On Consciousness

[Zeuzzz]

No.

Fish-leg.

 

[tsig]

Real world to academic world, are you receiving?
Over.

You're on the wrong frequency.

 

[tsig]

I wouldn't put much stock in that particular definition for our purposes here.

First of all because we know that perception and consciousness are not the same thing, a fact which MW does not take into account.

Also, the major point in my post about hallucination is that you are hallucinating all the time.

A doctor performing surgery is hallucinating. A gymnast delivering a perfect-10 performance is hallucinating. An orchestra performing Mozart is hallucinating.

These hallucinations are a mixture of perception and dreams.

You actually perceive a small fraction of what you experience. The brain patches up the rest in a process that's pretty much the same as dreaming, but without the bodily side-effects such as paralysis.

On the other side of the coin, you do quite a bit of perceiving which simply never gets involved at all in the brain functions that produce conscious experience.

The hallucination model has several advantages, not the least of which is that it conforms with current observation and experiment (unlike the alleged computational model of consciousness, which, truth be told, doesn't even exist). It also finally gets rid of the Cartesian theater for good, which is no small feat.

The computationalists will often speak of "representations" in the brain, and physicalists do as well... it's a very useful way of talking about what's going on in the brain. But the computationalists make the mistake of entifying the representations, treating them as real things rather than convenient ways of talking about incredibly complex phenomena.

I'll give you an example of what I mean....

Suppose you drop a stone in a lake. It causes ripples. These ripples are not "represenations" of the stone... they are merely consequences of the stone hitting the water. They don't resemble the stone at all. (And even if they did, their similarity could not actually be a "representation" of the stone without an observing mind to note the similarity and decide that they were representations.)

So even though different stones will produce different patterns, and even though these patterns may be entirely predictable, there's still no objective "representation" going on.

Now suppose that this particular lake has some sort of film on it, maybe pollution, maybe pond scum, whatever. And the ripples in the pond cause patterns of this film to be left behind on the lake bank when the ripples cease.

Those patterns on the bank are not representations of the ripples, much less of the stone!

And yet the computationalists want to say that they are... or they would say so, if they were consistent in their logic.

The patterns of neural firing that go on in your brain when light bounces off a tree and onto your eyeballs are not representations of the tree. They are in no way similar to the tree. They don't resemble it at all.

And here's the kicker... the hallucination resulting from the patterns of neural firings also does not resemble either the neural firings or the tree!

Your gut instinct is probably to think, "Wait, no, of course my vision of the tree resembles the tree... if it didn't, I couldn't do things like climb the tree".

But as we saw in the earlier thought experiment about the drug, the fire, and the poison, this is actually not true at all.

All that matters is that the hallucination enables your body to interact effectively with the tree. Representation is not necessary.

And absolutely nothing that's in your conscious experience of the tree is present in the tree itself -- nothing at all. Not the color, the smell, the sound of wind in the leaves or the branches rubbing together, the feeling of the texture of the bark or its coolness to your hand, the pain you get if a twig sticks into your side... absolutely none of that exists anywhere except your conscious experience.

The light bouncing off the tree is like the stone dropped into the pond. The neural firings are like the ripples in the pond. The hallucination your body performs is like the patterns of algae on the bank.

They are part of a causal chain, but no part resembles any other part, no part is a representation of any other part.

Once you kick this notion of representation to the curb, your understanding of what's really and objectively occuring gets much clearer... and the computationalist model unravels even further.

Why should I read the post of someone who is hallucinating?

 

[Belz...]

No.

Come on, Pixy. Even I am getting tired of that.

 

[Belz...]

I could go on

I wish you would, because I didn't expect only quotes.

but that should suffice to demonstrate that Pixy's claim is false.

It does ?

If, on the other hand, you are referring to his claim that it is widely accepted that "the brain is a computer", then there's nothing I can do for you because I can't cite what doesn't exist -- it's like asking me to provide citations to prove that it is not widely accepted that horses eat rabbits, because nobody writing about horses bothers to point out that they don't eat rabbits.

Okay, I'll bite. How is the brain _not_ like a computer ?

 

[Dancing David]

Also, the major point in my post about hallucination is that you are hallucinating all the time.

Um, I respect you and all but, no.

Hallucinations are false perceptions that are not related to sensation.

You can butcher meaning all you want but you could make your point more carefully and use the language that exists.

We do not hallucinate in that sense all the time, I think you are trying to say that we do not have direct sensation. But constructs called perceptions.

Either way, have a good ten days, I will be absent.

Same to all!

 

[Zeuzzz]

Okay, I'll bite. How is the brain _not_ like a computer ?

Free will
Self awareness
Consciousness
Different biochemical interactions
Different topology
A human brain uses 10 Watts of power, where most computers we have made to try to get to the same level of information processing and memory storage need over 20 terawatts.
Different ... well different in every regard really apart from. Um. Um.

 

[PixyMisa]

Come on, Pixy. Even I am getting tired of that.

I started in on a lengthier response a couple of times, but there's nothing in Piggy's post that isn't complete nonsense. There's no clear point to start in correcting him, because the that post is based on multiple layers of false premises that he's already been corrected on repeatedly.

 

[PixyMisa]

Free will

Libertarian free will is an incoherent concept; compatibilist free will is demonstrated by computers all the time.

Self awareness
Consciousness

Same thing, and some computer programs clearly demonstrate this behaviour.

Different biochemical interactions

Yes, but is there any reason to think that's relevant?

Different topology

Neural networks.

A human brain uses 10 Watts of power, where most computers we have made to try to get to the same level of information processing and memory storage need over 20 terawatts.

Where did you get that number from? My (admittedly back-of-the-envelope) calculations put it in the range of 10 to 100 megawatts. Which is a still a million times more than the brain, but a million times less than your number

Different ... well different in every regard really apart from. Um. Um.

Apart from the fact that they're both computers.

 

[PixyMisa]

Um, I respect you and all but, no.

Hallucinations are false perceptions that are not related to sensation.

You can butcher meaning all you want but you could make your point more carefully and use the language that exists.

Yes. It's one thing to take a concept that isn't well-defined, provide a definition, and to debate the value of that definition, but to take a well-defined scientific term and thrash it into meaninglessness is not going to be terribly productive.

 

[tensordyne]

In the same way I don't have a problem with free will. They are both used either as flags of dualist irrationality, or as convenient and careless abstractions that paper over ignorance of underlying mechanisms & processes.

comp.lit == "Crazy Cultist" resolves to true in this case. See Piggy refs above.

The existence of sensation isn't negated by that statement, but reinforced - sensations are changing mental states which are changing physical states. In terms of the active brain, talk of mental states is just relabeling physical states.

Perception of sensation is its own kind. For whatever reason, we can have a perception while at the same time being able to note its existence by our mind. Since consciousness is perception in action, we need a map from brain states to consciousness states.

Do you really think there's no you? who is it that thinks that if not you? Being you doesn't necessitate a Cartesian theatre, you just need to accept that your brain activity is you.

My mind is me, but the mind does not experience phenomenal sensation. In terms of perception, there is no me, there is only the perception. Your brain activity is either a model we have on how the brain works or observations we have accrued over the years as to how the brain, which is about a 3 lb. lump of flesh, operates. My brain activity gives rise to both my mind and to sensations. There is no theatre. You can go home now, there is no show today.

There are only physical states. The only mapping involved is between physical states, involving wetware 'processing'.

Read Piggy's thought experiment and show how it can be explained in terms of physical states. You are missing the concept of phenomenal consciousness. It is just not there for you. Your rejection of it implicitly does not mean it is not there, it just means like a child you do not understand certain ideas that the grown ups understand (by grown ups I mean the current leaders in the field of neuroscience).

I have no idea what you mean; what circuitry? what rule?

Did you not look at the video I put up? The evidence for CEMI is now stronger than it was in 2002. Several labs have shown that neurons respond to EM fields being applied without the possibility of action potential as the cause. If EM fields trapped inside a Faraday cage that cause EM field waves to bounce around is what consciousness is physically, then there should be rules, psycho-physical rules as to how an EM field causes various sensations to occur. These rules will have nothing to do with complexity or information but simply how one maps (in terms of a model) a given EM field configuration to its attendant phenomenal sensation complex.

Why introduce an unevidenced additional entity (especially a 'sensation field' ) when there is no reason to suppose it is necessary?

I take the following as ontological parts of a future consciousness model:

1. There is sensation that forms consciousness.
2. There exist two ontological states of existence in physics:
a. Matter (Fermions)
b. Energy (Bosons)

There exists no a priori reason to expect that consciousness can not be associated with 2.b. (in video McFadden notes the same). And, as well, new experiments are starting to show evidence that it is 2.b.

 

[tensordyne]

Be nice! We're all in this together.

Computationalists try my patience. Grrrr.

 

[tensordyne]

And that is why it, the scientific model is so effective at doing things, it is about behaviors, not about meaning.

Incorrect, the scientific method is about predicting conscious experience using social interaction and methodical examination of all phenomena in order to create models. These models will often have several different levels of semantic context.

 

[PixyMisa]

Read Piggy's thought experiment and show how it can be explained in terms of physical states.

Self-referential computation.

You are missing the concept of phenomenal consciousness.

Nope. Although we politely ignore the shibboleth "phenomenal".

Did you not look at the video I put up? The evidence for CEMI is now stronger than it was in 2002.

It's zero.

If EM fields trapped inside a Faraday cage that cause EM field waves to bounce around is what consciousness is physically, then there should be rules, psycho-physical rules as to how an EM field causes various sensations to occur.

This doesn't happen. Let me say that again: This. Does. Not. Happen.

I take the following as ontological parts of a future consciousness model:

1. There is sensation that forms consciousness.

That doesn't actually mean anything.

2. There exist two ontological states of existence in physics:
a. Matter (Fermions)
b. Energy (Bosons)

Nope. This is patently false, because they are interchangeable.

There exists no a priori reason to expect that consciousness can not be associated with 2.b.

Could you possibly be more vague? Everything in the Universe is assocated with bosons, because everything in the Universe is associated by bosons.

What's not possible, though, is for bosons alone to form complex structures or processes; you need Fermi-Dirac statistics for that, and that only applies to fermions.

 

[tensordyne]

Um, I respect you and all but, no.

Hallucinations are false perceptions that are not related to sensation.

You can butcher meaning all you want but you could make your point more carefully and use the language that exists.

We do not hallucinate in that sense all the time, I think you are trying to say that we do not have direct sensation. But constructs called perceptions.

Either way, have a good ten days, I will be absent.

Same to all!

He was using a metaphor. In terms of consciousness, hallucinations do not have a higher or lower status than waking conscious states or dreams. A hallucination is a conscious state just like the waking and the dream states are. A hallucination is a conscious state that we think is not directly influenced by the thing we call 'Reality', which is the model that says there is a world 'out there' (almost kind of a meta-model perhaps).

When a person's perceptions are not in line with everyone else's we think of those perceptions as false. In fact, there can be no such thing as a false perception because when it comes to consciousness the appearance is the reality!

Things are abstractions. The world 'out there', that is an abstraction. It is not primary to what we can know directly. Naive Realists, stop putting the cart (abstractions and models) before the horse (sensation, phenomena, perception, consciousness, whatever word means experience, in and of itself, to you).

Clear thinking on this is necessary if advances in understanding consciousness are to be made.

 

[tensordyne]

I am putting you on my ignore list PixyMisa. You are just too predictable in your responses as well as being a poster who resorts to empty blanket statements as if that proves anything (not just once or twice, but a lot!). See below for an example.

It's zero.

Oh, and who can forget the following jewel of illogical argument style.

No.

For those reasons and to save my heart increased blood pressure, bye, bye. Let me know through someone else if your position changes at all. As it is, there is not much new that can come of us discussing this topic. The only path that is open is to go into some retarded self-referential loop of me giving reasoned arguments versus you giving cult of computation catch-phrases and blanket claim statements without the benefit of a shred of evidence.

Piggy has your number and you are just not smart enough to see it, which is annoying.

Bye.

 

[AlBell]

Why should I read the post of someone who is hallucinating?

So you chose (hallucinated) not to read it. OK. Thanks for sharing.

 

[quarky]

Optical illusions are a good demonstration of hallucination. Our brains fill in a lot of blanks in what we are perceiving. We assemble our conscious impressions from an incomplete data-base.

 

[tsig]

Optical illusions are a good demonstration of hallucination. Our brains fill in a lot of blanks in what we are perceiving. We assemble our conscious impressions from an incomplete data-base.

Are you claiming that what happens in the brain is not a reflection of reality?

 

[Belz...]

I started in on a lengthier response a couple of times, but there's nothing in Piggy's post that isn't complete nonsense. There's no clear point to start in correcting him, because the that post is based on multiple layers of false premises that he's already been corrected on repeatedly.

If neither of you are willing to expand on your ideas and opinions about the real science of this, then all we have is a shouting match and a thread of no real value.