(b) Use of the applicant’s alleged confession to the police in his criminal trial
258. The applicant further complained that the fact that his conviction was based on his alleged confession given to the police without the presence of defence counsel ran counter to the guarantees of a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
259. The Court reiterates that its duty, according to Article 19 of the Convention, is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting States to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. While Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence as such, which is primarily a matter for regulation under national law (see Schenk v. Switzerland, 12 July 1988, §§ 45-46, Series A no. 140).
260. It is therefore not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence - for example, evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of domestic law - may be admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair. This involves an examination of the “unlawfulness” in question ... (see Khan v. the United Kingdom, no. 35394/97, § 34, ECHR 2000-V, and Lisica v. Croatia, no. 20100/06, § 48, 25 February 2010).
261. In the light of the above principles, the Court must determine whether the domestic courts’ admission of statements obtained in the absence of a lawyer during the applicant’s questioning by the police impaired his right to a fair hearing.262. The Court notes that during the entire criminal proceedings in question the applicant was unequivocal in his defence submissions that the content of his alleged confession to the police had been fabricated by the police. The Government denied these allegations and invoked the national courts’ findings. The national courts based their conclusion that the applicant was questioned in a lawyer’s presence on the fact that a statement to this effect had been given by State officials who had a duty to act in accordance with the laws well known to them. However, the Court cannot endorse such a conclusion in the light of the fact that the national courts failed to examine the obvious discrepancy between the alleged time of the presence of lawyer E.Č. and the time of the applicant’s actual questioning (see above, paragraphs 255 and 256).
263. The applicant had access to a lawyer after being remanded in custody and during the ensuing criminal proceedings; he thus had the opportunity to challenge the prosecution’s arguments. Nevertheless, as noted above, in convicting the applicant the domestic courts admitted in evidence statements which the applicant had subsequently retracted and which had been obtained during police custody in the absence of a lawyer. They based the applicant’s conviction to a significant degree on this evidence. Thus, in the present case, the applicant was undoubtedly affected by the restrictions on his access to a lawyer. Neither the assistance provided subsequently by a lawyer, nor the adversarial nature of the ensuing proceedings, could remedy the defects which had occurred during the applicant’s custody (see Salduz, cited above, § 58; Amutgan v. Turkey, no. 5138/04, § 18, 3 February 2009; and Dayanan v. Turkey, no. 7377/03, § 33, ECHR 2009-...).
264. In view of the foregoing, even though the applicant had the opportunity to challenge the evidence against him at the trial and subsequently on appeal, the admission of dubious evidence into the case file affected the applicant’s right to a fair trial to a degree incompatible with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention.
265. There has accordingly also been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the admission of evidence given by the applicant to the police without the presence of defence counsel and the reliance on that evidence for the applicant’s conviction.