Has consciousness been fully explained?

[rocketdodger]

So what?

The robustness or granularity of the sim makes no difference.

It's like saying that a sufficiently detailed drawing of a bird will become able to fly, mate, nest, lay eggs, and migrate.

Coupling.

If half of the stuff going on is in a simulation, and half is in the real world, then obviously the simulation needs an interface to the real world and vice versa.

If everything is in the simulation, no coupling is needed.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I can assure you that cornsail is not one of those people.

In fact, such folks are refreshingly rare on this forum.

Seconded

 

[rocketdodger]

That's like saying "if you replace my leg with a simulation".

Ok, lets play your stupid game.

Given that a neuron does nothing but respond to the impulses of other neurons, for the analogy to work your leg needs to be sitting still. And given that you can't touch neurons, or detect they are there in any way other than them responding to impulses, you aren't allowed to touch your leg either.

So supposing the analogy holds, and you are lying in bed perfectly still, and we remove your leg and hook up a simulated one to the stump with an interface so that all your leg neurons don't know the difference, and all the fluids are flowing properly, etc, how would you know that your leg wasn't still real?

How would you know that the interface with your body was controlled by a detailed computer simulation of the rest of your leg, and not just a real leg?

 

[rocketdodger]

Of course they do.

Without a human interpreter, it's just electrons moving around, lights on a screen, ink on paper.

Without a human interpreter, no addition has taken place.

Ditto for the abacus.

Have your computer add 1,234 and 4,321. Now, go and look for a quantity of 5,555 of anything in your machine.

But if I pick up two rocks in my hand, then pick up two more, I have physically added two and two to get four.

Your machine only "adds" because you can interpret the symbol system it's been built to conform to, same as the abacus.

Now wait a minute.

Numbers are just a construct humans (and computers some animals and maybe aliens) use to keep track of reality -- every number exists only in the internal system of some observer that understands what they mean.

To say otherwise is to claim that mathematics has some independent reality of its own. Do you want to make that claim? I don't think you do.

So the only importance of a number, then, is to some observer that is considering it. And in that respect, the binary numbers encoded in a digital register are just as valid as the number of stones you pick up. You can modify your behavior according to both numbers.

 

[rocketdodger]

Ah, that's good. That's basically what I'm saying but much more coherent than my clumsy attempt.

Note that this definition is entirely consistent with Shannon's information theory -- the bits of any information channel correspond to the number partitions of the set of states that C can be in that A has access to. If B is a single bit, A only has access to two partitions of C's state space. If B is two bits, A has access to 4 partitions of C' state space. And so on.

 

[AlBell]

Category error.

Yeah. The idea that a simulation will ever be conscious.

Will Terminators, and Mr. Data, ever be built? I'd say an absolute certainty. Will either be conscious? No one will ever know, although the probability will be high if a biologic brain is part of their systems.

 

[AlBell]

What are you talking about?

This is a very simple physical definition that applies to all information of all conceivable types.

System A changes it's behavior, for some reason, when the behavior of system C changes.

But A's only access to the state of C is via the intermediary B.

Hence, B is information regarding the state of C, from the perspective of A.

It couldn't be more simple.

I'd agree stimulus leads to reponse characterizes info transfer, and now you just defined the universe. And who I am to argue with your ontological choice the 'stuff' involved is 'physical'?

 

[rocketdodger]

and now you just defined the universe.

That is the point -- anything can be information, and anything can be said to react to information, or behave according to information, or whatever.

The difference between life and computers and rocks isn't that some have information and some don't, or that one "uses" information and one doesn't, it is the level and depth of sequential behaviors as a result of a given piece of information within the system that is vastly different.

Typically, a rock doesn't go through a cascade of internal state changes that results in some gross external state change as a result of some piece of information.

Typically, life and computers do.

 

[AlBell]

Numbers are just a construct humans (and computers some animals and maybe aliens) use to keep track of reality -- every number exists only in the internal system of some observer that understands what they mean.

To say otherwise is to claim that mathematics has some independent reality of its own. Do you want to make that claim? I don't think you do.

Why not? You seem to believe something 'physical' exists, and the harder you look for it the more ephemeral it becomes. The math is all there is.

 

[rocketdodger]

Why not? You seem to believe something 'physical' exists, and the harder you look for it the more ephemeral it becomes. The math is all there is.

physical doesn't mean what you think it does.

I always use physical in the monistic physicalist sense, not the "tangible material" sense.

physical == "follows the same underlying order as everything else"

 

[Beth]

Everything that composes a real person can be measured. The cells, organs, atoms, etc, etc. They all interact according to physical law. All of these relationships and formula can be simulated on a computer.

Everything physical that composes a real person can theoretically be measured within certain limits. Once you get below the atomic level, the Heisenberg uncertain principle rears its ugly head.

To a person simulated in this manner, thinking simulated thoughts as their brain simulation ran, they could measure and experience the simulated world just as you or I can the real world -- assuming this world is real. Name a relationship or interaction between particles or other objects in the real world that can't be duplicated if you disagree.

It is the relationship of thoughts that we don’t know how to duplicate. I don’t think that thoughts should be considered objects in the real world. Actions is probably a better description. Nonetheless, our thoughts have relationships with one another within our consciousness. I’m not certain that those relationships can be duplicated. How would you go about duplicating an action that can’t be observed?

That is, of course, an excellent question. But I think "what is art?" is rather outside the scope of this discussion. Hypothetically, one could point at any collection of sounds and call it music, I believe.

I think that, hypothetically, you are correct any collection of sounds can be considered music. I think that problem is isomorphic to the problem of defining information. What constitutes information is observer dependent, just as what constitutes music is observer dependent. That issue is, IMO, the heart of this discussion.

And I did discuss what I meant by the pattern in sufficiently specific terms. I talked about how signals from nerves indicated intensity and so forth for instance. And how different patterns within the brain cause the neurons affect to respond differently. How is that not sufficient?

How can we differentiate between patterns, whether within the brain or not, that constitute ‘information’ and patterns that do not? To consider all patterns as information is like considering all sequences of sounds to be music. Such definitions are not useful in furthering our understanding of the phenomena under discussion.

 

[dlorde]

But for some reason, these threads always get hijacked by people wanting to discuss the possibility of conscious machines.
...

Perhaps because before we can decide whether consciousness has been fully explained, we need to decide exactly (or more precisely) what we mean by it. If we agree that it is computable, we are a step closer. If we agree it is not computable then... we've eliminated a possibility. Of course, the chances of everyone actually agreeing are remote, but we might make progress with limited or provisional agreement.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

It is the relationship of thoughts that we don’t know how to duplicate. I don’t think that thoughts should be considered objects in the real world. Actions is probably a better description. Nonetheless, our thoughts have relationships with one another within our consciousness. I’m not certain that those relationships can be duplicated. How would you go about duplicating an action that can’t be observed?

Yes, that's the kicker as far as real world computer consciousness is concerned, I fear.

I think the best bet we have going now is that Blue Brain Project, or whatever it is called, with the guy who is trying to replicate cortical columns. It's just the whisper of a beginning, but it seems to me the best place to start.

 

[dlorde]

...
It is the relationship of thoughts that we don’t know how to duplicate. I don’t think that thoughts should be considered objects in the real world. Actions is probably a better description. Nonetheless, our thoughts have relationships with one another within our consciousness. I’m not certain that those relationships can be duplicated. How would you go about duplicating an action that can’t be observed?
...

If you agree that our physical brains alone give rise to our thoughts, memories, and consciousness, then, in principle, if we could duplicate the physical brain to an arbitrary (sufficient) level of detail at some moment - i.e. take a physical snapshot, would you expect the duplicate brain (given appropriate physical support) be conscious and function very similarly to the original? Clearly we can't actually duplicate an existing brain at all in practice, but if you accept that a sufficiently detailed physical copy would think and be conscious like the original, then the argument can move on to whether we can, in principle, model that level of detail in a different physical medium (e.g. electronics) to the same effect, and from there to a digital model in a computer. Then we could say that it is, in principle, computable.

 

[rocketdodger]

If you agree that our physical brains alone give rise to our thoughts, memories, and consciousness, then, in principle, if we could duplicate the physical brain to an arbitrary (sufficient) level of detail at some moment - i.e. take a physical snapshot, would you expect the duplicate brain (given appropriate physical support) be conscious and function very similarly to the original? Clearly we can't actually duplicate an existing brain at all in practice, but if you accept that a sufficiently detailed physical copy would think and be conscious like the original, then the argument can move on to whether we can, in principle, model that level of detail in a different physical medium (e.g. electronics) to the same effect, and from there to a digital model in a computer. Then we could say that it is, in principle, computable.

Lol, dlorde you are a bit out of date.

This kind of post is what started this whole discussion years and years ago. This is what everyone has been talking about the whole time.

 

[Beth]

If you agree that our physical brains alone give rise to our thoughts, memories, and consciousness, then, in principle, if we could duplicate the physical brain to an arbitrary (sufficient) level of detail at some moment - i.e. take a physical snapshot, would you expect the duplicate brain (given appropriate physical support) be conscious and function very similarly to the original? Clearly we can't actually duplicate an existing brain at all in practice, but if you accept that a sufficiently detailed physical copy would think and be conscious like the original, then the argument can move on to whether we can, in principle, model that level of detail in a different physical medium (e.g. electronics) to the same effect, and from there to a digital model in a computer. Then we could say that it is, in principle, computable.

I'm not convinced that it's possible to duplicate the physical brain to a sufficient level of detail. It's possible that it's not theoretically possible. If it is possible, then yes, I think that it's also possible the duplicate would also be conscious.

 

[Drachasor]

Everything physical that composes a real person can theoretically be measured within certain limits. Once you get below the atomic level, the Heisenberg uncertain principle rears its ugly head.

And this matters, how? There's no indication at all that we store any information at that level in our brains, and every indication that we do not.

It is the relationship of thoughts that we don’t know how to duplicate. I don’t think that thoughts should be considered objects in the real world. Actions is probably a better description. Nonetheless, our thoughts have relationships with one another within our consciousness. I’m not certain that those relationships can be duplicated. How would you go about duplicating an action that can’t be observed?

The duplication is not a necessary part of the thought experiment. We can propose a sufficiently advanced species made an Earth System simulation and everything we know arose from that. You don't HAVE to copy someone's thoughts to have a simulation that has thoughts.

But I will say that there's no indication that thoughts can't be observed. We can already observe how thoughts relate to various parts of the brain in a crude way and we have a tremendous amount of room for improvement. Again, everything we know about the brain indicates this will one day be possible.

I think that, hypothetically, you are correct any collection of sounds can be considered music. I think that problem is isomorphic to the problem of defining information. What constitutes information is observer dependent, just as what constitutes music is observer dependent. That issue is, IMO, the heart of this discussion

How can we differentiate between patterns, whether within the brain or not, that constitute ‘information’ and patterns that do not? To consider all patterns as information is like considering all sequences of sounds to be music. Such definitions are not useful in furthering our understanding of the phenomena under discussion.

It's objective. Just like a computer reacts different to different patterns, so does the brain. This in fact shows how a rock is very different from a computer, since it will show no significant difference in how it handles a short burst of energy of one pattern vs. another of the same energy and duration.

"We" don't have to differentiate. Nature does that just fine on her own. It's the height of hubris to suppose that this would break down if we aren't there to watch.

 

[Meed]

If I said anything incorrect, I would know about it by now.

so no, I wasn't incorrect.

Ah. Stellar logic.

 

[Meed]

Let me see if I can clear the confusion a bit. I fully admit that much of the problem arises from my poor use of language.

Nothing has meaning to a rock. A rock is not structured to 'see' information or meaning anywhere.

I think it might be more useful to express the idea as 'everything has information', but it is not information until it interacts with a structured system capable of 'seeing information' -- but that makes it sound like everything is information in one way of looking at it. Everything is informative?

No, I am most certainly not saying that information only exists with conscious/intelligent systems. I think it only exists with systems that have a particular structure that can make 'sense' of such interactions. So, for instance, (and I use this simple example again), a touch receptor will react to a certain type of stimulus and 'encode' particular aspects of the interaction -- modality, duration, intensity, location. There is nothing conscious about in a touch receptor. This is very basic information, but it can be built into much more complex structures; we happen to extract what is informative in objects using many different modalities.

While everything is potentially informative, not everything that we interact with provides us with new information. The third carbon atom to the left in an orange gives us no more information than that oranges are made of lots of carbon atoms (at least for most people).

Touch is informative at its onset. If it continues forever unabating and unchanging it is not information; receptors simply cease firing in that situation.

I just don't think it makes sense to speak of a rock as information in a world of rocks. Information, at least for me, is functional.

The problem for me is you're saying that information is something that has "meaning" and is "encoded", yet does not require conscious/intelligent systems. What makes you say a touch receptor "encodes" and that that particular interaction has "meaning"? How do you define those terms?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

The problem for me is you're saying that information is something that has "meaning" and is "encoded", yet does not require conscious/intelligent systems. What makes you say a touch receptor "encodes" and that that particular interaction has "meaning"? How do you define those terms?

This, not that. Touch receptors only respond to a certain stimulus (this) and not anything else. They also happen to 'decode' those other characteristics of a stimulus (duration, intensity, location) based on how they are 'constructed'.