Personality and Copies

[rocketdodger]

And there is the crux of it, and the whole point of this thread.

It's based on the idea that consciousness is a computer program. Not analogous to, the very same thing. And that there is a total equivalence between instances of that computer program, such that running the same program twice is pointless - meaningless even.

And that personhood - in every respect - is simply the running of this computer program. The physical world simply doesn't matter to someone's personhood. If there's a single instance of the same configuration in the brain, then that is all that's required, and having a second copy is as meaningless as running two identical copies of FreeCell with the same moves. The two people at either end of the transporter aren't different people with the same mind, they are the same person, because a person is solely the configuration of his mind.

If you think that all of the above is true, then you will be quite happy to be disintegrated. If you think that it involves a huge amount of guesswork and assumptions, then you will probably not wish to be disintegrated.

Why can't you be this well spoken all the time?

I find nothing I disagree with in the above post, good job sir.

 

[marplots]

I just did an experiment.

I tried to hang on to the current me. I couldn't do it. New thoughts arose, unbidden; new ideas formed.

I miss old me. Old me doesn't miss anything at all, but I miss him. I miss him a bit less than 'first thing this morning' me. Because 'first thing this morning me' was full of energy and a zest for life. This new me is a bit tired and blue.

I hope tomorrow me is a better person than now me. Now me is resisting going to bed and becoming history. Now me thinks he is the best and the brightest, most modern version of me. He is right. I wish he didn't have to fade away...

Hey! Surprise! There's an even newer me here now. I don't regret the passing of that me up above. He was too full of hubris. This me is wiser by far. In fact, I think I'll hang on to this me for the rest of my life...

 

[marplots]

Um, just reporting in. Newest me here. I have to say those two/three made all that stuff up. I'm just me. Honest.

 

[SOdhner]

Simply there being brain processes does not equal that of conscious processes (or consciousness). We can actually begin to study how these processes differ. Here’s one interesting study:

Okay, if I'm reading that right it is saying that even in deep sleep the individual parts of the brain are working, however they aren't always talking to each other and so that consensus opinion that we typically think of as the consciousness isn't there. That's an interesting clarification, and absolutely relevant to my image of the self. Without taking the time right now to do any further research (just not an option at the moment sadly) I'll concede that this is a greater difference than I was picturing.

That being said, I do still feel that there is value to the continuity in the parts; that while it is admittedly a drastic change in terms of the whole the fact that the fragments persist makes a difference in my mind between me and a copy or between me and the me that might be after a total and complete loss of brain function and subsequent repair.

And there is the crux of it, and the whole point of this thread.

[ ... ]

If you think that all of the above is true, then you will be quite happy to be disintegrated. If you think that it involves a huge amount of guesswork and assumptions, then you will probably not wish to be disintegrated.

Right. For me it all comes back to the idea of the disintegration being optional - if I can make a copy AND still be here and the original would then be thought of as independent from the copy... then destroying the original is destroying a distinct person. Therefore, even if the teleporter destroys the original I make that distinction.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Right. For me it all comes back to the idea of the disintegration being optional - if I can make a copy AND still be here and the original would then be thought of as independent from the copy... then destroying the original is destroying a distinct person. Therefore, even if the teleporter destroys the original I make that distinction.

Ah, I had always imagined being destroyed before the copy was made in this thought experiment. I'm not very comfortable with being destroyed after the copy is already made.

 

[Third Eye Open]

I just did an experiment.

I tried to hang on to the current me. I couldn't do it. New thoughts arose, unbidden; new ideas formed.

I miss old me. Old me doesn't miss anything at all, but I miss him. I miss him a bit less than 'first thing this morning' me. Because 'first thing this morning me' was full of energy and a zest for life. This new me is a bit tired and blue.

I hope tomorrow me is a better person than now me. Now me is resisting going to bed and becoming history. Now me thinks he is the best and the brightest, most modern version of me. He is right. I wish he didn't have to fade away...

Hey! Surprise! There's an even newer me here now. I don't regret the passing of that me up above. He was too full of hubris. This me is wiser by far. In fact, I think I'll hang on to this me for the rest of my life...

Great point, and why (though we haven't gone into it here) I'm comfortable with the copy not even being an exact one.
I change all the time, I forget things all the time, without even being aware of it, so even if the copy didn't have ALL my memories that would be fine. My opinions and moods can change also. Some brain injuries can cause huge personality changes, are those people dead, and a new person replaced them?

If you suddenly lost a week's worth of memories, would 'you still be you'? That version of you that did all those things for that whole week, had all those thoughts ideas and opinions about things, would be gone.

 

[Ferguson]

I don't understand this difference.

I don't see how 'growing clones' relates to this thought experiment. And if all the clones are conscious, then after the instant the become conscious, they are different than each other, because they have had different experiences than each other.

And the moment my duplicate steps out of the teleporter, he has had different experiences than me.

I don't believe in a soul.

But you believe in a "selfness" that can change bodies and locations. We have a word for that, it's "soul." But there isn't any evidence they exist.

How about this: Using some kind of 'stasis' machine, every particle in your body is frozen in place, nothing is moving, no messages are sent between neurons, nothing. Then, a day later, you are unfrozen, and your body continues working as if from the moment it was stopped. Are you still 'you' in this case?

Why would I have a problem with that? So long as you don't kill me (read: destroy my brain), I'm still there, just in stasis, and when you "unfreeze" me, I (read: "my brain") is still there.

 

[Ferguson]

Ah, I had always imagined being destroyed before the copy was made in this thought experiment. I'm not very comfortable with being destroyed after the copy is already made.

Yet it makes no difference to the copy. Whether you die or not thousands (or billions) of miles away will have no effect on him or his consciousness.

 

[Ferguson]

I don't really know enough about computer programs or how brains work to say that consciousness is like a computer program. And I don't think I even need to make that assumption. All you need to assume is that your consciousness is caused by your brain, and that there is not some 'essence of you' that goes away if your consciousness stops; that you ARE your consciousness, and if it comes back, YOU are back.

But you are the consciousness generated by your brain. When your brain is vaporized, it will never run again. A machine creating a copy of your brain in a distant place will begin running and generating a consciousness, which will behave like you since it is based on you, but it won't be "you." You will be dead.
To me the 'essence of you' is only being assumed by those positing that the 'essence of you' will magically relocate to a new body in a distant place.
I don't believe in an 'essence of me.' I accept myself as being my brain. Destroy my brain and you destroy me. Creating 1 or 10,000 copies won't bring me back.

 

[Ferguson]

And there is the crux of it, and the whole point of this thread.

It's based on the idea that consciousness is a computer program. Not analogous to, the very same thing. And that there is a total equivalence between instances of that computer program, such that running the same program twice is pointless - meaningless even.

And that personhood - in every respect - is simply the running of this computer program. The physical world simply doesn't matter to someone's personhood. If there's a single instance of the same configuration in the brain, then that is all that's required, and having a second copy is as meaningless as running two identical copies of FreeCell with the same moves. The two people at either end of the transporter aren't different people with the same mind, they are the same person, because a person is solely the configuration of his mind.

If you think that all of the above is true, then you will be quite happy to be disintegrated. If you think that it involves a huge amount of guesswork and assumptions, then you will probably not wish to be disintegrated.

If computer programs were self-aware living things, I think they would object to being stopped, even if there were 1,000 other Freecells "just like them" out there in the world.

 

[ThermionicScott]

If computer programs were self-aware living things, I think they would object to being stopped, even if there were 1,000 other Freecells "just like them" out there in the world.

I dunno, have you seen Solitaire lately? He just whizzes through the last part like he's tired of living anymore...

- Scott

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

But you are the consciousness generated by your brain. When your brain is vaporized, it will never run again. A machine creating a copy of your brain in a distant place will begin running and generating a consciousness, which will behave like you since it is based on you, but it won't be "you." You will be dead.
To me the 'essence of you' is only being assumed by those positing that the 'essence of you' will magically relocate to a new body in a distant place.
I don't believe in an 'essence of me.' I accept myself as being my brain. Destroy my brain and you destroy me. Creating 1 or 10,000 copies won't bring me back.

Could you please clarify the bolded part, so that I’m sure it’s not just a linguistic confusion: How can YOU be the consciousness generated by YOUR brain (before consciousness has created you to begin with)?

On another note: How can there be an owner of a brain in any other way than merely as an abstraction (or as a notion, a though)?

It is true that we generally talk like this, but in the transporter scenario we should perhaps be as clear as possible … Especially if the gist of an argument against using the transporter resides in a sentiment where the destruction of a particular brain results in a loss which cannot be recreated by a physical system that operates in an identical way. What is it about a particular brain that cannot be recreated in an identical one? Is it simply the abstract notion of ownership (my brain) that is lost? If so, how is that physically relevant?

 

[Third Eye Open]

I don't believe in an 'essence of me.' I accept myself as being my brain. Destroy my brain and you destroy me. Creating 1 or 10,000 copies won't bring me back.

I don't believe in an 'essence of me'. I accept myself as being a physical property of my brain. Destroy my brain and you destroy me. Recreate my brain, and the physical properties that make me, and you recreate me.

The only way this would not be the case is if there is some special unknown property in each specific brain that makes it unable to be replicated ever by any means.

 

[Third Eye Open]

And the moment my duplicate steps out of the teleporter, he has had different experiences than me.

And you have different experiences than 'you' of ten minutes ago.

Why would I have a problem with that? So long as you don't kill me (read: destroy my brain), I'm still there, just in stasis, and when you "unfreeze" me, I (read: "my brain") is still there.

I see, so you don't see your self as your awareness, but as the actual specific atoms that make up your brain? What if, while you were in stasis, I replaced the atoms in your brain, one by one, with different atoms?

 

[Ferguson]

Could you please clarify the bolded part, so that I’m sure it’s not just a linguistic confusion: How can YOU be the consciousness generated by YOUR brain (before consciousness has created you to begin with)?

I was just trying to talk in the language of the teleporter-reincarnation-proponents, who propose a "youness" that will manifest itself in any body made of identical shape. As far as I can see, you (the thinking, self-aware 'you') _are_ a brain -- the electrical processes produce a consciousness, that is why destroying that brain will destroy you. Creating a copy of that brain will create a copy of those electrical processes, resulting in someone who acts like you. But you, as in the stream of awareness reading this, will be gone. A new stream of awareness will begin with your memories, in the copy.

On another note: How can there be an owner of a brain in any other way than merely as an abstraction (or as a notion, a though)?

It is true that we generally talk like this, but in the transporter scenario we should perhaps be as clear as possible … Especially if the gist of an argument against using the transporter resides in a sentiment where the destruction of a particular brain results in a loss which cannot be recreated by a physical system that operates in an identical way. What is it about a particular brain that cannot be recreated in an identical one? Is it simply the abstract notion of ownership (my brain) that is lost? If so, how is that physically relevant?

It can be recreated as an identical copy to the satisfaction of all third parties, but it is still a recreation. If I had a machine that could make an identical copy of you, and you let it scan you, then sit there waiting for a moment and then watch as an identical copy of you walks out of the machine, would you now feel perfectly fine committing suicide, seeing as there is another person "identical to" you?

People seem to be conflating "same" with "selfsame" here. You are your brain, if your brain is destroyed, it's destroyed. If another copy is made, a copy is made, but you aren't in control of that copy.

I don't believe in an 'essence of me'. I accept myself as being a physical property of my brain. Destroy my brain and you destroy me. Recreate my brain, and the physical properties that make me, and you recreate me.

The only way this would not be the case is if there is some special unknown property in each specific brain that makes it unable to be replicated ever by any means.

Destroy my brain and you destroy me. Create a copy of my brain, and a copy will exist. Create 10,000 copies of my brain, and 10,000 copies exist. So what? I was vaporized in the machine. The brain that got in the teleporter is gone, and 10,000 new ones were "born." That those 10,000 new ones are based on me will have no effect on my death.

And you have different experiences than 'you' of ten minutes ago.

But I wasn't vaporized, and a new copy built from scratch, ten minutes ago.

I see, so you don't see your self as your awareness, but as the actual specific atoms that make up your brain? What if, while you were in stasis, I replaced the atoms in your brain, one by one, with different atoms?

My awareness is the electrical signals between those atoms, ions being transmitted by neurons, etc., so if you can replace the physical atoms while somehow maintaining all of the electrical signals and ions that were in transit, go ahead I won't notice. Otherwise, no, I'm toast.


Two clones of me are "the same" from any outside perspective, but to each of them they are "me," and not the other. Neither wants to die, and neither do I. Selfish, I know.

 

[Nick227]

But you, as in the stream of awareness reading this, will be gone. A new stream of awareness will begin with your memories, in the copy.

"You" are not a stream of awareness. There is awareness. But it is not experienced by anyone, in strict scientific terms. It is simply that the mind constructs, through thinking, the notion of there being an "experiencer." The experiencer doesn't actually exist, at least not as far as anyone has ever been able to detect, or find any objective evidence for its existence.

Thus, this "you" is actually just another aspect of consciousness, and one that will be identically replicated when the body is replicated.

OMG, it's Transporter heaven here!

Nick

 

[marplots]

Just for fun, I replaced everyone posting in this thread with an identical copy. I'm sorry if that messed up anyone's schedule.

 

[Darat]

The fact that "The Fountainhead" still exists, even if I burned that book on my shelf, is pretty good evidence that a story is not just a book on my shelf.

The fact that you can -- and do, every night -- loose consciousness while your brain remains the same physical object is pretty good evidence that you are not just "your brain."

Your copy of "The Fountainhead" is unique. It has had experiences that have altered it so it is no longer an exact copy of the original so when you destroy the book you are losing all that information, printing out a new copy of the book does not recreate your old book. A book is more than just the story that it contains.

I totally agree that we are not just our brain, indeed on its own the brain is pretty crap at being me, but the "I" that I am is the product of all the changes that have happened to the meatbag that we call "I". I would go further and say that there is no black and white, no clear cut line to where I end and the "rest of the environment" starts, I am contiguous with the environment; to such an extent that the particles in the air that I use to precess the smell of toast cooking in my kitchen right at this moment links me directly to the toast, the toast in a real and meaningful manner is part of what we generally call "I".

So to duplicate me "truly" accurately you'd have to duplicate my environment and that isn't very practical. Now in practical terms is there a lesser fidelity by which you could create a new "I" either from a destructive scanning of this particular meatbag or one that creates a new meatbag and doesn't destroy the original meatbag that would for all extent and purposes be indistinguishable from "I"? My guess is that yes there is.

 

[SOdhner]

Just for fun, I replaced everyone posting in this thread with an identical copy. I'm sorry if that messed up anyone's schedule.

Well, see, the person whose schedule you messed up is now gone. You didn't mess up MY schedule because I didn't exist until you just recently made me. Still, I'll have to just pretend to be the original SOdhner because I don't want to worry about getting a new SSN or dealing with the fact that I might not legally be a person or might be legally less than a year old and therefore not allowed to drive for sixteen years.

Also, while I totally admit that by my own logic I owe nothing to the original I still feel an irrational need to avenge his death. Can you please provide me with your contact information and a list of any weaknesses you might have?

 

[marplots]

Hey, you should thank me. All your sins have been forgiven. After all, you didn't commit them!