Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Ichneumonwasp]

Alright, I will try to clarify what my disagreement is, if any.



I'm with you so far.



When you say it shouldn't matter, I would say that depends: matters in regard to what? In regard to determining whether two systems are the same it matters. In studying how it interacts with its environment it matters. In determining whether it displays some pattern isomorphic to another system then it doesn't matter.



I disagree that an action can occur with anything other than a "thing" and I think this is an important point. As I understand actions, they must always refer to some change in the physical world. In this case I'd call simulated flying a pattern of changes in the computer.



Right -- what language easily allows -- and I have no issue with such language being used colloquially in most contexts. However, when someone is making a philosophical argument that there is not really any "in the simulation" and that a simulation of an orange is not a real orange, then saying in response "It's a real orange in the simulation" will not be interpreted merely as a colloquial metaphor used because it is easily allowed by language, nor should it.



Good point. So, where I would agree with you is that a simulated orange is a real simulated orange in the same sense that a cup of coffee is a real cup of coffee (not 100% on this, but it's my current thought). I wouldn't say it's real "in the simulation", though, I'd say it's real in the real world. And I would not say it's a real orange (without the "simulated" qualifier), because it's not the same thing as an actual orange. We can distinguish between the two.



I don't think a computer simulation can "recreate" things. It can recreate patterns, but the pattern behind the pattern (e.g. electrons moving through gates) is different(?)



Yeah -- I wouldn't say flight was "in" the bird either. Flight doesn't actually exist per se, it just refers to a pattern of change in things that exist.

I think I understand your argument more clearly than before. Thanks for that.

BTW, you said you aren't a computationalist. Any particular reason?

I think we are largely in agreement.

I do not call myself a computationalist because I don't know the math and I don't know the computer science; I have to rely on what Pixy and RD supply in that regard for my own arguments.

I am interested in the ideas and interested in 'how the brain does it'. I think it is easy to see that a series of chips that perform the exact same function as neurons (a model of a brain) should be conscious. It would not the exact same thing as a brain because the substrate differs, but I think most folks would fairly easily agree that such a robot would be conscious. Incidentally, I think that is way we should proceed if we want to demonstrate 'machine consciousness', so I am actually in yours and Piggy's camp. I don't find that argument all that interesting because I think that is a done deal. Others may disagree, but I think they are wrong.

However, I am not convinced that it is impossible for computationalism to recreate the patterns that are responsible for human consciousness; and, yes, I do think that human consciousness is a pattern of activity in the human brain.

The simulated human 'in the simulation' would not be conscious per se (speaking of such a 'person' as conscious is just an abstract way of helping people to see that there should be a pattern in there somewhere that *is* conscious); consciousness would exist in the pattern of electron movements responsible for the simulation. There would be all sort of other activity at the machine level having to do with the simulation (all the activity that "recreates" -- I know, it is a bad word for this -- 'neurons'), so we would have one heck of a time seeing the right pattern and actually being able to interact with it; but I don't see why such a pattern would not exist in such a simulation.

Yes, it would be different from a conscious human brain; for us to see it, it would have to be translated back out of the form in which it occurs (zipping electrons); but isn't that what a large part of our nervous system is devoted to -- translation of info in and out of the processing areas?

Our thoughts, as abstract concepts, have no effect on brain function directly. They affect the brain because they are actually firings of groups of neurons. I see the same thing -- but with an extra level of abstraction -- with the computer. The simulation itself -- what anyone might see on a computer screen -- is an epiphenomenon in the same way that epiphenomenalists discuss thoughts as an epiphenomenon (if that makes any sense). What is actually happening and what is actually important is the opening and closing of logic gates, the pattern of that activity.

 

[rocketdodger]

No, we don't expect to see actual consciousness emerge, no matter how robust the simulation is, as long as it is a digital simulation.

We only expect consciousness to emerge from a model brain, regardless of how similar it is to (or how dissimilar it is from) an organic brain.

Perhaps you should read Myriad's post about why one would make any distinction at all between a "model" brain and a "simulated" brain.

If one replaced all your neurons with computers that behaved like neurons because they ran a "simulation" of a neuron, would that be a model brain or a simulated one?

If you put all those neuron simulations together in one bigger computer, why is it any different?

If you then just replace the connections between the neurons with simulations as well, does the epistemology change? Is it now less of a model?

If you just put the whole thing in a single simulation instead of running a billion separate simulations with communication between them, does it change?

Why? Do you have any mathematically or logically valid arguments?

 

[rocketdodger]

A model brain can be conscious, for the same reason that a model airplane can fly.

But a simulated brain can't make the machine running it become conscious, for the same reason that a simulated airplane can't make the machine running it fly.

Can a simulated world make a real brain become conscious?

If we replaced all of your sensory neurons with artificial ones, hooked up to a simulation, would your real brain still be conscious even though all your sensory input came from a simulation?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I don't know. I'm thinking of ways to get switching by itself to generate "meaning" (sequences which only have limited coherent interpretations) without our having to impose it (mind-independent). If a history of changes in physical state can be interpreted as rule following, then, perhaps, it must be (that meaning emerges), and so the relationships responsible for whatever is being simulated are preserved (even if not obvious) in the switching, independent of our interpretation (which may be where simulation departs from mere description). Perhaps not. (Assuming that's all that matter does, preserve relationships, a 'world' might arise; though have we mangled local physical effects [what are they?] by reducing them to information?)

Anyway, that's mostly implementation: just a hurdle to my own understanding I'm trying to clear; not sure how much it helps generally.

I think those are the central issues, though, and I am very interested in what 'meaning' *is* and how we come to find/create/uncover/generate it. I suspect that at its core meaning is essentially 'cutting out other possibilities'. Perhaps it is defined negatively? It isn't that, so it's this? Receptors 'define' certain information because they only respond to certain types of inputs; and they are structured in such a way so as to preserve those cardinal features I mentioned a few times already (duration, intensity, etc.). The nervous system then takes that information and processes it to get more information, building up a 'picture'f the world. We don't know how all is accomplished as you know.

 

[alfa1]

I calculated 98% of people are at animal level; for them consciousness does not exists...

 

[westprog]

No, you are just playing word games -- and you are losing.

You specfically said that "there isn't anything going on in a computer that also isn't going on in a rock."

I challenge this view by asking "is there anything going on in a cell that isn't going on in a rock?"

Now you face the difficult decision either admitting:

1) Actually, yes, since there is stuff going on in cells that is not going on in rocks, the same is true of anything that is not a rock -- otherwise we would call said thing a rock.
2) No, there is nothing going on in a cell that is not going on in a rock, and so we have to start all over and find another phrase besides "going on" to describe what is different between a cell and a rock, because clearly even you admit that there are indeed differences despite your semantics.

Either way, your argument is destroyed. Thus you have refused to admit either of the above.

Are you now taking the position that there are things "going on" within a cell that are not "going on" within a rock?

As I've explained plenty of times - there are no physical processes going on in a computer that aren't, in differing quantities and ways, going on in a rock. That in no way implies that we can't differentiate between rocks and computers.

The main difference between rocks and computers is not in the realm of physics - it's that we can do useful things with computers. They are tools.

In particular, there is no physical activity of "information processing" that can be objectively defined as taking place in any quantifiable way in the computer and not in the rock. There's obviously an engineering difference between their behaviour, and the computer can provide information to us. However, in terms of information in its physical sense, the rock is processing information as well.

However, if you'd rather argue against the points I'm not making, I can't stop you.

 

[rocketdodger]

As I've explained plenty of times - there are no physical processes going on in a computer that aren't, in differing quantities and ways, going on in a rock. That in no way implies that we can't differentiate between rocks and computers.

The main difference between rocks and computers is not in the realm of physics - it's that we can do useful things with computers. They are tools.

In particular, there is no physical activity of "information processing" that can be objectively defined as taking place in any quantifiable way in the computer and not in the rock. There's obviously an engineering difference between their behaviour, and the computer can provide information to us. However, in terms of information in its physical sense, the rock is processing information as well.

However, if you'd rather argue against the points I'm not making, I can't stop you.

lol, how predictable.

I accuse you of avoiding an issue and you respond by .. avoiding an issue.

westprog, what about cells?

Are there "no physical processes going on in a cell that aren't, in differing quantities and ways, going on in a rock." ????

 

[!Kaggen]

Lets try to get PM to clarify his argument this way.

1. A Turing machine by definition is a machine that can compute anything computable-Church-Turing Thesis
2. All physical processes are computable.
3. Consciousness is the result of computing a physical process.
4. Therefore a Turing machine computing a physical process which results in consciousness is conscious.
5. SRIP is a computing process which results in consciousness.
6. A Turing machine doing SRIP is conscious.
7. Any other possibility is magic.


Ok Pixy, its over to you.... yes/no time...

 

[westprog]

lol, how predictable.

I accuse you of avoiding an issue and you respond by .. avoiding an issue.

westprog, what about cells?

Are there "no physical processes going on in a cell that aren't, in differing quantities and ways, going on in a rock." ????

No, there isn't. There's no elan vitale. Of course, a rock and a computer are more similar, being more chemically stable, but in terms of physical processes, there's nothing that we can be certain is happening in the cell that isn't happening to some extent in the rock.

However, life has the interesting property of producing consciousness in some way that we don't understand. So there's a mystery associated with life that doesn't apply to rocks or computers, which don't have side effects which aren't understood.

 

[westprog]

Perhaps you should read Myriad's post about why one would make any distinction at all between a "model" brain and a "simulated" brain.

If one replaced all your neurons with computers that behaved like neurons because they ran a "simulation" of a neuron, would that be a model brain or a simulated one?

If you put all those neuron simulations together in one bigger computer, why is it any different?

If you then just replace the connections between the neurons with simulations as well, does the epistemology change? Is it now less of a model?

If you just put the whole thing in a single simulation instead of running a billion separate simulations with communication between them, does it change?

Why? Do you have any mathematically or logically valid arguments?

It's not possible to replace a neuron with a simulation of a neuron. A simulation of a neuron won't do the job.

Something that would reproduce the necessary behaviour of a neuron is a different matter. That would not, however, be a computational solution.

This is not an abstract problem. We can simulate the properties of neurons. (Or at least some properties. We can never simulate all the properties). It would be great if we could replace them, but as yet we can't. Hence Christopher Reeve.

 

[rocketdodger]

No, there isn't. There's no elan vitale. Of course, a rock and a computer are more similar, being more chemically stable, but in terms of physical processes, there's nothing that we can be certain is happening in the cell that isn't happening to some extent in the rock.

Ok. Then what term would you like to use, moving forward, for "the kinds of differences that exist between a cell and a rock?"

I would have said that there are processes going on in a cell that are not going on in a rock. If you don't like that terminology, please specify what you prefer.

However, life has the interesting property of producing consciousness in some way that we don't understand. So there's a mystery associated with life that doesn't apply to rocks or computers, which don't have side effects which aren't understood.

Forget about consciousness -- cells are not conscious by themselves like humans are by themselves.

Focus on individual cells. A bacterium, for instance. Is there a mystery associated with a bacterium that doesn't apply to rocks or computers?

 

[AlBell]

Can a simulated world make a real brain become conscious?

If we replaced all of your sensory neurons with artificial ones, hooked up to a simulation, would your real brain still be conscious even though all your sensory input came from a simulation?

Most likely, and completely irrelevant. The working brain would be performing photon mediated interactions the same as always, and hooking up to a simulation will require photon mediated interactions as it does now.

 

[AlBell]

Forget about consciousness -- cells are not conscious by themselves like humans are by themselves.

Focus on individual cells. A bacterium, for instance. Is there a mystery associated with a bacterium that doesn't apply to rocks or computers?

Why yes, there certainly is a mystery there.

I doubt few besides you believe a simulation of a cell which is computer code (or as I_wasp says, electrons moving through gates) is alive.

I also suggest a reality check. How many computations per second would be needed to simulate a cell at planck limits?

Cells have many more similarities to humans than either rocks, or computers do.

I'm still waiting with westprog for your explanation of how rocks and computers are different.

 

[rocketdodger]

Why yes, there certainly is a mystery there.

I doubt few besides you believe a simulation of a cell which is computer code (or as I_wasp says, electrons moving through gates) is alive.

I also suggest a reality check. How many computations per second would be needed to simulate a cell at planck limits?

Cells have many more similarities to humans than either rocks, or computers do.

I'm still waiting with westprog for your explanation of how rocks and computers are different.

You don't even know what we are talking about.

This "response," if you can call it that, incorrectly mixes at least 3 different discussions in this thread. It's like you took 3 separate responses and just jammed them together without even proofreading the result.

Try again.

 

[rocketdodger]

Most likely, and completely irrelevant. The working brain would be performing photon mediated interactions the same as always, and hooking up to a simulation will require photon mediated interactions as it does now.

Well what if you replace the neurons of the real brain with artificial ones made of synthetic materials -- is the brain still conscious?

 

[AlBell]

Why yes, there certainly is a mystery there.

I doubt few besides you believe a simulation of a cell which is computer code (or as I_wasp says, electrons moving through gates) is alive.

I also suggest a reality check. How many computations per second would be needed to simulate a cell at planck limits?

Cells have many more similarities to humans than either rocks, or computers do.

I'm still waiting with westprog for your explanation of how rocks and computers are different.

You don't even know what we are talking about.

This "response," if you can call it that, incorrectly mixes at least 3 different discussions in this thread. It's like you took 3 separate responses and just jammed them together without even proofreading the result.

Try again.

I realize you can't address any of my post. It appears you are beginning to realize it too.

 

[westprog]

Ok. Then what term would you like to use, moving forward, for "the kinds of differences that exist between a cell and a rock?"

I would have said that there are processes going on in a cell that are not going on in a rock. If you don't like that terminology, please specify what you prefer.

Of course there are processes going on in a cell which aren't going on in a rock. However, they can be decomposed into physical processes which are going on in the rock.

Forget about consciousness -- cells are not conscious by themselves like humans are by themselves.

Focus on individual cells. A bacterium, for instance. Is there a mystery associated with a bacterium that doesn't apply to rocks or computers?

So we don't know how consciousness is being created, given the non-uniqueness of the physical properties of cells. So where does that leave us? In a position of ignorance. It doesn't mean that we can make assumptions as to what is happening in the cell which leads an aggregation of them to produce consciousness.

 

[PixyMisa]

I'm still waiting with westprog for your explanation of how rocks and computers are different.

Did you type that post on a rock?

No?

Well then.

 

[AlBell]

Well what if you replace the neurons of the real brain with artificial ones made of synthetic materials -- is the brain still conscious?

I hope so. This does imply that nothing of import occurs in brains that is not neuron activity, which I agree is the current consensus and may well be right. That plus the ability to actually mimic neuron connectivity and operations, and that we will eventually know enough to perform that engineering feat.

Probably do-able at atomic level rather than planck level is bonus for this approach; maybe at molecular level will do it, too.

 

[AlBell]

Did you type that post on a rock?

No?

Well then.

Is that the real Pixy, or is it a computer simulation?

ps. I could have written this on a rock and mailed it to you.