Biology of free will

[Beth]

Can I ask why the random number generator makes much of difference here? It's just a different input that the program does not directly construct, much as many external stimuli would be. If some object with an RNG has free will does it completely disappear if one is removed?

You need randomness to remove determinism. If you have a deterministic system, there are no choices and there can be no free will.

I'm sure there are some specific philosophical terms here that I'm unaware of, but I keep coming back to thinking about these things at different levels. I'm sure it makes sense to describe one pattern of functioning of consciousness as "free will", just as much as it makes sense to describe one of the perceptions of our mind as "color". I don't care if you want to describe this as an "illusion" or a "construct".

Yes, I think the perception of free will is constructed from our experiences in the same sense as the perception of color.

But when you look down at the physical construction of the mind/brain, these terms do not play and there is no need to assume that perception of free will is built upon a non-deterministic process.

The assumption of free will versus determinism is not falsifiable. There is no need to assume either. It simply makes more sense to me to assume that the universal human perception of making choices is accurate than to assume it is not.

 

[Nick227]

No I can't explain how free will emerges. I can't explain how conscious emerges from that either. I can only say that humans univerally have the sensation of consciousness and free will. Why should I assume these universal perceptions are incorrect just because I don't understand how it works? Unless there is an alternative explanation for why we have these perceptions and why they should be considered 'illusions' rather than reality, I see no reason to assume they are incorrect.

But I have given you another explanation.

You said previously free will was an 'illusion' because there was no inner self which chooses. I agree there is no inner self which chooses, there is only the entire self which chooses. So why should the sensation of choice be considered an illusion?

I'm not saying that choice should be considered an illusion. I said to you very clearly that you absolutely have a choice. But this does not mean that free will exists in objective reality.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

It simply makes more sense to me to assume that the universal human perception of making choices is accurate than to assume it is not.

Who is assuming it is not? The issues with free will and determinism arise because we are coming to understand the brain more than ever. We are developing a good functional understanding of just how consciousness emerges, and just how self emerges. And in this understanding certain things that seemed to be true about consciousness and the self once upon a time are now revealed to be false. That's all.

It's the same as with the sun moving around the earth. We investigated and investigated and the evidence showed that, contrary to how it seems, actually the earth revolves around the sun.

Where's the deal?

Nick

 

[yy2bggggs]

It simply makes more sense to me to assume that the universal human perception of making choices is accurate than to assume it is not.

But the perception of making choices isn't a perception of indeterminism; rather, it is a perception of availability of options at a teleological level, combined with a perception of agency behind the choices, added with a perception of ownership of initiation of actions due to a sensation of the purpose of the action correlating to the selection and triggering of a motor program to carry them out, and possibly a few more things I've left off here.

None of these require indeterminism. They simply require mechanism.

 

[KingMerv00]

Yes, minds are composed of the 4 fundamental forces and matter just as boulders and everything else is. Yes, we don't understand how free will can arise from the particular combination and interaction of those 4 fundamental forces and matter. So? Just because we don't understand how doesn't mean we must either assume that supernatural forces are involved or that it is only an illusion that we have free will.

Chemical state A yields mind state B. B is just an expression of A like the numbers on a calculator. Yes, mind state B is part of the chain reaction that leads to chemical state C and thus mind state D but the chain reaction runs only through chemical means. Those chemical reactions follow the mindless laws of physics. Where does choice come in?

You've misunderstood. Let me try to make it more clear. The words "Biochemistry and neurology" are not an explanation of why we have the sensation of making choices if we are not actually making choices. They can explain how it occurs, but not why.

What makes you think there is a "why"?

 

[Beth]

But I have given you another explanation.

I’m not sure what you mean by this. What post did you provide that explanation in?

I'm not saying that choice should be considered an illusion. I said to you very clearly that you absolutely have a choice. But this does not mean that free will exists in objective reality. Nick

What do you mean by ‘objective reality’ and how are you defining free will if the ability to make choices does not imply that free will exists.

It simply makes more sense to me to assume that the universal human perception of making choices is accurate than to assume it is not.

Who is assuming it is not?

People who assume that our perception of making choices (i.e. free will) is an illusion and we could not have chosen differently than we actually did.

The issues with free will and determinism arise because we are coming to understand the brain more than ever. We are developing a good functional understanding of just how consciousness emerges, and just how self emerges. And in this understanding certain things that seemed to be true about consciousness and the self once upon a time are now revealed to be false. That's all.

I don’t agree with this. The issues with free will and determinism have been around for a long time, well before our current understanding developed. In addition, I would not characterize the current state of research as having a good functional understanding of how consciousness emerges.

It's the same as with the sun moving around the earth. We investigated and investigated and the evidence showed that, contrary to how it seems, actually the earth revolves around the sun.
Where's the deal?
Nick

The deal is that the explanation for the illusion that humans have free will is nowhere near as solid as the one for the illusion that the sun orbits the earth. It rests on the assumption of a determinism and the current evidence supporting QM establishes that determinism is not the case for our universe. The addition of randomness from QM is frequently discarded by posters on this forum as being unimportant for free will, but I disagree with that stance. The addition of randomness is what allows space for choices to be made and free will to emerge.

But the perception of making choices isn't a perception of indeterminism; rather, it is a perception of availability of options at a teleological level, combined with a perception of agency behind the choices, added with a perception of ownership of initiation of actions due to a sensation of the purpose of the action correlating to the selection and triggering of a motor program to carry them out, and possibly a few more things I've left off here.
None of these require indeterminism. They simply require mechanism.

I’m afraid I have to disagree. The perception of making choices inherently includes a perception that we could have chosen to act differently. If it didn’t, we wouldn’t perceive it as making a choice. Thus, the perception of making choices includes a perception of indeterminism.

You can argue that it’s an illusion that we could have acted differently, but that's an unfalsifiable assumption with no evidence to support it. Thus, it makes more sense to me to assume that the universal human perception of making choices is accurate and that we could have chosen differently than it does to assume it is not an accurate perception and that the outcome of every choice is predetermined/destined.

 

[Beth]

Chemical state A yields mind state B. B is just an expression of A like the numbers on a calculator. Yes, mind state B is part of the chain reaction that leads to chemical state C and thus mind state D but the chain reaction runs only through chemical means. Those chemical reactions follow the mindless laws of physics. Where does choice come in?

I'm not so sure as you are that Chemical state A will always yield mind state B and I don't agree that B is an expression of A like the numbers on a calculator. If I punch in 2 + 2 I will always get 4 from my calculator. Humans beings are not as consistent as that. We can respond differently to the same situation at different times. Why should I assume that we would respond the same way to the same situation if time could be rewound instead of moving on to the next occurrance?

What makes you think there is a "why"?

I note that you still have given no explanation for why we would have the sensation of making choices if we are not actually making choices. Why should the sensation of choice be considered an illusion?

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

I'm not so sure as you are that Chemical state A will always yield mind state B and I don't agree that B is an expression of A like the numbers on a calculator. If I punch in 2 + 2 I will always get 4 from my calculator. Humans beings are not as consistent as that. We can respond differently to the same situation at different times. Why should I assume that we would respond the same way to the same situation if time could be rewound instead of moving on to the next occurrance?

<snip>

With all the variables involved (e.g., the vast number of neurons and connections in the brain) I doubt we are ever in the same state twice. It is therefore not surprising we react differently to what on the surface seem to be identical situations. Think Chaos Theory.

 

[KingMerv00]

I'm not so sure as you are that Chemical state A will always yield mind state B and I don't agree that B is an expression of A like the numbers on a calculator. If I punch in 2 + 2 I will always get 4 from my calculator. Humans beings are not as consistent as that. We can respond differently to the same situation at different times.

Humans are never in the exact same situation twice. Millions of variables play on the brain at once: Do you feel hungry? Are you sleepy? What do you remember from your previous encounters? In what subtle ways has your brain changed its connections? Are you thinking about some other problem? Have you learned to trust/not trust the creator of the situation? What is your current emotional state? and on and on and on...

Why should I assume that we would respond the same way to the same situation if time could be rewound instead of moving on to the next occurrance?

Because that is the way the laws of the universe work. They plod on, mindless and forever the same. To claim the mind is different is to claim the mind breaks the laws of physics.

The only thing that might change on a time-rewind is the randomness thrown in by QM but that doesn't give you a choice, that just gives you a slightly different scenario than before (though the difference is probably too small to be perceived on a human scale).

I note that you still have given no explanation for why we would have the sensation of making choices if we are not actually making choices. Why should the sensation of choice be considered an illusion?

Because there is ONLY a "how". "Why?" is not a valid question.

 

[Beth]

With all the variables involved (e.g., the vast number of neurons and connections in the brain) I doubt we are ever in the same state twice. It is therefore not surprising we react differently to what on the surface seem to be identical situations. Think Chaos Theory.

Oh, I understand all that. What I’m trying to get across is that the belief that IF we could be in the same state twice it would lead to the same outcome is an assumption. There is no empirical evidence to support it for the reason you give here.

Humans are never in the exact same situation twice. Millions of variables play on the brain at once: Do you feel hungry? Are you sleepy? What do you remember from your previous encounters? In what subtle ways has your brain changed its connections? Are you thinking about some other problem? Have you learned to trust/not trust the creator of the situation? What is your current emotional state? and on and on and on...

Right. Which means that the belief that IF we could be in the same state twice it would lead to the same outcome is an assumption. There is no empirical evidence to support it due to exactly what you have described here. Your assumption that the outcome would be the same is an unfalsifiable belief.

Because that is the way the laws of the universe work. They plod on, mindless and forever the same. To claim the mind is different is to claim the mind breaks the laws of physics.

I’ve already mentioned that I disagree with this contention. I do not think that using the mind to make choices breaks the laws of physics anymore than a bird taking flight is breaking the law of gravity.

The only thing that might change on a time-rewind is the randomness thrown in by QM but that doesn't give you a choice, that just gives you a slightly different scenario than before (though the difference is probably too small to be perceived on a human scale).

Actually, it does. It allows for a different choice to be made. For example, if there is a 25% chance you will choose option A and a 75% chance you will choose option B, and which choice is made is actually dependent on a random input – such as QM could provide – then rewinding time means that the outcome of the choice could well be different. If the outcome is that one time you might pick chocolate, another strawberry, then we have a situation where a choice has been made but could have been made differently. No laws of physics are broken in this scenario. It’s not deterministic. Why wouldn’t this meet the definition of free will?

Please note that I am not claiming that this IS the case. I'm saying that it is possible that this is the case and therefore the existance of free will in humans would not require supernatural intervention abrogating the laws of physics.

Because there is ONLY a "how". "Why?" is not a valid question.

Again, I’m afraid I must disagree. We can ask and answer the question why we perceive the illusion that the sun circles the earth every day. If you can’t answer the question of why we perceive the illusion of choice and what is happening instead, then there I have no reason to assume that our perception of choice is an illusion.

 

[KingMerv00]

Right. Which means that the belief that IF we could be in the same state twice it would lead to the same outcome is an assumption. There is no empirical evidence to support it due to exactly what you have described here. Your assumption that the outcome would be the same is an unfalsifiable belief.

If we rewind the boulder and push it again in the exact same way, would it roll differently?

You would answer "No, it lacks a mind." I would respond, "A mind arises from the same laws of physics so it is subject to the same limitations of choice as the boulder. There is no reason at all to think a mind is a special process."

I’ve already mentioned that I disagree with this contention. I do not think that using the mind to make choices breaks the laws of physics anymore than a bird taking flight is breaking the law of gravity.

Yes, I know. I'm not trying to build a straw man, I'm only saying that the only logical way to get free will is to appeal to the supernatural. Your position is insufficient.

Actually, it does. It allows for a different choice to be made. For example, if there is a 25% chance you will choose option A and a 75% chance you will choose option B, and which choice is made is actually dependent on a random input – such as QM could provide – then rewinding time means that the outcome of the choice could well be different. If the outcome is that one time you might pick chocolate, another strawberry, then we have a situation where a choice has been made but could have been made differently.

How is random chance a choice? Consider the boulder again. Given the proper QM randomness, it might roll left instead of right. Given the proper QM randomness, you might choose chocolate instead of strawberry. Neither situation requires free will.

Again, I’m afraid I must disagree. We can ask and answer the question why we perceive the illusion that the sun circles the earth every day. If you can’t answer the question of why we perceive the illusion of choice and what is happening instead, then there I have no reason to assume that our perception of choice is an illusion.

You are just using "why" in place of "how". That's fine. That's a common usage of the word. You did say above that I answered "how" the illusion takes place above. In that sense, I have answered "why".

If you mean "why" in a way that implies intent, I do not think there is intent behind the illusion. There is only causation without intent.

 

[Beth]

If we rewind the boulder and push it again in the exact same way, would it roll differently?

Is the path exactly the same too? If so, then I think there is a very high probability that it would roll the same. I'm not 100% sure though.

You would answer "No, it lacks a mind." I would respond, "A mind arises from the same laws of physics so it is subject to the same limitations of choice as the boulder. There is no reason at all to think a mind is a special process."

The boulder is subject to the same limitations of choice as the mind, but the reverse is not true. The boulder has no ability to change it's direction. A human being does. That we have free will does not imply that we have no constraints on the choices we can make.

Yes, I know. I'm not trying to build a straw man, I'm only saying that the only logical way to get free will is to appeal to the supernatural. Your position is insufficient.

Why? A bird does not need to appeal to the supernatural in order to fly. Why does a human need to appeal to the supernatural in order to get free will? How are you defining free will such that the laws of physics do not allow it?

How is random chance a choice?

Random chance is not the choice. Random chance allows choice to occur by allowing the exact same situation to have different possible possible outcomes. In other words, your previous statement that

Chemical state A yields mind state B. B is just an expression of A like the numbers on a calculator.

may not be accurate.

Consider the boulder again. Given the proper QM randomness, it might roll left instead of right. Given the proper QM randomness, you might choose chocolate instead of strawberry. Neither situation requires free will.

The boulder cannot assign a probability of 25% to left and 75% to right. We have no reason to think that the boulder perceives it's path down the hill and changes itself in order to alter it's path. The human can and I think that qualifies as free will. What is missing in order for the ability to alter oneself and consciously change the path one takes through life to be considered 'free will'.

Please define what you mean by free will. As far as requiring it - I don't know that it's required. I simply know that it is perceived and see no reason to doubt the veracity of that perception.

You are just using "why" in place of "how". That's fine. That's a common usage of the word. You did say above that I answered "how" the illusion takes place above. In that sense, I have answered "why".

If you mean "why" in a way that implies intent, I do not think there is intent behind the illusion. There is only causation without intent.

No, I don't mean intent, but I do require a reason why before I will be convinced that I am wrong. Our perception of the sun going around the earth is incorrect. The reason we have that perception is that since we move with the earth, is appears to us that the earth is stationary and those things not on earth, such as the sun are moving. In fact, both are moving and the appearance of the sun moving around the earth is due to the earth revolving on it's axis. That provides an explanation of both what is actually happening and why our perception is not accurate.

So why do we have the perception of making choices if we aren't actually making choices? It costs energy for animals to make decisions. We devote a large portion of our mental resources to making choices. If we aren't actually making choices, why would we evolve to do so? It must confer some advantage. What is that advantage? Why is the perception not accurate?

It seems to me that there is a distinct advantage in being able to contemplate various possible outcomes and select the most desireable one. If that is the case, that implies that we could have selected otherwise. If we can't select otherwise, then what is the evolutionary advantage of spending the resources to create an illusion that we make choices and could have chosen differently?

Again, if you can’t answer the question of why we perceive the illusion of choice and what is happening instead, then there I have no reason to assume that our perception of choice is an illusion. It makes more sense to conclude that we actually are making choices and that we could have chosen differently.

 

[BowlOfRed]

Which means that the belief that IF we could be in the same state twice it would lead to the same outcome is an assumption. There is no empirical evidence to support it due to exactly what you have described here. Your assumption that the outcome would be the same is an unfalsifiable belief.

If we believe the brain (and the rest of the physical systems of the body) are what produces mind and thought, and we go with that assumption about all other physical systems and their behavior, why should we not make that assumption about the mind as well?

It sounds as if you are requiring direct evidence (such as a time machine) to make the assumption valid. In fact, I know of no contradictory evidence to the fact that physical systems proceed with no internal choice. Electronics, biological systems, industrial chemical plants all rely on this principle. It becomes more difficult to predict future states as the system becomes more complex but there seems to be no qualitative difference as the variables increase.

I’ve already mentioned that I disagree with this contention. I do not think that using the mind to make choices breaks the laws of physics anymore than a bird taking flight is breaking the law of gravity.

I agree. But making choices is not the concept that's difficult to follow. It's whether or not the system is constrained in the choices that can be made. We say that every physical (and chemical, biochemical, etc.) portion of the system is constrained. No choices can be made by the individual molecules or atoms, so the system proceeds in a linear fashion to a future state. If that physical state is all that is necessary for a particular mental state, then the mental state is similarly controlled.

Actually, it does. It allows for a different choice to be made. For example, if there is a 25% chance you will choose option A and a 75% chance you will choose option B, and which choice is made is actually dependent on a random input – such as QM could provide – then rewinding time means that the outcome of the choice could well be different. If the outcome is that one time you might pick chocolate, another strawberry, then we have a situation where a choice has been made but could have been made differently. No laws of physics are broken in this scenario. It’s not deterministic. Why wouldn’t this meet the definition of free will?

Because it's only randomness, it's not choice.

I can take a pachinko machine and hook up the launcher to a geiger counter. If I rewind time, I don't expect the end state to be identical due to random differences. But I don't think the pachinko machine had any "control" over those differences. Even though I can't pre-determine the final state due to the fluctuations, I can still say the system as a whole is completely constrained. There are no little imps inside that are shoving the balls around as they choose.

Please note that I am not claiming that this IS the case. I'm saying that it is possible that this is the case and therefore the existance of free will in humans would not require supernatural intervention abrogating the laws of physics.

I think you have to claim that one of these assumptions doesn't hold.

• The dynamics of the atoms and molecules that make up the brain and body follow specific rules that do not allow for choice.
• The concepts of mind and thought are an emergent property of the brain and its parts, and are encoded as physical elements (neurons, neuronal connections, ionic concentrations, hormones, etc.)
• Because the dynamics of the physical portions of the system are constrained to proceed from a starting point to a future point without "choice", the same must be said for any logical structure that is realized within that physical structure.

 

[BowlOfRed]

I agree. But making choices¹ is not the concept that's difficult to follow. It's whether or not the system is constrained in the choices¹ that can be made. We say that every physical (and chemical, biochemical, etc.) portion of the system is constrained. No choices² can be made by the individual molecules or atoms, so the system proceeds in a linear fashion to a future state. If that physical state is all that is necessary for a particular mental state, then the mental state is similarly controlled.

Gah. I wish I'd reread that before posting and picked different words.

choice[1] A "decision". Perhaps made by a person in picking an item from a list, or by an electronic or mechanical device by way of an algorithm. When looking at a menu, you will make a "choice" of what to order.

choice[2] An alternative. A bowling ball rolling down a lane or an acid reacting with a base have no "choice" in how the system proceeds over time.

 

[KingMerv00]

Beth, let's start over.

Suppose a human is presented a cheeseburger and is either going to eat it or not eat the it.

To me the brain receives the stimulus (photons, scent molecules) and through various chemical pathways starts and electrical calculation which ends in either "That cheeseburger is unhealthy, therefore I'm not eating it." or "I am hungry, therefore I will eat that cheeseburger". (Obviously, there are other conclusions and justifications but best to keep it simple.) Either conclusion results from the movement of atoms and electrons.

To say the mind impacts the outcome is to say that it can change the path of electrons and atoms. How does it do that?

 

[orange31]

Did somebody post a definition of "free will" that most here agree on? If so, I missed it.

Take a null hypothesis approach - whatever you conceive 'free will' to be, if you think we don't have it, then it should be fairly easy to predict a wide range of specific human behavior, multiple times, in everybody. We don't and we can't. If you think we can, why do political parties and the media bother taking polls? After all, the questions posed are pretty basic.

 

[BowlOfRed]

Did somebody post a definition of "free will" that most here agree on? If so, I missed it.

Take a null hypothesis approach - whatever you conceive 'free will' to be, if you think we don't have it, then it should be fairly easy to predict a wide range of specific human behavior, multiple times, in everybody. We don't and we can't. If you think we can, why do political parties and the media bother taking polls? After all, the questions posed are pretty basic.

Fairly easy?

We can't forecast the weather more than a few days out. The physical modeling of something the size of a human at an atomic or biochemical level (let alone being able to handle the different inputs over that time) must be so many orders of magnitude greater.

Predicting a slot machine output would be trivial by comparison, but even there I still don't know what the initial state is, and I don't know how it proceeds over time, and I don't know what all the inputs are.

I consider neither the change in the weather over time nor the output of a slot machine to be examples of something exhibiting free will, yet I would fail at trying to show this by predicting either one.

 

[KingMerv00]

Fairly easy?

We can't forecast the weather more than a few days out. The physical modeling of something the size of a human at an atomic or biochemical level (let alone being able to handle the different inputs over that time) must be so many orders of magnitude greater.

Predicting a slot machine output would be trivial by comparison, but even there I still don't know what the initial state is, and I don't know how it proceeds over time, and I don't know what all the inputs are.

I consider neither the change in the weather over time nor the output of a slot machine to be examples of something exhibiting free will, yet I would fail at trying to show this by predicting either one.

What he said.

 

[Beth]

If we believe the brain (and the rest of the physical systems of the body) are what produces mind and thought, and we go with that assumption about all other physical systems and their behavior, why should we not make that assumption about the mind as well?

I do make that assumption. It isn't in conflict with what I've been saying.

It sounds as if you are requiring direct evidence (such as a time machine) to make the assumption valid.

I'm speaking of the assumption that if you could rewind time and start again, you would get the same result. Do you know of some other approach that could validate this concept?

In fact, I know of no contradictory evidence to the fact that physical systems proceed with no internal choice.

This depends on which definition of choice you are using. if you mean definition 1 in post 114, I agree that there is no internal choice. On the other hand, if you are speaking of alternative outcomes (definition 2), then choice does exist for those physical systems.

You might find this paper of interest. http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~lewis/LewisMacGregor.pdf
It was referenced in a similar thread over in the R&P forum and it seems apropos to what we are discussing. For example, the authors state: “Indeterminism seems an inherent characteristic of at least some significant portion of brain activity.”

Electronics, biological systems, industrial chemical plants all rely on this principle. It becomes more difficult to predict future states as the system becomes more complex but there seems to be no qualitative difference as the variables increase.

Actually, I think these systems rely not on the deterministic principles but on the size of the systems being sufficiently large that the inherent noise of the system is negligible and can be ignored.

I agree. But making choices is not the concept that's difficult to follow. It's whether or not the system is constrained in the choices that can be made.

I don’t think there is any disagreement on this matter. At least for us humans, our possible choices are always constrained. The question is, are they constrained to only one possible path? Or are different outcomes possible given the same initial state?

We say that every physical (and chemical, biochemical, etc.) portion of the system is constrained. No choices can be made by the individual molecules or atoms, so the system proceeds in a linear fashion to a future state. If that physical state is all that is necessary for a particular mental state, then the mental state is similarly controlled.

The paper referenced above shows that this is not the case for the definition of choice you provided for this statement in the post below this one. The behavior of indivdidual molecules or atoms are not predictible. Only large groups of molecules and atoms can be considered to proceed in a linear fashion with only one possible outcome.

Because it's only randomness, it's not choice. I can take a pachinko machine and hook up the launcher to a geiger counter. If I rewind time, I don't expect the end state to be identical due to random differences. But I don't think the pachinko machine had any "control" over those differences. Even though I can't pre-determine the final state due to the fluctuations, I can still say the system as a whole is completely constrained. There are no little imps inside that are shoving the balls around as they choose.

I’m not saying that randomness is sufficient for free will, only that it is necessary. The example I gave was to show a mechanism whereby a brain making use of randomness could result in different outcomes from the same initial state. Free will also requires consciousness, a quality that pachinko machines lack.

I think you have to claim that one of these assumptions doesn't hold.

I would say that your first assumption doesn't hold (see above). The second is fine. The third is dependent upon the first, so it doesn't hold either.

 

[Beth]

Beth, let's start over.

I'm sorry, but I'm not willing to start over unless you are willing to provide a definition of choice or free will and explain why you feel it requires a supernatural suspension of the laws of physics. At this point, I feel we are just repeating ourselves.