Has consciousness been fully explained?

[rocketdodger]

Mathematical concepts don't have a physical reality. However, mathematics can be used to describe the physical world.

There seems to be considerable confusion about this, and has been for a long time. It's not surprising that physicists have to be excluded from the discussion.

Everyone understands this but you.

It is quite clear that when computer scientists refer to "computation" that they are speaking of a real world behavior -- the kind of things that cells and computers do, and not cheese -- that can be described using the abstract notions of computer science, just like the abstract notions of mathematics do in fact describe real world behavior.

You are the only person (well, perhaps you and Malerin ) who thinks that there is this gigantic divide where mathematics describes reality but computer science describes ... non reality. Or something, you still haven't made your case coherent.

 

[rocketdodger]

Yes, i'm just interested in testing your definition of consciousness.

If we take an example of consciousness thought that is expressed by the words,

'Plane travel is faster than travelling by boat'

Where is the self reference in this thought?

Are you aware of what those words mean? I assume "yes" since otherwise it wouldn't be a conscious thought.

And if you are aware of what those words mean, I assume you are also aware that a "plane" is not you and a "boat" is not you (although you can probably picture yourself on each) and "traveling" and "faster" have meaning in the context of the world around you but not only within you.

In other words, every single word you understand has some kind of an implicit self reference. How could you be said to "understand" the meaning of a word if you didn't know whether it referenced yourself or not?

 

[rocketdodger]

I'm well aware of the Matrix hypothesis. I also know the limitations of "maybe there is no way to prove we are not" reasoning.

"Maybe" as in "no human has thought of a way to do it."

 

[rocketdodger]

It's quite simple, really. All physical interactions can be mathematically described. All of them. If neurons are doing calculations, then so are melting ice cubes, so are asteroids, so is the interior of the sun.

Computation is either non-existent in the real world, or it is universal. I expect that this will be characterised as "Westprog can't tell the difference between computation and cheese" but I don't anticipate any kind of refutation.

Well quite clearly you think cheese and both computers and cells behave the same way.

It is just an absurdly stupid idea and I know you don't *really* think that, but you are just too stubborn to even admit a single idea that leads away from your dualism.

Multiple people have asked you "if soup can do what computers do, why don't you respond to this post with a bowl of soup?"

And I would add to that "if cheese can do what cells do, why can't cheese reproduce or metabolize or anything else that only cells do?"

"don't anticipate any kind of refutation" lol

Stubborn

 

[rocketdodger]

That is certainly what they do at a system level. Is that not similar to what a computer does? That is my ultimate point. At their most basic level do computers compute according to this definition? It's electron flow through gates, just as with a single neuron we have EPSPs and IPSPs summating at the axon hillock and, in systems, differing levels of association through synaptic plasticity.

You are wasting your time, both Malerin and Westprog are playing this foolish game:

1) show that computationalists think consciousness arises from computation
2) show that computation is either everywhere or nowhere, because there is no "physical" definition for it
3) show that therefore everything is conscious or nothing is
4) Thus anyone who supports the computational model must admit that soup and cheese is conscious, an absurdity, and the anti-computational position wins by default.

An utterly stupid game, but apparently it caught Malerin's eye since westprog was the first to play it, and now both of them are taking swings. I only wish this game was like baseball and they would be gone after three strikes.

 

[rocketdodger]

I'm not sure how many times I have to say that I'm not claiming that neurons "do sums". If the words 'computation' and 'summation' are so tightly constrained in their meaning, then I humbly suggest that we have all been using the wrong words to talk about computers as well.

Nope, that won't work for their agenda.

I have tried this approach already.

"What, then, do you call the difference between a neuron and soup? between a transistor and soup?"

No answer.

I am telling you, it is a stupid game, and you won't make any headway. Malerin and Westprog are not serious participants in this discussion.

 

[blobru]

Once again, if that is the only way the word computation is used, then that is fine; it is simpy the wrong word to apply in this situation. But it still does not negate what neurons do -- which is summate. They take information, add it to get a new output and do something with it. No observer needs to define any of this as information (or as anything) for the neuron to do what it does.

Unless we really do want to wallow in a semantic mess, because computers at their most basic level don't compute either then. They take inputs following a set of rules to produce a new output. That is what neurons do -- the constraining rules being very important to the process.

I'm not sure how many times I have to say that I'm not claiming that neurons "do sums". If the words 'computation' and 'summation' are so tightly constrained in their meaning, then I humbly suggest that we have all been using the wrong words to talk about computers as well.

I wouldn't have thought this was controversial. So long as the neurons are part of a system which can distinguish between their 'summed' states and treat them as instructions, it makes sense to describe their activity as "computation".

That's the reason we don't describe all changes in state as computation: apples falling off a tree, for example. There is nothing in the orchard that necessarily registers one apple beneath a tree as an instruction to shake the tree, two as an instruction to shake a neighboring tree, three as an instruction to shake it twice, etc. (Besides, apple trees would not function very well within an orchard computer if there were: the results of shaking the tree are unpredictable, and apples cannot be reattached to branches to reset the tree to 'zero'; neurons, otoh, like computer switches, are predictable and resettable, which makes the analogy with manmade computers appropriate, imo -- so long as we realize it is an analogy -- which is the business of philosophy, to be fidgety about such niggling details -- I see no good reason not to call what neurons do, within the functional architecture of the brain, "summation", part of the brain's process of registering and passing on signals as instructions to other parts of the brain: i.e., "computation". Good luck explaining what the brain does without access to that handy vocabulary).

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I wouldn't have thought this was controversial. So long as the neurons are part of a system which can distinguish between their 'summed' states and treat them as instructions, it makes sense to describe their activity as "computation".

That's the reason we don't describe all changes in state as computation: apples falling off a tree, for example. There is nothing in the orchard that necessarily registers one apple beneath a tree as an instruction to shake the tree, two as an instruction to shake a neighboring tree, three as an instruction to shake it twice, etc. (Besides, apple trees would not function very well within an orchard computer if there were: the results of shaking the tree are unpredictable, and apples cannot be reattached to branches to reset the tree to 'zero'; neurons, otoh, like computer switches, are predictable and resettable, which makes the analogy with manmade computers appropriate, imo -- so long as we realize it is an analogy -- which is the business of philosophy, to be fidgety about such niggling details -- I see no good reason not to call what neurons do, within the functional architecture of the brain, "summation", part of the brain's process of registering and passing on signals as instructions to other parts of the brain: i.e., "computation". Good luck explaining what the brain does without access to that handy vocabulary).

Dude, how are you?

I agree. I don't have any problem using a different word if that's the consensus, but I don't see what the controvery in this situation is all about.

The point being, well, what you just said.

 

[Beth]

It does make things rather hard to keep straight. When you are talking about the reality of simulation oranges, I assume you are talking about the same level of reality as fictional characters. If something qualitatively different is meant, I don't know what it is. People arguing for a mechanical being being conscious I see as isomorphic to arguing that people possess souls.

Hmm, let me think about that. My initial feeling is that there is a difference, but unless I can express it clearly there may not be one. A simulated orange 'exists' only as it is implemented in a computer program. That is not precisely the case with a fictional character in a book, but it is the case that such a character exists only in the sense that it is implemented in our brains when we read the work of fiction. One clear difference is that we can look at the simulated orange separate from us, but not the fictional character since the fictional character only exists in our minds while the simulated orange actually has a sense of existing in the running of the program while the computer continues to function and the program is running.

I think the fictional character also exists in the paper and ink books. I don’t think the simulated orange has any more ‘sense of existing’ in the running of the program than a fictional character has in the reading of a book. I just don’t see any qualitative difference between the two. How can the simulated orange be considered ‘real’ in such a way as to exclude things like Hogwarts School of Magic from also being considered ‘real’?

Actually, I think neurons do "sums" in exactly the same way that rocks falling in a landslide do.

Again, we are not talking about "doing sums" as in "doing arithmetic" but the more general term -- summation. In other words, adding different inputs together to arrive at a new output. It really doesn't matter if we call it summation or "doing sums" or 'bawana'. The important thing is that it is a form of computation -- of taking inputs, and dealing with them according a set rule and arriving at a new output that differs (also according to a set of rules) from the original inputs.
For a typical cortical neuron somewhere on the order of 30 or so inputs are needed to summate in order to reach threshold at the axon hillock. Inhibitory inputs will alter this number.
There is no sense that anyone has to call it summation for the process at the axon hillock to occur. It's just going to happen and when it happens it will cause other things to happen. A bunch of rocks falling adds to the other set of rocks only in an observers mind because it doesn't cause another set of changes to occur according to a set of rules.

Yes it does. A bunch of rocks falling adds to the other set of rocks whether an observer is there or not. It can cause another set of changes that will occur according to a set of rules – the laws of physics. For example, some rocks may be broken into two or more pieces, others may be bounced out of the pile, etc.

The nervous system is set up to take inputs and actually do something with them, not simply rely on chance occurrences.

You say that it is different because a nervous system may do something with the inputs, but you were talking about individual neurons doing computations not what a nervous system does with the output of the individual neurons.

I think that Malerin and Westprog have a fair point regarding that either computation happens only when meaning is assigned by a conscious creature or it becomes a meaningless term applicable to everything in the universe. How can you distinguish the ‘computation’ done by neurons and rock piles without requiring an observer to extract meaning from one but not the other.

I think that different people in this discussion are primarily concerned about various issues. I'd like to hear what you consider to be the real issues. Thanks.

There are lots of real issues. The one at play now, as far as I can tell, is the question about whether or not a computer simulation might possibly be conscious. While the transporter problem is also very important and very much worth discussion, I simply think it would be too much of a derail to re-introduce it here. That is all I meant.

So, for you the ‘real issue’ is whether or not a computer simulation might be conscious?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

So, for you the ‘real issue’ is whether or not a computer simulation might be conscious?

As I said, that seems to be what is being discussed right now as far as I can tell. I don't call that any more real than any other issue. I simply don't think that derails within active discussions are worthwhile.

Why do you keep bringing up this point?

 

[Frank Newgent]

... "why don't you respond to this post with a bowl of soup?"

That describes well PixyMisa's answer to my last post

Planck's constant is a physical constant.

Yes. And that's the physical constant that defines precise physical measurements.

The observer remains, sir.

Well, no. In the sense that you mean, in the sense that an observer is somehow different from any other physical system, no.

No. That is not the sense I mean.

Read the sentence again: the precise measurements of the physical system depend on the observer through the normative principles of truth, relevence, and parsimony.

Abstract physical descriptions describe what we know, not what something "is".

Don't you know that?

* crickets

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I think the fictional character also exists in the paper and ink books. I don’t think the simulated orange has any more ‘sense of existing’ in the running of the program than a fictional character has in the reading of a book. I just don’t see any qualitative difference between the two. How can the simulated orange be considered ‘real’ in such a way as to exclude things like Hogwarts School of Magic from also being considered ‘real’?

All of which is fine with me.

Yes it does. A bunch of rocks falling adds to the other set of rocks whether an observer is there or not. It can cause another set of changes that will occur according to a set of rules – the laws of physics. For example, some rocks may be broken into two or more pieces, others may be bounced out of the pile, etc.

Well, if there is a set of rules that will constrain the actions of those rocks similar to what excitable tissue does, and if the falling rocks can continue to cause such changes according to those rules, then the rocks functionally do what the nervous system does.

You say that it is different because a nervous system may do something with the inputs, but you were talking about individual neurons doing computations not what a nervous system does with the output of the individual neurons.

What I said was that neurons summate inputs and provide an output. That is what they do. If that does not meet the definition of computation, that's fine with me. Computers at their most basic level don't compute either, then.

I think that Malerin and Westprog have a fair point regarding that either computation happens only when meaning is assigned by a conscious creature or it becomes a meaningless term applicable to everything in the universe. How can you distinguish the ‘computation’ done by neurons and rock piles without requiring an observer to extract meaning from one but not the other.

Neurons, within the nervous system, do something with the outputs in a coordinated fashion and rock piles generally don't. As I mentioned above, if falling rocks can be constrained by the same set of rules and can continue to perform the same sort of action that nerons do, then they can't really be functionally separated.

This needs to be contrasted with the other thing that gets thrown into the mix, which is that rocks falling are said to amount to computation if an observer sees two rocks add to another and says "that's 2+1=3". That isn't what neurons do. Neurons summate inputs. Rocks theoretically could do that if we lived in another universe where such actions are constrained in the same way that excitable tissue acts.

 

[rocketdodger]

I think that Malerin and Westprog have a fair point regarding that either computation happens only when meaning is assigned by a conscious creature or it becomes a meaningless term applicable to everything in the universe. How can you distinguish the ‘computation’ done by neurons and rock piles without requiring an observer to extract meaning from one but not the other.

No, they do not have a fair point. They are wrong.

Regardless of the stupid semantic games, the fact remains that living entities can do things that, until humans found ways to get similar behavior out of inert materials, nothing else could do.

I tried explaining this in a formal sense, but apparently my explanation was over everyone's head. Sorry nobody else is smart enough to get what I was saying? Here is an easier version of my explanation that a kid could understand -- " living cells can do stuff that rocks cannot do."

I keep coming back to the same point, over and over -- rocks do not behave the same as cells. No matter how many stupid arguments to the contrary Malerin and Westprog vomit onto the thread, that fact remains. I don't care how stupid one is, how utterly ignorant one is regarding the basic facts of science that even gradeschool children are expected to understand, they should still understand how blatantly obvious this is. Cells and computers can do things that rocks, cheese, and bowls of soup cannot do. Period. End of story.

 

[westprog]

Well quite clearly you think cheese and both computers and cells behave the same way.

It is just an absurdly stupid idea and I know you don't *really* think that, but you are just too stubborn to even admit a single idea that leads away from your dualism.

Multiple people have asked you "if soup can do what computers do, why don't you respond to this post with a bowl of soup?"

And I would add to that "if cheese can do what cells do, why can't cheese reproduce or metabolize or anything else that only cells do?"

"don't anticipate any kind of refutation" lol

Stubborn

Any more straw and you could build a house.

The issue is not whether there's a difference between living and non-living cells. There clearly is, and it's well defined, scientifically. There might be a fuzzy boundary, but it's generally possible to differentiate between living and non-living tissue using objective, scientific criteria.

Trying to differentiate between soup and computers is also easy. The computer has behaviour that the soup doesn't have. They don't form different classes of objects, but they are certainly very easy to distinguish.

So, nobody has made this claim. Nor is it implicit in anything I, or Piggy, or Malerin, or Al Bell, or Cornsail, or Democracy, or any of the other critics of the strong AI position have said on this or other threads. So the above is a refutation of something that nobody has said.

What I have said, which as I predicted, has not met with even an attempted refutation, was that there was no characteristic process of "computation" which can be objectively described as a physical process going on in the living tissue and the computer, and not in anything else. It's not good enough when making extreme claims as to what computation is capable of doing when a precise physical definition of computation is entirely absent. And no, the previous attempts were not convincing. If such a definition were provided, I suspect it would be enough to earn the person who came up with it a PhD.

The Wasp is generally quite rigorous in his reasoning, but his conviction that some kind of mathematical process is going on in neurons has led him astray on this occasion. In order to claim that the physical process going on in the neurons is computation, then there has to be a physical definition rigid enough that we can objectively ascertain whether computation is going on or not.

 

[blobru]

Dude, how are you?

Not too bad (thought I was cured of these consciousness threads after the last grueling teletransporter march to the sea, y' know, yet here I am again; old soldiers never die, they just reincarnate themselves in consciousness threads... or something... the slow ones, anyway).

I agree. I don't have any problem using a different word if that's the consensus, but I don't see what the controvery in this situation is all about.

The point being, well, what you just said.

Maybe a better distinction, for those who who are confused where to draw the line, is that if you want to call all reality a "computer", fine; however, we don't have access to all of reality, so it's kind of a moot point; we only have access to parts of reality, some of which, like brain neurons and mechanical switches, have properties which mimic bit manipulation in arithmetic, and as such are extremely good candidates for use in computation, either by man or nature; others, like apple trees and piles of rocks and the Mississippi, don't, and aren't. Thus, we tend to label "computers" whatever systematically exploits the properties of these arithmetic-mimickers per se, and whatever else doesn't, we don't.

 

[rocketdodger]

Well, if there is a set of rules that will constrain the actions of those rocks similar to what excitable tissue does, and if the falling rocks can continue to cause such changes according to those rules, then the rocks functionally do what the nervous system does.

This is another point that has been brought up and outright ignored by the other side.

If you take a bunch of rocks falling down a hillside, and somehow make their action repeatable like the excitation of a neuron, and somehow make their behavior affect other systems of rocks falling down a hillside, etc, until what "happens" is something even close to what "happens" when neurons fire and excite each other, then all of a sudden the assertion that "rocks can compute" doesn't seem so absurd anymore.

The idea that a rock just sitting there can compute is utterly stupid. The idea that a whole bunch of rocks, constrained by the same rules as the behavior of a neuron, doing stuff like a neuron, can compute isn't that absurd at all.

 

[westprog]

Cells and computers can do things that rocks, cheese, and bowls of soup cannot do. Period. End of story.

Which is no substitute for a physical definition.

My reasoning is more convincing because I used bold and italics.

It's not even enough to simply identify some commonality between cells and computers. We're not looking for "what do these two things have in common". We're looking for an actual physical quality.

 

[rocketdodger]

Any more straw and you could build a house.

The issue is not whether there's a difference between living and non-living cells. There clearly is, and it's well defined, scientifically. There might be a fuzzy boundary, but it's generally possible to differentiate between living and non-living tissue using objective, scientific criteria.

Trying to differentiate between soup and computers is also easy. The computer has behaviour that the soup doesn't have. They don't form different classes of objects, but they are certainly very easy to distinguish.

So, nobody has made this claim. Nor is it implicit in anything I, or Piggy, or Malerin, or Al Bell, or Cornsail, or Democracy, or any of the other critics of the strong AI position have said on this or other threads. So the above is a refutation of something that nobody has said.

What I have said, which as I predicted, has not met with even an attempted refutation, was that there was no characteristic process of "computation" which can be objectively described as a physical process going on in the living tissue and the computer, and not in anything else. It's not good enough when making extreme claims as to what computation is capable of doing when a precise physical definition of computation is entirely absent. And no, the previous attempts were not convincing. If such a definition were provided, I suspect it would be enough to earn the person who came up with it a PhD.

The Wasp is generally quite rigorous in his reasoning, but his conviction that some kind of mathematical process is going on in neurons has led him astray on this occasion. In order to claim that the physical process going on in the neurons is computation, then there has to be a physical definition rigid enough that we can objectively ascertain whether computation is going on or not.

Your positions are contraditory and you can't even see it.

1) The computer has behavior that the soup does not have.
2) The behavior that the computer has, that the soup does not have, is not objectively describable as a physical process.

This is just stupid. If you yourself can determine that there is a behavior difference, then quite obviously there is an objectively describable physical process that is different between them. Otherwise their behavior would not be different.

Welcome to Mr. Logic, Westprog. Play nice, you two!

 

[Dancing David]

Yes, i'm just interested in testing your definition of consciousness.

If we take an example of consciousness thought that is expressed by the words,

'Plane travel is faster than travelling by boat'

Where is the self reference in this thought?

What is generating the sentence, that needs to be answered first.

 

[rocketdodger]

Which is no substitute for a physical definition.

My reasoning is more convincing because I used bold and italics.

It's not even enough to simply identify some commonality between cells and computers. We're not looking for "what do these two things have in common". We're looking for an actual physical quality.

The fact that one is too lazy to put time into thinking about what the "actual physical quality" that differentiates two systems with very different behavior actually is in no way invalidates the logical and mathematical fact that if one can observe differences in behavior then there must be an actual physical quality that is different between those systems.

It. Is. Just. That. Simple.

Computers and soup have some kind of difference in physical quality. Otherwise you would not claim they behave differently.

It. Is. Just. That. Simple.