Free will and omniscience

Well gosh. Anything is possible with magic. Why would you be interested in logic or evidence at all?

I figured this was another attempt at bait-and-switch rhetoric.

I invoke Clarke's Third Law. There's nothing inherent about defining something as "magic" that means it is impossible or defies logic -- simply that the mechanism is far enough beyond human understanding to defy explanation.

Powered flight is "magic" in any context where the physics concepts underlying aerodynamics are unknown. So if we were in ancient Greece, I would agree that talking about human flight was "magic", but I would disagree that it therefore defied logic or was self-contradictory.
 
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I figured this was another attempt at bait-and-switch rhetoric.

I invoke Clarke's Third Law. There's nothing inherent about defining something as "magic" that means it is impossible or defies logic -- simply that the mechanism is far enough beyond human understanding to defy explanation.

Powered flight is "magic" in any context where the physics concepts underlying aerodynamics are unknown. So if we were in ancient Greece, I would agree that talking about human flight was "magic", but I would disagree that it therefore defied logic or was self-contradictory.
Time travel breaches several well-know physical laws. It breaches logical rules, as logic relies on causality. We're not talking about unknown mechanics. We're talking about things which would overturn everything we know about the universe if they were true.

But really, even human flight wasn't considered magic even back in ancient Greece. The story of Icarus was one case where the Greeks believed human powered flight was quite possible, given the right tools. Indeed, scientists have been attempting human-powered flight throughout the ages. Because they knew flight was possible. They'd seen things fly.

Now, have you seen anything travel backwards through time? Has anyone? Does it involve reversing the spin of the planets and the motion of atomic particles?

I think it is clear who is doing the "bait and switch" here.
 
You certainly did not.

Here is your claim:

I'll ask the question again: precisely what fact does an omniscient being, according to my definition, not know?
If you can't actually provide one, explain how a being that knows everything is "not-all-knowing".


Any fact that your magical omniscient being doesn't know with certainty it doesn't know. And if there's anything it doesn't know, it's not omniscient. You stated above...

You've defined "certainty of event X at time A" as "negating, at time A, any possibility or capability of acting other than according to event X".

Based on that definition of "certainty", I claim that omniscience doesn't imply "certainty". Atemporal omniscience knows the outcome of events; that doesn't in any way constrain the possible outcomes.

The omniscient being, to those of us who aren't making up definitions to support an otherwise unsupportable position, knows the outcome of events with certainty. So it does constrain the possible outcomes to the outcome it knows will occur, with certainty, because of its omniscience. Again, in the spirit of cooperation and helping to educate you, your failure comes from your error in redefining terms.
 
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Any fact that your magical omniscient being doesn't know with certainty it doesn't know.

So you're conceding that my omniscient being knows every fact, but you're claiming that a being that knows every fact but doesn't force that fact to occur isn't actually omniscient?
 
So you're conceding that my omniscient being knows every fact, but you're claiming that a being that knows every fact but doesn't force that fact to occur isn't actually omniscient?


Since I haven't made any such claim, I'm sure you agree it would be dishonest of you to suggest that I am. I, like most others in this discussion, have been trying to help you understand why you're failing so completely to support your position.
 
Since I haven't made any such claim,

How have you not? I just connected the dots for you.

We defined "certainty of event X at time A" as "negating, at time A, any possibility or capability of acting other than according to event X".

I denied that certainty, under this definition, was required for a being to be omniscient.

You claim that anything that an omniscient being doesn't know, in this way, it doesn't know.

In other words, you're begging the question, and trying to redefine "knowledge" in order to support your claim that my omniscient being doesn't have any.
 
How have you not? I just connected the dots for you.

We defined "certainty of event X at time A" as "negating, at time A, any possibility or capability of acting other than according to event X".

I denied that certainty, under this definition, was required for a being to be omniscient.


Yes, you denied that. You tried to redefine certainty to mean something other than certainty and omniscience to mean something other than omniscience. Here's a bit of helpful advice, which I and other people have already offered by the way. Stop insisting on redefining perfectly good words. It's not an honest way to engage in a discussion.

Omniscient means all-knowing, as in knowledge, which in the sense of omniscience, means certainty. You don't get the luxury of an omniscient being that doesn't know everything. You don't get the luxury of a lack of certainty in that being's knowledge. If it knows you'll have a tuna salad sandwich for lunch next Tuesday, you will. If it doesn't know what you'll have for lunch next Tuesday, it's not omniscient.
 
I'll ask the question again: precisely what fact does an omniscient being, according to my definition, not know?
If you can't actually provide one, explain how a being that knows everything is "not-all-knowing".

If it's possible that Y will happen in the future, then the omniscient being doesn't know that X will happen in the future, where X and Y are mutually exclusive choices.

It's like he's looking at my painting and can't tell if it's blue or green.

Your idea that "it's certain that X" doesn't not mean "it's not possible that not-X" is just redefining certainty to mean not certain. If something is certain to happen, it will happen, which means its negation will not happen. I really can't understand how you can dispute that.
 
OK, well that just avoids answering the question I asked. In my scenario he doesn't lie and he does tell you which way you'll turn. If you don't like that variation, what about the one where you somehow manage to catch a sight of what he wrote before you make the turn?

You've missed my point. In some cases he can't tell you in advance without "lying" because telling you would change the outcome to other than what he tells you (a self-defeating prophecy), making what would have been a true statement into a lie. We're only talking omniscience here, not omnipotence.

Sure, in cases where the same outcome occurs regardless of whether or not he tells you, he can tell you. And if he wants to be a smartass there may be some situations where he can cause an outcome to occur by telling you what the outcome will be (self-fulfilling prophecy).

But there will always be come circumstances where correctly telling you what's about to happen is logically impossible, because telling you would prevent it from happening (such as when you're annoyed at him for being infallible, and deliberately do the opposite of what he says you'll do just to make him wrong).

However, I'm assuming that this knowledge of future events is derived from calculating what the future will be from the state of the present universe. If the situation you're describing is supposed to come from someone observing the events and traveling back in time, then the answer to your question is unknowable. (Of course, this doesn't stop people from simply making up whatever answer they find most appealing.)
 
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If it's possible that Y will happen in the future, then the omniscient being doesn't know that X will happen in the future, where X and Y are mutually exclusive choices.

Nope. I'm saying the chance of X happening may still be 50%, even though the oracle knows X will happen.

Actual probability 1/2, Bayesian probability 1.
 
Nope. I'm saying the chance of X happening may still be 50%, even though the oracle knows X will happen.

Actual probability 1/2, Bayesian probability 1.

I may just be slow (it happens relatively often), but the above makes no sense to me. Perhaps you could give an example of something that fits that scenario?
 
I may just be slow (it happens relatively often), but the above makes no sense to me. Perhaps you could give an example of something that fits that scenario?

Sure.
I flip a coin.
While the coin is in the air, the Oracle says:
"The chance of that coin landing heads is 1/2.
"Also, that coin will land tails."
 
Sure.
I flip a coin.
While the coin is in the air, the Oracle says:
"The chance of that coin landing heads is 1/2.
"Also, that coin will land tails."

Then, there is a 1/2 chance that the oracle will be wrong. Unless, of course, the Oracle already knows how the coin will land. In which case, he is lying when he says there is a 1/2 chance of the coin landing heads.
 
Sure.
I flip a coin.
While the coin is in the air, the Oracle says:
"The chance of that coin landing heads is 1/2.
"Also, that coin will land tails."

The last sentence negates the second to last.
 
The last sentence negates the second to last.
You forget, it's magic. The oracle doesn't know it until it happens. Then it goes back in time and knows it in advance. It is amazing what you can do if you are not constrained by physical laws.
 
You forget, it's magic. The oracle doesn't know it until it happens. Then it goes back in time and knows it in advance. It is amazing what you can do if you are not constrained by physical laws.

That's why oracles always travel in pairs. One from the present to observe, and one from the future to tell you what it observed first time around. It's true, have you ever met an infallible oracle that traveled alone?
 
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Let's say god is going to create a man who will walk down a street and at some point will be given the ability to make a choice on his own to turn either left or right. God has decided on this scenario that there are multiple things he can do. Before god pulls the ethereal trigger to create he has to decide if he will create the man with free will. Once god makes his choice the man can make any choice. Can god choose to allow free will?

Your missing the point. This god knows every detail of the universe from beginning to end (which is silly enough if you stop and think about it but I digress).

The fact that this god already knows the outcome means that the person this god created came with a predetermined set of choices from cradle to grave. This god already knows the outcome of the right or left decision so by default the person he creates will already come with a predetermined choice when approaching the intersection.

I can choose to plead ignorance to the speed limit but that doesn't mean the speed limit doesn't apply to me. If there is an omniscient god who knows the outcome of everything, even if I am ignorant of the outcome myself, that doesn't mean that outcome doesn't apply to me.

In this scenario your free will is only a mirage, you can THINK that you are free to do what you wish but your god created YOU with a predetermined chain of events you will accomplish in your life.
 
Sure.
I flip a coin.
While the coin is in the air, the Oracle says:
"The chance of that coin landing heads is 1/2.
"Also, that coin will land tails."

Or alternately:

I flip a coin and look at it, seeing that it's heads, without showing you. I ask you, "heads or tails?"

From your perspective the chances that it's heads is 1/2, from mine it's 1.

But the fact that you lack information about which way the coin came up doesn't mean that there's a chance that it's tails. That 1/2 is only a measure of your ignorance, not of the actually possibility of a different result.
 
So Avalon, in Myriad's terminology, you're saying that ~n is possible, even though it is knowable that n is true or
n ^ P(~n), correct?

Also, I'm pretty sure you have to redefine what "random" and "chance" mean in order to claim that an outcome is knowable, yet p(n) ≠ 1
 

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