Hard consciousness: binary? cline? else?

[JeanTate]

Many of you reading this thread will have heard of the “hard problem of consciousness“; WP is as good an intro as any.

In this thread, I’d like to discuss a somewhat orthogonal question: is consciousness, of the “hard problem” kind, binary?

It’s a question I’ve not seen discussed; if you know of a good one, please cite.

Often, consciousness of the hard problem kind seems to refer to fully conscious, fully functioning adult humans, as well as AIs, philosophical zombies, etc.

But does whatever consciousness we have when dreaming, with brains ravaged by disease or drugs, etc count as consciousness?

In a recent discussion elsewhere - on an unrelated topic - a participant talked about a repugnance to torture dogs, but zero qualms about “torturing” azalea bushes. He said this had to do with a recognition that dogs have consciousness (of the hard problem kind), but azaleas do not. And torturing computers - AI or not - is impossible. IOW, he was, briefly, sketching boundaries.

So, where does consciousness begin, and end? When did it first evolve? Any convergent evolution (e.g. Octopoda vs Primate)?

 

[Puppycow]

Good question, but I have no idea how to answer.

Personally I am not so sure that an AI cannot have a consciousness in principle. Nor even maybe an azalea bush, although I rather doubt it. Do babies have consciousness? I assume they do, and yet I cannot remember being a baby at all. My earliest memories begin around 2 years of age and have all but faded away into a few images. Our perspective may be biased. We don't know what it is like to be another creature or another entity, so how can we really say with any certainty?

 

[Darat]

Many of you reading this thread will have heard of the “hard problem of consciousness“; WP is as good an intro as any.

In this thread, I’d like to discuss a somewhat orthogonal question: is consciousness, of the “hard problem” kind, binary?

It’s a question I’ve not seen discussed; if you know of a good one, please cite.

Often, consciousness of the hard problem kind seems to refer to fully conscious, fully functioning adult humans, as well as AIs, philosophical zombies, etc.

But does whatever consciousness we have when dreaming, with brains ravaged by disease or drugs, etc count as consciousness?

In a recent discussion elsewhere - on an unrelated topic - a participant talked about a repugnance to torture dogs, but zero qualms about “torturing” azalea bushes. He said this had to do with a recognition that dogs have consciousness (of the hard problem kind), but azaleas do not. And torturing computers - AI or not - is impossible. IOW, he was, briefly, sketching boundaries.

So, where does consciousness begin, and end? When did it first evolve? Any convergent evolution (e.g. Octopoda vs Primate)?

I view it like most physical properties of living creatures - there is a range but no clear division. When I'm using the word "consciousness" all I mean is the processing of stimuli, we tend to reserve it for the apparently more complex processing - so we don't say a plant has consciousness because it reacts to the direction of the sun as it grows. I'd be happy to say a nervous system with a central processing collection of neurons is the minimum required for any consciousness, after that it's all a matter of degree.

 

[Bikewer]

When philosophers get involved with consciousness, they tend to get stuck in endless arguments over defining “qualia” (experience).
Modern neuroscience tends to look at what’s actually going on in the brain.

At one level, consciousness is just being aware of the environment and being able to respond to it. A housefly would be “conscious” in that regard. But we normally use the term to describe the multiple cognitive functions of much more-advanced brains, like humans and a few other animals.
We know that there are many discrete structures in the brain, and that they are all cross-wired very extensively. Our primitive “reptile” brain communicates with the most-advanced structures like the pre-frontal cortex.
So it’s felt that consciousness is the sum total of brain function, the ability to not only have sensory input but to analyze and correlate those functions along with memory, emotion, analysis.... Etc.
As to exactly how that all works, and how such correlations and analysis lead to new ideas and creativity and such... Not well understood to put it mildly. But it’s only been for the last few decades that we’ve been able to image brain function in real time with modern scanning technology.

 

[Puppycow]

What is it like to be an electron? An interview with Galen Strawson

In recent years more and more philosophers seem to have embraced panpsychism—the view that consciousness pervades the universe and so is present, in however simple a form, in every little speck of matter. It’s a view that’s hard to wrap your mind around, so I’m glad I got to have a conversation with Galen Strawson, a noted philosopher who is one of its most articulate proponents (and who, as a bonus, is charmingly offbeat). I interviewed Galen on the Wright Show (available on both meaningoflife.tv and as an audio podcast) more than a year ago. Below is an extended excerpt.

Perhaps consciousness is a property of all baryonic matter, not just organic lifeforms.

 

[JeanTate]

When philosophers get involved with consciousness, they tend to get stuck in endless arguments over defining “qualia” (experience).

Inner experiences, such as the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, the redness of the evening sky ... that sort of thing, right?

Taking just the first: can dogs experience the pain of a headache? How about mice? A fruitfly? A nematode worm (e.g. C. elegans)?

Do philosophers concern themselves with the qualia of dogs?

Modern neuroscience tends to look at what’s actually going on in the brain.

AFAIK, in C. elegans the "what's actually going on" is now pretty well understood down to the level of each individual nerve cell (all ~200 of them).

At one level, consciousness is just being aware of the environment and being able to respond to it. A housefly would be “conscious” in that regard.

By that criterion, at the limit, even live bacteria could be conscious (not sure about viruses)!

But bacteria do not have qualia, do they?

And it should be a piece of cake to build a gadget, out of silicon and metal, which is aware of its environment and able to respond to it ... would that gadget be conscious?

But we normally use the term to describe the multiple cognitive functions of much more-advanced brains, like humans and a few other animals.
We know that there are many discrete structures in the brain, and that they are all cross-wired very extensively. Our primitive “reptile” brain communicates with the most-advanced structures like the pre-frontal cortex.
So it’s felt that consciousness is the sum total of brain function, the ability to not only have sensory input but to analyze and correlate those functions along with memory, emotion, analysis.... Etc.

Hence my question about Octopoda.

More advanced brain? Check.

Multiple cognitive functions? Check.

Many discrete structures? Check.

Extensively cross-wired? Check.

But, evolution-wise, as invertebrates, not in any way related to reptiles (other than, perhaps, convergent evolution).

As to exactly how that all works, and how such correlations and analysis lead to new ideas and creativity and such... Not well understood to put it mildly. But it’s only been for the last few decades that we’ve been able to image brain function in real time with modern scanning technology.

Maybe at least some qualia will be well-understood enough that my experience of the redness of red sunsets can be simulated in your brain (even if you are color-blind)?

Or will qualia be forever ineffible?

 

[sphenisc]

You might enjoy Dennett's Kinds of Minds and Consciousness Explained.

Unless you're a p-zombie, in which case you'll only think you enjoy them.

 

[Darat]

Inner experiences, such as the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, the redness of the evening sky ... that sort of thing, right?



Taking just the first: can dogs experience the pain of a headache? How about mice? A fruitfly? A nematode worm (e.g. C. elegans)?



Do philosophers concern themselves with the qualia of dogs?





AFAIK, in C. elegans the "what's actually going on" is now pretty well understood down to the level of each individual nerve cell (all ~200 of them).





By that criterion, at the limit, even live bacteria could be conscious (not sure about viruses)!



But bacteria do not have qualia, do they?



And it should be a piece of cake to build a gadget, out of silicon and metal, which is aware of its environment and able to respond to it ... would that gadget be conscious?





Hence my question about Octopoda.



More advanced brain? Check.



Multiple cognitive functions? Check.



Many discrete structures? Check.



Extensively cross-wired? Check.



But, evolution-wise, as invertebrates, not in any way related to reptiles (other than, perhaps, convergent evolution).





Maybe at least some qualia will be well-understood enough that my experience of the redness of red sunsets can be simulated in your brain (even if you are color-blind)?



Or will qualia be forever ineffible?

Qualia don't exist or at least the way philosophy uses the term. There is no requirement for them to exist apart from making us something more than self ambulatory bags of chemicals and water.

 

[steenkh]

I tend to think that consciousness is not binary, but a continuum ranging from bacteria to humans, and I think that qualia is an artificial concept designed to make consciousness mysterious and dualistic.

 

[JeanTate]

Qualia don't exist or at least the way philosophy uses the term. There is no requirement for them to exist apart from making us something more than self ambulatory bags of chemicals and water.

Indeed.

It would seem impossible to engage a dog in a discussion of the inner experience of the pain of a headache, much less a C. elegans

Such a discussion might tax some four year old Homo sapiens too, whether they are fully awake or dreaming.

Even the boldest philosophers would surely quail at the idea of elucidating the nature of qualia in quails

 

[JeanTate]

You might enjoy Dennett's Kinds of Minds and Consciousness Explained.

Unless you're a p-zombie, in which case you'll only think you enjoy them.

Thanks.

If you have read this, do you know if Dennertt discusses the nature of qualia in quails?

Would a p-zombie be confused by the idea of qualia?

 

[JeanTate]

I tend to think that consciousness is not binary, but a continuum ranging from bacteria to humans, and I think that qualia is an artificial concept designed to make consciousness mysterious and dualistic.

If an organism - bacterium or human - is alive, does the amount of consciousness it has change during its life?

For example, the same when you are trying to write down a taxonomic scheme for qualia as when you’re intubated and deeply sedated in an ICU?

 

[Darat]

Indeed.



It would seem impossible to engage a dog in a discussion of the inner experience of the pain of a headache, much less a C. elegans



Such a discussion might tax some four year old Homo sapiens too, whether they are fully awake or dreaming.



Even the boldest philosophers would surely quail at the idea of elucidating the nature of qualia in quails

Imagine red in your mind's eye. That is meant to be the qualia of experiencing red. Meant to be totally separate from seeing a red apple and experiencing red.

 

[Darat]

Thanks.



If you have read this, do you know if Dennertt discusses the nature of qualia in quails?



Would a p-zombie be confused by the idea of qualia?

And yes, us p-zombies are confused by the idea. I only experience the experience of red when I see something red, I have no "mind's eye" so I have no qualia of experience of red.

 

[JeanTate]

Thanks!

What is it like to be an electron? An interview with Galen Strawson



Perhaps consciousness is a property of all baryonic matter, not just organic lifeforms.

That may be an important contribution to philosophy, but not to science I feel.

If an object contains ~10²⁴ electrons, does it have ~10²⁴ the level of consciousness an electron does?

I wonder what the taxonomy of qualia is, in Strawson's panpsychism?

What is the pain of a headache for an electron? Is that quale the same for all electrons?

 

[JeanTate]

And yes, us p-zombies are confused by the idea. I only experience the experience of red when I see something red, I have no "mind's eye" so I have no qualia of experience of red.

Ah, but do you - sometimes at least - dream in color?

 

[Darat]

Ah, but do you - sometimes at least - dream in color?

Nope - don't dream in pictures.

 

[William Parcher]

You might enjoy Dennett's Kinds of Minds and Consciousness Explained.

Unless you're a p-zombie, in which case you'll only think you enjoy them.

I own Daniel Dennett's Consciousness Explained, but I have never met him.

I recommend Antonio Damasio's The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. My copy is autographed to me.

 

[p0lka]

What is it like to be an electron? An interview with Galen Strawson



Perhaps consciousness is a property of all baryonic matter, not just organic lifeforms.

Not just baryonic matter, they're including leptons as well.

 

[William Parcher]

Good question, but I have no idea how to answer.

Personally I am not so sure that an AI cannot have a consciousness in principle. Nor even maybe an azalea bush, although I rather doubt it. Do babies have consciousness? I assume they do, and yet I cannot remember being a baby at all. My earliest memories begin around 2 years of age and have all but faded away into a few images. Our perspective may be biased. We don't know what it is like to be another creature or another entity, so how can we really say with any certainty?

I am perplexed as to how AI can have consciousness without having personal and selfish motivations.

 

[p0lka]

I tend to think that consciousness is not binary, but a continuum ranging from bacteria to humans, and I think that qualia is an artificial concept designed to make consciousness mysterious and dualistic.

Re the highlighted I am of the same opinion.
Other creatures seem to have an internal state like a consciousness, but as you look at creatures with less brain structure, that consciousness seems to be less.
I remember watching a wasp attacking another wasp as a different wasp was eating its arse.
If that wasp had any sort of complex internal consciousness it possibly would have reacted to being eaten from behind and reassessed it's priorities.

 

[William Parcher]

I remember watching a wasp attacking another wasp as a different wasp was eating its arse.

If that wasp had any sort of complex internal consciousness it possibly would have reacted to being eaten from behind and reassessed it's priorities.

That wasp "consciously knows" that its head is meaningfully more important than its ass.

I am not joking around.

 

[JeanTate]

Not just baryonic matter, they're including leptons as well.

How about positrons, do they have consciousness, or anti-consciousness?

Or photons? Gluons? Virtual particles? Black holes?

Strawson seems to nod to physics, but I feel his take-away and application to consciousness is, um, an ineffably hard problem.

 

[William Parcher]

How about positrons, do they have consciousness, or anti-consciousness?

Or photons? Gluons? Virtual particles? Black holes?

Strawson seems to nod to physics, but I feel his take-away and application to consciousness is, um, an ineffably hard problem.

Pro Tip: Be very careful when you are in the presence of Philosophers who are attempting to do the work of Scientists.

 

[The Great Zaganza]

Consciousness must operate on a sliding scale - even cyclical chemical reactions exhibit properties that make it seem that they are aware of their environment.
It seems to me that people often mix up Consciousness with Free Will;
I would argue that it is entirely possible to have the former without the latter, in whatever sense you want to use it.

 

[p0lka]

Consciousness must operate on a sliding scale - even cyclical chemical reactions exhibit properties that make it seem that they are aware of their environment.
It seems to me that people often mix up Consciousness with Free Will;
I would argue that it is entirely possible to have the former without the latter, in whatever sense you want to use it.

I agree with your consciousness free will statement.

As long as it feels like you have free will, actually having free will is irrelevant.

 

[William Parcher]

Consciousness must operate on a sliding scale - even cyclical chemical reactions exhibit properties that make it seem that they are aware of their environment.

The chemicals react to their environment, but we don't just grant them with our kind of mental awareness.

It seems to me that people often mix up Consciousness with Free Will;
I would argue that it is entirely possible to have the former without the latter, in whatever sense you want to use it.

No way. The mere existence of Free Will in any form causes Free Will to exist everywhere in the universe, or model of the universe, and on any scale.

 

[p0lka]

The chemicals react to their environment, but we don't just grant them with our kind of mental awareness.


No way. The mere existence of Free Will in any form causes Free Will to exist everywhere in the universe, or model of the universe, and on any scale.

Does free will exist? You claiming it does, doesn't mean that it does.

For instance, could you have chosen to post a different post than the one you posted?

 

[William Parcher]

Does free will exist? You claiming it does, doesn't mean that it does.

For instance, could you have chosen to post a different post than the one you posted?

You've got an apple in front of you. Choosing to eat it, or not, is a situation and an act which proves Free Will exists. We use our brain and our senses to provide the theater staging and motive(s) for Free Will.

Our Free Will is inherent in this universe.

 

[JeanTate]

Consciousness must operate on a sliding scale - even cyclical chemical reactions exhibit properties that make it seem that they are aware of their environment.
It seems to me that people often mix up Consciousness with Free Will;
I would argue that it is entirely possible to have the former without the latter, in whatever sense you want to use it.

So where, on the sliding scale (continuum, cline) do qualia occur?

Perhaps the existence of qualia, for an object/entity with consciousness, is also on a sliding scale: electrons have consciousness but no qualia, primates have both in spades, nematode worms have consciousness but just the hint of a quale or two, azaleas have consciousness but no qualia (that sort of thing)?

 

[JeanTate]

Pro Tip: Be very careful when you are in the presence of Philosophers who are attempting to do the work of Scientists.

The irony is that the guy (“PhysicistDave”) in that other discussion I referred to in my OP (you can torture dogs, but not azalea bushes or AIs) is as hard-bitten a physicist as you’ll ever meet!

 

[William Parcher]

The irony is that the guy (“PhysicistDave”) in that other discussion I referred to in my OP (you can torture dogs, but not azalea bushes or AIs) is as hard-bitten a physicist as you’ll ever meet!

Good. He is a Physicist.

Both dogs and azaleas are designed by natural selection to withstand various "tortures" inflicted upon them by various sources - with most sources being nonhuman or indirectly a human source.

He seems to have skipped right to the part where he needs the azaleas to not feel or experience psycho-physical pain or anxiety (or whatever other bad things) in ways that dogs or humans would. Even if he is correct, he shouldn't assume that his audience fully agrees.

Is he stating that this is a fact like the laws of physics? Does he mention or imply that his proclamations of fact are always provisional?

 

[JeanTate]

Good. He is a Physicist.

Both dogs and azaleas are designed by natural selection to withstand various "tortures" inflicted upon them by various sources - with most sources being nonhuman or indirectly a human source.

He seems to have skipped right to the part where he needs the azaleas to not feel or experience psycho-physical pain or anxiety (or whatever other bad things) in ways that dogs or humans would. Even if he is correct, he shouldn't assume that his audience fully agrees.

Is he stating that this is a fact like the laws of physics? Does he mention or imply that his proclamations of fact are always provisional?

As is often the case, it kinda snuck in. I’ll add a link later, but it’s in Sabine Hossenfelder’s blog, BackReAction, as a rather OT sub-thread in the comments on “Do we need a Theory of Everything?”. Currently both of the two people who were most active in that sub-thread have stopped posting to it.

ETA link: https://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/07/do-we-need-theory-of-everything.html

 

[p0lka]

You've got an apple in front of you. Choosing to eat it, or not, is a situation and an act which proves Free Will exists.

As long as you had the option to choose differently, which is yet to be demonstrated

We use our brain and our senses to provide the theater staging and motive(s) for Free Will.

Our Free Will is inherent in this universe.

Feeling we had free will, whilst not having any free will, would be a distinction without a difference.

 

[steenkh]

So where, on the sliding scale (continuum, cline) do qualia occur?

If they exist. This is a matter of definition. I have yet to see a definition that is not assuming dualism.

You can also ask, what use has the term qualia, except to imply that consciousness is dualistic?

 

[The Great Zaganza]

The talk of qualia is, in my opinion, the result of insufficient understanding of how minds work.
We probably need better models and definitions of consciousness before a something like "Qualia" will become useful .

 

[The Great Zaganza]

The chemicals react to their environment, but we don't just grant them with our kind of mental awareness.

they react according to statistical probabilities even if we make the initial conditions as similar as possible, we still get minor variations on how the reactions occurs.
I would argue that processes in the brain similarly come down to probabilities.

 

[William Parcher]

The talk of qualia is, in my opinion, the result of insufficient understanding of how minds work.

We probably need better models and definitions of consciousness before a something like "Qualia" will become useful.

Oxford Dictionary has a decent definition...

Qualia (noun - from Philosophy): The internal and subjective component of sense perceptions, arising from stimulation of the senses by phenomena.

That seems good as it is, but the term seems to come from Philosophy rather than Science. We could go Full Science and choose a different term that means pretty much the same thing, but comes from Science.

For me, "Qualia" seems useful right away, regardless of whether it comes from Science or Philosophy.

 

[William Parcher]

As long as you had the option to choose differently, which is yet to be demonstrated

What part of the "apple choice situation" has not yet been demonstrated?

Feeling we had free will, whilst not having any free will, would be a distinction without a difference.

This isn't a trivial thing. The difference is huge and very meaningful.

 

[William Parcher]

they react according to statistical probabilities even if we make the initial conditions as similar as possible, we still get minor variations on how the reactions occurs.
I would argue that processes in the brain similarly come down to probabilities.

Go ahead and argue for that.

We use our brains to make critical decisions with enormous and permanent consequences. Our consciousness steers our decisions. The worst kind of conscious decision is what we call the Darwin Award. At its extreme, it's the full monty, and death is the result of the decision.

For your forthcoming argument, please try to use science instead of philosophy.