On Consciousness

[tensordyne]

It has been considered many times to switch to trinary computing, but many physical storage systems are naturally digital, and it is very difficult to distinguish between trinary voltages with sufficient accuracy. The brain on the other hand is known to be error prone, but that does not make it less of a computer.

Just a quick recap, it does not add anything to the argument about the brain not being a computer (or, that to whatever extent it is like a computer that that does not help in understanding consciousness) to say neurons work in base 3.

In the above quote the word digital was used when the correct word probably would have been binary (it is in bold for your convenience). Digital just means discontinuous and discrete. I also doubt it is hard to distinguish between voltages to set up trinary gate systems. It just involves more circuitry.

It is interesting to point out that anytime analog signals are being processed in a machine, then technically the operations of said machine are outside the paradigm of Turing Based Computation. Of course, one can use Turing Computation to approximate the results (if they are repeatable) of mechanisms that use analog processing.

 

[Belz...]

I am? We are? Evidence?

Your POSTS. You are defining "computer" as a specific type of computer, unjustifiably so.

Either way, if the brain is a computer (or a kind of computer), it's working in non-computerlike ways. That presents a challenge to the claim.

No, you meant that it doesn't work like your PC, which is irrelevant. Who cares if it's binary or trinary or if it has transistors or not ? Those things are not requisites for a computer.

 

[tensordyne]

Yes but when you say that it doesn't make it clear that the physical connectivity of the neurons is important. I honestly think piggy ( and others ) thinks the computationalist position is that the brain is like a stored program computer, that it can just be loaded up with any set of instructions and run any program because the architecture is so generalized.

It is interesting listening to the thoughts of someone you disagree with as they try and figure out your mindset. Since I am '( and others )' I think it is appropriate if I give a response.

Piggy has already addressed why he thinks the comp.lit position is wrong and it does not have anything to do with contentions over where the program in the brain is stored, so far as I can tell.

From my own perspective, the bone I have is that the comp position does not in any way address how the experience of perception works. Perhaps because the very concept of sensory experience is missing in some essential way from the Comp position mindset? Hard to say.

I only know that if you understand what consciousness is in terms of sensation (consciousness as just a bundle of sensations for some period of time), then the idea of computation being what gives rise to it is obviously absurd. Computation can only rearrange, it does not create, destroy or sustain the existence of an aspect of the Universe. To study those kinds of questions about the Universe you need Physics (in this case Psychophysics).

And that is it really.

 

[steenkh]

In the above quote the word digital was used when the correct word probably would have been binary (it is in bold for your convenience).

You are right, I meant to say "binary", but I was distracted while writing it. Thanks for understanding the meaning.

Digital just means discontinuous and discrete. I also doubt it is hard to distinguish between voltages to set up trinary gate systems. It just involves more circuitry.

Yes, obviously, but it goes without saying that trinary systems also need to be more cost efficient than the ruling binary systems.

It is interesting to point out that anytime analog signals are being processed in a machine, then technically the operations of said machine are outside the paradigm of Turing Based Computation. Of course, one can use Turing Computation to approximate the results (if they are repeatable) of mechanisms that use analog processing.

In reality, all analog systems will work to a certain resolution, and a digital value can emulate this to the same resolution.

 

[dlorde]

Btw, where are the symbols that you think the computer is manipulating?

Is it really manipulating symbols when it's operating, or is the manipulation of symbols more appropriate to the programming of the machine?

There are symbols in different contexts - the symbology of programming - the conceptual reification of the computational abstractions representing patterns of interaction within the system. Programming establishes a logical architecture for processing, the symbology is for the convenience of the programmer. When operating, the system manipulates actual data - although in processes at higher levels of abstraction, e.g. conceptual consciousness (thinking about ideas), it can be considered symbolic, but this is an operational, not structural, symbolism.

I was only talking about symbolic, as opposed to physical computations.

Strictly speaking, symbolic computations are physical computations, in the abstract; they embody the conceptual relationships between computations (and their data) that manipulate real data in a particular context. 'Symbolic Computation' as generally defined refers to manipulation of algebraic or mathematical expressions, and I wouldn't suggest that the brain explicitly does this (except at high levels of abstraction, e.g. in the meta-cognitive sense of a mathematician or algebraist at work). But I'm not sure that the manipulation of algebraic or mathematical expressions has any particular relevance to computational or biological consciousness.

That's what I mean by symbolic computation requiring a reader.

So 'reader' == interpreter, as I suggested. Interpreting the symbolic output in terms of the physical relationships it abstractly represents, in the given context.

I don't think neural work in the brain is symbolic

I'm not entirely sure what you mean by 'symbolic' in this context (i.e. why it's relevant). I'm happy to accept the brain doesn't symbolically manipulate algebraic or mathematical expressions, although its structure and connections can be viewed as instantiating certain mathematical or logical expressions, and can be modified.

I don't think the neural work in a computer running a paint sprayer is symbolic either.

'neural work' in a computer running a paint sprayer?? I have no idea what are you talking about.

what I'm asking my pocket calculator to do is essentially symbolic. That is, from my point of view. What it actually does, without regard to me, is not symbolic at all.

I agree it is just a point of view. The physical processes do their stuff, and the symbolism is just a convenience you use to helps you describe and understand what's going on as those processes do their stuff at various levels of abstraction.

From the physicalist point of view, what's important to understand in the production of consciousness are the physical computations of the brain, not the symbolic computations, so you don't need a reader.

I don't see why one might not have symbolic processing internally with a 'reader' incorporated to 'decode' the output - but I don't see that it matters here.

The result of a physical computation is simply a new shape of the physical stuff involved in the computation. That's how the brain works, by constantly reshaping itself physically.

It does that; restructuring the connectome is only part of the story, but it can be viewed as implicitly manipulating neural circuit expressions.

Feedback loops are everywhere in the brain, including areas that have no effect on consciousness, so yeah, you could say SRIP is going on here, but that's a trivial observation.

It's a question of the level of abstraction - SRIP seems to occur at every level.

 

[dlorde]

... Consciousness is not behavior (contra to the cousin of the computationalists the bahviorists), it is an internal state of being.

If there is activity, internal or otherwise, there is behaviour. It need not be motor activity. Consciousness is a process, it involves neural activity, so it is a behaviour (or aggregate of behaviours).

 

[dlorde]

.. if the brain is a computer (or a kind of computer), it's working in non-computerlike ways.

For example? I'm curious to know in what ways you feel the brain doesn't function like a computer.

 

[Mr. Scott]

So, what you're saying is that the brain is a trinary pulse-coded switched digital network?

I'm fine with that (if the evidence supports it). That makes it a computer.


Yes, it's a pulse-coded switched digital network. That makes it a computer.

A binary computer can emulate or simulate a trinary computer. In fact, most computers use tristate logic in their bus systems, but it's really just to simplify what would otherwise have been a network of binary OR gates.

 

[dlorde]

Are there any trinary computers out there?

Yes, as a matter of fact, there are (they're usually called 'ternary computers').

You didn't address that quote: "Human brains store information using many different strategies, none of which are very analogous to binary in a digital computer."
Paul King, Computational Neuroscientist

The analogy is with the concept of digital computers in general, rather than specific common implementations. As the Blue Brain project shows, digital systems can emulate biological brains and their storage strategies.

 

[dlorde]

In reality, all analog systems will work to a certain resolution, and a digital value can emulate this to the same resolution.

In any case, the Nyquist–Shannon sampling theorem says that sampling at twice the highest analogue frequency is sufficient.

 

[Mr. Scott]

A Question for Dr. Piggy, Brain Specialist

Question for Dr. Piggy, Brain Specialist:

I have a patient, Mr. Gumby, who's been told he does not experience qualia but otherwise is like any other member of his Gumby family.

What would you do, Dr. Piggy, to determine of my patient, Mr. Gumby, really was lacking in qualia? How would you test him to confirm or refute the assertion that he was qualia-impaired? Would his brain have to come out?

 

[rocketdodger]

Piggy has already addressed why he thinks the comp.lit position is wrong and it does not have anything to do with contentions over where the program in the brain is stored, so far as I can tell.

Well your language here sort of confirms my hunch, since there isn't any "program" at all. The computationalist position is *not* that consciousness is the result of the brain running some "program." It is simply that the same results can be achieved using a program because both the behavior of the brain and the behavior of programs are algorithmic in nature.

From my own perspective, the bone I have is that the comp position does not in any way address how the experience of perception works.

Yeah but that is just your own strawman, there is no such failure in reality. A good portion of the research over the last decade or two has been geared towards trying to figure out how the experience of perception works. Look at the aisb homepage ( http://www.aisb.org.uk/ ) to get started.

I only know that if you understand what consciousness is in terms of sensation (consciousness as just a bundle of sensations for some period of time), then the idea of computation being what gives rise to it is obviously absurd.

Naw, you don't "know" this, you "think" this, and I would even say your position is closer to "feel."

You certainly can't give a formal explanation for why you take this position.

Computation can only rearrange, it does not create, destroy or sustain the existence of an aspect of the Universe. To study those kinds of questions about the Universe you need Physics (in this case Psychophysics).

Yeah, see.

 

[PixyMisa]

That makes it work in trinary. Are there any trinary computers out there?

Yes: Three-valued logic^WP

 

[PixyMisa]

Not what Oreilly said:
"the brain as a whole operates more like a social network than a digital computer, with neurons communicating to allow learning and the creation of memory, according to O'Reilly."

It's a pulse-coded switched digital network. That makes it computer. You might say it operates more like a social network than a Von Neumann architecture computer like a PC. But it is a computer.

And not according to Paul King. You didn't address that quote: "Human brains store information using many different strategies, none of which are very analogous to binary in a digital computer."
Paul King, Computational Neuroscientist

Some digital computers use binary. Others don't. They're all digital; they're all computers.

This is a computer. It's running on another computer, which is running on another computer. They're all computers.



You'll know that you finally understand what a computer is when that video leaves you in awe.

 

[Fudbucker]

For example? I'm curious to know in what ways you feel the brain doesn't function like a computer.

In certain respects, it is like a computer. In other's it's not. I posted some differences earlier.

Despite what Pixy claims, it's not evident that computers think, feel, and are conscious in any way. It may be that in the future they will be, but for now, the brain is not a kind of computer we currently know of.

 

[Fudbucker]

Yes, as a matter of fact, there are (they're usually called 'ternary computers').



The analogy is with the concept of digital computers in general, rather than specific common implementations. As the Blue Brain project shows, digital systems can emulate biological brains and their storage strategies.

A computer emulating a brain isn't a brain. I'm with Piggy on this. A simulation/emulation is not the same thing as what's being simulated.

 

[PixyMisa]

In certain respects, it is like a computer. In other's it's not. I posted some differences earlier.

No you didn't. You posted what you think are differences between what you think the brain does and what you think a computer does.

Since you still don't understand what a computer is, your argument is not particularly cogent on this point.

Despite what Pixy claims, it's not evident that computers think, feel, and are conscious in any way. It may be that in the future they will be, but for now, the brain is not a kind of computer we currently know of.

Sorry, but you're still wrong.

A computer emulating a brain isn't a brain. I'm with Piggy on this. A simulation/emulation is not the same thing as what's being simulated.

 

[!Kaggen]

In any case, the Nyquist–Shannon sampling theorem says that sampling at twice the highest analogue frequency is sufficient.

Tell that to a vinyl collector.

 

[!Kaggen]

You'll know that you finally understand what a computer is when that video leaves you in awe.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIdDA4xdTf8&sns=em

You will finally understand a human when this video leaves you in awe.

 

[steenkh]

Well your language here sort of confirms my hunch, since there isn't any "program" at all. The computationalist position is *not* that consciousness is the result of the brain running some "program." It is simply that the same results can be achieved using a program because both the behavior of the brain and the behavior of programs are algorithmic in nature.

Well spotted. I have been uneasy about what the non-computationalists concept of computers are, but this nails the misconception down.