert on US criminal code.
 
My understanding is that there were actually rules in effect that limited communication between the FBI and CIA in an effort to protect civil rights.
 
I think the argument goes that if the FBI knew of criminal activity[1], they would be forced to intervene and perhaps arrest, which would have gone against the alleged CIA interest of "flipping" them.




[1] Being a member of a terrorist organization is a crime, I think, although I am not an expert on US criminal code.

The thing is, once he enters the US, the CIA can't operate and can't flip him. Sure, they can get the FBI to flip him, but then the can't run him, or something.

Also not an expert, but it takes the wall that was constructed to keep our national and international intelligence agencies separate per their charter and turns it into a conspiracy.

I'm still wanting more evidence that it was intentional non-sharing and not because of policies made years, or decades ago.

The idea that a CIA agent or the agency in general would intentionally allow a terrorist attack on US soil out of, let's call it spite, is absurd.
 
The thing is, once he enters the US, the CIA can't operate and can't flip him. Sure, they can get the FBI to flip him, but then the can't run him, or something.

Also not an expert, but it takes the wall that was constructed to keep our national and international intelligence agencies separate per their charter and turns it into a conspiracy.

I'm still wanting more evidence that it was intentional non-sharing and not because of policies made years, or decades ago.

The idea that a CIA agent or the agency in general would intentionally allow a terrorist attack on US soil out of, let's call it spite, is absurd.


This.

It may be that the failure of the CIA to share intel with the FBI resulted in the suspected terrorist being able to mostly complete their task of flying airliners into buildings on 9/11, but that was an unintended consequence, not an intentional act.

I have long believed that the failure of US intelligence services to realize a major terrorist attack was going to happen was more of a failure by policy makers that it was by intelligence analysts. It begins in the early 1990s after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War, with the mistaken belief on the part of policy makers that electronic gadgetry and satellite surveillance could replace human agents on the ground. This was an abject failure to understand how espionage works on the part of those whose job it was to understand.

There is no substitute for agents on the ground. A satellite cannot follow a suspect into buildings; it cannot watch closely and in detail, what a subject does; it can't use its experience gained over years of operational espionage and intelligence gathering, to predict the possible future actions of a suspect; it cannot analyse, in real time, the reasons why a suspect might be acting the way they are. Spy satellites and remote electronic surveillance will never be able to gather the sort of precise, tactical-level intelligence you need to allow analysts to analyse the data and draw the correct conclusions. Only human resources can give you this - you can't make good decisions if the data you are trying to analyse is poor, deficient or incomplete.

A case in point. In January 2000, the CIA Kuala Lumpur station were running surveillance on three suspected al-Qaeda operatives who were attending a secret meeting of Al Qaeda operatives from around the world. Among the participants was Khalid al-Mihdhar. By the time the meeting disbanded, the CIA had photographed al-Mihdhar, found out his full name and passport number, and found he held a multiple-entry visa to the United States. He and two other operatives boarded a flight to Bangkok, and there the trail went cold.

Khalid al-Mihdhar was one of the September 11 hijackers on Flight 77.

Now you can read a bit of a timeline of this here...

http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=cia_bangkok_station_1

It reads like Keystone Cops in some ways, the level of poor communications and incompetence is astounding. However, Bangkok Station was severely undermanned, an early victim of replacement of experienced human spies with satellites and technology.
 
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I’ve heard speculation of this nature from people like Richard Clarke and some angry FBI agents who remain bitter over the failure of the CIA to share critical information about two of the eventual hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar. The basic idea is that the CIA was covertly trusting Saudi intelligence to “flip” these two Saudi al-Qaeda operatives.

Supposed evidence for this is the assistance given to Hazmi and Midhar by a handful of men alleged to be Saudi spies upon the hijackers’ arrival in California, and the reported financing of those men by then-Saudi Ambassador to the United States Bandar bin Sultan (a well-connected man in Washington, to say the least) and his wife. These reports are documented to varying extents in the “28 pages” of the Joint Congressional Report, the 9/11 Commission Report, and media sources.

I am personally skeptical of a lot of this, but I remain open; on balance, I find it plausible but unlikely. I’m not sure what others here think, but I suspect there is a mix of views.

The allegation has floated around for a while but it is not consistent with the CIA's professional conduct in the Clinton-Era 1990's.

First off, the CIA cannot operate (meaning track or spy on people) within CONUS on their own, they are required by law to have a domestic law enforcement agency attached as their lead. This agency can be Customs/Border Patrol, FBI, DEA, etc but they can't run a surveillance superstition on their own. To do so is a career ender and officers can end up in prison.

It is clear from the 911 Commission Report and the dozen memoirs written by FBI and CIA officers that the CIA was not willing to take ANY RISKS during the lead up to the attacks of 911.

The next problem is Al Qaeda. They used their considerable resources to run background checks on their key operatives before they would be allowed to advance within the organization. The whole purpose of their camps in Afghanistan was to have a place for incoming volunteers to be housed while they were investigated. If they didn't trust an applicant they sent him on his way, and if they felt he was linked to foreign intelligence then they had the option of killing him or using him to spread disinformation.

The problem throughout the 911 discussion since BEFORE 911 is the under estimation of just how good Al Qaeda was and is at conducting itself on every level. They openly state that they are a learning organization. If they were a business they'd be Amazon.
 
There is no substitute for agents on the ground. A satellite cannot follow a suspect into buildings; it cannot watch closely and in detail, what a subject does; it can't use its experience gained over years of operational espionage and intelligence gathering, to predict the possible future actions of a suspect; it cannot analyse, in real time, the reasons why a suspect might be acting the way they are. Spy satellites and remote electronic surveillance will never be able to gather the sort of precise, tactical-level intelligence you need to allow analysts to analyse the data and draw the correct conclusions. Only human resources can give you this - you can't make good decisions if the data you are trying to analyse is poor, deficient or incomplete.



And this leads to another problem with a lot of the CTs based on CIA operations: in quite a few cases, the "agents on the ground" will not be nice people with clean records, because nice people with clean records can't get close to the targets they're trying to surveil.

When you're trying to track terrorists, you have to work with people who are, if not terrorists themselves, at least terrorist-adjacent. And that always looks bad when it shows up on the front page of a newspaper, but it's really the only way to get the job done.

Of course, working with these guys comes with the risk that they'll screw you over, because that's what bad guys do.
 
The next problem is Al Qaeda. They used their considerable resources to run background checks on their key operatives before they would be allowed to advance within the organization. The whole purpose of their camps in Afghanistan was to have a place for incoming volunteers to be housed while they were investigated. If they didn't trust an applicant they sent him on his way, and if they felt he was linked to foreign intelligence then they had the option of killing him or using him to spread disinformation.

I’m curious...do you find it plausible that bin Laden and his confederates had plenty of “friendly faces” directly or indirectly connected to Saudi intelligence whom they could count on to turn a blind eye to al Qaeda fundraising and even (in some cases) operations?

The Saudis have a massive and bloated government bureaucracy, after all - most Saudis who aren’t “on the dole” are in government jobs, and a lot of those Saudis are “ghost employees” who sit at home and collect state paychecks -, which would total millions of people. I find if hard to believe, especially before 9/11 when bin Laden was getting more aggressive and influential in his campaigns and especially before the 2003-onward al Qaeda attacks in Saudi Arabia itself, that there wasn’t a somewhat significant level of support, even if mostly from more junior levels. Not sure if the highest levels of the House of Saud could have policed this stuff even if they wanted to - and I’m not convinced that they had the stomach to pick a fight with bin Laden’s followers (a personality and ideological cult that the Saudi government had sponsored and arguably helped create in the 1980s as part of the anti-Soviet effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan) - certainly not before 9/11.

If the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States weren’t really willing to take serious action against al Qaeda before 9/11, as you argue, how much more in denial about the threat do you reckon the Saudis and other Gulf monarchies were? What about our old ally and conduit in the 1980s anti-Soviet effort Pakistan, whose military and intelligence services outright created the Taliban, sponsor the Haqqani network, and have trained jihadists whom have promptly gone on to attack targets in India and elsewhere?

I think governments across the world were in denial about al-Qaeda, if not outright dismissive of them. Even after 9/11, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and their advisors were pushing the narrative that it couldn’t have been “one guy and his motley crew in Afghanistan.” Ie. the Butcher of Baghdad that Bush 41 had given a massive black eye a decade prior but was still very much in power had to be involved somehow.

Even now, some members of the Trump administration are trying to use the 2001 AUMF against al-Qaeda and their allies to justify potential military action against Iran, of all countries - based on murky and frankly dubious alleged connections.

It’s hard for America the Exceptional to accept that a small, dedicated core of people could sneak by our national security and law enforcement agencies and destroy the World Trade Center, damage the Pentagon, and kill thousands of people in the process without there being some much grander, master plot behind them. Yes, I find it very plausible that there were people in or connected to several governments who helped al-Qaeda, however wittingly or directly (often not either). No, I don’t think any government had command and control over Osama bin Laden’s show.

Even the Taliban - even most of bin Laden’s top advisers! - were opposed to “The Planes Operation.” Bin Laden overruled them regardless and cut them out of the loop as he blessed and directed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s operation to accomplish what KSM’s nephew had failed to do in February 1993 - in addition to the targets in Washington ie, the Pentagon and Capitol building.
 
Working backwards:

Half of Al Qaeda was against the Planes Operation and there was a split. That side figured they had a good thing going in the Middle East and SE Asia and knew that attacking the USA directly would ruin everything (which it did).

The Saudi government's competence depends on many factors. Saudi Intelligence relies mostly what it can buy. The have a lot of third-party (non-Saudi) operatives who do much of the leg work, and they work with (i.e. Buy intelligence) from Jordan, UAE, Yeman, Egypt, Turkey, and private security firms run by former Mossad agents. After 911 there was a minor house-cleaning and the new guy has done some recent major house-cleaning. What the Saudis really knew about Al Qaeda is unknown and certainly unspoken. I'm suspicious by nature and I'm sure they knew what everyone else in the Middle East knew - Al Qaeda was planning to attack the US - because Al Qaeda had stated that was their plan, and they had quasi spokesmen showing up on Arab TV and in Arab newspapers clearly stating something was in the works.

If they knew more details of the pending attack they'll never tell anyone.

In short, if you watched or read the news you knew Al Qaeda was going to strike inside the US. In May, 2001 the DoD closed off public access to all military installations in the US citing concerns of a terrorist attack. The DoS issued a travel warning in July, 2001 warning that they had information about Al Qaeda planning to hijack or blow jetliners, but the warning was for the Middle East and the Mediterranean. The travel warning expired the first week of September, 2001. These are facts that are ignored by truthers because it undermines every CT.

Trump's dysfunctional NSC will cite 911 only because Ayman Al Zawahiri is hiding out in Iran (at least there is a 85% certainty that he is there).

As I said before, The Bush NSC were basically 911 Truthers who refused to believe Al Qaeda could have pulled off the attacks without a state sponsor.
 
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The question I'd ask is why they would do that? Why would they ask the Saudis to monitor those people and not share the info with the FBI.

Why use Saudi's? Why wouldn't they? Imagine a Saudi terrorist being approached by a couple of US CIA agents asking them to change teams and start working for the US Government.....

But what if you could get a couple of Saudi intelligence officers to befriend them, and then try? Convince them that they will become Saudi informants. Give them a realistic motivation (I'm sure they both had extensive families still living in Saudi-Arabia that could benefit from it etc etc). As far as they know, they will have only changed allegiance from one Saudi to another Saudi. In secrete of course Saudi Intelligence would be sharing everything they learn from them with the CIA. So indirectly they would become CIA informants via Saudi Intelligence.

Why not share it with the FBI? Because this was all happening inside the US. Far as I am aware FBI have total jurisdiction. If CIA tell FBI, then the FBI can say 'no, they're in the US, this is our territory, etc etc' and they will screw up everything.

So CIA had good reasons to use Saudi's, and to not tell the FBI.
 
The idea that a CIA agent or the agency in general would intentionally allow a terrorist attack on US soil out of, let's call it spite, is absurd.

Who said they intentionally allowed it? CIA may have very well been convinced for over 16 months that these two Saudi's were on their side. Evidently at some stage they realise this isn't the case, and when they do, they tell the FBI. That is why the FBI was told 4 weeks or so before the attacks about these two. It had nothing to do with spite. It perhaps did have a little bit to do with arse covering though, as once it was clear to the CIA the entire operation had gone tits up, they still didn't tell Clarke, the White House, anyone else, except the FBI, that two al qaeda terrorists were inside the US. Even when they were begging the White House for action just days prior to the attacks, the CIA still never mentioned it. Nor mentioned that, by this stage, they had told the FBI.
 
To address the OP, I am at least 70% convinced that the CIA were trying to recruit al-Hazmi and al-Midhar inside the US. To do this they had to use Saudi Intelligence officers, and they had to hide it from everyone, including the FBI.

At some stage the CIA realise it wasn't going as planned, sent a low level memo to the FBI and hid the rest from everyone else to cover their own buts. I don't believe they knew when, where, or how the terrorists would attack. I'm 100% sure they didn't know it was going to devastate Manhattan and kill 3000 people.

A really good interview to watch is this one with Richard Clarke. Really worth the watch.

 
Who said they intentionally allowed it? CIA may have very well been convinced for over 16 months that these two Saudi's were on their side. Evidently at some stage they realise this isn't the case, and when they do, they tell the FBI. That is why the FBI was told 4 weeks or so before the attacks about these two. It had nothing to do with spite. It perhaps did have a little bit to do with arse covering though, as once it was clear to the CIA the entire operation had gone tits up, they still didn't tell Clarke, the White House, anyone else, except the FBI, that two al qaeda terrorists were inside the US. Even when they were begging the White House for action just days prior to the attacks, the CIA still never mentioned it. Nor mentioned that, by this stage, they had told the FBI.

You don't have a conspiracy theory without intentionally allowing it. If the CIA knew and couldn't share, it's just a screwup. Without intent, you've got a nothing burger.
 
This assumes that the two hijackers could be recruited and that's a hell of a leap and the Saudis would have known this.

The flip side is that it is possible they courted Saudi money and aid hoping that it would be the dagger in the heart of the US/Saudi relationship, and this would make more sense because it would have been a smart move. Think about it, why does Al Qaeda choose Saudi nationals as hijackers? If you were looking for a frame job their presence would be exactly the kind smoking gun that would lead to US JDAM's falling on Riyadh.

In the interview you posted Richard Clarke leaves out the fact that the DoD had closed off access to all military bases due to an unspecified terrorist threat in May, 2001. What was their intel? Why didn't the FBI know or if they did then what did they know and why wasn't it enough to launch a manhunt?

And I'll ask again for the thousandth time, what did Sandy Berger steal from the National Archives and destroy that was directly related to the 9-11 investigations? Why does no one in the 911 Truth crowd ever chase this one down?
 
In the interview you posted Richard Clarke leaves out the fact that the DoD had closed off access to all military bases due to an unspecified terrorist threat in May, 2001. What was their intel? Why didn't the FBI know or if they did then what did they know and why wasn't it enough to launch a manhunt?

Do we know whether this had any connection to 9/11?

And I'll ask again for the thousandth time, what did Sandy Berger steal from the National Archives and destroy that was directly related to the 9-11 investigations? Why does no one in the 911 Truth crowd ever chase this one down?

I've not heard of this, got a link please?
 
Do we know whether this had any connection to 9/11?

Yup. And I already pointed out, as I often do, that the State Department issued a travel warning in July, 2001 specifically warning about Al Qaeda possibly hijacking commercial jetliners. The warning was for the Middle East and Mediterranean. It expired the first week of September 2001.

The warning has been removed from the DoS online archive yet it was never explored by the 911 Commission or anyone else which is a shame because the DoD and DoS draw their intelligence from the DIA as their primary, not the CIA. This means there is a line of Al Qaeda intelligence that was followed which included the possibility of hijackings, and this line of intelligence was external from CIA and the FBI. I don't have a link but if you have access to LexisNexis you should be able to find the original travel warning mentioned in most of the July newspapers.

I've not heard of this, got a link please?

https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/01/sandy_berger_what_did_he_take.html

https://www.archives.gov/research/recover/notable-thefts.html

https://fas.org/irp/congress/2007_rpt/berger.pdf

https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/w.../berger-thefts-still-weigh-on-archives-agents

https://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/08/berger.sentenced/

http://www.spectacle.org/0804/wilson.html

https://www.cato.org/blog/sandy-ber...tuck-wrong-papers-briefcase-hidden-them-under

http://gogov.com/bergerwatch.htm

https://www.chron.com/news/nation-w...s-confirms-Berger-took-classified-1677687.php

Gosh I hope this is enough.

I'd love to know why you can't look this up, it took me 30 seconds.
 
And I'll ask again for the thousandth time, what did Sandy Berger steal from the National Archives and destroy that was directly related to the 9-11 investigations? Why does no one in the 911 Truth crowd ever chase this one down?

I know the answer to the last part. It will offer no information about planes that never took off, missiles that don't exist, controlled demolition contracts and reems of NDAs. But it's probably filled with original footage of Rodan.
 
I know the answer to the last part. It will offer no information about planes that never took off, missiles that don't exist, controlled demolition contracts and reems of NDAs. But it's probably filled with original footage of Rodan.

O-Nay Alking-Tay Odan-Ray in-ay a-ay Ublic-Pay Orum-Fay.
 
The flip side is that it is possible they courted Saudi money and aid hoping that it would be the dagger in the heart of the US/Saudi relationship, and this would make more sense because it would have been a smart move. Think about it, why does Al Qaeda choose Saudi nationals as hijackers? If you were looking for a frame job their presence would be exactly the kind smoking gun that would lead to US JDAM's falling on Riyadh.

I read in an article somewhere (can't remember where unfortunately) that for the Planes Operation KSM ideally wanted hijackers from as many countries as possible but bin Laden was determined for it to be a Saudi-heavy operation. KSM was ultimately fine with Saudis for pragmatic reasons (easy to get visas to the US and the fact that so many would-be jihadists in the Al Qaeda training camps were Saudis so that skewed the recruitment pool).

Not sure if that bit about KSM's preferences is true but it's extremely likely that Osama bin Laden's dream scenario was for ALL of the hijackers to have been Saudis.
 
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Gosh I hope this is enough.

I'd love to know why you can't look this up, it took me 30 seconds.


Well, I'm busy at work most the day and figured you'd be able to throw a quick link in the reply to send me right to the source. If you're going to be a cock about it, forget it.
 
Instead of starting another thread I'll leave this here:

https://www.thedailybeast.com/michael-scheuer-hunted-bin-laden-for-cia-now-he-wants-americans-dead

This is about the creator of the CIA's Alec Station and it is a revealing analysis.

Scheuer’s advocacy of violence follows a long trajectory. In December, he endorsed the increasingly violent QAnon conspiracy movement, which the FBI has called a potential wellspring of domestic terrorism. Those who deny QAnon’s unhinged hallucinations are, to Scheuer, “coup-ists [and] insurrectionists.” Last month, Scheuer claimed vindication against critics when Trump seemed to acknowledge QAnon. Scheuer has long been comfortable with violence. His career-making 2004 book Imperial Hubris argued that America would need to wage a far bloodier war, including the destruction of civilian infrastructure, unless it divests its imperial role in the Mideast. Sixteen years later, Scheuer’s enemy is domestic. “The only thing I would be upset about if it came to war is that not enough Democrats would get killed,” he said on his podcast in July.


To some this will be a disturbing article. I think it adds a foundation for understanding why THIS GUY didn't share information with the FBI. 911 was about ego, bin Laden's ego, Scheuer's ego, Clarke's ego, and John O'Neil's ego.

Yes, you can still debate the question of if the attacks could have been prevented. I think they would have simply been postponed, and would have been larger in scale.
 
Instead of starting another thread I'll leave this here:

https://www.thedailybeast.com/michael-scheuer-hunted-bin-laden-for-cia-now-he-wants-americans-dead

This is about the creator of the CIA's Alec Station and it is a revealing analysis.




To some this will be a disturbing article. I think it adds a foundation for understanding why THIS GUY didn't share information with the FBI. 911 was about ego, bin Laden's ego, Scheuer's ego, Clarke's ego, and John O'Neil's ego.

Yes, you can still debate the question of if the attacks could have been prevented. I think they would have simply been postponed, and would have been larger in scale.

For what it's worth, Osama bin Laden recommended Scheuer's books. Takes one to know one...
 
Bump, because I have some additional thoughts.



I remember reading that the CIA’s counterterrorism people, especially when the notorious Michael Scheuer was in charge of Alec Station but continuing when Cofer Black and Rich Blee came in c.1999, wanted explicitly to kill Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda operatives, and thought of the fight against al-Qaeda as a war.

By contrast, the Clinton NSC was more predisposed toward the FBI view of bin Laden being a particularly dangerous criminal, but a criminal nonetheless, and so he and his confederates ideally would be prosecuted and thrown in federal prison like Ramzi Yousef and the Blind Sheikh were. Importantly though, both Richard Clarke and Bill Clinton have said they would have signed off on killing bin Laden if they thought it would be successful.

I can imagine, then, that people at the CIA (especially Scheuer) were frustrated by their inability to do anything about bin Laden, and bitter about having whatever foreign intelligence on him and al-Qaeda (and close associates, including one Khalid Sheikh Mohammed) be surrendered to the FBI. The notion that people whom they saw as imminent, deadly threats to the homeland being given any legal or constitutional rights in the US must have made them sick (this attitude would come back to haunt the CIA after 9/11, when Bush gave them responsibility for detention and interrogation of terrorist suspects...).

So no one is signing off on the chances to kill bin Laden in the late 90s in Afghanistan, even as the threat manifests itself with the embassy bombings and bin Laden’s repeated public threats and promises. All the US government has to show for it was a handful of cruise missiles that did little damage in Afghanistan (and destroyed a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan that turned out to be benign). The CIA’s CTC is simultaneously alarmed and embittered, and they are fed up with both the FBI and quite arguably, the NSC.

This is the context in which, in 1999, the CIA and NSA discover the switchboard in Yemen that leads them to a major al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia...
 
Bump, because I have some additional thoughts.



I remember reading that the CIA’s counterterrorism people, especially when the notorious Michael Scheuer was in charge of Alec Station but continuing when Cofer Black and Rich Blee came in c.1999, wanted explicitly to kill Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda operatives, and thought of the fight against al-Qaeda as a war.

By contrast, the Clinton NSC was more predisposed toward the FBI view of bin Laden being a particularly dangerous criminal, but a criminal nonetheless, and so he and his confederates ideally would be prosecuted and thrown in federal prison like Ramzi Yousef and the Blind Sheikh were. Importantly though, both Richard Clarke and Bill Clinton have said they would have signed off on killing bin Laden if they thought it would be successful.

I can imagine, then, that people at the CIA (especially Scheuer) were frustrated by their inability to do anything about bin Laden, and bitter about having whatever foreign intelligence on him and al-Qaeda (and close associates, including one Khalid Sheikh Mohammed) be surrendered to the FBI. The notion that people whom they saw as imminent, deadly threats to the homeland being given any legal or constitutional rights in the US must have made them sick (this attitude would come back to haunt the CIA after 9/11, when Bush gave them responsibility for detention and interrogation of terrorist suspects...).

So no one is signing off on the chances to kill bin Laden in the late 90s in Afghanistan, even as the threat manifests itself with the embassy bombings and bin Laden’s repeated public threats and promises. All the US government has to show for it was a handful of cruise missiles that did little damage in Afghanistan (and destroyed a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan that turned out to be benign). The CIA’s CTC is simultaneously alarmed and embittered, and they are fed up with both the FBI and quite arguably, the NSC.

This is the context in which, in 1999, the CIA and NSA discover the switchboard in Yemen that leads them to a major al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia...

It's so much more complex.

In the late 1990s there were many diplomatic considerations standing in the way of successfully capturing and or killing bin Laden. He came for a connected family, and the Bin Laden Group was a key player for important construction in Saudi Aradia and the Middle East. Killing him could have had complications for key diplomatic and trade issues.

Then there was Clinton's aversion to risk after the 10/3/93 Mogadishu raid. The NSC tasked the US Army's SFOD-D to develop plans to capture bin Laden in Afghanistan. The UNIT spent a few months researching operational options, which they forwarded to the Clinton NSC. They never heard back. The problem was that Clinton's NSC wanted 0% risk, and USASOC told them that was unrealistic. Hell, we managed to lose an MH-60X in the Abbottabad raid.

The FBI was hamstrung by the US Ambassador to Yemen because John Douglas pissed her off, and she clearly didn't take Al Qaeda seriously.

Both the FBI and CIA were handicapped by the fact that both had Bin Laden/Al AQaeda units which were SEPARATE from their central Counter-Terrorism Desks. This lead to the usual turf wars, and pee-pee contests internally which left huge gaps in intelligence. For example, you mention NSA. The NSA had just about everything: Names, Phone Numbers, Bank Accounts, Locations for the entire Al Qaeda logistics network. But the problem was that they DIDN'T KNOW THEY HAD IT until 9/12/2001 when they ran an audit. The NSA collects all communications from the Middle East, but unless someone at CIA or the FBI specifically asks for for targeted intelligence the NSA doesn't even bother to look at what they have.

Nobody at Alec Station or the NYFBI Bin Laden Taskforce bothered to request assistance from the NSA.

The closest thing that comes to a conspiracy is Sandy Burger's actions at the National Archives where he stole and destroyed key Clinton NSC documents. They should have water-boarded him until he revealed their contents, but unfortunately their secrets went with him. It is my opinion that the Clinton NSC had a third source for Al Qaeda's planning, but they didn't take is seriously. Remember, in May, 2001 the DoD closes military bases to the public citing a terrorist threat, and in July, 2001, the DoS issues a Travel Warning citing intelligence that Al Qaeda was planning to hijack commercial jets. I will say this again, there was an intelligence source who had at least some idea of what Al Qaeda was planning in 1999 through 2001, and in spite of all the investigations this source remains in the shadows.
 
It's so much more complex.

In the late 1990s there were many diplomatic considerations standing in the way of successfully capturing and or killing bin Laden. He came for a connected family, and the Bin Laden Group was a key player for important construction in Saudi Aradia and the Middle East. Killing him could have had complications for key diplomatic and trade issues.

Then there was Clinton's aversion to risk after the 10/3/93 Mogadishu raid. The NSC tasked the US Army's SFOD-D to develop plans to capture bin Laden in Afghanistan. The UNIT spent a few months researching operational options, which they forwarded to the Clinton NSC. They never heard back. The problem was that Clinton's NSC wanted 0% risk, and USASOC told them that was unrealistic. Hell, we managed to lose an MH-60X in the Abbottabad raid.

The FBI was hamstrung by the US Ambassador to Yemen because John Douglas pissed her off, and she clearly didn't take Al Qaeda seriously.

Both the FBI and CIA were handicapped by the fact that both had Bin Laden/Al AQaeda units which were SEPARATE from their central Counter-Terrorism Desks. This lead to the usual turf wars, and pee-pee contests internally which left huge gaps in intelligence. For example, you mention NSA. The NSA had just about everything: Names, Phone Numbers, Bank Accounts, Locations for the entire Al Qaeda logistics network. But the problem was that they DIDN'T KNOW THEY HAD IT until 9/12/2001 when they ran an audit. The NSA collects all communications from the Middle East, but unless someone at CIA or the FBI specifically asks for for targeted intelligence the NSA doesn't even bother to look at what they have.

Nobody at Alec Station or the NYFBI Bin Laden Taskforce bothered to request assistance from the NSA.

The closest thing that comes to a conspiracy is Sandy Burger's actions at the National Archives where he stole and destroyed key Clinton NSC documents. They should have water-boarded him until he revealed their contents, but unfortunately their secrets went with him. It is my opinion that the Clinton NSC had a third source for Al Qaeda's planning, but they didn't take is seriously. Remember, in May, 2001 the DoD closes military bases to the public citing a terrorist threat, and in July, 2001, the DoS issues a Travel Warning citing intelligence that Al Qaeda was planning to hijack commercial jets. I will say this again, there was an intelligence source who had at least some idea of what Al Qaeda was planning in 1999 through 2001, and in spite of all the investigations this source remains in the shadows.

Really appreciate the detailed response. Incredibly complex indeed. Thanks. :thumbsup:
 
Revisting this:

Was (or is) anything preventing the CIA from liaising with Saudi intelligence (or any other country’s intelligence agencies, for that matter) within the US in collecting intelligence on/attempting to recruit foreign nationals specifically (as opposed to US citizens, which Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar were most certainly not)?

After all, two foreign nationals who are known al-Qaeda operatives are valid US intelligence targets, and I don’t see why targeting them specifically within the US would be illegal. Not saying that there actually was any CiA-Saudi recruitment operation going on here, but I don’t see why that would be inherently problematic in this context, US soil or otherwise.
 
Revisting this:

Was (or is) anything preventing the CIA from liaising with Saudi intelligence (or any other country’s intelligence agencies, for that matter) within the US in collecting intelligence on/attempting to recruit foreign nationals specifically (as opposed to US citizens, which Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar were most certainly not)?

After all, two foreign nationals who are known al-Qaeda operatives are valid US intelligence targets, and I don’t see why targeting them specifically within the US would be illegal. Not saying that there actually was any CiA-Saudi recruitment operation going on here, but I don’t see why that would be inherently problematic in this context, US soil or otherwise.

Bump because I would appreciate an answer to this question.
 
Revisting this:

Was (or is) anything preventing the CIA from liaising with Saudi intelligence (or any other country’s intelligence agencies, for that matter) within the US in collecting intelligence on/attempting to recruit foreign nationals specifically (as opposed to US citizens, which Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar were most certainly not)?

After all, two foreign nationals who are known al-Qaeda operatives are valid US intelligence targets, and I don’t see why targeting them specifically within the US would be illegal. Not saying that there actually was any CiA-Saudi recruitment operation going on here, but I don’t see why that would be inherently problematic in this context, US soil or otherwise.

The short answer is once foreigners are on US soil the CIA has to brief the FBI and hand the situation off to them. Obviously, ALEC Station took their time notifying the FBI about the two hijackers' presence in the US. Their fear was the FBI would arrest them and alert Al Qaeda that the US was watching them closer than publicly disclosed. This was one of many problems created by the CIA allowing an independent cell which operated outside of the Agency's channels.

As it turned out, Nawaf al-Hazmi ended up at a San Diego mosque which was already under FBI surveillance. This implies the FBI already thought the place was fishy, but they were looking at the wrong things. Hunt down a book called "My Jihad" by Aukai Collins, who was one of their inside sources at the mosque. He said he never saw them. This is due to Al Qaeda training their operatives to keep a low profile and not "act Muslim". Burner phones, cash payments, and prepaid credit cards made them invisible.

It boiled down to operational limitations imposed by the CIA charter and the Agency keeping the FBI in the dark.

One last point, Alec Station knew Al Qaeda would be impossible to penetrate because they tried. The Saudis are easier to manipulate since Royal Families tend to have in-fighting to exploit.
 
The short answer is once foreigners are on US soil the CIA has to brief the FBI and hand the situation off to them. Obviously, ALEC Station took their time notifying the FBI about the two hijackers' presence in the US. Their fear was the FBI would arrest them and alert Al Qaeda that the US was watching them closer than publicly disclosed. This was one of many problems created by the CIA allowing an independent cell which operated outside of the Agency's channels.

As it turned out, Nawaf al-Hazmi ended up at a San Diego mosque which was already under FBI surveillance. This implies the FBI already thought the place was fishy, but they were looking at the wrong things. Hunt down a book called "My Jihad" by Aukai Collins, who was one of their inside sources at the mosque. He said he never saw them. This is due to Al Qaeda training their operatives to keep a low profile and not "act Muslim". Burner phones, cash payments, and prepaid credit cards made them invisible.

It boiled down to operational limitations imposed by the CIA charter and the Agency keeping the FBI in the dark.

One last point, Alec Station knew Al Qaeda would be impossible to penetrate because they tried. The Saudis are easier to manipulate since Royal Families tend to have in-fighting to exploit.

Interesting. Thanks for the book recommendation. :thumbsup:
 
Article from a month ago. This theory isn’t going away…

One “former senior FBI official whose identity is known to me,” dubbed CS-16, told Canestraro, the FBI’s N.Y.C. office wasn’t told that Hazmi and Mihdhar were in the country until Aug. 26, 2001. “CS-16 stated that the CIA withheld the information that the two hijackers had had entered the country in 2000 from the FBI on orders from two CIA employees, Richard Blee and Tom Wilshire. CS-16 stated that it was his/her opinion that the information was withheld as the CIA was attempting to recruit Al Hazmi and/or Al Mihdhar as intelligence sources while they were in the U.S.”

…….


FBI agent CS-5 said the CIA’s reluctance to tell the FBI about the two al Qaeda figures “didn’t make sense” to many New York agents and led CS-5 to conclude “that the CIA was running an intelligence operation targeting Al-Qaeda that somehow involved Hazmi and Mihdhar.” CS-5 believed the CIA operation “may have spun out of control” and they came to the FBI in June 2001 “with limited information in an attempt to locate the hijackers without revealing the true nature or extent of their operation against Al Qaeda.”

Yet another ex-FBI agent said to have “extensive knowledge” of counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters, stated in June 2021 that the effort to recruit Hazmi and Mihdhar “was an operation directed by the Central Intelligence Agency. CS-23 told me that the CIA used their liaison relationship with the Saudi intelligence services to conduct an operation on U.S. soil. CS-23 told me that the Saudis were used as a go between as the CIA is forbidden by law to conduct intelligence operations within the U.S.” The CIA “has used its relationship with allied intelligence services to conduct operations inside the United States in the past,” the declaration says.

https://www.floridabulldog.org/2023...i-officials-9-11-coverup-cia-domestic-spying/
 
Opinion is not documented fact. There would be a paper trail for this.

Given the nature of the accusations, assuming for a moment that they are true and that there was a paper trail, it’s either buried in still-classified CIA documents that relate to cooperation with Saudi intelligence—and I sincerely doubt the CIA or indeed, other relevant executive branch agencies like the State Department, Defense Department, and NSC/White House are eager to declassify their dealings with foreign governments in general (let alone the Saudis), and vice versa—or such documents have been destroyed.

Regardless, there’s NEVER been an adequate explanation for why critical intelligence regarding two known al-Qaeda operatives tied to the San’aa, Yemen switchboard that relayed messages between Osama bin Laden and the rest of his network—relevant to the FBI criminal investigation of the East Africa embassy bombings and of FBI intelligence investigations of the Al-Qaeda network more broadly—were not made known to the FBI by the CIA (or apparently, to Richard Clarke and the rest of the Clinton NSC—or the succeeding Bush NSC for that matter, and per Clarke, the decision to not share this information had to have been made “at the Director level”, meaning George Tenet). That intelligence being, Khalid al-Midhar’s multi-entry US visa and Nawaf al-Hazmi’s travel to Los Angeles in January 2000.

In fact, the FBI attaches at Alec Station were outright prevented from sharing it with the FBI (read: John O’ Neill at the NYC Field Office, ie. the “office of origin” for FBI criminal investigations into Osama bin Laden). Not only that, but when the FBI attaches resisted, Alec Station’s CIA personnel threatened them with prosecution if they shared the info re: al-Midhar’s US visa with the FBI. What gives? The so-called “Wall” doesn’t explain it—at least, not adequately.

And having failed to hand over surveillance of Hazmi and Midhar to the FBI (meanwhile the Saudis seemed to be surveilling—and assisting—them in the US just fine), after 9/11 these CIA Alec Station officers received promotions and a few of them became deeply involved with the CIA’s torture program. And Director Tenet not only became an accessory to Bush and Cheney’s weaponization of questionable to outright fabricated intelligence regarding Saddam Hussein (and thus, to the disastrous invasion and occupation of Iraq); he also signed off on the Agency’s use of torture and misled the White House on its effectiveness.

And yes, Sandy Berger’s theft of 9/11 Commission documents is also suspicious as hell. If I remember correctly, it was a classified summary and evaluation of the US government’s response to the Millennium Plots, drafted by Richard Clarke for the NSC.

Bottom line: I’m not a conspiracy theorist. I’m just looking for some answers on these and similar failures and fiascos. I think the American people—no, the entire world—are entitled to as complete and honest an explanation as possible, that’s all.
 
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Given the nature of the accusations, assuming for a moment that they are true and that there was a paper trail, it’s either buried in still-classified CIA documents that relate to cooperation with Saudi intelligence—and I sincerely doubt the CIA or indeed, other relevant executive branch agencies like the State Department, Defense Department, and NSC/White House are eager to declassify their dealings with foreign governments in general (let alone the Saudis), and vice versa—or such documents have been destroyed.
You should know what assuming is/does.
Regardless, there’s NEVER been an adequate explanation for why critical intelligence regarding two known al-Qaeda operatives tied to the San’aa, Yemen switchboard that relayed messages between Osama bin Laden and the rest of his network—relevant to the FBI criminal investigation of the East Africa embassy bombings and of FBI intelligence investigations of the Al-Qaeda network more broadly—were not made known to the FBI by the CIA (or apparently, to Richard Clarke and the rest of the Clinton NSC—or the succeeding Bush NSC for that matter, and per Clarke, the decision to not share this information had to have been made “at the Director level”, meaning George Tenet). That intelligence being, Khalid al-Midhar’s multi-entry US visa and Nawaf al-Hazmi’s travel to Los Angeles in January 2000.

In fact, the FBI attaches at Alec Station were outright prevented from sharing it with the FBI (read: John O’ Neill at the NYC Field Office, ie. the “office of origin” for FBI criminal investigations into Osama bin Laden). Not only that, but when the FBI attaches resisted, Alec Station’s CIA personnel threatened them with prosecution if they shared the info re: al-Midhar’s US visa with the FBI. What gives? The so-called “Wall” doesn’t explain it—at least, not adequately.

And having failed to hand over surveillance of Hazmi and Midhar to the FBI (meanwhile the Saudis seemed to be surveilling—and assisting—them in the US just fine), after 9/11 these CIA Alec Station officers received promotions
So what? how many others were promoted in the same time frame? How many operatives besides these two become involved in the torture program? Why do you bring this up in you CT theory?
and a few of them became deeply involved with the CIA’s torture program. And Director Tenet not only became an accessory to Bush and Cheney’s weaponization of questionable to outright fabricated intelligence regarding Saddam Hussein (and thus, to the disastrous invasion and occupation of Iraq); he also signed off on the Agency’s use of torture and misled the White House on its effectiveness.

And yes, Sandy Berger’s theft of 9/11 Commission documents is also suspicious as hell. If I remember correctly, it was a classified summary and evaluation of the US government’s response to the Millennium Plots, drafted by Richard Clarke for the NSC.

Bottom line: I’m not a conspiracy theorist. I’m just looking for some answers on these and similar failures and fiascos. I think the American people—no, the entire world—are entitled to as complete and honest an explanation as possible, that’s all.

Yes you are every time you post these connecting dots without any substantial proof other than I don't think the complete explanation has been presented (your opinion). Why hasn't some smart attentive newspaper journalist from the Washington Post or NY Times found the same situation as you have and run their own investigative research?
Sorry i have been around for some time reading this same narrative from you and you know pronounce yourself as not a conspiracy theorist. I understand you are passionate about this matter, but surely you need to assess your beliefs as what they appear to me a CT, plain and simple.
 
Bottom line: I’m not a conspiracy theorist. I’m just looking for some answers on these and similar failures and fiascos. I think the American people—no, the entire world—are entitled to as complete and honest an explanation as possible, that’s all.

You're just going to have to wait, and the whole story might never see the light of day. That's just how it is. You don't have to like it, but this is the world we've been living in.

All of those points you brought up have been discussed and debated here, and in the 911 Commission Report, and the CIA IG Report. The closest we (the public) have ever come to a name responsible for choking off the flow of intelligence between the CIA and FBI was a 2021 History Channel documentary on 9-11, wherein the trail stops at the desk of a single, unnamed CIA manager. This means the information is there, but with a name will likely come an explanation that nobody is going to be happy about.

At the end of the day, 9-11 lies at the feet of Al Qaeda, not the CIA or FBI. The US Government has a lot of moving parts. The FBI and CIA operate under the US Constitution, and a long list of laws. Before September, 2001, the lines for the CIA and FBI were clearly drawn. Not like today, where the CIA is quietly passing intel to the DEA about drug shipments, but this fact is not disclosed in federal court. Not like today, where the FBI seems to investigate to the full extent of its abilities with a minimum of legal paperwork. All the abuses of the FBI and CIA in the news today (real or perceived) are a direct result of the USA Patriot Act, and the war on terror creeping into non-terrorist investigations.

The limits of the CIA and FBI prior to 9-11 have also been discussed at length on this board, long before I got here, and by much smarter people.
 
the whole story might never see the light of day. That's just how it is. You don't have to like it, but this is the world we've been living in.

The frustrating part is, of all the 9/11 conspiracy theories that have come about over the years, this is one that may have been true. But we've had 20 years of being saturated by total f*ing ridiculous claims from "9/11 Truth" that the public is way over having to now deal with something else.

The Irony is, if this one was in fact true, then "9/11 Truth" actually helped the CIA get away with it. :boggled:
 
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