I don't know what you mean by a "numerical coincidence". Which numbers coincide? It is not a change in probability in that the probability of the original selection does not change, but it is a change from a selection with one probability to a selection with a different, greater probability.
Then the probabilities change. So what?
They don't.
The probability of car being behind any door is assumed to be 1/3. That is 1/(Number of doors). That results in the 2/3 that is assumed to occur because there are only two remaining doors, but isn't.
That latter part of the argument is wrong, and so is the 100 door variant, because the ratio of success to failure is initial probability and its complement.
If there are 3 doors, but one has the car 1/10 of the time, then the other 2 doors will have the complement, so the car 9/10 of the time
So
p sticking = 1/10
p swapping = 9/10
Not related to the number of doors, so the 100 door argument is not relevant.
ETA:
If the situation is reversed, so that the initial probability is 9/10 (or greater than 1/2) then sticking is the best option. From this argument, that inverts my initial and complement probabilities. I can counter that by randomly choosing the choice of first door. However, the assumption of the question is that my initial choice will be
less than the complement.
Yes. Why do you imply anyone is fixated on the word "doubles"? That happens to be the ratio of the two probabilities in the 3 door case. We all know that. So what is your point?
Now you say that, but it is not the ratio of the "3 door case".
But the given probability at
any door. If they differ for each door, so will the probability. Neither is related to the number "3" unless forced to be so.
Yet curiously a large number of people - some of them very smart people - have refused to believe it at first. Hence the 100 door variant, which merely makes it more obvious for many people.
That is the same nonsense about "intuition". Lawyers do not often know of elementary logic gates, and neither do many other "smart people"
Read this
http://204.14.132.173/pubs/journals/features/com-124-1-1.pdf
You do not understand probability. Monty can open all but one of the other doors without telling you anything you don't already know. You chose your door from the original 100, not from the 98. Your probability of being right has not changed.
One car and 100 doors.
The random chance is 1/100 when there a 100 doors. 1/50 when there are 50 doors and so on. Without Monty's action, each door has equal chance.
When there a 50, it is just as likely to be behind any door. When there are 3, the chance is 1/3.
However, Monty's strategy means that when there are 3, one door has p=1/3
and the other p=2/3. The probability does not actually change, but the conditions do, and that is
only applicable when there are 3 doors, otherwise the
initial probability at the chosen door
does change.
Four unopened doors means p = 1/4 for the chosen door, 3 means 1/3, but two
also means 1/3. See? That is the point about not changing.
Again this is wrong. Test it yourself with the 52 card version. See if you can beat Jeeves 1 in 3 times. Remember that to do so you must draw the ace of spades 1 in 3 times.
Again, a wrong argument give in support of another one.
Other than realising that the doors and Monty are a simple logic circuit,
Game Theory is the best explanation. It takes care of all secon-guessing or intent. Using the accepted question and even distribution;
1) I only know that Monty Hall always opens a door revealing a goat. That is all, no probability or anything else needed, save that a car is there.
2) I didn’t know what strategy Monty is going to use, other than he wants to keep the car, and that I want it.
3) A strategy of choosing a door uniformly at random, guarantees a win, but I don't know what that is.
4) If Monty opens a
remaining door, then I win with the competent of the initial chance, whatever that is. I do not need to know if he
would open my door. If it's not open, he didn't.
I can conclude that if it's not behind my door, then is it behind one of the the other two doors. The closed door may contain the car. I know my initial guess to be the minimum random chance, so swap to where it will be the
complement of that initial choice.
3) On the other hand, if Monty hides the car at random, and randomly chooses to open a door
if there is a choice, then I cannot win the car with a
better probability than the complement ( the
assumed 2/3)
4) My strategy gives me no worse than the complement, while Monty's strategy prevents me from doing better, and that proves they both my and Monty's are minimax strategies.
5) If Monty opens my door when the car is there, he loses. If it's not there he informs me that it is in one of the other 2, so I have p = complement/2 with each.
Monty can do nothing to reduce that, and it will happen only p=initial of the time.
Always swap, because my worst case (given assumptions) is p=1/2 or p=2/3 when swapping, whereas sticking is p=1/3.