Biology of free will

[Beth]

The problem with that is that experiments show brain activity significantly before we are conscious of our thoughts or decisions.

So when I think "I'm going to think about Beth", some part of my brain was already 'thinking' about Beth before I consciously became aware of wanting to think about Beth. I.e. consciousness appears to be an observation rather than a control of brain activity.

Those experiments are quite interesting, but they don't imply that we cannot consciously control our thoughts. It seems to be a common extrapolation, but it isn't justified by the experimental results because the experiments were not set up to test that hypothesis.

The experiments use very short time scales and ask people to make a choice quickly. They do not attempt to have people use their conscious minds to make a deliberate thoughtful choice after weighing the evidence for and against a particular decision. I think that we can only conclude that we have subconscious inputs to our thought processes (which isn't disputed) and that quick impulsive choices are made primarily or entirely via subconscious thought processes.

Consider the following situation: I want to get up early the next morning so I make a mental note of what time I need to wake up before falling asleep. The next morning I wake up at or just before the time I consciously decided on the night before. To me, that indicates that my conscious mind can make a deliberate decision that the subconscious will then impliment.

 

[Beth]

I don't buy free will.

Beth, you said that chains of causation present us with options. To say we have options is to say that the chooser is outside the chain of causation and thus supernatural. I see no evidence for things outside of natural law thus I don't believe in free will.

I can only say that I disagree. I don't see free will as being outside of natural law or supernatural in any way. Natural laws constrain our options but they do not dictate which we will choose.

To say that I have the option of choosing chocolate or vanilla or some other flavor when I go to Baskin-Robbins is a supernatural claim seems pretty bizarre to me actually.

 

[KingMerv00]

I can only say that I disagree. I don't see free will as being outside of natural law or supernatural in any way. Natural laws constrain our options but they do not dictate which we will choose.

To say that I have the option of choosing chocolate or vanilla or some other flavor when I go to Baskin-Robbins is a supernatural claim seems pretty bizarre to me actually.

How can a chain of causation "choose"?

The result may be unpredictable but that doesn't me there is something hovering over the chain nudging it in the right direction.

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

If consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, a thought or decision that becomes conscious was at some point before unconscious - otherwise where did the thought or decision we are conscious of come from?

 

[bokonon]

I don't buy free will.

That's your choice.

 

[KingMerv00]

That's your choice.

Nope. Stimuli forced me to think that way.

 

[bokonon]

Nope. Stimuli forced me to think that way.

You can choose to believe it did. I can choose to say no more in this thread, irrespective of stimuli.

 

[KingMerv00]

You can choose to believe it did. I can choose to say no more in this thread, irrespective of stimuli.

Why do you think you have a choice?

 

[Beth]

If consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, a thought or decision that becomes conscious was at some point before unconscious

Why would this need to be the case? I don't know that all conscious thoughts are unconscious first, though perhaps that is the case.

- otherwise where did the thought or decision we are conscious of come from?

Even if it did, where did the unconscious thought come from? Unconscious thought would also be an emergent property of the brain, so the question of where thoughts come from remains unanswered.

 

[Beth]

How can a chain of causation "choose"?

The result may be unpredictable but that doesn't me there is something hovering over the chain nudging it in the right direction.

I'm sorry, but I'm don't understand how this applies to what I wrote. It seems a non-sequitor to me.

 

[KingMerv00]

I'm sorry, but I'm don't understand how this applies to what I wrote. It seems a non-sequitor to me.

Sorry. The two separate sentences were meant to be taken as two separate thoughts. They were not meant to be taken together. Anyway...

The brain follows the rules of causation and the laws of physics. In what way is it different than a boulder rolling downhill? How can a chain of causation "choose" the path it takes without a supernatural agent?

 

[Beth]

Sorry. The two separate sentences were meant to be taken as two separate thoughts. They were not meant to be taken together. Anyway...

The brain follows the rules of causation and the laws of physics. In what way is it different than a boulder rolling downhill? How can a chain of causation "choose" the path it takes without a supernatural agent?

Thanks for the further explanation. There's no mechanism for boulders to choose what path they will take. Humans can, through conscious thought, choose what path they will take.

Humans can modify the probabilities of the various options available to choose from. A boulder rolls downhill, it's path altered by every stone it bumps. The boulder has no way of altering which stones lie in it's path or how it will respond to them.

A person, on the other hand, can contemplate all the difference options available to them and choose which they prefer based on their current valuation of various options. After choosing to go to Dairy Queen rather than Baskin-Robbins, an individual is presented with the choice of a low-fat yogurt or a high-fat ice cream. Some of the inputs to making that decision could be random, perhaps based on QM randomness. Those random inputs could be translated by the brain into different probabilities for the different options available. Those probabilities can be self-modified by the individual. For example, after a visit to the doctor and a lecture on the dangers of a high fat diet, an individual might respond by valuing a low-fat yogurt higher than they did, thus increasing the probability of choosing a low-fat yogurt on any particular occasion.

 

[KingMerv00]

Thanks for the further explanation. There's no mechanism for boulders to choose what path they will take. Humans can, through conscious thought, choose what path they will take.

Humans can modify the probabilities of the various options available to choose from. A boulder rolls downhill, it's path altered by every stone it bumps. The boulder has no way of altering which stones lie in it's path or how it will respond to them.

A person, on the other hand, can contemplate all the difference options available to them and choose which they prefer based on their current valuation of various options. After choosing to go to Dairy Queen rather than Baskin-Robbins, an individual is presented with the choice of a low-fat yogurt or a high-fat ice cream. Some of the inputs to making that decision could be random, perhaps based on QM randomness. Those random inputs could be translated by the brain into different probabilities for the different options available. Those probabilities can be self-modified by the individual. For example, after a visit to the doctor and a lecture on the dangers of a high fat diet, an individual might respond by valuing a low-fat yogurt higher than they did, thus increasing the probability of choosing a low-fat yogurt on any particular occasion.

Sorry, looking at the bolded bits I feel like you are simply asserting your conclusion.

The brain is biochemistry. Biochemistry does not choose. Explain to me how it can.

 

[calebprime]

...
In what way is it different than a boulder rolling downhill?

Bob the builder*, dead, rolling downhill=no agency, like a boulder.

Bob the builder, after a bottle of whisky, with a lobotomy, stumbling downhill=some agency (He can swerve left or right, keep going or fall over)

Bob the builder, on the level, with his frontal lobes, but horny as hell=more agency.

Bob the builder, on a good day=lots of agency.

Are they all the same in principle, though different to a degree?

Then why do we care about principles?

What we ought to care about are degrees.

*Yes We Can!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bA16sqCusbY

 

[Beth]

Sorry, looking at the bolded bits I feel like you are simply asserting your conclusion.

The brain is biochemistry. Biochemistry does not choose. Explain to me how it can.

Thanks for the further explanation. There's no mechanism for boulders to choose what path they will take. Humans can, through conscious thought, choose what path they will take.

Yes, here I am stating the conclusion.

Humans can modify the probabilities of the various options available to choose from. A boulder rolls downhill, it's path altered by every stone it bumps. The boulder has no way of altering which stones lie in it's path or how it will respond to them.
A person, on the other hand, can contemplate all the difference options available to them and choose which they prefer based on their current valuation of various options. After choosing to go to Dairy Queen rather than Baskin-Robbins, an individual is presented with the choice of a low-fat yogurt or a high-fat ice cream. Some of the inputs to making that decision could be random, perhaps based on QM randomness. Those random inputs could be translated by the brain into different probabilities for the different options available. Those probabilities can be self-modified by the individual. For example, after a visit to the doctor and a lecture on the dangers of a high fat diet, an individual might respond by valuing a low-fat yogurt higher than they did, thus increasing the probability of choosing a low-fat yogurt on any particular occasion.

Here I am describing how I think the process works, not stating a conclusion but premises. Do you disagree with the bolded statements? If so, why? Do you think that the humans are incapable of self-modification of their own behavior? Or are you claiming that all such self-modification is, itself, deterministic and without randomness?

It might be helpful to define what you mean by choose. I mean that one option is selected from multiple options that are perceived as available, such as a choosing a flavor of ice-cream at Baskin-Robbins.

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

Why would this need to be the case? I don't know that all conscious thoughts are unconscious first, though perhaps that is the case.

Because all thought is caused by neurons firing. Neurons firing in one region of the brain leads to neurons firing or being inhibited in other regions. The neurons fire in response to external and internal stimuli. While I admit it has not been conclusively demonstrated, I'm pretty confident that we do not become conscious of a particular region of the brain becoming active until enough neurons are firing. There is certainly evidence to show parts of the brain inhibiting conscious awareness of other neuronal activity which we would otherwise be aware of.

Even if it did, where did the unconscious thought come from? Unconscious thought would also be an emergent property of the brain, so the question of where thoughts come from remains unanswered.

My (rather unsatisfying) answer is that thought is just neurons firing. Our stream of consciousness (and over time the wiring of the brain) is 'directed' by external and internal stimuli.

 

[KingMerv00]

Here I am describing how I think the process works, not stating a conclusion but premises. Do you disagree with the bolded statements? If so, why? Do you think that the humans are incapable of self-modification of their own behavior? Or are you claiming that all such self-modification is, itself, deterministic and without randomness?

I am claiming that humans are a feedback loop.

1) Stimulus goes in.
2) Chemistry creates thought. (Essentially a calculation of probabilities.)
3) Thought creates action.
4) The action alters the environment and itself becomes a stimulus.
5) Return to 1.

To me, you are saying something outside the chain of causation must intervene at 2.5. What is that something?

Regarding randomness: QM exists so absolute determinism is probably not true. However, simply having a foundation in randomness does not mean free will is any better off.

It might be helpful to define what you mean by choose. I mean that one option is selected from multiple options that are perceived as available, such as a choosing a flavor of ice-cream at Baskin-Robbins.

I don't know if I can come up with a good definition but I don't like yours because it doesn't help. "Selecting from options" doesn't really clarify "choose". It is more of a restating.

 

[Beth]

Because all thought is caused by neurons firing. Neurons firing in one region of the brain leads to neurons firing or being inhibited in other regions. The neurons fire in response to external and internal stimuli. While I admit it has not been conclusively demonstrated, I'm pretty confident that we do not become conscious of a particular region of the brain becoming active until enough neurons are firing. There is certainly evidence to show parts of the brain inhibiting conscious awareness of other neuronal activity which we would otherwise be aware of.

Okay. I don't think we are in much disagreement on this then. You're basically saying that the claim that all conscious thoughts are first subconscious thoughts is not proven while I've already acknowledged that it's possible.

My (rather unsatisfying) answer is that thought is just neurons firing. Our stream of consciousness (and over time the wiring of the brain) is 'directed' by external and internal stimuli.

I don't think we are in disagreement here either. I'm just saying that when we 'direct' the neurons firing in our brain by our conscious thoughts, which is a form of internal stimuli, that constitutes free will. We can alter our thoughts in specific ways and by doing so, we alter our future actions - that is, what choices we will make.

 

[Paul2]

I'm just saying that when we 'direct' the neurons firing in our brain by our conscious thoughts, which is a form of internal stimuli, that constitutes free will. We can alter our thoughts in specific ways and by doing so, we alter our future actions - that is, what choices we will make.

I don't think you're getting the implications of how you define free will in terms of determinism.

I think the determinists are saying that free will must mean something beyond materialistic determinism. So when you say that neurons firing as a result of conscious thought is a form of internal stimuli, determinists say that that still falls under determinism; that is, it doesn't matter if the stimuli is external or internal, neurons or not, it's still deterministically causal (excepting for possible quantum randomness, as mentioned above).

Free will, in the strong form, must mean something beyond determinism, but the way you've defined it directly above, it's not beyond determinism.

 

[Beth]

I am claiming that humans are a feedback loop.

1) Stimulus goes in.
2) Chemistry creates thought. (Essentially a calculation of probabilities.)
3) Thought creates action.
4) The action alters the environment and itself becomes a stimulus.
5) Return to 1.

To me, you are saying something outside the chain of causation must intervene at 2.5. What is that something?

Consider your statement number 1. If you recognize that a stimulus can be an internal state which includes ones thoughts, then you have a feedback loop that is affecting itself. That describes a mechanism that could allow an individual to self-modify their responses to various stimuli. That is one way to describe free will.

If you don't recognize that a stimulus can be an internal state, that's another issue and I would need you to define stimulus as you are using it in this context.

Regarding randomness: QM exists so absolute determinism is probably not true. However, simply having a foundation in randomness does not mean free will is any better off.

As I said earlier, I disagree with this POV. Without randomness, strict determinism would hold. If strict determinism does not hold, then there is room for free will to arise.

I don't know if I can come up with a good definition but I don't like yours because it doesn't help. "Selecting from options" doesn't really clarify "choose". It is more of a restating.

All definitions are a restatement of the term being defined. I suspect that we are using somewhat different definitions, but unless you can provide me with an alternative I can't clarify how they differ.

 

[KingMerv00]

Consider your statement number 1. If you recognize that a stimulus can be an internal state which includes ones thoughts, then you have a feedback loop that is affecting itself. That describes a mechanism that could allow an individual to self-modify their responses to various stimuli. That is one way to describe free will.

Yes, I acknowledge that thoughts can be a stimulus. I don't acknowledge you control your thoughts.

 

[Beth]

I don't think you're getting the implications of how you define free will in terms of determinism.

I think the determinists are saying that free will must mean something beyond materialistic determinism.

Yes. I'm somewhat suspicious of arguers who define their opposing position and then defeat it. While some people no doubt do hold that opinion, I have yet to see anyone on this forum arguing for anything other than a compatibilist definition of free will. There are, however, those who argue against the compatibilist definition claiming that it still requires a supernatural assumption.

So when you say that neurons firing as a result of conscious thought is a form of internal stimuli, determinists say that that still falls under determinism; that is, it doesn't matter if the stimuli is external or internal, neurons or not, it's still deterministically causal (excepting for possible quantum randomness, as mentioned above).

Except that when conscious thoughts are part of the internal stimuli altering behavior, it introduces a self-referential feedback loop. This allows the individual to modify their responses to future stimuli, which is compatibilist free will.

Free will, in the strong form, must mean something beyond determinism, but the way you've defined it directly above, it's not beyond determinism.

I'm not arguing for the strong form of free will.

 

[Beth]

Yes, I acknowledge that thoughts can be a stimulus. I don't acknowledge you control your thoughts.

While no one is entirely in control of all of their conscious thoughts, some of us do manage to exert some control on occasion. Studying up for a difficult test for example. If you have no personal experience with such self-control, I can understand your reluctance to acknowledge that others can.

 

[BowlOfRed]

As I said earlier, I disagree with this POV. Without randomness, strict determinism would hold. If strict determinism does not hold, then there is room for free will to arise.

Say I build a programmable robot that has sensory input (cameras, sensors),
memory/state (able to recall past experiences and act upon them),
and a radioactive-based random number generator (non-deterministic).

In the case of "making a choice", this device could choose from a list, and that choice could be both non-deterministic due to inputs from an RNG, and it could be based on past actions and memory. Is this sufficient to give it the label of free will?

 

[KingMerv00]

While no one is entirely in control of all of their conscious thoughts, some of us do manage to exert some control on occasion. Studying up for a difficult test for example. If you have no personal experience with such self-control, I can understand your reluctance to acknowledge that others can.

Again you are asserting that which is to be proven. To say you control your conscious thoughts is to assume free will from the start.

Maybe this would help:

What would be different about the universe if free will (as you define it) did not exist?

 

[Beth]

Say I build a programmable robot that has sensory input (cameras, sensors),
memory/state (able to recall past experiences and act upon them),
and a radioactive-based random number generator (non-deterministic).

In the case of "making a choice", this device could choose from a list, and that choice could be both non-deterministic due to inputs from an RNG, and it could be based on past actions and memory. Is this sufficient to give it the label of free will?

An interesting question. I'll think on it.

 

[Nick227]

Because all thought is caused by neurons firing. Neurons firing in one region of the brain leads to neurons firing or being inhibited in other regions. The neurons fire in response to external and internal stimuli. While I admit it has not been conclusively demonstrated, I'm pretty confident that we do not become conscious of a particular region of the brain becoming active until enough neurons are firing. There is certainly evidence to show parts of the brain inhibiting conscious awareness of other neuronal activity which we would otherwise be aware of.

I think you have to be careful when you use phrases like "that we do not become conscious of a particular region" when discussing the inner workings of the brain. To me it tends to imply that some agency is aware of the brain, or parts of it. When, of course, what is far more likely is that there is no qualitative difference between consciousness and unconsciousness, it is simply that these terms refer to information processing going on in different networks.

Nick

 

[Beth]

Again you are asserting that which is to be proven. To say you control your conscious thoughts is to assume free will from the start.

Maybe this would help:

What would be different about the universe if free will (as you define it) did not exist?

I'm not sure that anything would be different. Or it could be that earth, at least, would have a vastly different history. That's why I think that free will is ultimately an untestable hypothesis.

What do you think would be different about the universe if free will, as I define it, did exist?

If nothing would be different, why reject the evidence of the universal human sensation of making choices rather than being like a boulder falling downhill and unable to respond in more than one way to any particular stone in it's path? Why should we experience the sensation of choosing among options if, in truth, only one path is available to us?

 

[Nick227]

If nothing would be different, why reject the evidence of the universal human sensation of making choices

Because no one has yet managed to come up with a credible account of how this phenomenom could in reality manifest.

Why should we experience the sensation of choosing among options if, in truth, only one path is available to us?

Because this is the agency through which decision-making is undertaken. Determinism makes no difference whatsoever to the experience of choosing.

You still have to apply conscious energy to choosing.

Nick

 

[BowlOfRed]

While no one is entirely in control of all of their conscious thoughts, some of us do manage to exert some control on occasion. Studying up for a difficult test for example. If you have no personal experience with such self-control, I can understand your reluctance to acknowledge that others can.

I don't see how this example shows evidence of control. Suppose I say that various inputs (time remaining until test, analysis of current level of expertise, expected consequences of test outcomes, expected loss of pleasure from missing "I Love Lucy" reruns, etc.) all combine within the mind to make you decide that study is required at that time and you had no "control" over thinking some other way?

 

[KingMerv00]

I'm not sure that anything would be different.

So the world appears exactly as if there were no free will but you believe in it. Why?

What do you think would be different about the universe if free will, as I define it, did exist?

If free will (as I define it) did exist, there would have to be something beyond the material world.

If nothing would be different, why reject the evidence of the universal human sensation of making choices...

Feeling like something is true is not sufficient evidence to prove that is true. The near universal belief in god(s) is a good analogy.

Why should we experience the sensation of choosing among options if, in truth, only one path is available to us?

It is to the brain's advantage to continue making calculations before, during, and after the decision has been made; you might remember something that changes your cost/benefit analysis or put two bits of information together that changes the equation drastically. This constant calculation would feel like you actually have a choice.

 

[Beth]

Because no one has yet managed to come up with a credible account of how this phenomenom could in reality manifest.

Are you making the following argument: I don't understand how this is possible therefore, despite the fact that nearly all humans report this sensation, it's not actually occurring and must be an illusion.

If this isn't what you mean, please clarify. If that is what you mean, it's just an argument from ignorance, which isn't a solid argument. Lacking an explanation for how something might occur isn't sufficient reason to reject the hypothesis that a common sensation is not what it universally appears to be. An alternative explanation of what is actually occurring and why it seems to be something different is required.

Because this is the agency through which decision-making is undertaken. Determinism makes no difference whatsoever to the experience of choosing.

You still have to apply conscious energy to choosing.

Nick

This makes no sense to me. Either we are choosing, or we are not and it is an illusion as some people claim. If we are not, why would we experience the illusion of making choices? It requires conscious energy, yes. Why expend that energy if it's not necessary? It doesn't make sense to me that we would experience the sensation of choosing if we weren't actually making choices.

 

[Beth]

I don't see how this example shows evidence of control. Suppose I say that various inputs (time remaining until test, analysis of current level of expertise, expected consequences of test outcomes, expected loss of pleasure from missing "I Love Lucy" reruns, etc.) all combine within the mind to make you decide that study is required at that time and you had no "control" over thinking some other way?

What entity, other than yourself 'made you decide' anything? When you describe it as 'all combine within the mind to make you decide' is not a part of the 'you' that is making a conscious decision?

 

[Nick227]

Are you making the following argument: I don't understand how this is possible therefore, despite the fact that nearly all humans report this sensation, it's not actually occurring and must be an illusion.

One aspect of the argument I'm making is that thus far no one has come up with a credible explanation of how free will could possibly exist. It seems to go completely against everything we currently know about the brain and information processing.

Another aspect is that we have now researched the brain so extensively that it is grossly unlikely that any magical pixie dust Self/Observer/Experiencer actually exists within the brain or anywhere else. Self is a reflection of whole brain function. Thus there is a basic functional explanation available for why free could appear to exist and yet not. It appears as though there is a self within the brain, doing the choosing, but from understanding systems we know that choice can simply be the output from whole brain function.

A further aspect is that if I sit down and allow my mind to quiet a little there is clear awareness of the thinking process which constantly creates the impression of there being a self, and thus an awareness that it is illusory in the sense that there is no one that chooses or experiences.

This makes no sense to me. Either we are choosing, or we are not and it is an illusion as some people claim. If we are not, why would we experience the illusion of making choices? It requires conscious energy, yes. Why expend that energy if it's not necessary? It doesn't make sense to me that we would experience the sensation of choosing if we weren't actually making choices.

That's because you are still locked up in the illusion of self. There is not actually a "we" that is experiencing, not in reality. The brain creates a sense of self to help it function coherently. Now, if conscious processing is taking place, towards making a decision, the existense of this sense of self creates a relatively uniform path of intent. It is not that there really is a me, somewhere within the brain, that is choosing, but in behaving as though there is so the decision making proceeds more efficiently. So whether you believe that there really is some "me" somewhere that is choosing, or whether you are not deluded, actually makes little difference. It simply reflects the degree of self awareness.

Nick

 

[KingMerv00]

Are you making the following argument: I don't understand how this is possible therefore, despite the fact that nearly all humans report this sensation, it's not actually occurring and must be an illusion.

It is not an argument from ignorance. It is a lack of evidence. Those claiming the existence of the phenomenon have the burden of proof. Simply saying "We feel like X exists." is not sufficient to prove X exists.

 

[Beth]

So the world appears exactly as if there were no free will but you believe in it. Why?

Because I have the sensation of making choices and every other human also appears to have the same sensation. It appears as if we are making choices. Why should I reject that conclusion in favor of concluding that it is not as it appears, and is only an illusion?

If free will (as I define it) did exist, there would have to be something beyond the material world.

And how would you be able to tell if that something actually existed?

Feeling like something is true is not sufficient evidence to prove that is true. The near universal belief in god(s) is a good analogy.

I agree. It's not sufficient. However, in the absense of a better alternative explanation, it's the one to go with. Humans didn't reject the idea that the sun orbited the earth until there was a better explanation for the universal observation that it did.

It is to the brain's advantage to continue making calculations before, during, and after the decision has been made; you might remember something that changes your cost/benefit analysis or put two bits of information together that changes the equation drastically. This constant calculation would feel like you actually have a choice.

How is this constant recalculation different from actually making a choice? That is what we are doing when we make choices: deciding which option we prefer at that point in time based on our current evaluation of the costs and benefits of each possible choice.

 

[Beth]

It is not an argument from ignorance. It is a lack of evidence. Those claiming the existence of the phenomenon have the burden of proof. Simply saying "We feel like X exists." is not sufficient to prove X exists.

I disagree. Those who would deny the existance of a phenomenon that is universally experienced have the burden of proof to show that what is experienced is not what it seems. They must provide a superior explanation that both explains the what we experience and what they claim is occurring instead. Claiming free will is an illusion does not explain why we have the sensation that we are making choices.

 

[Nick227]

Because I have the sensation of making choices

You are making choices. But that you is not some inner observer or experiencer. It is just the result of whole brain function.

Nick

 

[Hellbound]

What entity, other than yourself 'made you decide' anything? When you describe it as 'all combine within the mind to make you decide' is not a part of the 'you' that is making a conscious decision?

I think the heart of the question is:

What makes "you" choose the choice you decide on?

You seem to simply assume the "you" as some external entity, seperate from the neurochemical processes of the brain.
What others are stating is that "you", the part of you that makes the choice, is itself a function of underlying neurochemical processes, which are themselves the product of chemistry and physics. Regardless of your sense of choosing, or your subjective experience, there's no evidence of anything operating beyond chemistry and physics, which are deterministic (with quantum randomness thrown in).

So the question is, do you believe there's some sort of free will outside of the subjective apeparance of free will? And do you agree that even that experience of choice is governed by chemical and physical processes?

 

[Beth]

That's because you are still locked up in the illusion of self. There is not actually a "we" that is experiencing, not in reality.

Yes, I agree, if there is no 'self' there is no free will either. Now, all you need to do is convince me that 'I' don't actually exist. Good luck.