Why is there so much crackpot physics?

[AlBell]

I concede your point.

/thread

 

[BurntSynapse]

Your approach may be the best you can do. I concede that.

Yes, I try for my best, and try not to change the subject or resort to snarky attacks when my errors are pointed out.

"Limited to" was my inference. I concede that.

But not willing to show an inch of willingness extend a hand of rational understanding? That's a shame, I think.

You object when your claims are interpreted as general, just as you object when your claims are interpreted as being limited to the specific circumstances you mention. I concede that.

Criticism of specific claims when interpreted as general and general claims being interpreted as specific with the only apparent purpose to justify a strawman fallacy is objectionable categorically, but also in point of context because its not merely unhelpful, but seemingly deliberately seeking to avoid agreement and progress.

That observation seems relevant as your comment conveys desperation to never admit the slightest error in any detail. This habit seems unfaithful to the purpose of critical thinking and logic - which I take to be tools that are supposed to guide us to better thinking.

It's easier to get away with mathematical errors at a Trekkie convention than with audiences that contain many physicists, mathematicians, and professionals who work in related technical disciplines. I concede that.

I yield to your apparent superior experience getting away with mathematical errors. My field is standards development for management & administration where I've made plenty of mistakes, but I think its been years since I consciously tried to obscure them. A sense of mortality seems to make us more honest in some ways.

If someone wants to debate mathematical claims, (rather than the claims about relative risk in selection and application of particular mathematics), I must excuse myself. A number of criticisms like yours here continue to imply that I profess significant competence in that field, after failing 2nd year Calculus twice.

Anyone is free to call me out the next time I profess ANY serious mathematical talent not taught at a nameless Ivy League biz school.

Some readers may not bother to click on the link I provided for your grotesque distortion of Quine's underdetermination theory. I concede that.

If you'd explain what, exactly is the problem with my position, there's room for dialog. I'm happy to adopt any modification for which you can provide believable support - all you have to do is present it. "Grotesque distortion" doesn't tell me what, out of the infinite number of potentially related concepts is problematic.

I don't care whether I'm shown my current appraisal of Quine is wrong or my theory is bad, because there's probably an infinite number of ways that's true about any position. Surely its fair to ask that critics provide some clue as to what is so horrible about the advocates claims. What possible benefit derives from attacking opinions another doesn't hold and making vague claims about positions' problems.

Although readers who do click on that link can read Burton Dreben's demolition of your belief that Quine's underdetermination theory supports your conclusion that it's "very difficult to formally demonstrate one theory (Zeus) is better or worse at explaining falling than a theory of gravity", you do not understand how Dreben's words refute your argument. I concede that.

The Zeus quote is not my idea. It's almost a verbatim quote explaining Quine from an award winning HPS professor whose name I'm happy to provide with the understanding I'm not deceptively name-dropping.

I concede that your advocacy of FTL projects is analogous to Arthur Conan Doyle's belief in fairies.

Clearly this is more comfortable than addressing any actual point of the discussion, but in my experience being a courageous adult usually seems less painful in the long run.

I also concede that the relationship between intelligent project management and your conduct within this thread may be analogous to the relationship between chess mastery and anti-Semitism.

And what do you think the relationship is between anti-Semitism and its ability to provide evidence for or against chess mastery? My opinion has been stated (that there is no proper relation).

Might we agree?

 

[BurntSynapse]

The ones where you show how your pet theory could have actually have benefited any of the paradigm shifts in the last 150 years?

Maybe Rutherford, Hubble or Guth?

Maybe any or all. I'm willing to take any of the 3 and let you pick which. All I need is to understand what is meant by the term "your pet theory", assuming this refers to concept(s) I actually believe...

Also, we'd probably need to have a shared definition of "show", so that we agree on whether something explains something else adequatlely.

I tend to use possible worlds semantics for justification but here, larger issues of modal logic looms large and consistently present the greatest obstacles. I'm not sure how to overcome those.

Ideas?

 

[W.D.Clinger]

You object when your claims are interpreted as general, just as you object when your claims are interpreted as being limited to the specific circumstances you mention. I concede that.

Criticism of specific claims when interpreted as general and general claims being interpreted as specific with the only apparent purpose to justify a strawman fallacy is objectionable categorically, but also in point of context because its not merely unhelpful, but seemingly deliberately seeking to avoid agreement and progress.

That observation seems relevant as your comment conveys desperation to never admit the slightest error in any detail. This habit seems unfaithful to the purpose of critical thinking and logic - which I take to be tools that are supposed to guide us to better thinking.

You seem to have forgotten that you objected to interpretation of your highlighted claim as a general claim and later objected when that very same highlighted claim was interpreted as being limited to the specific circumstances you mentioned when stating your objection to interpreting the claim as general.

If someone wants to debate mathematical claims, (rather than the claims about relative risk in selection and application of particular mathematics), I must excuse myself. A number of criticisms like yours here continue to imply that I profess significant competence in that field, after failing 2nd year Calculus twice.

You seem to have forgotten that your claims about relative risk rested upon your erroneous interpretation of Gödel's incompleteness theorems, which was a mathematical error. Once your mathematical error was recognized, your claims about risk in mathematics were seen to have no foundation.

Anyone is free to call me out the next time I profess ANY serious mathematical talent not taught at a nameless Ivy League biz school.

You seem to have forgotten that you have consistently preferred your own (mis)interpretation on mathematical issues such as quaternions, Gödel's incompleteness theorems, and the ubiquity of non-Euclidean geometry in relativistic physics to well-reasoned and clearly stated explanations provided by qualified physicists and mathematicians.

The Zeus quote is not my idea. It's almost a verbatim quote explaining Quine from an award winning HPS professor whose name I'm happy to provide with the understanding I'm not deceptively name-dropping.

You seem to have forgotten that my quotation of Burton Dreben's refutation of your grotesque distortion of Quine's underdetermination theory was accompanied by a citation and link to Dreben's entire paper, which is mainly devoted to refuting Hilary Putnam's many misinterpretations of Quine. It is conceivable (albeit unlikely) that the award-winning HPS professor whose name you're happy to provide (but haven't) is even more prominent than Putnam, but that doesn't matter. Wrong is wrong, no matter who's wrong.

I concede that your advocacy of FTL projects is analogous to Arthur Conan Doyle's belief in fairies.

Clearly this is more comfortable than addressing any actual point of the discussion, but in my experience being a courageous adult usually seems less painful in the long run.

You seem to have forgotten that you introduced Sir Doyle's belief in fairies within a discussion of "your advocacy of FTL projects and your conduct within this thread". The question you invited me to answer made no sense within that context unless you think Sir Doyle's belief in fairies is somehow analogous to your advocacy or conduct.

I also concede that the relationship between intelligent project management and your conduct within this thread may be analogous to the relationship between chess mastery and anti-Semitism.

And what do you think the relationship is between anti-Semitism and its ability to provide evidence for or against chess mastery? My opinion has been stated (that there is no proper relation).

Might we agree?

I agree there should be no relationship between anti-Semitism and chess mastery, just as there should be no relationship between intelligent project management and your conduct within this thread. On the other hand, it would be easy to name a chess master who was anti-Semitic. That's why I wrote "may be analogous" instead of "is analogous".

 

[tsig]

Maybe any or all. I'm willing to take any of the 3 and let you pick which. All I need is to understand what is meant by the term "your pet theory", assuming this refers to concept(s) I actually believe...

Also, we'd probably need to have a shared definition of "show", so that we agree on whether something explains something else adequatlely.

I tend to use possible worlds semantics for justification but here, larger issues of modal logic looms large and consistently present the greatest obstacles. I'm not sure how to overcome those.

Ideas?

It means he has a dog named "theory".

"Show" means a movie so he's talking about a movie about his pet dog.

 

[Roboramma]

This thread reminds me of this:
http://www.gocomics.com/calvinandhobbes/2014/02/14#.Uv9hWhaDIZ4

 

[BurntSynapse]

You seem to have forgotten that you objected to interpretation of your highlighted claim as a general claim and later objected when that very same highlighted claim was interpreted as being limited to the specific circumstances you mentioned when stating your objection to interpreting the claim as general.

Alleged memory lapses or no, if an altered, misapplied, or mischaracterized position is attacked by a critic, pointing out the fact seems like it should be allowed.

You seem to have forgotten that your claims about relative risk rested upon your erroneous interpretation of Gödel's incompleteness theorems, which was a mathematical error.

The relevance of Gödel to real world problems to which I refer came from others (name drops suppressed) who claim we can give more general epistemological interpretations of Gödel's theorems. The fact that this is not a mathematical claim does not somehow make it bad math.

Application statements are different than statements about the tool being applied. A hammer has nothing to say about the deck construction to which it's applied, and that fact does not undermine that it can help us build one.

A classic HPS example considers the traditional view that all truths can be proved by self-evident steps from self-evident truths and observation. It was pointed out that even the truths of elementary number theory do not seem derivable by any self-evident steps from self-evident truths. It is claimed that (assuming particular HPS understanding of “analytic”) there must be, (by Gödel's theorems), synthetic truths in mathematics. These historians claim Gödel himself made remarks in a very similar spirit that even the theory of integers is demonstrably non-analytic (in the HPS sense).

To object meaningfully, some fact about these claims or my use of them should be shown as defective in some specific way. Simply calling an opinion a grotesque distortion and casting other (apparently angry) aspersions does not, and should not suffice for actual criticism.

In fact, if such tactics are the best attacks offered, I often tend to take it as at least a preliminary endorsement of the advocates' position.

 

[Paulhoff]

Maybe it is just a simple answer.

There seems to be more Crackpot Physics only because we know more about Physics now.


Paul

 

[W.D.Clinger]

You seem to have forgotten that your claims about relative risk rested upon your erroneous interpretation of Gödel's incompleteness theorems, which was a mathematical error.

The relevance of Gödel to real world problems to which I refer came from others (name drops suppressed) who claim we can give more general epistemological interpretations of Gödel's theorems.

One example considered the traditional philosophical picture that all truths could be proved by self-evident steps from self-evident truths and observation. It was then pointed out that even the truths of elementary number theory do not seem derivable by any self-evident steps from self-evident truths. It is claimed that (assuming partivular HPS understanding of “analytic”) there must be, (by Gödel's theorems), synthetic truths in mathematics. These historians claim Gödel himself made remarks in a very similar spirit that even the theory of integers is demonstrably non-analytic (in the HPS sense).

A lot of nonsense has been written about Gödel's incompleteness theorems. Those theorems are easy to explain to people who possess basic knowledge of logic and mathematics, and Douglas Hofstadter did a wonderful job of explaining the meaning of those theorems to a somewhat broader audience, but you are not the only person who still prefers mystical interpretations, of which there have been many. Adding the philosophers' analytic/synthetic muddle to the inherent technical difficulty of the theorems doesn't help.

Had you studied Quine's philosophy, you'd know Quine eventually rejected the analytic/synthetic distinction. I am not entirely convinced by Quine's argument, but Quine makes a very good case against the sort of thinking you endorsed in your paragraph above.

To object meaningfully, some fact about these claims or my use of them should be shown as defective in some specific way. Simply calling my opinion a grotesque distortion and casting other (apparently angry) aspersions does not, and should not suffice for actual criticism.

You continue to pretend my characterization of your opinion as a grotesque distortion of Quine's theory was unsupported by specifics or argument. Fair-minded readers who examine that post will conclude otherwise.

In fact, if such tactics are the best attacks offered, I often tend to take it as at least a preliminary endorsement of the advocates' position.

Of course you would. That earns 20 points on John Baez's crackpot index.

Speaking of which:

• 1. A -5 point starting credit.
• 3. 2 points for every statement that is clearly vacuous.
• 5. 5 points for each such statement that is adhered to despite careful correction.
• 24. 20 points for defending yourself by bringing up (real or imagined) ridicule accorded to your past theories.
• 26. 20 points for talking about how great your theory is, but never actually explaining it.

Those 2- and 5-pointers add up fast.

 

[W.D.Clinger]

explaining the joke

Compare

A classic HPS example considers the traditional view that all truths can be proved by self-evident steps from self-evident truths and observation. It was pointed out that even the truths of elementary number theory do not seem derivable by any self-evident steps from self-evident truths. It is claimed that (assuming particular HPS understanding of “analytic”) there must be, (by Gödel's theorems), synthetic truths in mathematics. These historians claim Gödel himself made remarks in a very similar spirit that even the theory of integers is demonstrably non-analytic (in the HPS sense).

with

6.2 Self-evident and analytical truths

One can also give more general epistemological interpretations of Gödel's theorems. Quine and Ullian (1978), for example, consider the traditional philosophical picture that all truths could be proved by self-evident steps from self-evident truths and observation. They then point out that even the truths of elementary number theory are presumably not in general derivable by self-evident steps from self-evident truths (Quine & Ullian 1978: 64–65.) Hilary Putnam (1975) in turn submits that, under a certain natural understanding of “analytic”, there must be, by Gödel's theorems, synthetic truths in mathematics. In fact, Gödel himself made remarks in a very similar spirit that even the theory of integers is demonstrably non-analytic (Gödel 1944).

That's from the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's current article on Gödel's incompleteness theorems. Section 6 is titled "Philosophical Implications—Real and Alleged".

By suppressing the philosophers' names, BurntSynapse muddled the paragraph. In BurntSynapse's version, you might think Putnam's allegation was made by the the same person(s) who observed that not all truths of arithmetic can be "proved by self-evident steps from self-evident truths and observation". Putnam's claim actually depends upon a dichotomy Quine had rejected.

ETA: Everything below this was adding during editing of my original post.

Actually, I suspect the assumption of an analytic/synthetic dichotomy, which I attributed above to Putnam, is an artifact of Raatikainen's rephrasing of Putnam's claim. I don't have Putnam's "What is Mathematical Truth?" in my personal library, and won't be able to read the full paper until Tuesday. From what I can see of the paper at Google Books, Putnam doesn't actually use the word "synthetic". I also find that Putnam's paper comes pretty close to my own view of mathematics, and quite likely influenced my view. (I read it within a few years of its publication.) My objections to BurntSynapse's paragraph (beyond its plagiarism) therefore boil down to the ambiguity BurntSynapse introduced and to its reliance upon the notoriously unhelpful analytic/synthetic dichotomy, which appears (at least in part) to have been Raatikainen's doing.

In general, however, I have no objection to what Raatikainen has written. In fact, I'd like to call attention to Raatikainen's review of a cleverly titled book by Torkel Franzén: Gödel's Theorem: An Incomplete Guide to Its Use and Abuse. In that review, Raatikainen applauds Franzén's refutation of BurntSynapse's argument:

Gödel’s theorem is often thought to support some form of skepticism with regard to mathematics: it is contended that we cannot, strictly speaking, prove anything or that the consistency of our fundamental theories (such as ZFC) is shown to be doubtful. Franzén argues against such claims that nothing in Gödel’s theorem in any way contradicts the view that we have absolutely certain knowledge about the truth of the axioms of the system and, consequently, of their consistency. We don’t need Gödel’s theorem to tell us that we must adopt some basic principles without proof. If we have no doubts about the consistency of, say, ZFC, there is nothing in the second incompleteness theorem to give rise to any such doubts. And if we do have doubts about the consistency of ZFC, we have no reason to believe that a consistency proof of ZFC given in ZFC itself would do anything to remove those doubts.

That's what I was saying, more verbosely, in my own discussion of BurntSynapse's misinterpretation of Gödel's incompleteness theorems. BurntSynapse didn't listen to me, but he tried to counter my argument by plagiarizing Raatikainen. Will BurntSynapse pay any more attention to Raatikainen's words above than he did to mine?

 

[ben m]

BurntSynapse, please learn the difference between a "citation" and a "name-drop".

A citation is when you help your reader to actually locate the sources of the particular ideas you're using. In academic contexts, this is expected to go as far as giving a page number (if citing a book), a complete article-identifier (if citing a journal article), a URL and date-of-access or stable/archival link (if citing a web resource).

A name-drop is when you attach a person's name to a claim, but leaving the reader with little to do but take your word for it that the source said such a thing.

I don't think you're actually confused on this point, I think you're pretending to be confused because you think it's funny, but in fact you're doing a great job reinforcing my desire to keep you far, far away from any advisory role at any agency I interact with.

 

[BurntSynapse]

Compare
By suppressing the philosophers' names, BurntSynapse muddled the paragraph.

Perhaps - but I think the edits for concision altered the meaning more.

In BurntSynapse's version, you might think Putnam's allegation was made by the the same person(s) who observed that not all truths of arithmetic can be "proved by self-evident steps from self-evident truths and observation".

True, if readers were concerned mainly with the source of each idea in the narrative, which is an unusual focus, but not problematic unless we intend to focus on the person making the argument rather than the merit of the argument, as in:

Putnam's claim actually depends upon a dichotomy Quine had rejected.

...which tells us nothing about whether the rejection killed the dichotomy or whether the distinction survived despite that rejection, being regarded as useful for, well: drawing distinctions. Carnap was aware of Quine's objections, but justified maintaining the dichotomy on utilitarian grounds - which seem more in line with my work.

In my work, an idea or guideline doesn't need to be correct so much as effective.

Although SEP claims Quine "doubted" the distinction http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/, your reference makes a very good case for outright rejection. I think the logical case supports skepticism at the very least, while empirical evidence suggests there is something going on if ordinary people can easily can distinguish the 2 types of statements.

Actually, I suspect the assumption of an analytic/synthetic dichotomy, which I attributed above to Putnam, is an artifact of Raatikainen's rephrasing of Putnam's claim.

Perhaps. I learned about it from Kassler's Teaching Company course in the lecture on positivism, where it sounded like it came from Hume, under the label "relations of ideas", SEP also explains Kant's early work as related to Hume also.

My objections to BurntSynapse's paragraph (beyond its plagiarism) therefore boil down to the ambiguity BurntSynapse introduced

It would be very helpful to know what "the ambiguity" is, and some hint about what you'd like me to do about it?

...and to its reliance upon the notoriously unhelpful analytic/synthetic dichotomy

On this point, (being concerned with utilitarian application), I'd seem to be more aligned with Carnap's thinking described at http://www.iep.utm.edu/quine-an/#H2

Thus, I think "notoriously unhelpful" seems a bit much, but what sort of reliance on that . The examples they give of each category do seem different, so clearly something is going on.

I'd like to call attention to Raatikainen's review of a cleverly titled book by Torkel Franzén: Gödel's Theorem: An Incomplete Guide to Its Use and Abuse. In that review, Raatikainen applauds Franzén's refutation of BurntSynapse's argument:

To me, he's talking about arguments with regard to mathematics which attack it as unreliable. I don't recognize any of those arguments as opinions I share.

That's what I was saying, more verbosely, in my own discussion of BurntSynapse's misinterpretation of Gödel's incompleteness theorems. BurntSynapse didn't listen to me, but he tried to counter my argument by plagiarizing Raatikainen.

I'm reading your references with care, but still don't know what this "misinterpretation" is, unless it is the argument in the above link where it seems quite easy to see a substitution of "math" for my claim about "physicists' use of math".

I regard uses of math different than math. Risky use does not mean the math is risky in and of itself in any way, and should not be taken as such.

My read of Gödel's incompleteness theorems, (first learned from Gödel, Escher, Bach and as described therein) is that the incompleteness he describes in dialog form is analogous to the project management principles of inherently incomplete documentation, and the issue that PM standards are limited in their ability to define when to apply any particular guideline.

That claim doesn't seem mathematical to me, and if it does to others, help in rewording the claim is welcome.

You continue to pretend my characterization of your opinion as a grotesque distortion of Quine's theory was unsupported by specifics or argument. Fair-minded readers who examine that post will conclude otherwise.

A) It's not pretending, and
B) it's not my objection.

It's more that the specifics seem to attack opinions that I don't hold. Admittedly if the goal is to attack more, time involved in understanding my opinions would detract, and offering anything actually helpful would seem to run counter to that goal. Avoiding to offer any helpful comment can simply be optimizing one's time. In contrast, I found your references to Quine refreshing and informative, and I'm grateful you shared them because I learned from them.

It seems rare to see assertions like "Management can do nothing about X", an instance where I do hold the contrary position that management can, and even has an obligation to do something about X. I honestly don't think the vast majority of characterizations attacked reflect opinions I've presented or would agree with.

 

[BurntSynapse]

BurntSynapse, please learn the difference between a "citation" and a "name-drop".

A citation is when you help your reader to actually locate the sources of the particular ideas you're using. In academic contexts, this is expected to go as far as giving a page number (if citing a book), a complete article-identifier (if citing a journal article), a URL and date-of-access or stable/archival link (if citing a web resource).

A name-drop is when you attach a person's name to a claim, but leaving the reader with little to do but take your word for it that the source said such a thing.

I don't think you're actually confused on this point, I think you're pretending to be confused because you think it's funny, but in fact you're doing a great job reinforcing my desire to keep you far, far away from any advisory role at any agency I interact with.

Not confused, nor do I think it funny, nor do I think including a name leaves a person unable to ask for any details about which they have any question.

 

[BurntSynapse]

I want to emphasize that when Nersessian says "conceptual change", it seems to me that she's referring to all scientists' learning process, not "world-historic revolutions".

Should we or should we not consider development of revolutionary paradigms developed by scientists a subspecies of scientific conceptual change?

 

[ben m]

Not confused, nor do I think it funny, nor do I think including a name leaves a person unable to ask for any details about which they have any question.

Ha ha! I see. Instead of using the standard, universally-understood, highly-efficient approach to utilizing academic sources, you decided to invent your own approach! Great.

I see that your approach specifies that we're allowed to ask questions, but doesn't mention your willingness to answer them. For example, after I-don't-know how many requests, you still haven't provided the must-requested page citation or quote showing Nersessian's purported statements about identifiable characteristics of revolution-promoting science.

Between the no-citations and the reluctant-follow-up: it's funny that you picked an approach that's so easily confused with the approach the approach commonly taken by actual charlatans---remember them? We know a thing or two about charlatans, this being a skeptics' forum.

 

[ben m]

Should we or should we not consider development of revolutionary paradigms developed by scientists a subspecies of scientific conceptual change?

Sure, why not? Who cares?

Likewise, we should consider striking gold to be a subspecies of geological exploration. We should consider discovering a supernova to be a subspecies of pointing a telescope at the sky. We should consider billion-dollar startups founded in garages to be a subspecies of entrepreneurship.

Seriously, who cares? Was this sort of definition under dispute? It doesn't follow that knowledge of the larger category grants you knowledge of how to distinguish the special cases a priori. It follows even less that your knowledge (or have a method for developing a method for finding a method etc. for doing so) improves on the status quo.

ETA: Moreover, given that your attempts at identifying conceptual-change opportunities have led you to (a) quaternions, (b) "dimensional analysis", and (c) the "concrete problem" of an approaching world-killing meteor, I don't think that you need to clarify these abstractions. It's like: if you meet a guy who wants to talk about (a) the conceptual distinctions between "orbital mechanics" and "ballistics" in light of GR, and (b) his conclusion that the Moon is a CIA-controlled aerostat that's following him around the world---well, we don't need lots of GR abstractions in order to declare this person's methods unsound.

 

[BurntSynapse]

Ha ha! I see. Instead of using the standard, universally-understood, highly-efficient approach to utilizing academic sources, you decided to invent your own approach! Great.

We all are experts in something. Perhaps you, most certainly Clinger have more knowledge, experience, and skill in utilizing academic resources.

If anyone can point me to good resources for newbies, it would be very welcome.

I see that your approach specifies that we're allowed to ask questions, but doesn't mention your willingness to answer them. For example, after I-don't-know how many requests, you still haven't provided the must-requested page citation or quote showing Nersessian's purported statements about identifiable characteristics of revolution-promoting science.

There are 2 reason for that: the first is that my copy of CSC is packed for a move, with unpacking complete probably around April 15th. Second: the only specific characteristics of paradigm-changing science I'm reasonably sure about is her placement of it within a framework.

As for description of past requests: demands for "exactly" how her view applies to some unknowable future application seems quite different that the characterization of quite reasonable requests. It was asserted either her model was being used in NSF guidelines already (no evidence ever provided) or I "must explain" my use of "specific problems" after quoting the jacket cover of the book. http://www.amazon.com/Creating-Scientific-Concepts-Bradford-Books/dp/0262515075

This is very different than a very reasonable citation request you describe.
I think the first sentence of http://logica.ugent.be/philosophica/fulltexts/45-3.pdf provides an answer of some degree.

Between the no-citations and the reluctant-follow-up: it's funny that you picked an approach that's so easily confused with the approach the approach commonly taken by actual charlatans---remember them? We know a thing or two about charlatans, this being a skeptics' forum.

My reply: Hanlon's Razor.

 

[The Man]

We all are experts in something. Perhaps you, most certainly Clinger have more knowledge, experience, and skill in utilizing academic resources.

If anyone can point me to good resources for newbies, it would be very welcome.

Try this…

http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/instruct/guides/citations.html

...many people learn this in grade school doing book reports.

There are 2 reason for that: the first is that my copy of CSC is packed for a move, with unpacking complete probably around April 15th. Second: the only specific characteristics of paradigm-changing science I'm reasonably sure about is her placement of it within a framework.

As for description of past requests: demands for "exactly" how her view applies to some unknowable future application seems quite different that the characterization of quite reasonable requests. It was asserted either her model was being used in NSF guidelines already (no evidence ever provided) or I "must explain" my use of "specific problems" after quoting the jacket cover of the book. http://www.amazon.com/Creating-Scientific-Concepts-Bradford-Books/dp/0262515075

This is very different than a very reasonable citation request you describe.

Of course it is different, as asking you to explain what changes you would what make and why is not asking you to cite the work of others. Unless it is your contention that those others made such recommendations, which of course would be easy for you to cite in that case. Heck, it doesn’t even look like you could cite her as even just asserting her work as “her model”. Say, given that “the only specific characteristics of paradigm-changing science” your “reasonably sure about is her placement of it within a framework” how would you determine that “her model was being used in NSF guidelines already” or not?

I think the first sentence of http://logica.ugent.be/philosophica/fulltexts/45-3.pdf provides an answer of some degree.


My reply: Hanlon's Razor.

My reply to that is that it doesn’t take malicious intent to really screw the pooch. Not knowing what one is doing, specifically wants to do or why, while asserting that they just want to experiment and will figure it out (‘expand extrapolation’ was the phrase I think you tried to use) as they go can have just as detrimental effects even lacking malice. Perhaps even worse as one acting with malicious intent at least knows what they want to damage while someone working from just ignorance, though perhaps good intents, may be unaware of the damage they may cause.

 

[BurntSynapse]

Sure, why not?

Because I interpret:

I want to emphasize that when Nersessian says "conceptual change", it seems to me that she's referring to all scientists' learning process, not "world-historic revolutions".

...to mean that you regard her general view of creativity not applicable to the subset on which I focus.

Who cares?

People trying to develop standards which support researchers progress as well as it is feasible for us to.

I obviously do not claim physics needs *my* "new, cog-sci-informed management to get it to identify and focus on paradigm-shifting research", since this focus exists and has been developed for years. I do claim the effectiveness of existing guidelines and processes can be improved, based on work like Nersessian's. There exists a persistent misperception I'm not sure how to correct, since I think I correct it often enough. Most arguments seem to keep attacking a phantom position not mine, not of my creation in any other venue, and which simply won't die.

Likewise, we should consider striking gold to be a subspecies of geological exploration.

To quote Picard: "What he might say with irony, I say with conviction..." Here: we should consider striking gold to be a subspecies of geological exploration. Especially if we are trying to improve gold mining efficiency and effectiveness.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exploration_geophysics explains how valuable this transdisciplinary linking is.

We should consider discovering a supernova to be a subspecies of pointing a telescope at the sky.

...and obviously: if we are trying to improve supernova discovery, our recommendations for improvement seem like they ought to include new discoveries that seem promising in telescope pointing.

We should consider billion-dollar startups founded in garages to be a subspecies of entrepreneurship.

...and the same sort of application would seem sensible.

Was this sort of definition under dispute?

It seems to be, especially when supported by a belief that runs counter to my understanding of logic:

It doesn't follow that knowledge of the larger category grants you knowledge of how to distinguish the special cases a priori.

True, especially when using post-hoc criteria for distinguishing successful transformative research, meaning community accepted. But historically distinctive, post-hoc commonalities seem like the best guidelines for helping improve the future success with lessons we can learn.

Kassler's TTC course offers that logic enables "rock solid" inferences. even if we don't know what they're about:

He says If no Blonks are Cronks, and Nufu is a Cronk, then we can know Nufu is not a Blonk, without any idea what we just said, and we don't need to.

It follows even less that your knowledge (or have a method for developing a method for finding a method etc. for doing so) improves on the status quo.

My knowledge improving on the status quo of physics? Hardly, unless someone really wanted to go through a very complex network of relations from information system standards and development to some eventual discovery only identifiable after the fact as improvement. This is perfectly true.

Updating guidelines to reflect new research in order to help researchers answer updated questions from physicists, however seems like it should be completely uncontroversial. I think we agree that some updates will be developed at some point, and to me, it seems that there is overwhelming hostility (here) to the idea that incorporating new developments in HPS into those future updates.

Research administration is a facilitating process would seem to benefit from greater specificity for example treating scientific models as "hybrid objects, serving as intermediaries between targets and analogical sources in bootstrapping processes" (from CSC dust-jacket/Amazon summary)

ETA: Moreover, given that your attempts at identifying conceptual-change opportunities have led you to (a) quaternions, (b) "dimensional analysis", and (c) the "concrete problem" of an approaching world-killing meteor, I don't think that you need to clarify these abstractions.

Perhaps the responses above change whether this applicable. I don't don't see these a. b. & c. illustrations as abstractions, but rather as examples to help explain some concepts.

It's like: if you meet a guy who wants to talk about (a) the conceptual distinctions between "orbital mechanics" and "ballistics" in light of GR, and (b) his conclusion that the Moon is a CIA-controlled aerostat that's following him around the world---well, we don't need lots of GR abstractions in order to declare this person's methods unsound.

If the conclusion "Incorporating HPS findings like Nersessian's in subsequent revisions of research administration standards and guidelines is a good idea" is of equal plausibility to the conclusion that "the Moon is a CIA-controlled aerostat" I would agree.

Obviously, they don't seem that way to me.

 

[dlorde]

.. using post-hoc criteria for distinguishing successful transformative research... historically distinctive, post-hoc commonalities...

Research administration is a facilitating process would seem to benefit from greater specificity... ...scientific models as "hybrid objects, serving as intermediaries between targets and analogical sources in bootstrapping processes"...

Wow, excellent obfuscating jargon!

Although jargon can also be used to concisely express complex technical ideas...