Akhenaten
Heretic Pharaoh
You don't include me in your list but for the record I have stopped responding because I have given up trying to make sense of your posts.
+1
You don't include me in your list but for the record I have stopped responding because I have given up trying to make sense of your posts.
- But Pixel, you gotta admit that a particular person not being able to make sense of what I'm saying, doesn't necessarily mean that what I'm saying doesn't make sense.
- Whatever, can you say something about what it is in my last attempt that doesn't make sense?
xtifr,I was included in the list, but my reasons for not responding are very similar. Insofar as I have been able to follow the tenuous line of reasoning, others seem to have been addressing it well enough for my purposes.
For that matter, it's been a while, but I don't remember seeing a full response to my last question. But I may be losing track...
Akhenaten,Awesome.
Akhenaten,
- Gotta admit that I couldn't find any question addressed to me. What am I overlooking?
Pixel,
- The chances of the sequence of events that produced my individual consciousness occurring even once is vanishingly small is according to the current scientific model that I will only exist, at most, for one, finite lifetime.
- Infinitely alive means that you will never cease to exist.
Lenny,First I think it is important to always note what you are conditioning on, the background information "I" which informs your probabilities, P(x |data, I).
Second, I think it is useful to evaluate the probability you expected to observe, under the assumption that I holds and your probability (forecast, in my case) is True.
Skill scores for probability forecast systems are useful both for seeing how good one system is relative to another, and (some of them) can be used to see how surprised you "should" be give a specific outcome. A poor score is surprising only if a good score was to be expected, given the probability forecast issued.
I cannot follow the whole of jabba's argument, but it seems suggest the observed value has too low a probability to happen by chance. It appears to me that the expected probability assigned to the outcome (that is, the value corresponding to an outcome determined by the true probability distribution) is vanishingly small. Thus it is no surprise that the probability of the observed outcome is vanishingly small.
If you are forecasting over a huge (finite) number of possible outcomes then, in the case some are high probability and others are very very low probability, it is surprising to observe a low probability outcome.
But if every possible outcome is carries a very very low probability, then you expect a low probability outcome, you just don't know which one. I do not claim this is the first time this basic idea has been stated on this thread.
Toon,Given the "uniqe brain" hypothesis, you do not expect a low probabiity outcome, for the very simple reason that there is also a high probability outcome.
The high probability outcome is the near certainty that you, specifically, should never have seen the light of day at all. Not once, not ever. But that is not the outcome you are observing, in case you haven't noticed.
Furthermore, it wouldn't matter anyway if all the possible outcomes were low probability, in terms of the expectation of observing a specific one. There happens to be a vast difference between the sum of all low probability events, versus a specific low probability event:
The sum of all low probability events = 0.999999....
One specific low probability event=0.000000....1
That's why the likelhood of observing a random lottery winner is far greater than the likelihood of observing yourself winning.
In case any of you were wondering why other people keep winning the lottery but you never do.
Toon,
- Or, does the "unique brain" hypothesis underly #1...
Toon,
- I think we won! Maybe, we should try to collect our million dollars from Randi...
