Immigrants are regular folks whose lives don't fit neatly within national boundaries. Your reviewer is one of the quarter billion (the number doesn't include illegal migrants) living outside her country of birth, and counts herself fortunate to have lived for more than a few months in three other countries as well. She has dual citizenship of New Zealand and the United Kingdom and has often wondered why it isn't easy for people to accumulate many nationalities at will should they wish to. So fair disclosure--she is not an opponent of immigration.
Philippe Legrain's 2007 text is a compelling case for this kind of thing to be far more widespread, and as such it goes against the tide of contemporary popular consensus on the left and right of politics. Indeed some now argue that the new political divide is open versus closed borders (to trade, migration and attendant legislation), which was to some extent evident in the result of the UK's 2016 referendum that voted to exit the European Union. In many parts of the world, "drawbridge-up" is in the ascendancy. So it is useful to revisit the alternative view to the recent trend. And recent it largely is: people have migrated since they first walked on the planet, border controls are a much newer innovation.
Mr Legrain's thesis is that these restrictions are morally wrong, economically stupid and politically unsustainable. Morality first. Before areas like the EU established free migration as a principle, The United Nations' universal human right 13 already had it half enshrined since 1948, although the freedom described therein is that to leave a country, not enter one, as if it is possible to only do the former. But while few would agree that any state has any moral right to prevent citizens leaving its land, the other side of the coin--that states should welcome all-comers--isn't really accepted anywhere, outside of a few civil-libertarian groups. There is modest tolerance for granting entry to doctors and other skilled professionals but--notwithstanding Emma Lazarus's poem at the Statue of Liberty--the huddled masses (poor, low-skilled) are widely regarded with suspicion and of negative benefit and thus to be justifiably turned away. This is ethically odd particularly when it is argued even by those of nominally egalitarian persuasion, who would favour redistribution to such folks if only they were of their own nationality. And (see economic) the negative benefit bit doesn't appear to be true for these folks either. Most migrants take risks and endure hardship in pursuit of the opportunity to relocate. Yet we tend to take it for granted that restrictions on movement of people should exist, as if it should be normal to expect poor foreigners to be tied to their birthplace. Underlying this it is assumed that immigration controls protect the rich, and first world ways of life. But what if they don't?
This leads to the economics. Gains from trade come from taking advantage of differences--differences in endowment, and ability (and preference) to produce, consume and invest. Thanks to Messrs Adam Smith and David Ricardo this wisdom is in generally mainstream acceptance for most sources of wealth contained within inanimate stuff. John Stuart Mill applied it to movement and association of persons as well in 1848, phrased as there being no nation that didn't need to borrow from the people of others. The underlying logic behind mutual win-win is just the same for people as it is for goods, services and capital: the list of benefits from voluntary movement of human beings is long and the list of costs short (but non zero), making the net surplus rather large (Ask Israel, which permits and experiences bursts of unplanned immigration that would scare the daylights out of most western governments and their voters, but which its economy has hugely thrived on). Yet according to common wisdom in most of the west, migrants take limited jobs, depress low wages and sap scarce resources from host countries while contributing little in return. And (to the extent that people even think about it, which isn't much) they supposedly also represent a net loss to their homelands.
But all of this is backwards. Legrain points out that even if immigrants were replicas of natives they would still enlarge the size of the pie by adding supply as well as demand, but they would also certainly compete against natives in that case too. Yet immigration's opponents would be first to attest to migrants' differences--not similarities--as being the "problem", but this substantially blows away the economic concern. Gains from trade (in labour), diversification / diversity, and positive sumness almost mechanically result, and are ubiquitous if sometimes not obvious. Temporary strawberry pickers might not boost fruit harvesting productivity, but they can boost output per person / hour economy-wide by allowing others to work at something else, that they either do better, like more, or add more value at. Foreign nannies allow high flying native lawyers or management consultants to return to work and be much more productive than if they didn't. Imported hotel maids save managers having to inflate wages to entice unwilling nationals to take the jobs, that they would probably do only grudgingly anyway.
Some rich-world governments agree that immigration is fine, but that it just needs managing, and they then advocate points-based selection, biased to the educated and skilled (and rich). This is both less scary to the typical voter and supposedly preferable to discriminating on nationality / race. But it discriminates against the poor and uneducated instead and is thus no less ethically flawed. It also falls foul of governments' poor eligibility to pick winners in deciding who should arrive (Had they been immigrants facing points systems, Richard Branson, Bill Gates and Barack Obama senior wouldn't have been allowed in to the UK and US respectively). Skill-biased immigration is counterproductive in the countries of its most ardent adherents. Australia has a 700 page manual on which skilled immigrants should make it ashore, but faces pressure from industry for more unskilled workers. Toronto has the most highly qualified taxi-driving force in the world (half of them having PhDs or MDs) because of policy-induced over-supply of imported high skills and under-supply of lower skills. And Canada and Australia are two of the most pro-immigration countries with 20% and 24% of their populations foreign born, respectively. (Legrain thinks Canada is a template of where the rest of the rich world will be in 100 years time) But the bottom line is that rich, poor, skilled, unskilled, it is very difficult morally or economically to argue that it is in anyone's best interest to over-ride the voluntary choice to migrate. Particularly when substantial hurdles are willingly overcome to do it. Falling fertility, which is happening almost everywhere (see Peoplequake) but from already-below-replacement levels in the rich world, only exacerbates the need, and the benefit, for increased migration across the skill spectrum to these places even as scared voters recoil from it.
With most post-war migration being from third world to first (rather than old world to new, which was the case a century ago), a relevant question is the net impact on the countries of origin. Some brain-drain is costly (and usually the most likely to migrate are the most skilled), particuarly in respect of medical doctors leaving AIDS-torn Africa. But other countries (India, Philippines) produce more qualified workers that they can (yet) realistically use. And remittances from overseas diaspora are extremely beneficial: not only are they larger in size than total international aid flows, they also fully bypass corrupt governments and extractive regimes and find their way far more directly to those they are intended to benefit. Even better, they are responsive to increased hardship in timely fashion: when originating countries are hit by crop failure or hurricanes, remittance flows quickly increase. Somaliland, which doesn't even formally exist as a country, benefits hugely from its diaspora. The Philippines treats emigrants as heroes in recognition of the contribution they make to the country that they leave, by dint of leaving it. In short these voluntary transfers do a great deal to lift many out of poverty in poor countries. They can also even increase a country's credit rating. (Mr Legrain suggests that emigrants may raise local wages for those left behind, but this would probably be inconsistent with his insistence that immigrants don't lower wages in the countries where they fetch up)
Notwithstanding popular resistance, which he does a superb job of invalidating, Mr Legrain believes that the political end game will inevitably be much more open borders than the reverse. The forces that motivate people to move are increasing not diminishing, and the organisation of the world around a fictitious norm that everyone stays in one place, is ever more unsustainable as the numbers of people on the move keep growing. If conscience is not sufficient to persuade, Mr Legrain says, then self-interest should be. Few governments will, he believes, ultimately be able to resist the use of increased immigration alongside go-without / work-longer policies to deal with their greying citizens. Even Japan, which encourages more temporary immigration than it used to, pretty much out of necessity.
Borders were originally designed to administer flows through open doors rather than prevent them (just 2% of Ellis Island arrivals were refused before WW1). Illegal migrants become beholden to criminal gangs and end up contributing far less to their host country, send less back to their origin country, are highly unlikely to leave, and enjoy no protection where they are. Yet they still come despite higher walls. According to Mr Legrain, the world has as much to gain from setting people free (in poor countries) and having open doors (which become revolving ones) as it did from the shift from feudal serfdom to capitalism. It should give this freedom a (renewed) try.
Philippe Legrain's 2007 text is a compelling case for this kind of thing to be far more widespread, and as such it goes against the tide of contemporary popular consensus on the left and right of politics. Indeed some now argue that the new political divide is open versus closed borders (to trade, migration and attendant legislation), which was to some extent evident in the result of the UK's 2016 referendum that voted to exit the European Union. In many parts of the world, "drawbridge-up" is in the ascendancy. So it is useful to revisit the alternative view to the recent trend. And recent it largely is: people have migrated since they first walked on the planet, border controls are a much newer innovation.
Mr Legrain's thesis is that these restrictions are morally wrong, economically stupid and politically unsustainable. Morality first. Before areas like the EU established free migration as a principle, The United Nations' universal human right 13 already had it half enshrined since 1948, although the freedom described therein is that to leave a country, not enter one, as if it is possible to only do the former. But while few would agree that any state has any moral right to prevent citizens leaving its land, the other side of the coin--that states should welcome all-comers--isn't really accepted anywhere, outside of a few civil-libertarian groups. There is modest tolerance for granting entry to doctors and other skilled professionals but--notwithstanding Emma Lazarus's poem at the Statue of Liberty--the huddled masses (poor, low-skilled) are widely regarded with suspicion and of negative benefit and thus to be justifiably turned away. This is ethically odd particularly when it is argued even by those of nominally egalitarian persuasion, who would favour redistribution to such folks if only they were of their own nationality. And (see economic) the negative benefit bit doesn't appear to be true for these folks either. Most migrants take risks and endure hardship in pursuit of the opportunity to relocate. Yet we tend to take it for granted that restrictions on movement of people should exist, as if it should be normal to expect poor foreigners to be tied to their birthplace. Underlying this it is assumed that immigration controls protect the rich, and first world ways of life. But what if they don't?
This leads to the economics. Gains from trade come from taking advantage of differences--differences in endowment, and ability (and preference) to produce, consume and invest. Thanks to Messrs Adam Smith and David Ricardo this wisdom is in generally mainstream acceptance for most sources of wealth contained within inanimate stuff. John Stuart Mill applied it to movement and association of persons as well in 1848, phrased as there being no nation that didn't need to borrow from the people of others. The underlying logic behind mutual win-win is just the same for people as it is for goods, services and capital: the list of benefits from voluntary movement of human beings is long and the list of costs short (but non zero), making the net surplus rather large (Ask Israel, which permits and experiences bursts of unplanned immigration that would scare the daylights out of most western governments and their voters, but which its economy has hugely thrived on). Yet according to common wisdom in most of the west, migrants take limited jobs, depress low wages and sap scarce resources from host countries while contributing little in return. And (to the extent that people even think about it, which isn't much) they supposedly also represent a net loss to their homelands.
But all of this is backwards. Legrain points out that even if immigrants were replicas of natives they would still enlarge the size of the pie by adding supply as well as demand, but they would also certainly compete against natives in that case too. Yet immigration's opponents would be first to attest to migrants' differences--not similarities--as being the "problem", but this substantially blows away the economic concern. Gains from trade (in labour), diversification / diversity, and positive sumness almost mechanically result, and are ubiquitous if sometimes not obvious. Temporary strawberry pickers might not boost fruit harvesting productivity, but they can boost output per person / hour economy-wide by allowing others to work at something else, that they either do better, like more, or add more value at. Foreign nannies allow high flying native lawyers or management consultants to return to work and be much more productive than if they didn't. Imported hotel maids save managers having to inflate wages to entice unwilling nationals to take the jobs, that they would probably do only grudgingly anyway.
Some rich-world governments agree that immigration is fine, but that it just needs managing, and they then advocate points-based selection, biased to the educated and skilled (and rich). This is both less scary to the typical voter and supposedly preferable to discriminating on nationality / race. But it discriminates against the poor and uneducated instead and is thus no less ethically flawed. It also falls foul of governments' poor eligibility to pick winners in deciding who should arrive (Had they been immigrants facing points systems, Richard Branson, Bill Gates and Barack Obama senior wouldn't have been allowed in to the UK and US respectively). Skill-biased immigration is counterproductive in the countries of its most ardent adherents. Australia has a 700 page manual on which skilled immigrants should make it ashore, but faces pressure from industry for more unskilled workers. Toronto has the most highly qualified taxi-driving force in the world (half of them having PhDs or MDs) because of policy-induced over-supply of imported high skills and under-supply of lower skills. And Canada and Australia are two of the most pro-immigration countries with 20% and 24% of their populations foreign born, respectively. (Legrain thinks Canada is a template of where the rest of the rich world will be in 100 years time) But the bottom line is that rich, poor, skilled, unskilled, it is very difficult morally or economically to argue that it is in anyone's best interest to over-ride the voluntary choice to migrate. Particularly when substantial hurdles are willingly overcome to do it. Falling fertility, which is happening almost everywhere (see Peoplequake) but from already-below-replacement levels in the rich world, only exacerbates the need, and the benefit, for increased migration across the skill spectrum to these places even as scared voters recoil from it.
With most post-war migration being from third world to first (rather than old world to new, which was the case a century ago), a relevant question is the net impact on the countries of origin. Some brain-drain is costly (and usually the most likely to migrate are the most skilled), particuarly in respect of medical doctors leaving AIDS-torn Africa. But other countries (India, Philippines) produce more qualified workers that they can (yet) realistically use. And remittances from overseas diaspora are extremely beneficial: not only are they larger in size than total international aid flows, they also fully bypass corrupt governments and extractive regimes and find their way far more directly to those they are intended to benefit. Even better, they are responsive to increased hardship in timely fashion: when originating countries are hit by crop failure or hurricanes, remittance flows quickly increase. Somaliland, which doesn't even formally exist as a country, benefits hugely from its diaspora. The Philippines treats emigrants as heroes in recognition of the contribution they make to the country that they leave, by dint of leaving it. In short these voluntary transfers do a great deal to lift many out of poverty in poor countries. They can also even increase a country's credit rating. (Mr Legrain suggests that emigrants may raise local wages for those left behind, but this would probably be inconsistent with his insistence that immigrants don't lower wages in the countries where they fetch up)
Notwithstanding popular resistance, which he does a superb job of invalidating, Mr Legrain believes that the political end game will inevitably be much more open borders than the reverse. The forces that motivate people to move are increasing not diminishing, and the organisation of the world around a fictitious norm that everyone stays in one place, is ever more unsustainable as the numbers of people on the move keep growing. If conscience is not sufficient to persuade, Mr Legrain says, then self-interest should be. Few governments will, he believes, ultimately be able to resist the use of increased immigration alongside go-without / work-longer policies to deal with their greying citizens. Even Japan, which encourages more temporary immigration than it used to, pretty much out of necessity.
Borders were originally designed to administer flows through open doors rather than prevent them (just 2% of Ellis Island arrivals were refused before WW1). Illegal migrants become beholden to criminal gangs and end up contributing far less to their host country, send less back to their origin country, are highly unlikely to leave, and enjoy no protection where they are. Yet they still come despite higher walls. According to Mr Legrain, the world has as much to gain from setting people free (in poor countries) and having open doors (which become revolving ones) as it did from the shift from feudal serfdom to capitalism. It should give this freedom a (renewed) try.