I read some summaries of recent ECHR opinions on deprivation of counsel.
It looks to me like Knox has a slam dunk in some respects. I mean, gee—the Italian Supreme Court has already decided that she was entitled to counsel at some point and she did not get counsel.
The only issue as to the right to counsel being violated is when did the right to counsel attach for purposes of the ECHR—did it attach prior to the start of the interrogation (I think it did), but this doesn't even matter that much, because it clearly attached before she signed the 1:45 statement that in part underlies the arrest warrant. Thereafter, we have quite a lengthy period of denial of counsel (by decree of Mignini, access to counsel was denied for two days, and not for any good reason). So, not much of an issue there: her right to counsel under ECHR 6.3.c was violated for at least two days.
Then you get into the question of are the consequences of the violation of the right to counsel. It seems to me that any statements made by Knox during this period cannot be used against her for purposes of proving her guilt of the crime being investigated, i.e., murder. What I’m not sure of yet is whether the statements could be used to support a charge that was not then under investigation, i.e., calumnia. But it seems to me that even as to this charge, the court is going to run into problems with entrapment, etc. Bottom line, and this seems to be the crux of the ECHR analysis once a violation of counsel is established: the calumnia never would have arisen if there had been access to counsel in accordance with the law, and thus Knox was injured by the deprivation of counsel.
Getting a bit beyond her currect ECHR appeal (which is of the calumia conviction), we can see that a judgment of an ECHR violation regarding calumnia will be a de facto condemnation of the murder conviction. First, the calumnia and civil charges were joined with the murder trial, and therefore, they were in fact in play in the murder proceeding, notwithstanding any artificial distinction that might be raised about what particular evidence was used for. Second, the supreme court is now urging the use of the calumnia conviction as evidence of guilt in the murder, and therefore, the statements underlying the calumnia charges are being used in a sort of backdoor way to support the murder conviction.
Bottom line for me: Knox was deprived of counsel in violation of ECHR 6.3.c, and the 1:45, 5:45 and gift statements are all the fruit of this illegal deprivation of counsel. The calumnia action is a derivative of an unlawful deprivation of counsel. The murder proceeding is already tainted by the use of these statements, and further, to the extent that a murder conviction is based on a finding of guilt for calumnia, this is going to be a violation of the ECHR.