[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Slowvehicle]

Slowvehicle,
- I use the terms synonymously -- but, I think that one captures the concept better than the other.

Just to clarify:

Are you, in fact, saying that "self", "soul", "consciousness", and "observer" are, in this context, identical; and that all of them are, in fact, "immortal"?

I, for one, resit equating "consciousness" (a demonstrable condition) and "soul" (an undemonstrable condition). If you are going to use "soul" and "consciousness" interchangeably, with what term will you refer to the emergent property of neurosystems commonly referred to as "consciousness"; the emergent property that seems, at least to exist only so long as the neurosystem exists, and is affected by trauma to the neurosystem (and has never been demonstrated to be "immortal")?

Do you intend to continue to simply ignore the falsehood you told "Roger"?

 

[Giordano]

Dave,
- Sorry for my forgetfulness, but it takes up less time to simply ask my questions than it does to search for the answers.
- Can we switch to "observer" rather than "self"? I think that "observer" makes for a better indicator of the concept I'm trying to discuss.

As Godless Dave pointed out, that is fine with me. But remember the SM states that the "observer" comes directly from the physical workings of the brain. If the brain dies, so does the observer. If that is in your definition, fine.

It may take time for you to look, but is also takes time for others here to answer questions once again than to have you simply search for the answers recently given on this thread. Once again, you are being very rude to ask others to spend their time on your project, instead of you.

By the way:

1. Weren't your going to prove the idea of "self?" You said so, recently, in this very thread. Have you given up in favor of "observer?"

2, Why, again, doesn't your very proof (and definitions) also prove that an individual's fingerprints, and VWs, are reincarnated? I am dying to know. You seem to be avoiding this question: do you have no answer?

 

[Giordano]

- Is the particular observer continuous through a lifetime?

Jabba, we are not playing a game of words, here- this is just irritating and misleading, not productive. As almost everyone here has stated (but you) the "observer" or "self" may be continuous, but certainly changes with time. You are not the same "self" or "observer" you were at 5 years old, even though I don't know of an abrupt discontinuity in your "self" during that time. Is a river continuous, but changing as you go downstream or back in time? Can an observer (an aircraft spotter) take a course to better spot airplanes, but this training lead to a continuous change during the time of the course even though the observer is changed later from the observer that they were before.

Edit: for the sake of simplicity, I have ignored the periods of sleep and other unconsciousness that Slowvehicle correctly points out. Obviously one is not an "observer" in most senses of the word during these periods in time. But let's say dreaming, and other forms of sleep, fit your definition of continuous.

 

[Giordano]

Good Morning, Mr. Savage.

Granting, purely for the sake of argument, an "exact" copy of a particular moment in the life of an organism, would not that "exact copy" be no more than a meat sculpture? How do you propose to "bring it to life", as it were? It will not do to propose some as-yet-not-possible energizing process ("It...Is...ALIVE")

Kites in lighting storms? I've seen it done- admittedly in black and white in movie theaters.

 

[jt512]

Jay,
- I suspect that you have already answered the following question in the negative, but I can't remember that you did. Do you agree that P(me|A) = 1/∞? (I accept that P(me|A) may not be the proper term to use in my attempt to 'prove' immortality -- the proper term might be P(some(non-specific) one|A).)

1/∞ = 0, so I don't think the P(me|A) = 1/∞. I have no idea what values would be reasonable for P(me|A) or P(someone|A) because you have not specified the model A well enough to deduce any probabilities from it.

But your argument is dead to me anyway, since you have stated that you are using some sort of "selves" as data under A. If you're doing that, then your Bayesian argument fails because you have no evidence that "selves" exist; therefore, then cannot be data. Interestingly, I don't think you are using "selves" as data, but if you, yourself, don't understand the role in your Bayesian argument that you are giving to "selves," then you don't understand Bayes' Theorem well enough to draw any valid conclusions from it. So your argument is still dead.

 

[Loss Leader]

- Is the particular observer continuous through a lifetime?

You change your own word to something else and then you ask questions about what you mean? You can call it a self, soul, observer, duck, Martin Bashir of CNN, tulips, two lips ... it doesn't matter.

The thing you are talking about is an illusion created by the physical brain. It is not continuous (although it imagines itself to be). It is not transferable. It is not able to be shared.

For some reason, you don't want two "identical" brains to share a consciousness (or observer or whatever). This, if anything, greatly weakens your argument. But nobody here is going to disagree with that.

Why you've gone back, renamed an old term and started debating its properties again is as mysterious to me as anything else you've chosen to talk about.

 

[zooterkin]

Dave,
- Sorry for my forgetfulness, but it takes up less time to simply ask my questions than it does to search for the answers.

Less of your time, maybe. It seems a rather rude way to proceed, notwithstanding.

 

[Giordano]

- I think that most everyone here accepts that total replication of a physical person (including the person's brain) would not produce a replication of the self -- i.e., this total physical replication would not produce one consciousness overseeing both bodies.
- Anyone disagree with that?

I disagree strongly; as I and others explained to you again and again in prior posts. I will try again: a total replication of a physical person down to the microscopic physical actions in their brain (same synapses and action potentials) would produce a replication of the "self." So, no, I disagree with you.

At the next moment in time, the two "selves" would begin to diverge because of different experiences. At first, the two "selves" would be identical and would think identically, although they would think increasingly different thoughts with time, depending on their different experiences. They would become different "selves" but start out the same. I use the term experiences to describe even minor differences, like being on the left instead of the right in the same room.

Why are you trying to deny that we disagree on this? Is this your style of honest debate: ask the same question over and over again, take the least strong denial, and then pretend everyone agrees with this point? This is not a courtroom, You are trying to convince us, not some invisible, and silent on repeated requests, non-existent jury.

 

[Giordano]

- I think that most everyone here accepts that total replication of a physical person (including the person's brain) would not produce a replication of the self -- i.e., this total physical replication would not produce one consciousness overseeing both bodies.
- Anyone disagree with that?

Jabba. aren't you just trying a backhand way of claiming that the "self" is not physically linked to the brain? When you asked this question directly, everyone here stated that the "self" (or "observer" or "Clyde") was directly linked to the physical processes in the brain. If you forgot, this will serve as a summary for you, Everyone!

 

[Jabba]

It depends what you mean by "continuous". It's the same brain, but it changes throughout its life.

Dave,
- I think that the specific words we use matters. From what you've said previously, you must also believe that it's the same observer -- just that some of his/her characteristics have changed. Correct?

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- I think that the specific words we use matters. From what you've said previously, you must also believe that it's the same observer -- just that some of his/her characteristics have changed. Correct?

Sure, you could put it that way.

It's not really a mystery how animals grow and change throughout their life.

 

[Slowvehicle]

Dave,
- I think that the specific words we use matters. From what you've said previously, you must also believe that it's the same observer -- just that some of his/her characteristics have changed. Correct?

Of course the specific words matter--which is why posters keep asking you what you mean.

If, by "continuous", you mean that consciousness proceeds without interruption, and without alteration, from its inception to its demise, then I disagree with you--consciousness is not "continuous" (as is demonstrated, for instance, by your claim of diminished faculties).

On the other hand, I do agree that my "identity", if you will, is what ties my consciousness as a child, as a teen-ager, as an adult, and as a geezer, to each other. I am not sure I would call that "continuous".

 

[Giordano]

Sure, you could put it that way.

It's not really a mystery how animals grow and change throughout their life.

Godless:
Against all odds you are in danger of being nominated this round by Jabba as "less critical poster" and so spoken to by name by Jabba. I know that you really don't think that the observer is not linked to the physical brain, but I think that is precisely what Jabba wants to pretend you say. It is very crucial to his "proof" so please be careful in terms of how you state things in the future; Jabba is happy to pretend that even disagreement is agreement! He has done so very often in the past.

 

[godless dave]

Giordano, like you, I suspect that Jabba is trying to trick me into agreeing to a definition of the "observer" that could be interpreted as immaterial. Thanks for the warning. We're on the same page.

 

[carlitos]

"When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master— that's all."

I think that Jabba may have proven reincarnation, of ex-JREFF member Rramjet.

 

[Toontown]

You realize those two statements contradict each other, right?

No, but I do realize the fact you think or pretend to think the two statements contradict each other increases my already significant suspicion that talking to you is a waste of time.

1. If a 6 sided die is rolled. some side will turn up.

2. The expectation that the side will have a 6 on it is 1/6.

Explain how these statements contradict each other. I would have asked you to explain how the two statements you referred to are contradictory, But I know you can't, and this leaves you less room for obfuscatory pseudo-explanation. And the principle is the same.

 

[godless dave]

No, but I do realize the fact you think or pretend to think the two statements contradict each other increases my already significant suspicion that talking to you is a waste of time.

1. If a 6 sided die is rolled. some side will turn up.

2. The expectation that the side will have a 6 on it is 1/6.

Explain how these statements contradict each other.

They don't. The contradiction comes in if you claim, as you did, that it is prohibitively unlikely that a 6 would come up, but not prohibitively unlikely that a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 would come up.

 

[tsig]

Let's instead take Baby X, who if born will have thus-and-so genes and will one day ask that same question. We have now sidestepped the problem with P(me) that "me" already exists.

According to genetics, P(BabyX) is fairly low. But how are Baby X's genes relevant? How does it matter what shade of green Baby X's eyes are?

The probability of Somebaby X, where genes are ignored, and only the likelihood of some day questioning its own existence, is so close to 1 as to be indistinguishable.

P(SomebabyX) ≈ 1, or as I said earlier, P(someone) ≈ 1.

And all of these are the same given your proposition A, which as far as we can tell is entirely true. P(SomebabyX|A) ≈ 1.

Since your particular genes are irrelevant to the question, P(me|A) = P(someone|A), so P(me|A) in your formula ≈ 1. You are trying to peg it at ≈ 0. Obviously these approaches give very different outcomes.

This is why your argument produces an answer that contradicts all available evidence.

I see:

If (Baby (X)) = P^onme) then Diaper > Wet.

 

[godless dave]

Jabba, are you going anywhere with this?

 

[Toontown]

What jt512 said was correct. What you are saying is wrong. This distinction actually matters.

Oh. Well in that case, I'll just quote jt512.

JS, in Bayesian inference for a hypothesis we combine data with the prior probability of the hypothesis to obtain an updated probability for the hypothesis, using Bayes theorm:

P(H|D) = P(D|H)P(H) / P(D) ,​

where H is the hypothesis and D is the data. The data, D, is always an event that has already occurred when we perform the analysis. According to you, that implies that P(D)=1, and therefore that P(D|H)=1. But if that were true, then P(H|D) would always equal P(H), which would imply that it is impossible to do Bayesian inference. No amount of data could ever affect our opinion about the plausibility of a hypothesis.

Remember, this is not me talking, this is the infallible jt512, with whom you've already locked yourself into agreeing.

So. What have we learned? Nothing for you, but I've learned that your form of reasoning means all data is meaningless. That's why jt512 corrected you on it, after I corrected you on it.

But you say jt512 is correct, but I am wrong. Hmm...I guess that's that reasoning of yours at work again.