Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Piggy]

But we are not discussing a simulation of evolution, but a simulation that actually evolves.

It makes no difference.

Simulations are still simulations, whether or not they evolve.

A model brain can be conscious, for the same reason that a model airplane can fly.

But a simulated brain can't make the machine running it become conscious, for the same reason that a simulated airplane can't make the machine running it fly.

And it makes absolutely no difference whether the simulation evolves or not.

 

[Piggy]

Look at what you just wrote. Only systems that start out conscious can end up conscious. That's dualism.

Are you out of your mind?

Where's the dualism?

Please "be specific". Please actually produce some sort of coherent explanation.

That would be most interesting.

And anyway, you're distorting what I've said.

I have not said that we cannot produce a machine that reproduces itself and ends up evolving consciousness. (It would be quite a feat, but not theoretically impossible, since we know consciousness has evolved in organic machines.)

I have said, however, that if a machine is running a sim that evolves a simulated entity, the machine does not take on any of the characteristics of the simulated entity. Which is true.

In other words, if a machine running a sim of an entity that scavenges for food does not itself scavenge for food, then it will also be true that a machine running a sim that allows such entities to evolve still will not itself scavenge for food.

Ditto for being conscious.

If a machine is conscious, then it is conscious, regardless of whether or not it's running any sort of simulation, evolving or no.

If a machine is not conscious, then it is not conscious, also regardless of whether or not it's running any sort of simulation.

And there is absolutely no duality to be found in any of that.

If you want to claim duality, you're going to have to explain yourself. There is no "Get Out Of Evidence Free" card for PixyMisa.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

No, it is not.

It is not in the least analogous.

If I ask you to show me a street view of San Francisco, can your brain do it?

If I ask you to process my order with Amazon.com, can your brain do it?

A: No.

What possible difference does it make if my brain can do it? That does not make the search process any less a mental activity. That there are other activities involved just shows that used another type of action that a computer with peripherals can do. I did not say that computers are limited to mental activities, only that they were designed to carry out mental activities.

 

[Piggy]

What possible difference does it make if my brain can do it? That does not make the search process any less a mental activity. That there are other activities involved just shows that used another type of action that a computer with peripherals can do. I did not say that computers are limited to mental activities, only that they were designed to carry out mental activities.

Which is demonstrably incorrect, since a great deal of what computers do has nothing at all in common with mental activities.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Our professions are irrelevant, and it matters a great deal.

My profession does matter when you mention those things as something I may have not considered. Believe me, I do not consider perception as consciousness. And I have nowhere called perception consciousness.

 

[Piggy]

My profession does matter when you mention those things as something I may have not considered. Believe me, I do not consider perception as consciousness. And I have nowhere called perception consciousness.

I haven't said that you have not considered them.

And yes, it's true that you have not said that perception is consciousness.

Nevertheless, my friend, you seem all too willing to discuss consciousness in terms of processes which can be carried out non-consciously.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

They are entirely analogous.

You don't get reproductions of actual behavior in the phyiscal world from digital simulations. Period. (Unless, of course, you rig it up from the get-go to be redundant, as in the example of the simulation which creates a simulated heat equivalent to the heat produced by the machine running the sim, or the example of a computer which runs a sim of itself.)

What a computer is doing physically is not equivalent to what a brain is doing physically.

If you do create a machine that's doing physically what a brain is doing, then you have a model, not a simulation.

Of course a computer doing physically what a brain does physically will produce consciousness. That is easy to see.

The real issue is whether programming can do it and you have not given me an argument that contradicts that possibility as of yet.

What is important is recreating the relationships in a brain that produce consciousness. Neurons can do it. Do you really think it is impossible to recreate the same sort of relationships in a computer that occur in a brain? It is not as if there is no physical output from a computer. Computers couldn't work without physical output -- so all we would need to do is translate the actual physical output from a computer, physical output that can change based on the inputs provided, into an actual physical representation such as a voice.

Unless I am completely wrong about this, the whole reason that recurrent loops were introduced into the discussion is to counter the charge that computers only do simple line coding -- step one, step two, step three. With recurrent loops, as are prevalent throughout the brain, computers can change their behavior fairly significantly. They can take account of information that changes in the environment and change their behavior. They can do so within a simulation, taking rules laid down at the onset and altering their behavior based on what occurs later in the simulation.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I haven't said that you have not considered them.

And yes, it's true that you have not said that perception is consciousness.

Nevertheless, my friend, you seem all too willing to discuss consciousness in terms of processes which can be carried out non-consciously.

Well, yeah, because that is true of the brain as well. Most of what the brain does occurs non-consciously. Consciousness, very easily, may be the process by which we sift through numerous behavioral tendencies and nothing more.

 

[Piggy]

The real issue is whether programming can do it and you have not given me an argument that contradicts that possibility as of yet.

So... you believe that there can be observable real-world behavior without a direct physical cause?

Ready to chuck the conservation laws, are we?

 

[Piggy]

What is important is recreating the relationships in a brain that produce consciousness.

This is demonstrably false.

Any sort of symbolic representation can preserve relationships.

 

[Piggy]

Consciousness, very easily, may be the process by which we sift through numerous behavioral tendencies and nothing more.

Well, fine.

So, tell me, how are you going to get this real-world activity to happen without a real-world physical cause?

 

[Piggy]

Do you really think it is impossible to recreate the same sort of relationships in a computer that occur in a brain?

Who cares?

I could do it by writing in the sand, too, I suppose.

But representing those relationships isn't going to do the trick.

I can represent all the relationships in a working car engine on paper. But that won't make my piece of paper go roaring down the highway at 70 mph.

 

[Piggy]

It is not as if there is no physical output from a computer. Computers couldn't work without physical output -- so all we would need to do is translate the actual physical output from a computer, physical output that can change based on the inputs provided, into an actual physical representation such as a voice.

Ok, so what you're saying is that you need the computer plus enough hardware to pull off the actual physical phenomenon. Not only enough hardware to run the logic and no more.

We're on the same page there.

 

[Piggy]

Unless I am completely wrong about this, the whole reason that recurrent loops were introduced into the discussion is to counter the charge that computers only do simple line coding -- step one, step two, step three. With recurrent loops, as are prevalent throughout the brain, computers can change their behavior fairly significantly. They can take account of information that changes in the environment and change their behavior. They can do so within a simulation, taking rules laid down at the onset and altering their behavior based on what occurs later in the simulation.

And...?

Look, it doesn't matter if you have computers that can learn. Totally irrelevant to the question of whether or not they can be conscious solely by virtue of their programming.

 

[Drachasor]

It makes no difference.

Simulations are still simulations, whether or not they evolve.

A model brain can be conscious, for the same reason that a model airplane can fly.

But a simulated brain can't make the machine running it become conscious, for the same reason that a simulated airplane can't make the machine running it fly.

And it makes absolutely no difference whether the simulation evolves or not.

A simulated plane can fly within the context of the program. A simulated brain could think and be conscious within whatever world it is generated in....how exactly is that not actual thinking at that point? Give it a couple cameras and whatnot and that "simulated" world becomes its interpretation of the real world. Not any different from people, really.

Consciousness is about how you process information and produce thoughts. A simulation that can mimic that is conscious. It isn't something like flight, which requires physical interaction with the world.

What you are saying is that a computer program that simulates a simple cypher, doesn't actually encode anything. That's absolutely and utterly ridiculous.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

So... you believe that there can be observable real-world behavior without a direct physical cause?

Ready to chuck the conservation laws, are we?

No, of course not. That is why we have to be careful not to get lost in programming language; which is one of the places where, I think, Searle made a mistake. While we speak of the abstractions of programming languages and the abstractions of a computer simulation it is important to realize that the reason we speak in these terms is because it makes conceptualization and conversation easier, but it does not reflect reality.

There is a direct physical cause -- in the actions of opening and closing of logic gates. That is the real world physical effect of what a computer does. There is no violation of conservation laws involved. The sorts of behavioral changes we need to see to produce consciousness occur because the programming is set through feedback loops and other means to alter its behavior based on inputs from the simulation so that entirely new outputs can be created.

When Searle created his Chinese Room argument the type of programming we are speaking about had not been created I don't think. He wasn't really speaking about consciousness really but about understanding a language, but the same thought basically applies. Computers actually can change their outputs -- real world outputs -- based on what happens to/within them.

 

[PixyMisa]

So... you believe that there can be observable real-world behavior without a direct physical cause?

Exactly what observable real-world behaviour are we proposing to not have a direct physical cause? Please show your work.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

And...?

Look, it doesn't matter if you have computers that can learn. Totally irrelevant to the question of whether or not they can be conscious solely by virtue of their programming.

But wait, one of the objections that you had was that computers acted according to lock-step programming which, if a completely sound argument, would preclude the possibility of consciousness. The whole point here is that they are not restricted to lock step action based entirely on line code. I am not equating learning with consciousness -- only trying to show that computers can change their output based on rules that are not directly prescribed by code. That is an essential, but not sufficient, part of consciousness.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Ok, so what you're saying is that you need the computer plus enough hardware to pull off the actual physical phenomenon. Not only enough hardware to run the logic and no more.

We're on the same page there.

I've not said any different. The relationships are all there in the logic of the computer, but we would need a way of accessing it to make it work in the real world.

Can we go get a beer now?

 

[Clive]

If your argument requires that you assume that everything we know is wrong, you have a real problem.

Pointing out what we don't know is not the same as assuming everything we know is wrong. Just because we haven't found a realisable computational model more powerful than a Turing machine doesn't mean it isn't possible. If it turns out that such a machine is in fact possible within our universe then no Turing machine will ever be ability to simulate that machine (let alone the universe). Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

Wrong. The simulation will be indistinguishable in all respects from our Universe. There's no maybe. Either you accept that it can produce consciousness, or you believe in magic.

Why don't you helping try me instead of being repetitive while not actually adding any new information about what you think? Perhaps you could start by precisely and concisely laying out the terms and what theories, hypotheses or beliefs (widely held to be true or otherwise) should be treated as absolutely true for the purposes of this thought experiment. I have searched the thread previously but I couldn't track down any single post or page where that information seemed clear. A reference to the key earlier posts might be easier if the information I'm asking for is included.

We already know what those personal beliefs are.

You know what my beliefs are also?

What I'm asking for is some justification for those beliefs. On the one side - computationalism - we have an understanding of biology and physics. On the other side, so far all we have is logical fallacies. I'm hoping for more than that.

We have a partial understanding of biology and physics. There are many things we know we don't know yet (including exactly how consciousness operates) and there are likely to be other aspects that we don't even know that don't know yet.

Which of the following most accurately captures the meaning of "to know" as you most commonly use it in this thread?
1. It seems likely to be this way to me.
2. I and lots of other people I respect believe this.
3. It it very widely accepted in academic/scientific circles.
4. It has been mathematically/logically proven beyond doubt.

0 or 5. God whispered it into my ear.