[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

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I had hoped to see such an argument on this thread :)

But if u point me to one specific link at which I can find the clear argument we both desire, I would be grateful.
Lenny,
- Sorry I'm so slow... My excuses are numerous.
- This might be a good place to start: http://shrouddebates.com/?page_id=86. Though, I don't really have an example of a "clear" (effective?) argument.
 
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And you experience all that sentience?

Of course not. I only experience the sentience in my brain. Sentience is the thing capable of observing.

If I didn't exist, there would be no "I" to experience sentience or the lack of it.

Given the unique brain assumption, it is conditionally true that Jabba (or anyone else) may only observe one low probability outcome, if anything. But that's beside the point. The point is that, for any potential individual, nothing at all should be observed, with probability 0.9999999.......

And since the vast majority of potential individuals don't exist, that's exactly what we see.
 
What if you could show that the likelihood of sentient experience, given the unique brain assumption, is 1/infinity, and the likelihood of nothingness forever is (1-1/infinity)?

That would mess with some heads - not. Stonewallers don't pay attention. They just look for nits.


OK, I'll bite.

Show it.

Then, JFG, show what it has to do with the OP.
 
But how did you arrive at that probability?

One dauntingly complex unique organization, occurring at unique spacetime coordinates. And you think that infinitesimal nit makes a bit of difference.

How many elements does the set of all possible brains contain?

Nevermind. If you're scrounging for better odds, I'll give your unique brain an unbelievably generous expectation of 0.0000001. But it won't change anything. The supercomputer would still reject the hypothesis.

If you can make a case for it, I'll give you a ludicrously unrealistic 0.0001. Still won't change anything.
 
One dauntingly complex unique organization, occurring at unique spacetime coordinates. And you think that infinitesimal nit makes a bit of difference.

How many elements does the set of all possible brains contain?

Nevermind. If you're scrounging for better odds, I'll give your unique brain an unbelievably generous expectation of 0.0000001. But it won't change anything. The supercomputer would still reject the hypothesis.

If you can make a case for it, I'll give you a ludicrously unrealistic 0.0001. Still won't change anything.

Why? What's ludicrously unrealistic about odds of 0.0001 or 0.0000001?

Highly unlikely is not the same as impossible. Not at all.
 
What if you could show that the likelihood of sentient experience, given the unique brain assumption, is 1/infinity, and the likelihood of nothingness forever is (1-1/infinity)?

That would mess with some heads - not. Stonewallers don't pay attention. They just look for nits.

Why? What's ludicrously unrealistic about odds of 0.0001 or 0.0000001?

Highly unlikely is not the same as impossible. Not at all.

Either of those is sufficient to reject the hypothesis.

How many elements does the set of all possible unique brains contain?
 
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Dave,
- Sorry about that. I'll remove "intuition."
- Otherwise, as I understand things, that is what is done in Bayes statistics. We may be far off in our judgement about the prior probability of a thesis, but speculation is accepted (and, for what it is) in Bayes statistics (according to my understanding).

Speculation is not used for coming up with probabilities.
 
And you experience all that sentience?

Of course not. I only experience the sentience in my brain. Sentience is the thing capable of observing.

Then you have no argument. You can't have this argument from the position you've chosen, and I don't think you can demonstrate that your position is superior.

Have you forgotten that we are only assuming the unique brain assumption to test it? You said in another post you don't believe you've beaten those unique brain odds. Now you're implying you do believe it.

If I didn't exist, there would be no "I" to experience sentience or the lack of it.

Bingo. That nothingness forever is rather conspicuous by it's absence, isn't it.

Oh wait. You're using that for an argument, aren't you.

But the problem is, you're saying if the unique brain assumption is true, then you, specifically, wouldn't be around. Unless you've beaten those unique brain odds you say you don't believe you've beaten.

Given the unique brain assumption, it is conditionally true that Jabba (or anyone else) may only observe one low probability outcome, if anything. But that's beside the point. The point is that, for any potential individual, nothing at all should be observed, with probability 0.9999999.......

And since the vast majority of potential individuals don't exist, that's exactly what we see.

Given the unique brain assumption, nothingness forever is the near 1 probability. But that's not what you see, and what you see is what brings the unique brain assumption into question.
 
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Then you have no argument. You can't have this argument from the position you've chosen, and I don't think you can demonstrate that your position is superior.

Have you forgotten that we are only assuming the unique brain assumption to test it? You said in another post you don't believe you've beaten those unique brain odds. Now you're implying you do believe it.

No, I'm not. "I" haven't beaten any odds because if "I" didn't exist, "I" wouldn't have any odds to beat or not beat. "I" don't exist until after the events have happened.


Bingo. That nothingness forever is rather conspicuous by it's absence, isn't it.

How so? The potential brains that don't exist don't have the capacity to experience nothingness, because they don't exist.

But the problem is, you're saying if the unique brain assumption is true, then you, specifically, wouldn't be around.

I'm not saying that at all.


Given the unique brain assumption, nothingness forever is the near 1 probability. But that's not what you see, and what you see is what brings the unique brain assumption into question.

Near 1, not 1. I don't see nothingness because I exist. If I didn't exist, I wouldn't be able to see anything, because there would be no "I".
 
Dave,
- I'll see if I can find an official statement, but sure think we're expected to "speculate" in Bayesian statistics.

Sure. That's what it's for. There is nothing wrong with using probabilistic inference. We do it every day of our lives, because it's useful. We couldn't get along without it.

How could we decide it's safe to cross the street, when we don't have a probability distribution based on collected data?
 
No, I'm not. "I" haven't beaten any odds because if "I" didn't exist, "I" wouldn't have any odds to beat or not beat. "I" don't exist until after the events have happened.

How so? The potential brains that don't exist don't have the capacity to experience nothingness, because they don't exist.

I'm not saying that at all.

Near 1, not 1. I don't see nothingness because I exist. If I didn't exist, I wouldn't be able to see anything, because there would be no "I".

I see. In your world, it is impossible to test a hyposthesis, because once the data exists, the hypothetical expected frequencies cease to have any meaning, so there is no way to compare observation to expectation. And anyway, it doesn't matter how miniscule the hypothetical expectation of an observation is, because if it happened, it happened. Probability 1.

I could prove you wrong about that, but what would be the point? Tomorrow we'd be right back at square 1. Groundhog day all over again.

In fact, I've already proved you wrong about that when I brought up the chi-square test, but I think that got deleted.
 
I see. In your world, it is impossible to test a hyposthesis, because once the data exists, the hypothetical expected frequencies cease to have any meaning, so there is no way to compare observation to expectation.

Nonsense. But you seem to think that I should be surprised that I exist, because it's unlikely (but not impossible) for this specific me to exist. That's just bad math.


And anyway, it doesn't matter how miniscule the hypothetical expectation of an observation is, because if it happened, it happened. Probability 1.

That's pretty much true, yes. If something happened, we know it's not impossible.

I could prove you wrong about that

I doubt that very much.
 
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