Would you use a Star Trek type transporter?

[phunk]

I told you the question was far more interesting

I expect a merger would entail somehow reconciling the neural network connectivity between the two instances, effectively teleporting both of them at the same time and modifying what is reconstructed. It can be done, but it would be pretty darn complicated.

It wouldn't be that jarring for you, though. Think about any events from your past that aren't directly related to each other. A trip you took to some city, for example. When did it happen? Was it you? I could have easily just slipped those memories into your mind, as if they were experienced by a copy of yourself, and you wouldn't know the difference.

Continuing that analogy, before I asked just now, were you thinking of those memories? I bet not. So a merge would just be like having more memories of stuff you didn't have memories of before, and you wouldn't know it, until you recalled those memories for some reason.

It may be more interesting, but it's a completely different question.

 

[Thunderchief]

To be specific, the copy can also ( or should, rather ) materialize in the state corresponding to the state of the original one planck time after it is vaporized.

This actually might be a transporter I would get into, but I will have to think about it for a bit. However it is not the same as the Startrek Transporter, which I will not be getting into. ;-)

Simon.

 

[phunk]

It doesn't, except that if you're going to wait until later to form me elsewhere, then my reaction will depend on my feelings about being relocated AND sent to the future, plus I have to factor in the possibility that something will happen and I won't get formed elsewhere at all.

I was actually thinking the other way around, with you being recreated elsewhere first, then the original destroyed. Basically, if there's enough time for someone to say "ok, the copy is complete, we're going to vaporize you now", would you be ok with it?

 

[rocketdodger]

I can only think of one reason why it matters that the original dies instantly... so that they have no time to realize "oh crap, I've been copied but I'm still here, and I don't want to die".

Yep.

However it isn't as bad as it seems, because mathematically even if you exist for some time after a copy is made, the copy really *is* you 'up until the copy was made.'

Meaning, how bad the death of the original happens to be is a matter of perspective. Is death bad because it hurts? Or is death bad because of the snuffing of a conscious being that has both a future and a past full of experiences?

If you hold the latter view ( and I think most people do, after they think about it ), then the death of the original is only as bad as the amount of experience lost. You can think of it like the save points in a video game ( or any software, for that matter ). If you just saved, and you die a few minutes later, no big deal -- you only lost a few minutes. If you can't save at all and you die, well that utterly sucks. If you can't replay the game after you die ( how our lives are now ) then it really really totally sucks.

Conversely, in a game where you can't save, you get *really really* tense when you're character is in danger. If you just saved, you might treat dying so trivially that you don't even bother to take care of your character ( "I wonder if there is a secret down in that pit -- i might not be able to get back out, but I can just reload my last save point so who cares" ).

 

[AvalonXQ]

I was actually thinking the other way around, with you being recreated elsewhere first, then the original destroyed. Basically, if there's enough time for someone to say "ok, the copy is complete, we're going to vaporize you now", would you be ok with it?

From a materialist point of view, absolutely. There's no reason not to be.

 

[rocketdodger]

It may be more interesting, but it's a completely different question.

Not really.

If you propose having teleporters around that don't destroy the original, then you probably need to think about what happens when there are thousands of instances of yourself walking around.

You should read the novel "Glasshouse," it really dives into all this stuff ( and is incidentally one of the best sci-fi novels ever written, its actually better than "Rainbows End" which stole the 2007 Hugo from it ).

 

[Croc411]

I think materialists still have this idea that there's something unique about the continuity of their experiences, as if the fact that the same physical brain cells are being used now as were being used 20 seconds ago is the reason you're still you. That's how you get this silly notion that if we suddenly replace the physical matter with different physical matter, it's a "different person" experiencing the thoughts - despite the fact that there's absolutely no physical evidence or other material fact you can point to that actually supports there being any difference.

Exactly.

There is absolutely no connection between the "you" from 20 seconds ago and the current "you" that could be relevant for the continuity of your self (both of these states of "you" emerged from the same physical body but we know that this cannot be relevant).

Why? Because everything that is required for the continuity of the self is part of the information represented by your nervous system (in particular our short-term memory), at any given moment.

There is no reason to assume otherwise. It'd only make things more complicated and create problems.

 

[phunk]

From a materialist point of view, absolutely. There's no reason not to be.

I don't get how that is the materialistic point of view. From a materialistic point of view, the instant you are copied, there are two completely separate instances of you. There is no connection, no shared soul, no shared experience. It's not like the one who dies suddenly starts experiencing life from the other's point of view. From the point of view of the original, he's stepping into a transporter and dying, end of story. He'd experience nothing different stepping into a transporter vs a suicide booth.

 

[phunk]

Not really.

If you propose having teleporters around that don't destroy the original, then you probably need to think about what happens when there are thousands of instances of yourself walking around.

You should read the novel "Glasshouse," it really dives into all this stuff ( and is incidentally one of the best sci-fi novels ever written, its actually better than "Rainbows End" which stole the 2007 Hugo from it ).

The whole point of this thread is to discuss the implications of the "copy and destroy the original" style of transporter, and whether or not it's effectively suicide.

PS. Glasshouse is on my todo list, I liked some of Stross' other work.

 

[Croc411]

I don't get how that is the materialistic point of view. From a materialistic point of view, the instant you are copied, there are two completely separate instances of you. There is no connection, no shared soul, no shared experience. It's not like the one who dies suddenly starts experiencing life from the other's point of view. From the point of view of the original, he's stepping into a transporter and dying, end of story. He'd experience nothing different stepping into a transporter vs a suicide booth.

There is no "you" in that sense. We are just the sum of our memories and personality traits and nothing else.

 

[AvalonXQ]

I don't get how that is the materialistic point of view. From a materialistic point of view, the instant you are copied, there are two completely separate instances of you. There is no connection, no shared soul, no shared experience. It's not like the one who dies suddenly starts experiencing life from the other's point of view. From the point of view of the original, he's stepping into a transporter and dying, end of story. He'd experience nothing different stepping into a transporter vs a suicide booth.

Again, the problem is that you're discussing "the one who died" as if he has some sort of metaphysically coherent "consciousness" outside of his brain and memory.

The physical brain has no point of view outside of the processes of the mind that it manifests. Moving those processes from one mind to another does not cause one point of view to cease and another point of view to begin; it's the same mind and the same point of view.

 

[phunk]

The processes aren't moved though, they're duplicated. The original process continues until it's vaporised.

ETA: And no, I'm not discussing this as if there is anything outside the brain. I'm explicitly saying the opposite as a reason that the copy is not the original, because the original persists until it is destroyed.

 

[zeggman]

Yes, me too. So where's the drama about getting into a Teletransporter?

You cannot die in a correctly functioning Teletransporter. One body ceases to be and another is created. But "you" is only an emergent property of brain activity. If the body is perfectly reproduced then the "you", the "I", is identical.

Nick

I agree with this, and don't think I'd have a problem stepping into a tested, functioning transporter.

Still, when the scenario is changed only slightly, it gives me pause.

Suppose you're transported five feet from where you are right now, and the "original" is not vaporized. You now exist as two virtually identical individuals. You can even have a brief conversation with yourself to verify that your memories are exactly the same.

Would you be happy now to step into the vaporization chamber, knowing that your emergent brain activity is cycling along just fine in the other body?

 

[AvalonXQ]

The processes aren't moved though, they're duplicated. The original process continues until it's vaporised.

I disagree that these descriptions are meaningful. A process isn't an object and can't be vaporized. What is the difference between a process being moved and being duplicated?

Again, I think you're making the mistake of conflating the brain with the mind.

 

[Croc411]

OK let us change a bit the parameter. Imagine that for an incredible accident, random happenning of cosmic proportion, somebody in 2000 years has the same thought / emerging property as I have now, same memory, same thought. I have died 1900+ years before him.

Do you really think this would be me, that the I of now would be seeing what that person would be seeing, because essentially the teleporter experiment comes down to that.

Of course it would be you. In the very sense you mean here. You could even turn it around (that "other you" having existed 2000 years ago) or put it to a place causally disconnected from us (different universe). The only question is: does that conscious state exist somewhere or doesn't it.

Our time dimension is of no direct relevance here. What matters is how you perceive time, and this is solely based on your memories and the workings of your brain.

 

[dudalb]

I would have to be very careful that nothing else got into the transporter chamber with me...like a fly.

Wow, a thread about matter tranporters and it took 4 pages for a "The Fly" reference.

 

[Thunderchief]

I disagree that these descriptions are meaningful. A process isn't an object and can't be vaporized. What is the difference between a process being moved and being duplicated?

Again, I think you're making the mistake of conflating the brain with the mind.

Hmm, in a materialistic point of view the Brain is the mind, so when you vaporise the brain the mind goes too. Is that not obvious? So when I step into the vaporising machine, it would be no comfort to me that a copy of me exists elsewhere. Can you honestly say that you would happily step in to a vaporiser after being copied?

 

[Croc411]

Hmm, in a materialistic point of view the Brain is the mind, so when you vaporise the brain the mind goes too.

But materialism also says that the mind is just information. And information can be copied or reproduced.

 

[BenBurch]

Hmm, in a materialistic point of view the Brain is the mind, so when you vaporise the brain the mind goes too. Is that not obvious? So when I step into the vaporising machine, it would be no comfort to me that a copy of me exists elsewhere. Can you honestly say that you would happily step in to a vaporiser after being copied?

But is the mind just the current configuration of your brain?

If I replicate that configuration elsewhere with different atoms, how is that different?

Nature replaces the atoms in your body and over the course of your life there is significant turnover.

Was there some point where the cycling of material left you not you?

 

[macdoc]

Again, I think you're making the mistake of conflating the brain with the mind.

and I think you are making a mistake in not doing so.

All transporter scenarios envisions an instanteous duplication of the material state of the person and that includes processes down to the quantum level.

Possible? not in my view.

But I do think some sort of ongoing consciousness of a person uploaded to a machine has potential.