Forgiven for what, eactly?

[Aepervius]

Then don't participate in a thread that assumes magic as part of the commonly agreed upon premises -- such as a thread talking about the necessity of asking God for forgiveness for sin in Christianity.

Huhu.

Don't start a thread with magic as premise , if you expect not to be called for it, on a critical thinking forum (or at least we strive to). Because magic, is the ultimate rationality killer.

Once you have got magic, pig fly, hell freeze, you are forrgiven for sin you did inherited from myth, people have ESP, and I am a great lover. Anything can be made up. You don't need to have it logically consistent, you don't even need to filll all holes, you just invok magic. Goddidit. Godworkinmysteriousway. Godgivesusfreewillandisomniscient. Godsquarethecircle.

Why not jsut say as premise : "Christian stuff are all true and you are all wrong" and then write as post "premise is enough to show the conclusion" and then the last line "end of thread" so we can jsut close the theread after you jsut post the first time.

If you want to ignore all logic loophole which are pointed to you, all contradiction and invok magic, fine, but then don't protest when pointed to you that it is irrational.

 

[AvalonXQ]

Don't start a thread with magic as premise.

I didn't.

 

[tsig]

I didn't.

Neither did the OP.

 

[SOdhner]

You're saying that it's okay for your position to be impossible from a basic logical level because of magic.
[...]
When your argument requires a magical circumvention of logic, it is by definition illogical for anyone to agree with you.

I don't like it when people do that "you didn't respond, so you must agree!" thing, but I don't really know what else to say since Avalon posted here again without addressing this at all.

I'm not sure if I was expecting him to tell me my summary of his position was inaccurate in some way, or to argue that there is a good reason to believe in something that requires the suspension of logic. Either one would have been interesting.

As it stands, this discussion's question ("For what , exactly, are we supposed to be asking forgiveness?") has the answer that we should be asking forgiveness for things that are logically the responsibility of god. We are then asked not just to accept physical miracles, but to ignore basic logic. There's nothing to tell us how we would reach the correct illogical conclusion though, since without using logic I might just as well believe anything.

 

[AvalonXQ]

I see nothing there about magic, that seems to be your own contribution.

I see something about God -- specifically, somebody asking for details regarding God and forgiveness, which assumes the existence of God as a premise of having the discussion. I was giving people the benefit of the doubt that "magic" was essentially a term for phenomena outside of the natural world, which would certainly include the properties and capabilities of the Christian God.
But if you insist that we can assume the Christian God without assuming magic, then I'll disagree when people claim that my position includes belief in magic.
My position includes the existence of two supernatural entities -- an atemporal deity who is capable of foreknowledge of nondeterministic events, and souls that can represent nondeterministic causes for events. If those aren't "magic", then there's no "magic" in the discussion. I certainly don't feel that I'm the one who introduced it.

 

[iknownothing]

If I created robots with the ability to make choices, but every single one of them ended up making the choice to do something "sinful", I could only conclude that I had made a mistake when designing the decision-making part of the robots. It would hardly be fair to blame it on the robots.

Quoting because it's an excellent way to put it, and I didn't want this to be lost or overlooked.

 

[qayak]

If I created robots with the ability to make choices, but every single one of them ended up making the choice to do something "sinful", I could only conclude that I had made a mistake when designing the decision-making part of the robots. It would hardly be fair to blame it on the robots.

The only other reason would be that you needed to believe they had the ability to make their own decisions so you made the claim knowing full well that they didn't.

But the analogy here would be more of the robots claiming they had been designed with the ability to make choices so that they could punish other robots. That is what religions, and legal systems, require.

In the case of humans, those who believe in a designer also believe they will be punished by Him and their fellow humans. Those who don't believe in a designer believe they will only be punished by their fellow man.

The question still remains as to whether or not they should be punished?

 

[bruto]

I see something about God -- specifically, somebody asking for details regarding God and forgiveness, which assumes the existence of God as a premise of having the discussion. I was giving people the benefit of the doubt that "magic" was essentially a term for phenomena outside of the natural world, which would certainly include the properties and capabilities of the Christian God.
But if you insist that we can assume the Christian God without assuming magic, then I'll disagree when people claim that my position includes belief in magic.
My position includes the existence of two supernatural entities -- an atemporal deity who is capable of foreknowledge of nondeterministic events, and souls that can represent nondeterministic causes for events. If those aren't "magic", then there's no "magic" in the discussion. I certainly don't feel that I'm the one who introduced it.

I think you raise an interesting point, and a problem that occurs frequently in discussions like this. For the subject to make sense at all, it must be addressed at least as if there were a god, and as if that god resembled the one we think we're discussing when jumping off from a DOC thread , which is to say something that at least resembles the deity at the center of Christian scripture. The OP asks what is essentially a theological question, or one of doctrine, to which skepticism about the existence of God or critique of his "personality" is not really responsive. If "magical" is the word you use to describe theism, then magic is inherently the subject of the thread. I will agree with you thus far even though I think your ideas on original sin are biblically dubious and largely semantic.

 

[tsig]

I see something about God -- specifically, somebody asking for details regarding God and forgiveness, which assumes the existence of God as a premise of having the discussion. I was giving people the benefit of the doubt that "magic" was essentially a term for phenomena outside of the natural world, which would certainly include the properties and capabilities of the Christian God.
But if you insist that we can assume the Christian God without assuming magic, then I'll disagree when people claim that my position includes belief in magic.
My position includes the existence of two supernatural entities -- an atemporal deity who is capable of foreknowledge of nondeterministic events, and souls that can represent nondeterministic causes for events. If those aren't "magic", then there's no "magic" in the discussion. I certainly don't feel that I'm the one who introduced it.

So god = magic. That doesn't leave much room for rational discussion.

 

[AvalonXQ]

So god = magic. That doesn't leave much room for rational discussion.

Like I said, I assumed that the whole "omnipotent atemporal supernatural diety" idea qualified as "magic" the way the term was being used. If you mean something more by "magic" (something like, "not subject to rules that can be rationally examined for consistency"), then I'm not claiming that god = magic, nor have I introduced "magic" into our discussion.

 

[laca]

Like I said, I assumed that the whole "omnipotent atemporal supernatural diety" idea qualified as "magic" the way the term was being used. If you mean something more by "magic" (something like, "not subject to rules that can be rationally examined for consistency"), then I'm not claiming that god = magic, nor have I introduced "magic" into our discussion.

Since we're on the subject, have you responded to Robin's proof? You know, the one that showed a contradiction between the concept of your god and free will. You cannot ignore that and still claim to subject your god to rules that can be rationally examined for consistency. Which is it going to be?

 

[AvalonXQ]

Since we're on the subject, have you responded to Robin's proof?

I responded to it, but not to Robin's satisfaction. Robin's proof can be reduced to the following:
1) If God knows X, then not (possibly not X).
2) If free will, then (possibly not X). Contradiction.
IIRC I already explained why I don't agree with the above -- it exploits the very ambiguity in "possibly" that is the crux of the disagreement. Depending on exactly how "possibly" is defined, I disagree with (1) or I disagree with (2) -- but the point is that I don't agree with both (1) and (2) for any single definition of "possibly", since I don't agree that what is eliminated by God's knowledge is the same as what is necessary for free will.

 

[iknownothing]

It is true that the concept of God is fundamentally magical. So you can define him as doing magical things that violate known facts of existence, like turning water into wine or something.

But that doesn't mean you can just dismiss a logical contradiction as magic. It's like how people will come up with a question like, if God can do anything can he create a rock so heavy he can't lift it? (google filled in the rest of the sentence for me because I was drawing a blank)

The answer is 'no' because it just doesn't make sense. The words are all English and the grammar is correct, but the meaning is self contradictory.

If I understand what you are saying, it is "God created the universe and everything in it, down to each tiny particle that we are made of, and knew in advance everything that would happen as a consequence of his creating the world exactly as he did. But, people still have free will because: magic." To me that is the same sort of logic problem as the rock question above. You can't just say "magic" to explain away something that fundamentally makes zero sense.

 

[AvalonXQ]

If I understand what you are saying, it is "God created the universe and everything in it, down to each tiny particle that we are made of, and knew in advance everything that would happen as a consequence of his creating the world exactly as he did. But, people still have free will because: magic."

That's not what I'm saying. This is.
God created the universe and everything in it, down to each tiny particle that we are made of.
God created souls, which cause things to happen in a way that is not a consequence of God creating the world exactly as he did, but rather in a way that is a consequence of the souls' free choices.
God knew in advance everything that will happen, whether as a consequence of his creation or as a consequence of souls' choices.
People still have free will because foreknowledge is irrelevant to the question of the capacity to make unforced choices.

 

[laca]

I responded to it, but not to Robin's satisfaction. Robin's proof can be reduced to the following:
1) If God knows X, then not (possibly not X).
2) If free will, then (possibly not X). Contradiction.
IIRC I already explained why I don't agree with the above -- it exploits the very ambiguity in "possibly" that is the crux of the disagreement. Depending on exactly how "possibly" is defined, I disagree with (1) or I disagree with (2) -- but the point is that I don't agree with both (1) and (2) for any single definition of "possibly", since I don't agree that what is eliminated by God's knowledge is the same as what is necessary for free will.

Nice weaseling. How could you not agree with 1)? If an omniscient entity knows X, then by definition not X is not possible. How else would you define omniscience? Also, for most, free will means that everyone is able to choose for themselves. Well, I cannot choose to fly, but you get the gist. I can choose however to move my arm, unless broken or otherwise disabled. If your god knows I won't lift my arm at time t0, then I cannot choose to lift it. Simple as that. How else do you define free will?

 

[laca]

That's not what I'm saying. This is.
God created the universe and everything in it, down to each tiny particle that we are made of.
God created souls, which cause things to happen in a way that is not a consequence of God creating the world exactly as he did, but rather in a way that is a consequence of the souls' free choices.
God knew in advance everything that will happen, whether as a consequence of his creation or as a consequence of souls' choices.

OK...

People still have free will because foreknowledge is irrelevant to the question of the capacity to make unforced choices.

It doesn't have to be forced, just restricted. If you define free will such that the above holds, you'll loose all meaning of the concept. But you're free to try.

 

[AvalonXQ]

It doesn't have to be forced, just restricted.

But it's not.
God knows that X will happen because God knows what choice A will make -- not because there is only one choice that A can make. A has the capacity to choose X or not X, but in exercising that capacity, A chooses X and God knows this.
I'm starting to get the impression that this is more an unwillingness to accept the idea of supernatural foreknowledge (foreknowledge of nondeterministic outcomes due to atemporal existence) as opposed to an unwillingness to accept free will (nondeterministic nonrandom causation).

 

[AvalonXQ]

Nice weaseling. How could you not agree with 1)? If an omniscient entity knows X, then by definition not X is not possible.

No. If any entity knows X, then by definition X will occur. X and not X may still both be possible.
Again, is "possible" an expression of what objectively can happen deterministically (what I call "capacity"), or what subjectively has a nonzero probability of happening based on the witness's knowledge? If the latter, then I agree with (1) for any agent that knows what God knows, but I also don't agree that free will requires that multiple choices subjectively have nonzero probabilities for all observers.

 

[SumDood]

God's knowledge does not act as a restraint on action; it doesn't remove the capacity for something to occur.

People still have free will because foreknowledge is irrelevant to the question of the capacity to make unforced choices.

...since I don't agree that what is eliminated by God's knowledge is the same as what is necessary for free will.

You keep implying that we think that it is God's knowledge of the future that somehow constrains our actions and removes free will.

I don't think anyone is saying that the knowledge itself causes or prevents anything.

I wish I had something better to add to this discussion, but it really makes my head hurt. And I think i just realized that even without God, free will is an illusion.

 

[laca]

But it's not.

Is too!!1

Seriously, if your god knows I'm not going to lift my arm at t0, can I still lift it when the time comes? If the answer is no, then it is restricted. No way around it. There is but one path. Free will is an illusion.

It's like a computer program. I program it to print a specific sequence. It is able to print any other sequence, but it will still print the one it's programmed for. Following your line of reasoning, the computer program has free will.

God knows that X will happen because God knows what choice A will make -- not because there is only one choice that A can make. A has the capacity to choose X or not X, but in exercising that capacity, A chooses X and God knows this.

You're begging the question by assuming there's a choice involved at all.

I'm starting to get the impression that this is more an unwillingness to accept the idea of supernatural foreknowledge (foreknowledge of nondeterministic outcomes due to atemporal existence) as opposed to an unwillingness to accept free will (nondeterministic nonrandom causation).

It's more like an unwillingness to swallow unmitigated crap.