Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Piggy]

If you disagree with the Church-Turing thesis, you are free to find the error in the proof.

Otherwise you're stuck with the consequences. You may find them counter-intuituve, but that just means you need to upgrade your intuition. And for that I recommend Godel, Escher, Bach.

I am not arguing from intuition. I am arguing from biology, which includes the study of the only object in the universe which we know produces conscious experience.

Others here have made direct objections to your interpretation of Church-Turing, yet I don't see that you have addressed them in any way.

I have pointed out many red flags in your logic, as well.

And fwiw, I would recommend that you put down GEB and pick up some Gazzaniga.

 

[Piggy]

Not to pick a fight or anything, but can you cite the proof you have in mind?

You might want to ask him to summarize it rather than cite it, else you will merely receive a demand to read several hundred pages of text, or take a semester-long college seminar.

Not that it will do you any good, but still....

 

[PixyMisa]

Regardless of whether or not I read GEB (and your insistence is getting more than a little tiresome) you are on record as denying that you have a sense of felt individual awareness. You've said so many times.

Really? Then I'm sure you'll have no trouble referring me to one of the many times I said that.

While you're at it, you can refer me to one of the many times I said that thermostats are conscious.

Consider the experiments demonstrating the "signature" of conscious awareness, consisting of the simultaneous action of 4 brain-wide waves.

The same way your computer works by 2GHz electromagnetic interference, yes.

 

[PixyMisa]

I am not arguing from intuition. I am arguing from biology, which includes the study of the only object in the universe which we know produces conscious experience.

How is biology immune from mathematics, exactly?

Others here have made direct objections to your interpretation of Church-Turing, yet I don't see that you have addressed them in any way.

There have been plenty of objections. There have been no coherent objections. I see no particular need to address incoherent objections.

I have pointed out many red flags in your logic, as well.

No, Piggy, no you haven't. I know you really believe this, but that's precisely why you need to stop posting here and read the book.

 

[PixyMisa]

You might want to ask him to summarize it rather than cite it, else you will merely receive a demand to read several hundred pages of text, or take a semester-long college seminar.

A good place to start would be with a related but simpler proof - the Halting Problem.

Naturally, the Halting Problem is discussed in detail in Godel, Escher, Bach, the book you refuse to even look at, along with Godel's Incompleteness Theorems and the Church-Turing Thesis itself.

 

[Robin]

Well, which one? It's really a whole series of proofs, starting with the proof of the equivalence of lambda calculus and general recursion as computationally equivalent, then the Turing machine, and then at least a dozen other mechanisms.

I am ok with the equivalence of lambda calculus and general recursion and TM's

I am OK with the proof that there is no halting algorithm

Is there a proof that formally demonstrates the C-T thesis, even if it references all these other proofs?

 

[Robin]

You might want to ask him to summarize it rather than cite it, else you will merely receive a demand to read several hundred pages of text, or take a semester-long college seminar.

Not that it will do you any good, but still....

Even if it is several hundred pages of text I would be interested to see it.

 

[Piggy]

Really? Then I'm sure you'll have no trouble referring me to one of the many times I said that.

Are you kidding? Heck, if you're willing to change your tune and say that you do have a sense of felt individual experience, then all I can say is, welcome aboard!

Time for bed. Replies to the rest in coming days.

 

[rocketdodger]

What makes you think that a deer is conscious while an ant is not?

Please be specific.

The reason I want you to be specfic is that in doing so you will arrive at something resembling an actual definition, which hasn't been done thus far.

Then again, another implication is that since if you can describe why you think a deer can be conscious while an ant cannot you necessarily define consciousness, and you can't define consciousness, then you won't be able to describe why a deer can be conscious and an ant cannot.

But in that case, you shouldn't think that a deer can be conscious while an ant cannot.

Either one has an explanation for what they "think," or one is a pre-schooler. There really isn't any other option -- only uneducated young children respond to questions by shrugging their shoulder and muttering "i dunno ... "

 

[rocketdodger]

I am ok with the equivalence of lambda calculus and general recursion and TM's

I am OK with the proof that there is no halting algorithm

Is there a proof that formally demonstrates the C-T thesis, even if it references all these other proofs?

As far as I know there is no formal proof, that is why it is still called a thesis.

Also, as far as I know, everyone accepts it as being true. Even crazy people like Penrose.

 

[Robin]

As far as I know there is no formal proof, that is why it is still called a thesis.

Also, as far as I know, everyone accepts it as being true. Even crazy people like Penrose.

But the claim is that it has been proven.

 

[PixyMisa]

I am ok with the equivalence of lambda calculus and general recursion and TM's

I am OK with the proof that there is no halting algorithm

Is there a proof that formally demonstrates the C-T thesis, even if it references all these other proofs?

Ah, good question. No, there is no formal proof that all possible computational models are equivalent. (At least, as far as I know; if there is such a proof it would have to be pretty recent.)

What is proven is that every computational model that has been formulated to date is equivalent, i.e. we have been unable to even conjecture a computational model that is both well-defined and of greater power than the UTM.

 

[PixyMisa]

Are you kidding? Heck, if you're willing to change your tune and say that you do have a sense of felt individual experience, then all I can say is, welcome aboard!

No, Piggy, I'm asking for you to quote me ever saying otherwise.

As I've said, you don't understand the argument, and the best thing for you to do is read Godel, Escher, Bach. It covers all the groundwork you need in an accessible and entertaining fashion. Yes, it's 800 pages long. It needs to be 800 pages long.

 

[Meed]

[...] the Church-Turing thesis establishes that it is impossible for the brain to do something that cannot be done by a computer.

No it doesn't.

 

[my_wan]

Depends on what the actual mechanism turns out to be, of course.

So long as the mechanism being slowed fully contains the mechanism of consciousness, it makes no difference. Consciousness is maintained.

Are you kidding? Heck, if you're willing to change your tune and say that you do have a sense of felt individual experience, then all I can say is, welcome aboard!

Time for bed. Replies to the rest in coming days.

I want a reference to such a claim, even one, myself before I'll accept such a characterization of claims. Here's why:

I'm pretty sure I see the issue. I've searched for instances of said claims pretty thoroughly, not that I can't have missed something, and all I see is instances of functional consciousness model parts (toy models) in which it is rightly denied by others that the parts alone are conscious. Which was never really the point, nor claimed, any more than a transistor is a functional computer.

Yet by denying the point that was made, and operating on the notion that said part models in themselves fully defined consciousness, it's now falsely claimed that the falsely perceived consequences of such claims are the actual claims of the author. The actual claim was more like holding the operational principles of a transistor up and talking about what a computer could do, only to have people accuse you of calling a transistor a computer with internet access.

Consider the above issue with the rate in which a conscious mechanism operates effecting the capacity of that mechanism for consciousness. The claim was not that the example principle itself had the full complexity and interactions necessary to produce consciousness. But if it did, the rate at which it took place has no relevance, and it would be conscious at any rate of operation, period. I used General Relativity to demonstrate we are subject to the same rate variances without losing consciousness. The only "dependence" as indicated in the response is that the rate variance applies to the whole mechanism of consciousness rather than some subset of that mechanism.

If consciousness is built from from a set of self syncing metronomes, and you changed the base resonance rate of some subset of those metronomes, it obviously breaks its operation. But if you changed that rate uniformly for all the metronomes it has no effect on the operation, only the rate at which it can think.

Now I am seeing false notions of one claim, falsely calling the supposed consequences of a misunderstanding the claim itself, mixed with false notions of another claim, in which the misperceived consequences are called the claim, as if a misperceived claim can be used to refute an effectively unrelated misperceived claim.

Claims of what has been claimed are disqualified without reference to that claim, and I think I've done my due search diligence to require that.

 

[Meed]

[Psychology studies behaviour (the outward reactions of the whole body), not the brain. ]

It's a good enough description for many psychologists. Only the psychologists who claim to study what is going on "in the mind" might disagree, and those tend be woo.

Most psychologists are not behaviorists, nor are they woo. Behaviorism had its day -- the cognitive school has taken over.

 

[PixyMisa]

No it doesn't.

Effectively it does, but that sentence conflates two different points (though I've gone into both separately and together previously).

First, all conjectured forms of computation are of equivalent power - that's what the Church-Turing thesis proves. (More precisely, it's a collection of proofs establishing that no well-defined model of computation conjectured to date is more powerful than a UTM.)

Second, all physical systems are simulable. This means that even without knowing how the brain works at a high level, we can simulate it at a low level and come up with the same result anyway.

 

[Meed]

It appears the breadth of empirical science you are making presumptions from is intensely limited. In fact we have a far better gauge than any "behavioral criteria" can ever dream of conceiving.

Almost all human cognitive empirical work involves behavioral criteria. We make inferences about mind/brain functionality by observing behavior under controlled conditions.

We can watch your thoughts

We can't do this

and know which predefined choices you are going to make before you do.

I think I know which study you're referring to. It's not very impressive in my opinion. Certainly far less than some people make it out to be in free will discussions and such.

It's even making its way into the gaming market. Buy yourself a brain wave game controller for $99.99.

It's not a whole lot more impressive than a pulse game controller or a blood pressure game controller would be, really. More fun, yes. I think they're cool actually, just not very impressive from a cognitive science perspective.

Its primary limitation is signal quality issues without implanted sensors inside the brain. "Behavioral criteria" makes it sound like we're stuck in the 1940s.

The main difference between strict behaviorism and today's cognitive science is that behaviorists would say you cannot make conclusions about the brain/mind based on behavioral criteria, whereas now that is not generally the case. Both still are primarily based on observing behavior (including things like self reports).

We know exactly what do do to your brain so everything is normal, except that you will not recognize your mother while looking at her.

I'm pretty sure this is not accurate.

If you want to hang onto the notion that consciousness is some kind of whole body phenomena, base it on something more than 1940s style "behavioral criteria".

I'm inclined to agree it's not a "whole body phenomena" although a lot of that dispute may come down to semantics.

 

[Earthborn]

When you are asleep and not dreaming, it is not happening. When you wake up, it engages.

That still does not explain what you mean.

Daemons are like subprograms, or routines.

The nervous system does not run "programs" or "routines", as it is not a digital computer.

One of the best examples of how they operate is the cocktail party effect: You're having a conversation with someone in a noisy room, and suddenly you realize that you just heard someone say your name.

I don't think that is an "unconscious gatekeeper daemon". I think that is just something that happens to occur near the limits of good old consciousness.

That's because my gatekeeper daemons have learned that a 14 pound animal walking on my body in the night is not sufficient reason to disturb my sleep.

Or maybe it is just you having consciously decided not to wake up when a cat is walking on your body. Or perhaps even more prosaic, your cats having consciously decided to be careful not to wake you up.

Oh, I am absolutely not assuming this. It has been experimentally verified many times over.

Give an example of such an experiment.

Of course it is. It's extremely specific. All you have to do to falsify it is to show a single incidence of bodily trauma which has no effect on the brain which nevertheless affects consciousness.

With the brain extending its grubby little tentacles all over the body, it is practically impossible to do anything to the body that does not affect the brain in some way. Also, consciousness can't be measured directly -- you have to ask a person about it -- so this test can only measure effects on consciousness that reach the parts of the brain that allow a person to formulate a change in their consciousness.

Consider the case of Marvin, who lost awareness of his emotional states.

Specific examples require links.

Consider the experiments demonstrating the "signature" of conscious awareness, consisting of the simultaneous action of 4 brain-wide waves.

Has someone tried to measure these "4 brain-wide waves" in ants? What were the results? Do these waves define consciousness?

 

[my_wan]

Dan Dennett pointed out a correlation between something Lee Siegel said about magic and the way we perceive consciousness. As Lee Siegel pointed out, when people speak of "real magic" they are talking about magic that is not real. But not real magic refers to magic that is real, conjuring tricks that can actually be done. Likewise, as Dennett pointed out, if you explain consciousness as a bag of tricks peoples reaction is that it's not real consciousness, consciousness is not a bag of tricks. Dennett's point was to convince people that consciousness really is just a bag of tricks. Many of the objections here almost appear as if it's a denial that trick X can be conscious. Well OK, true, consciousness consist of the whole bag of tricks. Not just the one under discussion. What can't be supported by the evidence is the notion that this whole bag of tricks can't be conscious, just because it consist of a bag of tricks. Not real magic is the real magic.

Then when PixyMisa points to a trick in the bag, trying to show how the trick quality generalizes to the whole bag, he gets accused of calling that singular trick actually conscious. That is, from the evidence of all the post I've read, what the claims of what PixyMisa claimed is based on. Such claims of what PixyMisa has claimed, from all I've been able to find, appear totally misguided and outright false. I'm still waiting on a reference to demonstrate otherwise. Still unable to find it myself.