Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Piggy]

So, even after I make it clear I'm was not and am not talking about matter per se, you keep insisting that it's impossible to program matter. Nice debating skills you have...

Also, you don't need to be able to program matter to program a system built out of matter.

Yes, I do, because you do not seem to be making the connection that you need to be talking about matter.

It makes no sense to say that the building blocks can be programmed. They can't.

That last sentence of yours there also makes no sense, and this is what I'm trying to get across. Apparently without success.

You can represent a system built out of matter, but that's irrelevant.

 

[Piggy]

Wrong. Like I said, all senses and effectors can be emulated with only enough hardware to support the programming. In that case, the program could only be conscious within the emulated world.

A meaningless statement, if your frame of reference is reality, if you're talking about what it would take to make a computer conscious.

I mean, within the emulated world of Winnie-the-Pooh illustrations, teddy bears have conversations with kangaroos in a hundred-acre wood in England. But this has no bearing on reality.

In a digitally simulated world, you can do whatever you please. What is real "within the emulated world" is not actually real within our world, which is the only one we know of that truly exists.

 

[Piggy]

Incredulity is not evidence.

Your claim, you provide the evidence. Please do not attempt to spin your lack of evidence as incredulity on my part.

There is not a single example of a real-world behavior that is achievable by programming alone.

If you want to claim that conscious awareness is some sort of exception, you're going to have to explain why.

It's going to be damn difficult, given that the mechanism of this behavior is not yet understood.

 

[Piggy]

Again, I would rather say biological processes build our brains that are capable of consciousness. To say "build to do it" implies purpose. There is no inherent purpose in those biological processes.

Biological processes do indeed build our brains to do that, because evolution has crafted them that way, just as biological processes build our legs to walk for the same reason.

 

[Piggy]

Wrong. Functional equivalent of a leg is for example a wheel, with axles, drive-train, etc. The purpose of the leg is to facilitate movement. As for the heart, it's a pump, for crying out loud! I've got a several pumps in my house working 24/7.

Just to reiterate, I don't need to be able to program matter to program systems built out of matter.

You cannot "program systems built out of matter", you can only program representations of them. There's a difference.

Yes, for real-life consciousness.

There is nothing worth talking about other than "real-life consciousness". Fictional consciousness is beside the point.

 

[Piggy]

All I need is for it to respond to the same inputs with the same outputs. I don't need to program matter for that. That is ridiculous.

This is like saying that I don't need to build a house to live in, I only need to draw the blueprint. After all, the essential information and relationships are preserved -- what more do you want?

 

[Piggy]

Strawman and analogy fail. We're talking about behavior.

The analogy is spot on.

The question at hand (hijack tho it may be) is what it would take to create a conscious machine.

Having that machine represent a brain in digital simulation is not sufficient, for precisely the same reason that a digital simulation of a power plant is not sufficient to make the machine running the simulation exhibit the actual behavior of a power plant.

And "conscious in the world of the simulation" is every bit as irrelevant as "producing power in the world of the simulation".

 

[Piggy]

Actually you did, earlier. Some guy who you hold in high regard and is supposedly an expert in the field said that we don't understand all of the neurons yet. That means we understand at least some, if not most. For me, that is indeed evidence that all neuron types will sooner or later be understood and therefore programmable.

The only "evidence" against so far is incredulity...

The neurons will not be programmable. Representations of the neurons will be programmable.

The difference is crucial, yet consistently ignored by the computationalists around here.

 

[Piggy]

Yeah, it's a category error. Piggy thinks that consciousness is - or requires - a substance. Which substance he is unable to locate, quantify, or define. Because there's no such thing.

Consciousness, like all behaviors, does require a substance.

That substance, so far, is easily locatable, quantifiable, and definable -- it's the physical matter of the brain.

This doesn't mean that no other substance is able to replicate that behavior, of course, even though we don't yet have any idea how that might happen.

But if you want to claim that we can somehow replicate that behavior without any substance, you've got your work cut out for you.

 

[Piggy]

Are you saying the brain of the newborn did not exist before it being born? Or that it was closed off to any external stimuli?

Ya wooshed me. I don't understand those questions at all, or see how they relate to my earlier posts.

Do you have kids?

No, I don't (thank you Jesus) but I do have animals, nieces and nephews.

 

[Piggy]

We can tell that consciousness is an action, not a substance.

I have always maintained that consciousness is a behavior, a bodily function. I have never even implied that it is a substance. I have no clue where you and Pixy are getting that notion.

 

[Piggy]

Electricity is not computation. Apples and oranges.

I'm sorry, but I cannot continue this conversation (if it can be called that).

This is a complete non-sequitur from my post.

The analogy had nothing to do with any claim that electricity is computation.

The analogy is simply to point out that machines running simulations do not somehow begin to exhibit the behaviors of the systems being simulated. If they did, you could power your computer by running a simulation of a hydroelectric station and plugging it into itself.

Now, if you want to claim that this notion of computation changes the game for the brain and consciousness, then it's up to you to provide a coherent explanation of why.

 

[Piggy]

They know this ? Link ?

Let me get this straight.... You're asking me for a link to what brain researchers are not thinking and saying?

 

[Piggy]

Characters in the simulation can get hurt by the simulated plane.

Who gives a rat's ass?

In the Hundred Acre Wood, Winnie the Pooh can ride a balloon up to the honey tree.

 

[Piggy]

It's actually pretty important. A simulated person is not a person. But what about simulated actions ? Are they not actions, themselves ?

Tell you what, you hire me to fly you to Phoenix, I'll do it in a simulator. Satisfied?

 

[Piggy]

I know you can understand this point so I have to wonder if you're doing this on purpose: the MACHINE isn't walking. The simulated person IS.

So what?

The simulated person exists exclusively in your imagination. This isn't Mr. Roger's neighborhood.

You can't make a machine walk by running a simulation of a human body walking, and for the same reason you can't make a machine conscious by running a simulation of a brain.

That point has been made so many times now that I'm done making it.

 

[Piggy]

Well, you could say thermostats have involuntary reactions to external stimuli, and that is about it.

Seems to me thats all a newborn has as well.

Research proves you wrong on that point.

 

[Piggy]

Who cares if it would be silly?

I am concerned with if it would be possible.

I wasn't aware that science, in particular theoretical science, had any concerns about "silly."

Suit yourself.

Continue with the silliness.

 

[Piggy]

Do you think this external behavior implies a self-awareness similar to our own, and the baby is thinking "I hear those other babies, so I am going to start crying too, because I like to communicate?"

Or do you think the organizing neural network in the baby's brain is just doing something like a development "sound test?"

You accuse me of paying too much attention to external behavior -- well I think you are assuming too much about possible internal behavior. Why would a newborn be thinking any thoughts at all, let alone thoughts comparable to those of you and me?

I don't think that sympathetic crying is an instance of conscious volition. I was only making the point that the poster had very little understanding of the newborn brain.

I don't think that newborns think like you and I do, just as newborns don't use their muscles the way you and I do.

However, I don't doubt that newborns have muscles or that they're conscious.

 

[Piggy]

There's no real distinction. Just as you are not able to tell whether you're in a perfect simulation, the simulated consciousness would have no way either. As far as it's concerned, it's all real.

You are confusing two very different situations: (A) being a conscious entity who is experiencing a simulated world, and (B) being a conscious entity which is itself a simulation.

A is entirely possible, B is not.