Materialism (championed by Darwinists) makes reason Impossible.

Much of the support for the HPC takes the form of "since we don't have the exact ingredient for the origin of consciousness, we can't say it is organically derived." This allows for the dismissal of all evidence supporting the emergence argument. But my point is that even if we never know the exact 100% cause (model consciousness perfectly), we can still see it as an emergent behavior. This is the reason for the analogy, when you consider the transition between turbulent and laminar. As I said, there is no magical ingredient requiring the transition, even though we can't fully describe it. There is no reason to assume a magical ingredient is needed for consciousness to exist.

Another difference is that fluid dynamics is just a description of what something is doing (fluid flowing). Is consciousness just a description of neural processes?
 
We're seperate in that we experience things: pain, sense of self, conscious awareness.
Out of curiosity, how do you know that other things aren't conscious? Is there some way to determine that a computer or a rock or the Earth lacks consciousness?

I mean, these things don't display independent actions or try to communicate with us... but that really doesn't prove that they are not conscious, does it?
 
I am very interested in hearing what exactly is the difference that could be repeatedly observed between a conscious organism and one not-so.

Some articles from peer reviewed journals would be appreciated.
 
Out of curiosity, how do you know that other things aren't conscious? Is there some way to determine that a computer or a rock or the Earth lacks consciousness?

I mean, these things don't display independent actions or try to communicate with us... but that really doesn't prove that they are not conscious, does it?

This leads into the "conscious toasters" argument.

Problem is that no matter how you define consciousness, it requires the brain, and everything that makes it up to be so. See signature for further details -.-
 
Another difference is that fluid dynamics is just a description of what something is doing (fluid flowing). Is consciousness just a description of neural processes?
Yes, it is a description of neural processing.
 
This leads into the "conscious toasters" argument.

Problem is that no matter how you define consciousness, it requires the brain, and everything that makes it up to be so. See signature for further details -.-

Human consciousness requires a brain, yes. Animal consciousness does too.

Isn't it possible that rock consciousness can exist without a brain?
 
Human consciousness requires a brain, yes. Animal consciousness does too.

Isn't it possible that rock consciousness can exist without a brain?

Without delving into possibilianism, to answer this question you'd need to define what consciousness ACTUALLY is (and have an agreement on it, you can't declare consciousness...) and what rocks possibly have that humans can't to be able to have consciousness absent the brain.
 
I am very interested in hearing what exactly is the difference that could be repeatedly observed between a conscious organism and one not-so.

Some articles from peer reviewed journals would be appreciated.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20522270
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21383615
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21512777
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21293252
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21160616

A Pubmed search on "monitoring consciousness general anesthesia"
will pull up a whole host of relevant papers.
 
Without delving into possibilianism, to answer this question you'd need to define what consciousness ACTUALLY is (and have an agreement on it, you can't declare consciousness...) and what rocks possibly have that humans can't to be able to have consciousness absent the brain.

That seems to go round in a circle to me. We started in talking about what consciousness is by saying that it comes from the brain... but now in order to say whether it actually is, we have to decide what consciousness is first.

I'm not really arguing a position here, by the way, I have no idea whether rocks are conscious or not. It just seems to me that in discussions of this type things like "what special property of a brain gives rise to consciousness" are often said... and I don't think I've ever seen anybody actually show that consciousness is a special property of brains, they just seem to take it as a given.

Sure we can prove pretty conclusively that our brains create consciousness, but perhaps other things can, too. Perhaps everything is conscious? I have no idea how you would go about proving that it isn't.
 
What I mean by qualatatively different are questions like these:
Why does conscious experience exist at all?
I would have thought that the survival benefits of things like pain, fear, having a real-time 3D model of our environment would be fairly obvious.
How does it arise?
At the moment I don't think any neuroscientist would claim that we can answer that question although we know quite a good deal about how our subjective experience is caused.

But is this an argument against Materialism?

Why is this "don't know" different from all the rest of our "don't know"s?

Again, show me the argument.
How do I know others are conscious? What is their conscious experience like? Is such a thing, in principle, knowable?
But what if we can't, even in principle, know what another's conscious experience is like?

Would that be an argument against Materialism? If you think so then show me the argument.

What if Materialism, worst case, Materialism was not capable of answering any of these questions - would that be an argument against Materialism?

If so then, again, I would be interested to hear the argument.
DOC's task is to take the HPC and use it as evidence against materialism.
Many have claimed that these things form evidence against Materialism.

Nobody has yet produced the argument.
 
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This leads into the "conscious toasters" argument.

Them's dangerous!
toasters_cover_full.jpg
 
Yes, it is [just] a description of neural processing.

The "just" in my quote is important. If consciousness is just a description of neural processing, then two people who know nothing about neural processing should not be able to have a meaningful discussion of consciousness. Similarly, two people who speak in nothing but neural terms should be able to meaningfully explain to each other their subjective experience of seeing a sunset. Since the former happens all the time and the latter never does, consciousness is something more that just a description.

Pain hurts. It's not just a description of nerves sending messages to the brain. It's this subjective quality of experience that makes consciousness so difficult to decipher.
 
That seems to go round in a circle to me. We started in talking about what consciousness is by saying that it comes from the brain... but now in order to say whether it actually is, we have to decide what consciousness is first.

I'm not really arguing a position here, by the way, I have no idea whether rocks are conscious or not. It just seems to me that in discussions of this type things like "what special property of a brain gives rise to consciousness" are often said... and I don't think I've ever seen anybody actually show that consciousness is a special property of brains, they just seem to take it as a given.

Sure we can prove pretty conclusively that our brains create consciousness, but perhaps other things can, too. Perhaps everything is conscious? I have no idea how you would go about proving that it isn't.

I don't take it as a given. I'm partial to idealism, where everything is a projection of God's mind (is made of "consciousness"). However, we were talking about consciousness within materialism. Not very many materialists would claim rocks are conscious, but I think there's a few who claim that. The conscious toaster lobby is small but vocal around here, at least.
 
The "just" in my quote is important. If consciousness is just a description of neural processing, then two people who know nothing about neural processing should not be able to have a meaningful discussion of consciousness. Similarly, two people who speak in nothing but neural terms should be able to meaningfully explain to each other their subjective experience of seeing a sunset. Since the former happens all the time and the latter never does, consciousness is something more that just a description.

Pain hurts. It's not just a description of nerves sending messages to the brain. It's this subjective quality of experience that makes consciousness so difficult to decipher.
Using your argument, people who know nothing of fluid mechanics shouldn't be able to discuss the effects of turbulence while flying.

Subjectivity is part of the chaotic nature that results from the emergent behavior. The exact trajectory that a particle takes in a turbulent flow will be subject to the exact initial conditions the particle was introduced at and the state of the system upon being introduced. As a result, turbulent flow results in subjective experiences. I agree it makes quantitative values hard to come by, but that doesn't make the overall behavior undefinable or magically derived.
 
The "just" in my quote is important. If consciousness is just a description of neural processing, then two people who know nothing about neural processing should not be able to have a meaningful discussion of consciousness.

I can have a conversation about driving, but I've got no idea how to build a car.
 
Using your argument, people who know nothing of fluid mechanics shouldn't be able to discuss the effects of turbulence while flying.

No, they shouldn't be able to discuss fluid mechanics meaingfully. Two Romans talking about fluid mechanics would be amusing. Two Romans talking about how much stepping on a nail hurts wouldn't be.

Subjectivity is part of the chaotic nature that results from the emergent behavior.

Huh?

The exact trajectory that a particle takes in a turbulent flow will be subject to the exact initial conditions the particle was introduced at and the state of the system upon being introduced. As a result, turbulent flow results in subjective experiences. I agree it makes quantitative values hard to come by, but that doesn't make the overall behavior undefinable or magically derived.

:confused:

Whenever there's turbulent flow, there are subjective experiences?
 

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