Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Ichneumonwasp]

Back to the tree-falling problem. "Summing" doesn't happen in a mindless universe. The beads of an abacus may move if it falls from a tree and hits the ground, but with no one around there's no computation going on.

Sure it does. Whether you call it summing or not, a neuron receiving multiple inputs summates those inputs to create its output. That happens regardless of who observes it or if there is anyone to call it summation. That is simply a description of what occurs.

The reason we have discussions like this is because we have devices that we assign meaning to, like abacuses, and for which summation cannot occur without an observer.

Neurons don't care.

 

[Bikewer]

Science Friday this week interviewed Antonio Demasio, neuroscientist and author.

He's talking about the origins of consciousness and the role played by emotion and feeling.

http://www.sciencefriday.com/program/archives/201011126

 

[Malerin]

Sure it does. Whether you call it summing or not, a neuron receiving multiple inputs summates those inputs to create its output. That happens regardless of who observes it or if there is anyone to call it summation. That is simply a description of what occurs.

The reason we have discussions like this is because we have devices that we assign meaning to, like abacuses, and for which summation cannot occur without an observer.

Neurons don't care.

I don't doubt neurons do that. The question is, is it computation? No, not anymore so than an abacus shaking in an earthquake is doing computation. Computation (and simulation) is mind-dependent. Without an observer, there is no simulation.

Of course, without an observer there is no "orange" either, as that is an arbitray label we place on a particle group of particles behaving a certain way. A single "orange"/"tree"/"rock"/"anything" in a universe is an incoherent concept as there is no oberserver to arbitrarily seperate particles and behaviors and assign a label to them. A single consciousness in a universe is a coherent concept. It does not require an oberserver to assign it a label. Consciousness/mind is unique in this respect.

 

[PixyMisa]

Back to the tree-falling problem. "Summing" doesn't happen in a mindless universe. The beads of an abacus may move if it falls from a tree and hits the ground, but with no one around there's no computation going on.

Right. So we'll put you in the "Consciousness is not just magical, but actually logically incoherent" column. Check.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I don't doubt neurons do that. The question is, is it computation? No, not anymore so than an abacus shaking in an earthquake is doing computation. Computation (and simulation) is mind-dependent. Without an observer, there is no simulation.

It's fine if you want to define words in that way; and if so this is just an issue dealing with definition. If you want to define computation as observer dependent, just as sound is defined as a perception and so observer dependent I have no problem with that.

But it is still the case that neurons summate, and John Searle should know better. If summation does not mean the addition and/or subtraction of inputs to create a new output, then we simply need a new word. And whatever that new word might be, it is the basis for allowing us to talk about computation being observer dependent because it is the computing that we speak of with computation.

Of course, without an observer there is no "orange" either, as that is an arbitray label we place on a particle group of particles behaving a certain way. A single "orange"/"tree"/"rock"/"anything" in a universe is an incoherent concept as there is no oberserver to arbitrarily seperate particles and behaviors and assign a label to them. A single consciousness in a universe is a coherent concept. It does not require an oberserver to assign it a label. Consciousness/mind is unique in this respect.

We can decide to turn this into a semantic cesspool or we can address the real issues.

 

[westprog]

No they don't.

Not wishing to revisit the transporter thread - but suffice to say that no consensus on what human identity is was ever achieved.

 

[Malerin]

Not wishing to revisit the transporter thread - but suffice to say that no consensus on what human identity is was ever achieved.

Has consensus ever been reached on anything in the philo forum?

 

[PixyMisa]

We can decide to turn this into a semantic cesspool or we can address the real issues.

Hey, why start now?

 

[westprog]

Has consensus ever been reached on anything in the philo forum?

Yes, on whether consensus has ever been reached on anything in the philo forum. Oh, wait...

 

[Malerin]

It's fine if you want to define words in that way; and if so this is just an issue dealing with definition. If you want to define computation as observer dependent, just as sound is defined as a perception and so observer dependent I have no problem with that.

It's not how I want to define them. Give me a coherent account of mindless computation and I'll agree with you.

If simulations are observer-dependent, then a simulation - if it could be conscious at all- could only be conscious while being observed. This, of course, represents a huge problem for the "simulated consciousness" crowd.

But it is still the case that neurons summate, and John Searle should know better.

Searle? A rank amateur, am I right?

If summation does not mean the addition and/or subtraction of inputs to create a new output, then we simply need a new word.

No, you need a coherent concept. Individual neurons cannot do "sums" anymore than rocks falling in a landslide can "add".

And whatever that new word might be, it is the basis for allowing us to talk about computation being observer dependent because it is the computing that we speak of with computation.

We can decide to turn this into a semantic cesspool or we can address the real issues.

ROFL!

This sound familiar?

To discuss this issue intelligently, however, we can make inroads; but all depends on definitions of the words we use. Since we discuss consciousness in terms of feeling and awareness I have tried to get folks to commit to some sort of definition for those words. I have yet see very good definitions. If we want any sort of explanation of consciousness I think that is where we should begin.

So when the definitions don't go your way it's all a "semantic cesspool"?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

It's not how I want to define them. Give me a coherent account of mindless computation and I'll agree with you.

I already did. Summation is a form of computation. If neurons don't summate, what do they do? If adding inputs to create a new output is not summation, then what is the definition of summation?

If simulations are observer-dependent, then a simulation - if it could be conscious at all- could only be conscious while being observed. This, of course, represents a huge problem for the "simulated consciousness" crowd.

Why is that a problem? Even if true, I don't see how that is any sort of problem. The issue is whether or not consciousness is possible in a simulation, not under what circumstances it occurs or is experienced.

Searle? A rank amateur, am I right?

Are you suggesting that it is not possible for a philosopher to make a mistake?

No, you need a coherent concept. Individual neurons cannot do "sums" anymore than rocks falling in a landslide can "add".

Again, I ask you, what is the definition for summation then? If it is not adding and subtracting inputs to create an output, what is it? I didn't say that neurons "do sums" as if they add two plus two, so let's actually address the issue, please.

So when the definitions don't go your way it's all a "semantic cesspool"?

As I said earlier I don't care what words you want to use and what definitions you want to attach to them, because reality is still what it is. Neurons still summate no matter what you or anyone else wants to say.

Is it too much to ask for you to leave the attitude at the door and discuss this like an adult human being?

 

[Beth]

Really? I don't think it is at all inconsistent, but maybe we are talking about two different views and are not understanding one another?

Perhaps. It just seems to me that when people argue against the concept of the 'soul' having any reality, it seems they use a different definition of 'reality' than when they are claiming consciousness exists and is essentially computation and nothing more.

The idea is that consciousness is an action that takes place within a particular body, a body being required for it to occur. That body can be a physical human body or a computer or a dog or other animal or alien species. That there is no magic involved is their main point.

I don't disagree. But I think it's wrong to label those who disagree as claiming magic. It's only true if you define 'unknown cause' as equal to magic and few people posting here are of that opinion.

Within a simulation we would have actions (simulations of particles) being responsible for the 'body' associated with any particular consciousness, but none of it works without the computer running it. There's just an extra level of 'abstraction' if you will. No action is possible without a physical process to perform the action whatever level of abstraction intercedes.

It does make things rather hard to keep straight. When you are talking about the reality of simulation oranges, I assume you are talking about the same level of reality as fictional characters. If something qualitatively different is meant, I don't know what it is. People arguing for a mechanical being being conscious I see as isomorphic to arguing that people possess souls.

No, you need a coherent concept. Individual neurons cannot do "sums" anymore than rocks falling in a landslide can "add".

Actually, I think neurons do "sums" in exactly the same way that rocks falling in a landslide do.

We can decide to turn this into a semantic cesspool or we can address the real issues.

I think that different people in this discussion are primarily concerned about various issues. I'd like to hear what you consider to be the real issues. Thanks.

 

[PixyMisa]

Searle? A rank amateur, am I right?

No, he gets paid for it. The word you are looking for is idiot.

 

[Malerin]

It's not how I want to define them. Give me a coherent account of mindless computation and I'll agree with you.

I already did. Summation is a form of computation. If neurons don't summate, what do they do? If adding inputs to create a new output is not summation, then what is the definition of summation?

Summation is the operation of combining a sequence of numbers using addition; the result is their sum or total.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Summation

That's a form of computation and neurons are not doing that. Isn't the term you're using actually "spatial summation"?

If simulations are observer-dependent, then a simulation - if it could be conscious at all- could only be conscious while being observed. This, of course, represents a huge problem for the "simulated consciousness" crowd.

Why is that a problem?

Because it would not be a simulation of real consciousness. Do you go unconscious when no one's observing you?

Even if true, I don't see how that is any sort of problem. The issue is whether or not consciousness is possible in a simulation, not under what circumstances it occurs or is experienced.

See above. It would be qualiatatevly different than real consciousness because real consciousness is not observer dependent. I'm not sure observer-dependent consciousness is even a coherent concept.

Searle? A rank amateur, am I right?

Are you suggesting that it is not possible for a philosopher to make a mistake?

I'm suggesting if it comes down between a recognized authority like Searle and a bunch of anonymous forum posters, the smart money is on the authority. Perhaps someone here has published something as influential as the Chinese Room? Anyone?

No, you need a coherent concept. Individual neurons cannot do "sums" anymore than rocks falling in a landslide can "add".

Again, I ask you, what is the definition for summation then?

Again, I tell you: summation is the operation of combining a sequence of numbers using addition; the result is their sum or total.

If it is not adding and subtracting inputs to create an output, what is it?

Adding and subtracting numbers. Isn't that what computation is all about? Do you think numberless computation is possible?

I didn't say that neurons "do sums" as if they add two plus two, so let's actually address the issue, please.

That IS the issue. Computing: to determine especially by mathematical means.

Neurons are not computing anything.

So when the definitions don't go your way it's all a "semantic cesspool"?

As I said earlier I don't care what words you want to use and what definitions you want to attach to them, because reality is still what it is. Neurons still summate no matter what you or anyone else wants to say.

Except we have multiple definitions going on and you're playing fast and loose with them. You don't seem so gung-ho about definitions as you were earlier in the thread.

 

[Meed]

How does it not 'exist' when you can see it on a monitor?

Backup for a sec.... You spoke of a "robust 'world'" that does not exist in a real sense. The pixels you see on the monitor are in the real world, just like whatever is implementing the simulation is in the real world. The "simulation world" can't both exist and "not exist in a real sense", unless you mean that it exists in someone's imagination. I have no problem saying the simulation exists when it it's not being said to exist in some separate "world".

It has a location in exactly the same way that Descartes could speak of John Smith's soul. The soul carries out actions within a person, but the action of the soul is still without location. The implementation of a simulation must occur in a physical space, but the actions themselves are without location. You can't touch any of them.

I don't see how "action" can be defined as anything other than change in the real world (with location) and retain any meaningfulness or usefulness as a term. Nor do I see how any action of the simulation is not simply just an action of the implementation.

Recall you said "[...] its nature is as action -- steps being carried out within the computer. That is why it has no location, no extension, etc." Surely you're not saying steps carried out within a computer have no location?

An action has to occur within some thing, such as a computer. Why does an action have to be an action 'of something' where that 'something' is defined as a physical entity? Take a computer for instance. I can input a number into the system and it 'exists' as a way in which the system functions -- it is an action. There is no number there for me to touch. I can input another number -- same thing. I can add those two numbers together and get a new number. So, I have performed an action on two 'things' that do not exist. Did I not add those numbers simply because there was no "thing" there to manipulate?

You hit some keys which sent electrical signals to the computer, which resulted in some pattern of electrical signals within the computer, which resulted in some output. That all happens in the real world. The concept "number" exists in your brain.

(ETA: In the sense that it exists in your brain, it can be said to exist in the real world, of course.)

Most of the mental activity that we perform does not involve actual 'things', but actions about actions. That is what planning and daydreaming are all about. That it all occurs in our mind is a trivial issue -- of course it does.

The bottom line is that we perform actions on actions all the time. I don't see anything controversial about this at all. Yes, it all takes place within a physical space, but it is still all just action (movements of ions through ion channels changing neuronal potentials, etc.).

The controversial part is the claim that an action can exist independently of a physical thing and have non-locality.

 

[westprog]

It might seem obvious that neurons are carrying out summation, but as we've seen in previous failed attempts to assign mathematical concepts a physical reality, either everything is doing computation or nothing is. The absence of a physical theory is the gaping hole in the computationalist viewpoint. Admittedly, the physicalists can do little more than point out the need of a physical theory, but that's a necessary first step which a sound theory will require.

 

[westprog]

Similar mathematical descriptions can apply to different physical qualities. For example, both the electromagnetic and gravitational forces are governed by the inverse square law. That doesn't imply interchangability. It's simply that the same maths is used in both cases. There's no "Inverseaquareness" that exists in both cases.

 

[westprog]

It's been suggested that if the universe, or some portion of it, could be perfectly simulated on the Planck scale, that the end result would be in some way "real". Leaving aside the almost certain impossibility of such a proceeding (many orders of magnitude more unlikely than the Chinese room) there's no reason to suppose that such a simulation would be any more "real" than any other simulation. It would simply have more detail. There's no magical point at which simulations spring into life. No matter how detailed or accurate the simulation of magnetism, you'll never get a magnet, in or out of the simulation world.

 

[Meed]

Really? I don't think it is at all inconsistent, but maybe we are talking about two different views and are not understanding one another?

The idea is that consciousness is an action that takes place within a particular body, a body being required for it to occur. That body can be a physical human body or a computer or a dog or other animal or alien species. That there is no magic involved is their main point.

It doesn't seem logically coherent to me to talk of an action that is "within" something, that something being "required for it to occur", yet has no location and is not defined as a change in the real world. Or am I misunderstanding?

Also, to say there is no magic involved appears rather meaningless. How do you define magic? A connotation of the word for me is "does not really exist" or "impossible". If we look at the word that way, then it's trivially true to say there's no magic involved. OTOH, if we look at it as simply something that is not understood, known, or explained by physics, then it's trivially false to say there's no magic, since physics is incomplete.

 

[rocketdodger]

I don't know what you mean by "mathematically supportable".

That means it can be described in a formal way that science can make progress with. Can be mathematically described and proven. The usual way that intelligent people go about figuring things out.

What does "exhibit" mean here? Show?

Usual dictionary definition.

Conscious things show SRIP? How? Sometimes they show SRIP. Most of the time, no.

Naw they show it all the time, its kinda impossible not to.

I define a conscious thing as something which experiences consciousness. This is no more circular than the trivial and non-controversial claim that a happy person is someone who's experiencing happiness.

Who cares, it doesn't advance the issue in any useful direction so nobody cares.

Really? So consciousness can only happen when some kind of self-reference is going on? That is demonstrably false. I am conscious of all sorts of things that have nothing to do with self reference.

Not really. I am pretty sure that if you are conscious of X, you implicitly know whether X is you or not you.

If you want to bring up a counterexample, something that you can be conscious of without simultaneously understanding that said thing is you or not you, please be my guest.

Perhaps because conscious experience has nothing to do with mathematics? There is no equation for "Ouch, I stubbed my toe!".

No equation that you understand, yes I agree.

It confuses people because it is obviously wrong. Piggy has pointed out many times that much of what the brain does is unconscious, including SRIPs. And things like bacteria have SRIPs, yet to claim E coli is conscious reduces your position to an absurdity. Why would you think anyone would take that seriously?

More like why would I think anyone would actually read posts? I dunno, since obviously you are incapable of even that behavior.

Who's claiming something is beyond basic consciousness? Consciousness includes sofia, subjective experiences, emotions, etc. These don't go "beyond" basic consciousness. They are consciousness. Putting a qualifier like "basic" in front of "conscious" just muddies the water. Something either has conscious experience or it doesn't.

So dogs are not conscious? Nor babies? Or mentally disabled people? Where do you draw the line? Are only normal healthy humans conscious? Sorry I didn't know that was your position on the issue.

Under materialism, a thermostat/bacteria/toaster is not conscious because it has no mechanism that can produce consciousness that is remotely close to the complexity of the human brain.

Congratulations on failing at the simple task of just reading a post.

Did you not notice the irony that you're trying to account for the "myriad aspects of consciousness" with a single definition? I think intuitively, you know that SRIP is not a sufficient account of consciousness. If it were, you wouldn't be tying yourself in knots with "SRIP is consciousness" and "consciousness is a form of SRIP" and "thermostats do/don't have SRIPs".

Congratulations on failing at the simple task of just reading a post.