On Consciousness

[tensordyne]

Note that this is not "my" method. This is mainstream science.

Your method is one approach, of many approaches.

If you're modelling at the molecular level, what physics exactly are you missing?

Do you have any idea what is involved in modeling molecules? If you model them classically, there are on the order of 10^23 molecules at least you would have to model. That is a problem, but the bigger problem is if you consider modeling molecules quantum mechanically.

Each new particle you add that you are considering increases the dimension of the wavefunction's configuration space by 3. Quantum computing might help in this regard if the technology comes around. The paper "More is Different" comes to mind.

Yes there is, and it is this: That sentence doesn't actually mean anything.

It does not mean anything to you. To me it means what was written.

Those are included in computational neuroscience.

Computational neuroscience uses physical and cognitive neuroscience, it is not included in computational neuroscience. Saying what you said above is like saying physics is included in computational physics, which is false. I guess it depends on what you mean by include, but if you mean by include a subset relationship, than I disagree.

Psychophysics is one part of computational neuroscience. In itself it cannot produce the full story.

Let's see how Wikipedia defines the two.

Psychophysics quantitatively investigates the relationship between physical stimuli and the sensations and perceptions they affect.

Computational neuroscience is the study of brain function in terms of the information processing properties of the structures that make up the nervous system.

If anything, computational neuroscience is a subset of psychophysics, not the other way around. In reality though, they are different forms of study, as should be plainly obvious from the above.

 

[tensordyne]

Well, you should, since nobody currently studying consciousness in the brain -- which is the only place to study it -- believes that computation is responsible for consciousness, except in the sense that all physical actions are computations.

...

That was a magnum opus of a thread post. Thank you very much for the information. It just gives more proof to me that computationalists are deluded.

 

[Dancing David]

Dennett spends much of that book railing (correctly) against the Cartesian theater, then ends up replacing it with his own version of it, in which the primitive Brain A serves as the theater for the more recently evolved Brain B homunculus.

It sounds like a pretty good argument at first, until you realize what he's done, and that he offers no explanation whatsoever for why it should be that the interaction of more primitive and more recently evolved areas of the brain should cause the body to hallucinate.

That question is simply ignored.

Which, at the end of the day, is the core problem with all philosophical approaches to consciousness.

Thank you Piggy!

My point about the 'theater' models is this, the brain seems to have a lot of separate yet conjoined parallel processors, so there are like a bunch of theaters and a bunch of actors, all mushed together.

No single piece is a theater and no single piece is 'consciousness' it is an amalgam and myriad.

 

[PixyMisa]

Your method is one approach, of many approaches.

No. First, it's not "my" method. And second, it's a synthesis of multiple approaches, including all the ones you suggest.

Do you have any idea what is involved in modeling molecules? If you model them classically, there are on the order of 10^23 molecules at least you would have to model.

Yes. This is being done.

That is a problem, but the bigger problem is if you consider modeling molecules quantum mechanically.

Yes, it becomes much more computationally expensive. Not impossible, but a lot more work. The question is, why should we consider this?

If we run our molecular models and find that they don't accurately model the behaviour of the real thing, that would certainly be a reason to explore quantum effects. But right now, there is no evidence that this is required.

Each new particle you add that you are considering increases the dimension of the wavefunction's configuration space by 3. Quantum computing might help in this regard if the technology comes around. The paper "More is Different" comes to mind.

Quantum computers can solve algorithms in ways that classical computers can't, but they're not terribly practical so far.

It does not mean anything to you. To me it means what was written.

No. It's not a defined statement.

Computational neuroscience uses physical and cognitive neuroscience, it is not included in computational neuroscience. Saying what you said above is like saying physics is included in computational physics, which is false. I guess it depends on what you mean by include, but if you mean by include a subset relationship, than I disagree.

Computational neuroscience includes the methods and results of physical and cognitive neuroscience.

Let's see how Wikipedia defines the two.

If anything, computational neuroscience is a subset of psychophysics, not the other way around.

No. Look at the whole thing:

Computational neuroscience is the study of brain function in terms of the information processing properties of the structures that make up the nervous system. It is an interdisciplinary science that links the diverse fields of neuroscience, cognitive science and psychology with electrical engineering, computer science, mathematics and physics.

Computational neuroscience is distinct from psychological connectionism and theories of learning from disciplines such as machine learning, neural networks and computational learning theory in that it emphasizes descriptions of functional and biologically realistic neurons (and neural systems) and their physiology and dynamics. These models capture the essential features of the biological system at multiple spatial-temporal scales, from membrane currents, protein and chemical coupling to network oscillations, columnar and topographic architecture and learning and memory. These computational models are used to frame hypotheses that can be directly tested by current or future biological and/or psychological experiments.

Computational neuroscience is a collective effort taking the disparate subfields of research (such as psychophysics) and using them to construct broadly-based and testable computational models.

In reality though, they are different forms of study, as should be plainly obvious from the above.

And it's plainly obvious that computational neuroscience, as an approach, encompasses the others. That's the whole point.

 

[Dancing David]

Computational models may approximate consciousness, but they are different in their structure then actual processes than the biological models.

I agree with PM, they are similar
I agree with Piggy , they are not the same

But I do not believe in the magical special nature of consciousness that some people seem to ascribe to it.

We will have a better idea when we start using computational models that are based upon an array of one trillion elements, with each element interacting with ~2,000 other elements in feedback loops. Driven by a models of underlying brain architecture and fuzzy feedback loops.

I don't think any CPUs being used right now will do that. (Or the super computers are tied up), it will be interesting when they can however, as it will give us insight into actual brain emergent properties.

 

[PixyMisa]

That was a magnum opus of a thread post. Thank you very much for the information. It just gives more proof to me that computationalists are deluded.

Since Piggy is arguing that the brain is not a computer, when it is, and since he is unable even to define his own position, nor his opposition to computationalism, it must be pointed out that any "proof" based on his "information" is likely to lead you to nothing but utter bewilderment.

 

[PixyMisa]

Computational models may approximate consciousness, but they are different in their structure then actual processes than the biological models.

But I do not believe in the magical special nature of consciousness that some people seem to ascribe to it.

Yes. The best answer we've been able to get from the anticomputationalist camp on why they believe as they do is "because".

We will have a better idea when we start using computational models that are based upon an array of one trillion elements, with each element interacting with ~2,000 other elements in feedback loops. Driven by a models of underlying brain architecture and fuzzy feedback loops.

Sure. But smaller and simpler models can also provide information, and can be tested against the real thing to ensure accuracy. Or, if they're not accurate, that's useful information too.

I don't think any CPUs being used right now will do that. (Or the super computers are tied up), it will be interesting when they can however, as it will give us insight into actual brain emergent properties.

Funding for the next stage of the "Blue Brain" project is expected to be decided this year. (That was the one modelling parts of the rat neocortex.) If it goes ahead, I'm cautiously optimistic, but it might be another ten years before computing power is available cheaply enough to make large-scale molecular modelling widely practical.

 

[Belz...]

The computational literalists here are not concerned with the brain. They find it irrelevant.

That's a mischaracterization. The brain is very relevant, since it's the main conscious thing we know of.

 

[PixyMisa]

That's a mischaracterization. The brain is very relevant, since it's the main conscious thing we know of.

It's outright bizarre is what it is, considering how much time we spend talking about the brain.

 

[tensordyne]

Because all consciousness, waking or dreaming, is hallucination. Nothing in your conscious world corresponds to anything that exists outside that hallucination -- not color, not sound, not texture, not pain or any other bodily sensation, not smell, not taste, nothing in your conscious experience has any existence outside of the hallucination (yours or someone else's).

It is in no way an image of the outside world. It is a hallucination which bears no resemblance to reality, but which nevertheless allows your body to successfully interact with the world when it's functioning properly.

(If you don't believe me, I have a little thought experiment we can do.)

I am curious now, what is this thought experiment of which you speak?

 

[PixyMisa]

I am curious now, what is this thought experiment of which you speak?

Good question. If nothing else, the answer should help explicate the depth of Piggy's confusion.

 

[!Kaggen]

Anyway, it has been shown that it is impossible - logically impossible - that computers can't become conscious, ~ snip

There is your problem again.
Assuming that logic is anything other than a human invention.

 

[PixyMisa]

As for Piggy's question about how to make a computer hallucinate - well, a hallucination is a mental process that appears to represent sensory data, but doesn't. Depending on the cause of the hallucination (i.e. what layer of abstraction the error occurs in) the subject may or may not be aware that there is something wrong.

It is so easy to replicate this in a computer that I find it hard to grasp the source of Piggy's confusion on this subject.

 

[PixyMisa]

There is your problem again.
Assuming that logic is anything other than a human invention.

All the puppies of a thousand laughing dogs, and all their puppies, and all their puppies unto the tenth generation, do not suffice to express the sheer inanity of your comment.

Well done, sir. Well done!

 

[tensordyne]

But I do not believe in the magical special nature of consciousness that some people seem to ascribe to it.

Which special magical natures of consciousness that people ascribe to consciousness are you referring to?

 

[PixyMisa]

Which special magical natures of consciousness that people ascribe to consciousness are you referring to?

The usual one in this subforum is that consciousness is not a behaviour. Unlike, well, everything else in the Universe.

If you venture out into the other subforums, things get seriously weird.

 

[tensordyne]

Since you guys are not likely to read Johnjoe McFadden's papers on CEMI the link below should be to a video of him giving a talk on the same.

http://youtu.be/SrB_pALdudk

 

[PixyMisa]

Since you guys are not likely to read Johnjoe McFadden's papers on CEMI the link below should be to a video of him giving a talk on the same.

Ah yes, the magic fairy field theory of quantum consciousness. From the same guy who gave us the time-travelling magic fairy theory of quantum evolution.

And we should watch this.... Why, exactly?

 

[Belz...]

There is your problem again.
Assuming that logic is anything other than a human invention.

It's good to know that you think something could exist and not exist simultaneously, Kaggen, if only humans hadn't invented logic.

 

[!Kaggen]

It's good to know that you think something could exist and not exist simultaneously, Kaggen, if only humans hadn't invented logic.

I think this was referring to your comment above

All the puppies of a thousand laughing dogs, and all their puppies, and all their puppies unto the tenth generation, do not suffice to express the sheer inanity of your comment.

Well done, sir. Well done!