On Consciousness

[tensordyne]

Real world to academic world, are you receiving?
Over.

Zeuzzz, I am a bit disappointed you did not comment on the video link I gave. I think it would be right up your alley. Saw (mostly heard) the link you gave. Cancer, yeah, that is a hot topic. I am hesitant to comment too much on the issues raised in the link. I can say with some certainty that if I get cancer I am going to juice raw cannabis as my main therapy method.

http://youtu.be/7xPmR8j4plw

On a kind of separate note, maybe it would be interesting to start a thread on DMT and similar types of hallucinogens such as Iboga if that has not been done before. If you have not heard about Iboga and Ibogain before, you should definitely look it up. I guess one of the weird things about Iboga(/Ibogain) is that it cures physical addiction to many hard drugs. It is not a nice trip to go on according to the reports people have given.

I have not taken DMT or Iboga or any other hard hallucinogen yet, but I do have other people's stories to relate about DMT. In one report from a fellow I met at a party, he said that during the initial phase of the DMT trip you feel like your body is being taken over by some separate entity. Another fellow who was his partner related that at some point in some trips there is a pop and time stops, at which point you go into the really crazy part of the experience.

He also stated that there was a kind of beat tempo that you feel before time stops. This tempo gets faster and faster until it becomes one beat at which point time stops. It kind of reminded me of how Fourier Transforms of functions approaching the Dirac Delta Function act. He got a kick out of the idea.

 

[tensordyne]

I should hope so. Logic tells us that P and not P cannot be both true, for instance, and this holds for all of human experience, ever. It's not a construct, it's a representation of how reality works. Indeed, it couldn't possibly work in any other way, under any set of physical laws.

That is one form of logic. In Quantum Computing Logic for instance the superposition of |P> and |not-P> is fine (although when you make a measurement you only ever either get P or not-P).

In Fuzzy Logic you also can have a nonzero evaluation for P and not-P because P can have any value form 0 to 1. So for all real P such that 0 < P < 1, P(1-P) != 0.

In classical prepositional logic it is true, P and not-P is false is a tautology.

 

[dlorde]

I do not believe that subjective experience is beyond the applicability of a physical theory (or at the very least, I see no reason to think that is true).

It's a reasonable position to take, given the linked article's evidence that there is a 'strict identity' between color qualia, and coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways.

As the article concludes:

We began by confronting the philosophical claim that no physical theory could ever yield specific predictions concerning the qualitative nature of our subjective experience. And yet here we have before us a theoretical initiative that yields precisely the sorts of predictions—in qualitative detail—that were supposed to be impossible. Moreover, the predictions at issue concern genuinely novel phenomena, phenomena beyond our normal qualitative experience. And at first blush, it seems that those predictions might even be true.

 

[Belz...]

That is one form of logic. In Quantum Computing Logic for instance the superposition of |P> and |not-P> is fine (although when you make a measurement you only ever either get P or not-P).

In Fuzzy Logic you also can have a nonzero evaluation for P and not-P because P can have any value form 0 to 1. So for all real P such that 0 < P < 1, P(1-P) != 0.

I don't think that means what you think it means.

 

[tensordyne]

I don't think that means what you think it means.

I know exactly what I am talking about in reference to my original post. If you doubt my statements in that post, the best thing to do is look them up. The post was in line with standard interpretations of the subjects covered.

 

[tensordyne]

It's a reasonable position to take, given the linked article's evidence that there is a 'strict identity' between color qualia, and coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways.

As the article concludes:

Oooooh, you used that dangerous word qualia.

Yep, in words, that is the goal of solving consciousness. Figure out the mapping between physical states and mental qualia states. At least that is the goal for the moment unless along the way some other more important and encompassing problem presents itself.

 

[Piggy]

Thank you Piggy!

My point about the 'theater' models is this, the brain seems to have a lot of separate yet conjoined parallel processors, so there are like a bunch of theaters and a bunch of actors, all mushed together.

No single piece is a theater and no single piece is 'consciousness' it is an amalgam and myriad.

I think the key that resolves a lot of apparent problems and clicks things into focus is to realize that you are not "having an experience".

There is no difference between you and the experience.

Right now, my brain is producing colors, sounds, smells, physical sensations, and so forth in response to its functioning in the world.

Those things are not "being experienced by me". Those things are me.

I am all of that. When they start up, I start up. When they stop, I stop. We are the same thing.

That's the key to getting out of the Cartesian theater illusion.

Once you realize that it's a total fiction that your eyes, for example, are somehow "looking out" into the world, or that the world is somehow entering your head through your eyes, you're well on your way to seeing through that illusion and leaving it behind.

What's actually happening is that your brain is moving in certain ways in response to the activity of your body and what's bouncing off of it (light, air, objects) and that motion -- somehow, we don't know how -- produces a hallucination, which is your conscious self.

There's no such thing as color in the external world. There are no sounds out there. No smells. No textures.

Everything you appear to experience is, in fact, entirely a product of your brain.

Yes, it allows your body to interact successfully with the world, but don't make the mistake of thinking that this means you are actually "looking out at the world" when you point your eyes at something. You are not.

What your body is doing is producing a hallucination in response to the light hitting your eyes etc.

That hallucination is not the outside world, as it seems to be.

That hallucination is you. It is your consciousness. And that's all it is.

 

[Piggy]

Not even remotely. You can't even define your disagreement with me, much less show any evidence for it.

I'm not going to play this tired game with you much longer.

You should know by now what our differences are. We've discussed them at length.

1. You claim that it is widely accepted that "the brain is a computer". You have offered no evidence for this. I have pointed out that nobody actually believes this, and have cited, for example, Steven Pinker, Ned Block, and Micheal Gazzaniga who point out that the "computational model" is a metaphor and that no one takes it literally these days.

2. You claim that consciousness is caused by self-referential information processing, while refusing to say what you mean by "information". I have explained why this definition is useless (it's long been proven that much self-referential processing in the brain is not involved in conscious awareness, which you would know if you bothered to read any research on the brain) and gone to great lengths to explain that if we use the Wolfram definition of information then every organ in your body is an information processor, but if we use the more common definition then a 2nd party programmer/user is a necessary part of the system so it makes no sense to assert that the brain by itself could be such a thing.

3. You assert that a machine running a simulation of a brain could thereby become conscious if the simulation were detailed enough. In another thread I posted an extremely detailed explanation of why this idea is wrong.

That's for a start.

It's getting old going around in circles with you.

Your assertion that your ideas are consistent with current mainstream cognitive neuroscience is blatantly and demonstrably wrong.

Which is why you respond with one- or two-word phrases and refuse to offer any coherent arguments or citations whatsoever.

So now, seriously, I'm going to stop wasting my time. If and when you get ready to talk about the actual research on the brain that's going on right now, we'll have something to talk about.

 

[Piggy]

Even if what you are saying about TCN is accurate, that merely means that it's wrong.

So every author contributing to one of the most widely used graduate texts in the field is wrong, and you are right.

Good luck with that.

 

[Piggy]

That's a mischaracterization. The brain is very relevant, since it's the main conscious thing we know of.

It's the only conscious thing we know of.

So tell me, why are the comp.lits on this forum so unwilling to cite actual brain science?

Why do they crash every single thread on this forum about consciousness with talk of AI and conscious machines and p-zombies and robots, while openly resisting attempts to steer the discussion toward the current studies of how the brain does consciousness?

Why do they insist that leading scientists in the field are "wrong"?

 

[Piggy]

I am curious now, what is this thought experiment of which you speak?

Imagine you took a psychedelic drug which had some very specific effects on your brain when you interacted with certain types of objects.

First of all, if you got near a toxic substance, the drug would make you feel extremely hot. The closer you got, the hotter it would feel. It would feel as if you were approaching a fire. If you reached out to touch the poison, your hand would feel as if you were trying to stick it into a white hot flame, and the pain would become unbearable. Your arm would reflexively recoil.

On the other hand, if you approached something very hot, the drug would make you feel as though you were smelling something extremely noxious. The closer you got, the stronger the nauseating scent would become. If you tried to get close enough to make contact with the hot item, you would become overwhelmed with nausea and double over in fits of vomiting.

You would consider those experiences to be hallucinations, right?

After all, the poison isn't really hot, and the heat isn't really producing any noxious odors.

But here's the thing... that "hallucination" is not in any way different from the situation you're in right now.

Your sensation of heat, of burning, and your body's reflexive response to move away... these are entirely products of your mind.

And the same is true of noxious smells which warn you against, for example, rotten food. Entirely the product of your brain.

These are functional hallucinations. They help you interact with the world, but not by somehow allowing your conscious mind any access to what's outside of it.

As long as it works, it works. So evolution has produced these functional hallucinations over time.

If we had instead evolved to have burning sensations when exposed to toxins, or to get violently ill when nearing dangerously hot items, then we would consider it a hallucination if we felt a burning sensation when too near a fire or if we felt nausea upon smelling rotten food.

But it's all the same.

100% of our conscious experience is hallucination. Every bit of it.

And those conscious experiences are who we are. They are us. We are not experiencing a hallucination, if we want to be precise. When the hallucination begins -- whether we're dreaming or waking up -- we begin. When it stops, we stop.

The hallucination is us. It is all we are.

 

[Piggy]

As for Piggy's question about how to make a computer hallucinate - well, a hallucination is a mental process that appears to represent sensory data, but doesn't. Depending on the cause of the hallucination (i.e. what layer of abstraction the error occurs in) the subject may or may not be aware that there is something wrong.

It is so easy to replicate this in a computer that I find it hard to grasp the source of Piggy's confusion on this subject.

Please explain how you get a computer to hallucinate and how you know it's hallucinating.

Thanks.

 

[Piggy]

I am not a troll so it isn't my intention to constantly monitor the thread and make sure I have the last word ...

... however I just wanted to point out that I made what should have been a very clear and easy to understand case for why a machine can "know" something, in a similar sense to how any animal can "know" something, and there have been zero intelligent responses to that post thus far.

This thread has become a joke, like all of the similar threads before it.

I came in late, so could you please provide a link?

I suspect that your error will lie in the "similar sense" bit, or in a definition of "know" which ignores the difference between activity associated with consciousness and activity not involved in consciousness, but we'll see.

 

[Piggy]

Even if what you are saying about TCN is accurate, that merely means that it's wrong. Brains are computers, Piggy. It's what they do. Anyone who asserts otherwise is wrong. Either they don't understand what the brain does, or they don't understand what a computer is, or both.

Here, for example, is an article pointing out 10 important differences between brains and computers. Anyone who actually knows the definition of computer will run out of hands with which to facepalm before they reach the end, because none of those so-called differences are actually differences.

If the article had been titled "10 differences between the brain and a low-end desktop PC that don't affect the computational model one iota", then it would be fine. Just not terribly relevant.

OK, pony up, then.

Give me your definition of "computer" which allows my PC and my brain to be "computers" but which does not allow stars, oceans, or muscles to be "computers".

Westprog and I have been trying to get you to do this quite literally for years now, and so far you've refused.

 

[dlorde]

Oooooh, you used that dangerous word qualia.

Yes. For dramatic effect.

Yep, in words, that is the goal of solving consciousness. Figure out the mapping between physical states and mental qualia states. At least that is the goal for the moment unless along the way some other more important and encompassing problem presents itself.

'Solve' consciousness, or explain it?

But you seem to miss the point - the quote was 'strict identity' - i.e. the mental states are the physical states; no mapping. Mapping means interpretation - which leads you into a recursive Cartesian theatre (wasn't there a video posted here recently that covered this?). This is why messing with the physical states by flooding the brain with chemical messifiers is messing with your experience, messing with you. Been there, enjoyed that

 

[Belz...]

It's the only conscious thing we know of.

So you admit that your accusation was a bit silly ?

So tell me, why are the comp.lits on this forum so unwilling to cite actual brain science?

Are you asking me to peer inside their minds ? If you think they are wrong, then please post some relevant evidence. You might be frustrated by repeated posting of said evidence, but not everyone may have seen the other threads.

 

[Belz...]

Please explain how you get a computer to hallucinate and how you know it's hallucinating.

Thanks.

Well, I don't know about hallucinating but I can make a computer perceive something that's not real and react as though it is. It would be trivially easy, in fact.

 

[tensordyne]

I think the key that resolves a lot of apparent problems and clicks things into focus is to realize that you are not "having an experience".

There is no difference between you and the experience.

Right now, my brain is producing colors, sounds, smells, physical sensations, and so forth in response to its functioning in the world.

Those things are not "being experienced by me". Those things are me.

I am all of that. When they start up, I start up. When they stop, I stop. We are the same thing.

That's the key to getting out of the Cartesian theater illusion.

Once you realize that it's a total fiction that your eyes, for example, are somehow "looking out" into the world, or that the world is somehow entering your head through your eyes, you're well on your way to seeing through that illusion and leaving it behind.

What's actually happening is that your brain is moving in certain ways in response to the activity of your body and what's bouncing off of it (light, air, objects) and that motion -- somehow, we don't know how -- produces a hallucination, which is your conscious self.

There's no such thing as color in the external world. There are no sounds out there. No smells. No textures.

Everything you appear to experience is, in fact, entirely a product of your brain.

Yes, it allows your body to interact successfully with the world, but don't make the mistake of thinking that this means you are actually "looking out at the world" when you point your eyes at something. You are not.

What your body is doing is producing a hallucination in response to the light hitting your eyes etc.

That hallucination is not the outside world, as it seems to be.

That hallucination is you. It is your consciousness. And that's all it is.

Favorite quote of Searle:

...where consciousness is concerned the appearance is the reality.

That is funny because the above is how I have pretty much always thought. You are your sensations and your sensations are you (in a kind of you-less way). I find it almost inexplicable that anyone can think otherwise because to me it is pretty self-evident after just a little thought that the above is true.

The 'Real' world is a model created by something that allows us to come up with ideas called the mind (I do not like how some cognitivists lump mind with a bunch of mental concepts so that mind becomes nearly as much of a stew as the term soul is). We do not experience mind. Well, there is no 'we', but you get my point. Or perhaps there is a we. There is no you when it comes to sensation, but there is a you when it comes to mind, even though the mind is not anything associated with sensation (it may initiate sensation it seems though in the form of imagination).

Some people have a concept of consciousness whereby consciousness is a bundle of the five senses. Take away those senses and there is nothing going on, the total void called unconsciousness. Unfortunately, even this is a model, but it works to a large extent (the very basic idea behind Atheism). There would have to be some interesting evidence presented to contradict it, but who knows, maybe some form of tryptophan based technology of the future may allow us to experience the singularity. I only leave it open as a possible model. Mostly though I have my doubts of the necessity of theological convictions.

It is true, the tree is not like what you observe it is (or, there is no good reason to suspect as much), that is a mapping from the physical world we postulate to exist 'out there' back to the sensation field. Yes.

Very interesting and good post. Your writing style Piggy is succinct and convincing. Fantastic to hear a sane voice for once.

 

[Jeff Corey]

ROFL!

Doesn't this idea of qualia need something like a sixth sense? What is it that generates qualia, and what is it that senses and appreciates it? Why does it seem quales are produced on a special substrate apparently no machine we could conceive could output or input? There must be some interface between the chemical reactions, electrical charges and currents, and magnetic impulses, and the qualia substrate. What's keeping us from studying and replicating this interface?

From Wisdom of Chopra:

The "wisdom of Chopra" is an oxymoron.

 

[Jeff Corey]

That is one form of logic. In Quantum Computing Logic for instance the superposition of |P> and |not-P> is fine (although when you make a measurement you only ever either get P or not-P).

In Fuzzy Logic you also can have a nonzero evaluation for P and not-P because P can have any value form 0 to 1. So for all real P such that 0 < P < 1, P(1-P) != 0.

In classical prepositional logic it is true, P and not-P is false is a tautology.

Call me a classicist if you wish, but I find that old stuff, like modus ponens and modus tolens helpful in navigating the macroscopic environment in which I dwell, and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-3VxOqHI-4