LondonJohn
Penultimate Amazing
- Joined
- May 12, 2010
- Messages
- 21,464
"Catnip" on .org writes the following:
(S)he is obviously unfamiliar with the jurisprudence arguments applying to preventative custody and the remand of suspects into custody. In brief, the argument is as follows: even though the suspect is still presumed innocent in law (and in ethics), there is clearly a reasonable possibility that the suspect committed the crime with which (s)he has been charged, pending a full examination of the case by a criminal trial in a courtroom. And if the offence with which the suspect has been charged is a serious one, this has certain ramifications: firstly, the very serious nature of the charges themselves mean that conviction would carry a sentence with a long period of custody; secondly, the seriousness of the charges mean that if the suspect was indeed culpable, it would be justifiable to remand the suspect into custody pending the trial process, since the potential protection of the public (against the suspect re-offending in the same or similar way) is judged to outweigh the suspect's right to liberty until convicted; and thirdly, the serious nature of the charges (and the attendant heavy sentence if convicted) might cause the suspect to flee before a trial if (s)he was released on bail, and that preventative pre-trial custody is deemed important to ensure justice ensues - and overrides the right of the suspect to pre-trial liberty.
However, if an authorised criminal court assesses all the evidence and finds for acquittal, then even if the trial process has not yet concluded, jurisprudence dictates that this is easily a sufficient factor to move the scales of balance heavily back in favour of the suspect(s). In other words, the factors which justified preventative custody in the first place - severity of the charges, risk of re-offending, and flight risk - are now minimised by the acquittal verdict of the court, and the right of the suspect(s) to liberty pending the conclusion of the trial process now overrides all the factors pointing to custody. Therefore, it's perfectly correct - legally and ethically - that any suspects acquitted by an accredited criminal court should be released from custody, even if the trial process is not yet complete.
I had thought that this would all have been pretty obvious to most people. Clearly I was wrong, though.
Procedurally, one thing does not make sense (yet) to me: if the presumption of innocence applies uintil Cassation's final verdict, and the evidentiary standard is lesser or lighter at the committal hearing than the full "beyond all reasonable doubt" standard of a full trial, how and when can a court pre-empt the final verdict and override the precautionary custody orders? In effect, it is a whim to do so. Until Cassation, there is a reasonable doubt that any lower court's reasoning may be incorrect, or fallacious, or misinformed, or misled. Public policy would dictate prudence, one would imagine.
(S)he is obviously unfamiliar with the jurisprudence arguments applying to preventative custody and the remand of suspects into custody. In brief, the argument is as follows: even though the suspect is still presumed innocent in law (and in ethics), there is clearly a reasonable possibility that the suspect committed the crime with which (s)he has been charged, pending a full examination of the case by a criminal trial in a courtroom. And if the offence with which the suspect has been charged is a serious one, this has certain ramifications: firstly, the very serious nature of the charges themselves mean that conviction would carry a sentence with a long period of custody; secondly, the seriousness of the charges mean that if the suspect was indeed culpable, it would be justifiable to remand the suspect into custody pending the trial process, since the potential protection of the public (against the suspect re-offending in the same or similar way) is judged to outweigh the suspect's right to liberty until convicted; and thirdly, the serious nature of the charges (and the attendant heavy sentence if convicted) might cause the suspect to flee before a trial if (s)he was released on bail, and that preventative pre-trial custody is deemed important to ensure justice ensues - and overrides the right of the suspect to pre-trial liberty.
However, if an authorised criminal court assesses all the evidence and finds for acquittal, then even if the trial process has not yet concluded, jurisprudence dictates that this is easily a sufficient factor to move the scales of balance heavily back in favour of the suspect(s). In other words, the factors which justified preventative custody in the first place - severity of the charges, risk of re-offending, and flight risk - are now minimised by the acquittal verdict of the court, and the right of the suspect(s) to liberty pending the conclusion of the trial process now overrides all the factors pointing to custody. Therefore, it's perfectly correct - legally and ethically - that any suspects acquitted by an accredited criminal court should be released from custody, even if the trial process is not yet complete.
I had thought that this would all have been pretty obvious to most people. Clearly I was wrong, though.