westprog
Philosopher
- Joined
- Dec 1, 2006
- Messages
- 8,928
replacing science with scientism is always going to be problematic in our pursuit of the truth.
And scientism is just another form of bad science, masquerading as good science.
replacing science with scientism is always going to be problematic in our pursuit of the truth.
And scientism is just another form of bad science, masquerading as good science.
If that is his argument, then I can only point out that he has mangled it in my estimation.
In fact, I think he has sidled his way into an equivocation fallacy.
There are forms of reasoning that do not depend on emotion; we call them mathematics/calculation. It's what our current iterations of computers do.
For human reasoning to function, however, emotion must play a role, but it plays a slightly different role in different types of reasoning.
So, for instance, the reason why we engage in discussions about 9/11 is determined by desires and motivations, but the reasoning process itself is best left to arguing data not determined by emotional factors. His argument about how truthers go about their business supports Haidt's position that folks have a marked tendency to rely on ascertainment bias in their arguments; and emotional input is the primary reason behind it. When it comes to what actually happened on 9/11, however, I will repeat, there is a set of data that is explained better by one and not the other theory. ETA: That a group of people flew planes into several structures and there is no actual evidence of explosives in the rubble, etc. are simple facts. They are not determined by our emotional involvement in discussing the process. Granted, the importance we assign those facts is determined by our emotional involvement, but that is part of the equivocation as I see it.
When it comes to moral reasoning, however, we have no recourse but to rely ultimately on emotion/motivation/desire/feeling. Morality does not exist without values and values do not exist without desire/feeling. In that sense, feeling is the very basis of all moral reasoning in a way that it is not for other types of reasoning -- we only think about 9/11 because of our feelings about it, but we should not think about it using our feelings about it as the primary mode of intellectual input. Feelings are, by their very nature, the primary input for moral thinking, though. ETA: Or, in other words, emotion/desire/motivation/feeling constitute the 'facts' in moral reasoning (as opposed to reasoning about occurrences in the world that many people can see where the facts do not depend on emotion).
So, folks might make the mistake of interjecting too much emotion into their appraisal of 9/11 facts, but it does not follow that subjectivity being the improper approach in that instance translates into a mistake in moral decision making. Morality simply is another fish.
Look into Jonathan Haidt's work for examples of the different ways that folks approach moral problem solving.
I think you misunderstand the point.
According to Angrysoba's Harris' Haidt:
People disagree on morality because they get really emotional about it and the fact they get all emotional about it demonstrates there is no fact of the matter.
It is Harris (and me!) saying that this is unsound reasoning and it can be shown (shown as opposed to being an analogy!) that this takes place with almost any area of controversy. I only point this out because the case of Haidt's research was brought up by another poster to show that this is how people arrive at moral beliefs.
Oh wait, no it is was you Ichneumonwasp!
I realize that I may have misunderstood Harris' interpretation of the paper which is why I talked about transmission errors but I still don't think that those who are saying, "well there is an objective truth to 9/11" are making a good point. Rather they are question-begging given that Harris thinks that moral questions also have an objective truth.
Most of the time, "scientism" is just a strawman.
I have brought up before in several different threads that we mean several different things by the word 'objective'. I think the best definition is something more along the lines of 'inter-subjective' where several subjective interpretations/perceptions are shared amongst folks. That does not appear to be the case when we speak of emotion/desire/etc. since there are people who simply do not seem to have the same sorts of emotional responses to the same situation.
I agree with this. But in this context, it's warranted. If Harris is wrong (and he painfully is) then he is engaging in scientism.
Most of the time, "scientism" is just a strawman.
He also says, in his book, that he knew people would accuse him of that.
He also says, in his book, that he knew people would accuse him of that.
Well, one doesn't need to be a prophet to predict that. His claim ("this can be done scientifically") was one of the two necessary conditions for it to be properly classified as scientism. The other necessary condition is to blatantly fail to deliver compelling evidence for the claim.
Scientism is to fail to be scientifically rigorous while still claiming it's science.
I know that people who subscribe to scientism always call it science. But the test for science is whether it's in the science literature produced by scientists. If not, it's something else.
I think, by that definition, nothing would ever get published.
What, exactly, is wrong with scientism?
What if we can scientifically demonstrate that scientism is more scientifically reliable than these "belief systems" you speak of?What is objectionable is when scientism claims to be science.
In the highlighted part, Harris is either:The notion that facts and values are distinct breaks down again when you look at how we describe the most basic understanding of the physical universe.
You take water. We now know something about its structure: water is two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen. We've known this for about 150 years. What do you do when someone comes into the room and doubts this proposition. What do you do with a skeptic about water chemistry? How do you change their mind? Well, you have to appeal to certain values. You have to... first of all, the person has to want to understand the world, that is a core scientific value. There's some virtue in figuring out what is actually going on. So what would you say to someone who says "listen, actually my chemistry doesn't have much to do with understanding the world, I just want make everything fit the book of Genesis. That's my version." That person can use the word chemistry all here she wants, but it's not chemistry in the way that any real chemist would acknowledge, and no chemist would be burdened with the task of saying "well, if I just can't convince that guy, maybe there's no truth to chemistry, maybe I'm wasting my life".
Anyone in this room doesn't think this is a tight analogy? This is the kind of criticism I get equating morality and human values to questions of the well-being of conscious creatures. We have to value evidence. What do you say to someone who doesn't value evidence? What evidence could you provide that would suggest they should value evidence [crowd laughs, circularity is funny]. What logic could you use to show the necessity of valuing logical consistency.
Intellectual honesty, Parsimony, mathematical elegance... these are all values.
So the notion that many of you I'm sure have heard, loosely derived from David Hume, that you can never get an ought from an is, that you can never get to a statement about what you ought to do based merely on a description of the way the world is... we only get to "is", to scientific statements, through "oughts", through values.
The only way you say what water is is: first you ought to respect evidence, you ought to want to understand the world, you ought to be logically consistent...
Yeah, he is actually making this argument.The very idea of “objective” knowledge (i.e., knowledge acquired through honest observation and reasoning) has values built into it, as every effort we make to discuss facts depends upon principles that we must first value (e.g., logical consistency, reliance on evidence, parsimony, etc.)