I don't think you got my point, probably because I didn't phrase it very well. If the Senate is in session, they are not in recess. If the Senate is in recess, they are not in session. To take the administration's position seriously, the caveat that recess appointments expire at the end of the next session should mean then that the next time the Senate breaks for long enough that a recess appointment could be made, any recess appointments made in the prior recess should expire. Which would mean recess appointments should last no more than maybe a week after the Senate convenes again. For the weekend break.
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Ooooh, OK. I see what you're saying.
So the term "shall expire at the End of their next Session" has always been taken to mean the point when the Senate adjourns
sine die on the very last day of the next annual session. I frankly don't know how or when that practice came about. There may be caselaw on it someplace ages ago or it could just be another historical understanding between the branches. I can't recall ever seeing it questioned before. There is, though, a clear distinction between the two types of recess in terms of parliamentary procedure that we can rely on. For an intrasession recess the Senate adjourns with a specified date and time to reconvene. For an intersession recess there's no day specified (hence
adjournment sine die - "without date").
So, if I'm hearing you correctly now, what you're saying is that recesses for the purpose of all of Article II, Section 2 should only be those in which the Senate has adjourned
sine die and entered an intersession recess. That was effectively the decision of the lower court.
If that's your argument then it risks more than you may think.
If you read the phrase "during the Recess of the Senate" as only applying to intersession recess following
sine die adjournment then you also have to apply the same reading to the phrase ""shall expire at the End of their next Session", correct? If we do that with absolute strictness and the Senate continues to hold
pro forma sessions and never adjourns
sine die then "the End of their next Session"
never comes and recess appointments
will never expire. Under that interpretation a President could effectively make life appointments if the Senate stayed in perpetual
pro forma session. That would give enormous power to the Party that controlled both the Presidency and one branch of Congress. It would allow a complete end-run around the "advice and consent" of the Senate for as long as that party held office.
On the other hand, if you go all the way to the opposite extreme and read both phrases as applying to both regular and
sine die adjournments then the power shifts dramatically to the Senate. Under that reading, as you point out, all the Senate would have to do to quash a recess appointment would be to adjourn for an hour, come back into session, and then adjourn for an hour again. All recess appointments would then expire at "the End of the next Session". That reading of the phrase would make the President's power under Article II, Section 2 effectively meaningless. The Senate could dispose of his recess appointments without breaking a sweat.
So it's clear that
neither of those two extremes can be right. Either of those two readings screws up the intent of the Advice and Consent Clause.
The way we've always gotten around it in the past is through a political agreement between the branches. Presidents got to read the first part as applying to all recesses and the Senate was always put into
sine die adjournment at the end of the annual session so that those appointments would eventually expire. In effect, we've always agreed to a compromise that makes the Article work in a way that's good for everybody. Power between the branches stayed in balance until Reid and Boehner got their hands in the game.
Canning is now mucking up that system by asking the Supreme Court to chuck out the compromise and come up with a ruling that forces a bad outcome on everybody. If the Supreme Court actually issues a ruling it will either be: 1) an illogical split-the-baby thing where they maintain the status quo compromise by applying different meanings to different sections of Article II, Section 2 (which will piss off Scalia to no end,
), or 2) a definitive ruling where they try to pick the lessor of two evils and end up screwing everybody over by forcing a definition of recess that hands too much power to one branch of government or the other. We're asking the Court to make a bad decision either way.
That's why I say the Court needs to apply political question doctrine and keep out of it. There's no good decision to be had in this case. It's a choice between two bad outcomes.
So I agree completely that you
could read Article II, Section 2 the way you suggest. You could also read it in the complete opposite of the way you suggest. What I'm saying is that you shouldn't read it
either way. I think doing so creates even more potential for recess appointment shenanigans and political strife down the road.
The old compromise worked fine for everybody until people injected politics into it. Maybe the best thing is to just lock Reid and Boehner in a room with copious food and drink but no toilet and not let them out until they agree to end this stupid mess. It really is a political fight that's spilled over into the courts. We should be forcing the political branches to clean it up for themselves.