Mind over Matter

[Dancing David]

Stating that the universe is deterministic neither suggests nor requires that prediction be possible or feasible.

Which gets back to the difference between the scientific meaning of causal/determined and the philosophical meaning.

 

[Dancing David]

Did somebody claim free will was a physical thing? I haven't been arguing that it exists in a physical sense.

Regardless of ontology, if you can not define free will as a set of behaviors obseved in visible operants than it is imaginary and does not exist except in the thoughts of operants.

There is no meta-space, there is no Kantian realm.

 

[Beth]

Well, no. The very point I'm trying to make is that removing determinism isn't enough to allow free will. To have free will, you'd have to have some unit, most likely a mind, that was independent of the universe around it, yet able to affect it.

Where does this idea of ‘independent of the universe around it’ come from? Free will is always being discussed in regard to humans. This condition excludes human beings from having free will as they not independent of the universe. It doesn’t make much sense to me and it doesn’t seem to have much relation to the compatiblist free will we been discussing in this thread.

I'm also making the point that the very concept of 'free will' is simply something that exists inside human minds. It's not even possible to define free will in materialistic terms.

Yes, well, the same can be said for all concepts: Justice, peace, tranquility, beauty, mathematics, philosophy, etc. Would you describe them all as imaginary, made up things? That argument can be made, but I think when multiple humans independently discover such concepts, it implies they have an objective albeit non-material reality that a daydream doesn't.

Yes, this is the cruncher. You believe there is some 'we' guiding the processes. I believe that 'we' are those processes. We do not guide them; they make us what we are.

I’m not sure what the point of disagreement is here. Yes, we are those processes. Yes, I believe we are able to exert some measure of control over them. I decide to move my fingers and type these words. My fingers are part of me and I can guide them. My thoughts are part of me and I can guide them (at least occasionally ). What is the conflict?

It's a philosophy thing. A personal experience of something is a poor reason to assume that something actually exists, and is in any way similar to the experience.

For a singular experience, yes, you’re correct. However, we’re not talking about a singular experience, but a consistent experience that appears to be nearly universal to all humans. At that point, it seems fairly reasonable to conclude that the thing exists unless there is a very solid reason to suppose that all humans are being deceived about the experience and a sound alternative explanation for what is causing the experience.

From my point of view, there's no reason to think there is a free will. And I don't really think I've ever had a sensory experience that suggested I could have done something differently - I can think about that, sure, but I can think about flying as well.

You are, I think, referring to the fact that whatever choice is made, it is not possible to determine whether you might have chosen differently if time could be rewound and then started again. We can never know whether or not the choices we make are the ones we were fated to make or if we could have chosen otherwise. Whatever you or I or anyone else chooses to believe regarding that situation, it is a matter of faith, not reason. I feel the evidence available indicates we can; you feel it indicates we cannot. Neither of us can claim certainty about our conclusion.

On the other hand, if I reason it out from a purely logical standpoint, it seems obvious that there is simply no room for free will in a materialistic universe. In such an universe, there exist only deterministic and random events. There is no 'me' that could affect these events; any 'me' is simply an arbitrary subset of these events.

I don’t think that any “me” is an arbitrary subset of those events. Each individual is a very specific subset of those events with a clear beginning (conception or birth, depending on your POV), a clear ending (death) and a unique set of events that connects the two.

It seems to me that if there is no room in a materialistic universe for free will, then is no room for things like numbers, justice, beauty, etc. either. My senses indicate otherwise but perhaps none of that actually exists and this life is nothing but a dream. If you take the stance that we can't the evidence of our subjective experiences, as you indicated above, then we don’t know that the materialistic universe is real either. Philosophical musing apart, we generally trust our senses and those of our companions unless there is some cause for doubt.

Perhaps it's wrong of me to say 'there is no free will'. Rather, I should say that the concept of 'free will' is meaningless. It cannot be defined without a contradiction.

What is the contradiction you perceive? Does is have to do with the ‘independent of the universe’ criteria? If so, I agree. Any definition that includes it would be self-contradictory. Do you perceive a contradiction with the working definition I gave earlier?

Well, if we were to say free will exists in the same sense a mind, a dance or a moral do, I'd have no problem with that. I consider them all human constructs, not real in the strictest sense, but useful, and usually more important than actual truth.

We are in agreement regarding the idea that free will is as real as a mind, a dance, or a moral. On the other hand, other animals dance, think and perhaps even have morals, so I'm not sure those are entirely human constructs.

Yes, now that you put it that way, that's precisely what I am saying. An ocean or a person is really just a chunk of the world we arbitrarily lined off as a unit and gave a name to. The lines don't exist physically, which, from a materialistic worldview, is synonymous to saying they don't exist, at all. I suppose what I'm getting to is that a human worldview is not a materialistic one, but composed of imaginary lines. This argument about free will rises when humans using their ordinary worldview meet other humans who also understand a materialistic worldview.

This is the problem I have with a materialistic worldview and why I tend to reject it. Saying that things like oceans, dances and free will don’t exist seems rather ludicrous to me, yet it is exactly the conclusion that a materialistic worldview leads one to. When the conclusion is ludicrous, one either must accept that however ludicrous it seems, it is true or you must reject the worldview that gives rise to those conclusions. That is as true of materialism as it is of Christianity.

Please don't take me for a fool. I'll admit I am getting fairly metaphysical here, but I have no intention of bringing in any mystical entities like a 'greater oneness'.

And yet, that seems an accurate label for what you have described: There is no 'me' that could affect these events; any 'me' is simply an arbitrary subset of these events . What is the difference between those worldviews? They seem to me just different ways of framing the same idea about the universe and our place within it.

Also, while I'm somewhat ashamed to admit it, it's not so much that I'm trying to get a point across, anymore. That was my original intention, but this discussion has actually made me rethink some of my views. Right now, I'm just trying to make sense of them. I realize it may make my text seem rather incoherent.

Rethinking your views is nothing to be ashamed of. It’s something to be proud of. I do it all the time. It’s why I visit this forum and participate in these discussions. I hope I’ve given you some good food for thought.

Well, I'm not so sure about that. The very idea of counting relies on the assumption that there can be more than one of the same thing. But that assumption has no counterpart in the physical world. If there was no observer, there wouldn't be two atoms; there would just be objects, separate from one another.

Huh? If there were no observers, atoms wouldn’t exist? I’m a bit confused by this. I thought that was the opposite of what the materialistic worldview would say. Doesn’t the materialist think that the universe would exist in pretty much the same way if there were no humans at all? What is the difference between the earth orbiting the sun and the collection of atoms that comprise the earth orbiting the sun? And why do you think counting requires more than one of the same thing?
At any rate, the way we determine whether something is objectively real in the materialistic sense is through consistent agreement with others. Our senses are imperfect, so we must rely on others to confirm that what we experience, they also experience. I may think I see a tree, feel it’s bark, eat it’s fruit, etc. But it could all be a hallucination. If you also see, feel and touch the same tree, the probability that it is a unique subjective experience gets much lower, as two people don’t generally experience the same hallucinations at the same time.
Mathematics is a purely mental construct, but it has the same property of consistency from one person to another. One plus one always equals two. Although the symbols we use to represent those concepts may vary, it’s as consistent from one person to another as anything made of molecules. For that reason, mathematics seems to me to have a rather strong claim on being both ‘objectively real’ and non-material.

Anyway, I'm starting to give myself a headache with all this metaphysical silliness. This has been an interesting conversation, and it has made me rethink some basic concepts, of which I'm glad. An unfortunate side-effect may have been making me appear rather insane. Thus, I think it might be a good idea to wrap this discussion up.

Oh heavens, you seem to me to be one of the most reasonable and rational posters in this subforum. I have enjoyed this conversation very much, but I understand your desire. Sometimes I just need time to absorb ideas and let them percolate through my head, both consciously and subconsciously. Hopefully, we can converse again in some other thread.

If you still want to ask about something I've posted, I'll be happy to reply. But I won't mind just agreeing to disagree, either.

No problem. I like to explore what assumptions about the world lead to the divergent opinions. There is no alternative but to agree to disagree about assumptions which have no definitive answer. We’ve uncovered a few of those, like whether or not subsequent events would play out exactly the same if you could rewind time and whether or not specific collections of events, such as those that define a dance, a person or an ocean, can be considered ‘objectively real’ is another.

 

[dlorde]

Stating that the universe is deterministic neither suggests nor requires that prediction be possible or feasible.

That was exactly my (long-winded) point. Even a computer universe with mathematically calculable determinism will be unpredictable if it has chaotic features.

 

[dlorde]

You are, I think, referring to the fact that whatever choice is made, it is not possible to determine whether you might have chosen differently if time could be rewound and then started again. We can never know whether or not the choices we make are the ones we were fated to make or if we could have chosen otherwise. Whatever you or I or anyone else chooses to believe regarding that situation, it is a matter of faith, not reason. I feel the evidence available indicates we can; you feel it indicates we cannot. Neither of us can claim certainty about our conclusion.

I think the point is that if time could be rewound and run forward again from a point before our choice, we would make the same choice again because the state of everything would be exactly as it was before - the physics, the chemistry, every thought, every emotion, nagging doubt, uncertainty, every external and internal influence. In fact, if something different happened (we made a different choice), we could confidently say that we had not rewound time to exactly the same point, because something must have been different at the start.

So although we feel that we have a choice and that we make a choice, determinism means that what we have is the perception of having and making a choice. If something was very slightly different (internally or externally) we might take a different action, but given that exact situation and state, the result of our deliberation is inevitable (assuming strict determinism).

However, this strict interpretation doesn't really matter to us as humans, because we are not aware of all the tiny influences on our decision-making processes, and so, for practical purposes, we can model it as a 'real choice' - and we tend to do that in terms of relatively gross differences in the starting situation, e.g. "if we hadn't been quite so tired, we'd have stayed up to watch the tennis, but we 'chose' not to..." or "even though we were tired, we were excited enough by the prospect of a good match that we 'chose' to stay up and watch it". These statements explicitly acknowledge that our 'choices' are dependent on our state and that of our environment when the decision is taken, and implicitly acknowledge that they would be different only if that state was different.

What matters socially is how the complex and unique knot of processes & data (experience) that makes each of us individuals, responds to the environment; and, in a gross way, we can learn to predict roughly how we and other individuals will respond by using our experience of our/their past responses to model our/their future responses. This modelling process is part of how we perceive our 'self' and the selves (personalities) of others.

 

[Beth]

I think the point is that if time could be rewound and run forward again from a point before our choice, we would make the same choice again because the state of everything would be exactly as it was before - the physics, the chemistry, every thought, every emotion, nagging doubt, uncertainty, every external and internal influence.

Yes, that was what I was trying to express.

In fact, if something different happened (we made a different choice), we could confidently say that we had not rewound time to exactly the same point, because something must have been different at the start.

I disagree. If random processes are involved (and it's a reasonable assumption that they are), then it's possible that a different choice might have been made. Of course, as I said before, neither of us can be certain of our conclusion.

So although we feel that we have a choice and that we make a choice, determinism means that what we have is the perception of having and making a choice. If something was very slightly different (internally or externally) we might take a different action, but given that exact situation and state, the result of our deliberation is inevitable (assuming strict determinism).

Yes, that is my interpretation of strict determinism. However, I think QM establishes that our universe is not strictly deterministic. I have no disagreement with the rest of your post.

 

[Maia]

I think the point is that if time could be rewound and run forward again from a point before our choice, we would make the same choice again because the state of everything would be exactly as it was before - the physics, the chemistry, every thought, every emotion, nagging doubt, uncertainty, every external and internal influence. In fact, if something different happened (we made a different choice), we could confidently say that we had not rewound time to exactly the same point, because something must have been different at the start.

So although we feel that we have a choice and that we make a choice, determinism means that what we have is the perception of having and making a choice. If something was very slightly different (internally or externally) we might take a different action, but given that exact situation and state, the result of our deliberation is inevitable (assuming strict determinism).

However, this strict interpretation doesn't really matter to us as humans, because we are not aware of all the tiny influences on our decision-making processes, and so, for practical purposes, we can model it as a 'real choice' - and we tend to do that in terms of relatively gross differences in the starting situation, e.g. "if we hadn't been quite so tired, we'd have stayed up to watch the tennis, but we 'chose' not to..." or "even though we were tired, we were excited enough by the prospect of a good match that we 'chose' to stay up and watch it". These statements explicitly acknowledge that our 'choices' are dependent on our state and that of our environment when the decision is taken, and implicitly acknowledge that they would be different only if that state was different.

What matters socially is how the complex and unique knot of processes & data (experience) that makes each of us individuals, responds to the environment; and, in a gross way, we can learn to predict roughly how we and other individuals will respond by using our experience of our/their past responses to model our/their future responses. This modelling process is part of how we perceive our 'self' and the selves (personalities) of others.

I'm sorry to say it, but I really think that the main appeal of this POV is that it provides emotional comfort because of its illusion of two things: predictability, and the view of individual human beings at the center of the universe. But neither is supported by actual facts, and it has nothing to do with QM silliness.

The paradox of determinism is that this philosophy is actually remarkably comforting and satisfying on an emotional level. All personal responsibility for our behaviors and choices can potentially be removed, and the universe becomes a paradoxically "friendly" place because randomness has disappeared from it on any macro level as regards human beings, providing a means of giving up control on some strange level where a belief in God used to be. It's as if we're trying to sneak in a number of concepts through the back door because they can't go in the front. Well, we might as well believe in religion if we're going to go there, because all of these qualities are the basis of Christianity, and every concept of determinism can be related to every related concept traced through the history of Christian theology, one by one.

 

[Complexity]

My understanding is that quantum mechanics is consistent with unpredictability, so that a rollback and replay of the universe would, most likely, result in a different universe.

This does not mean that the universe is not deterministic, merely that it is unpredictable at the quantum level.

At the macro level, the universe appears to be highly predictable, but it is not perfectly so (there is a non-zero probability that I'll find myself in Paris in the moment rather than near Minneapolis), and quantum fluctuations can have a macro influence (e.g. matter/energy distribution after inflation).

I think that the universe is deterministic, unpredictable, and nonsusceptible to influence by supernatural forces, which don't exist anyway.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

Stating that the universe is deterministic neither suggests nor requires that prediction be possible or feasible.

If you have perfect knowledge of a state of system and perfect knowledge of how processes work within the system doesn't that suggest that a subsequent state is determined by the prior state and the processes?
And doesn't that imply that prediction from one state to a subsequent state is possible in principle?

If the answers are no then what is deterministic about our universe?

(I do not think our universe is deterministic.)

 

[Complexity]

If you have perfect knowledge of a state of system and perfect knowledge of how processes work within the system doesn't that suggest that a subsequent state is determined by the prior state and the processes?
And doesn't that imply that prediction from one state to a subsequent state is possible in principle?

If the answers are no then what is deterministic about our universe?

(I do not think our universe is deterministic.)

Your premisses are incorrect, so your conclusion is meaningless.

Perfect knowledge of the universe is not achievable (consider the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle).

Quantum mechanics dictates that unpredictability is inherent in the universe - you can not predict what will happen 'next' at any level with certainty. This unpredictability is real and is not merely the result of insufficient or inexact information.

Your opinions on whether the universe is deterministic are uninformed.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

Your premisses are incorrect, so your conclusion is meaningless.

Okay, so you don't understand that questions are neither premises nor conclusions.

Perfect knowledge of the universe is not achievable (consider the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle).

And you don't get that a inquiry can be about hypothetical conditions.

Quantum mechanics dictates that unpredictability is inherent in the universe - you can not predict what will happen 'next' at any level with certainty. This unpredictability is real and is not merely the result of insufficient or inexact information.

Your opinions on whether the universe is deterministic are uninformed.

But can you inform me about what is deterministic about a universe that is inherently uncertain.

 

[Complexity]

Okay, so you don't understand that questions are neither premises nor conclusions.

Your question contained both.

And you don't get that a inquiry can be about hypothetical conditions.

It can, but the discussion that I was having wasn't about hypothetical conditions, it was about the universe. If you were having another discussion, that is your problem.

I only engage in discussions involving hypotheticals with friends on a narrow range of topics.

But can you inform me about what is deterministic about a universe that is inherently uncertain.

Things that happen are completely determined by what happened before except for the uncertainty that exists as a result of quantum mechanics. The universe is not influenced by non-physical (i.e. supernatural) 'things' such as gods or minds, for these things do not exist. In particular, quantum mechanics does not open up an opportunity for supernatural things to influence the (physical) universe, even if they did exist (which they do not).

 

[Dancing David]

If you have perfect knowledge of a state of system and perfect knowledge of how processes work within the system doesn't that suggest that a subsequent state is determined by the prior state and the processes?
And doesn't that imply that prediction from one state to a subsequent state is possible in principle?

No. If the processes are probabilistic, then they are causal and deterministic but not always predictable.
That is the difference between the scientific use of determinism and the philosophical use of determinism.

If the answers are no then what is deterministic about our universe?

In science it means that causal relationships may be determined.
But if the process is stochastic or probabilistic then it is a causal process that is not able to be predicted.

(I do not think our universe is deterministic.)

And then do you mean in terms of science, i.e. causal or philosophy, i.e. predetermined?

 

[Mirrorglass]

Well, I'll continue this a bit further, since it seems to me a lot of this is genuine communication bypass which seems like it could be solved.

Where does this idea of ‘independent of the universe around it’ come from? Free will is always being discussed in regard to humans. This condition excludes human beings from having free will as they not independent of the universe. It doesn’t make much sense to me and it doesn’t seem to have much relation to the compatiblist free will we been discussing in this thread.

The idea is that since there is no entity independent of the universe, any entity that appears to be making decisions is in fact only acting according to the physical laws of the universe and only appearing to make decisions.

I take it you understand the idea that if the universe was fully deterministic, then there could be no free will? To make an analogy, if the universe was a single, forkless path one could not stray from, there would never be a choice to be made between paths.

However, even if we add random elements, it doesn't add free will. To continue the analogy, imagine the path did have forks, but whenever you reach one, you have to flip a coin to decide which one you enter. This way, your destination is not predetermined, and if we rewound time, the result could be different - but you still never get to make a choice.

Yes, well, the same can be said for all concepts: Justice, peace, tranquility, beauty, mathematics, philosophy, etc. Would you describe them all as imaginary, made up things? That argument can be made, but I think when multiple humans independently discover such concepts, it implies they have an objective albeit non-material reality that a daydream doesn't.

Yes, they are imaginary. They do not exists outside human minds, no matter how many humans believe in them. If by 'objective' you mean they can be observed by several independent observers, then you are correct, at least with a loose definition of 'independent'. Justice can be observed, and so can Hansel and Gretel. But if you mean 'independent of the observer', then they most certainly have no objective reality.

I’m not sure what the point of disagreement is here. Yes, we are those processes. Yes, I believe we are able to exert some measure of control over them. I decide to move my fingers and type these words. My fingers are part of me and I can guide them. My thoughts are part of me and I can guide them (at least occasionally ). What is the conflict?

The problem is that no part of this process exerts control over it's own behaviour - for each part of you, it's processes are determined by prior events and random chance. There can be no free will because there can be no being that has free will.

Of course, that's in a materialistic universe. If we act in an universe based on human experience - where a 'human' is considered an objectively definable subset of reality - then free will can exist. But I maintain that this universe isn't strictly, objectively real.

For a singular experience, yes, you’re correct. However, we’re not talking about a singular experience, but a consistent experience that appears to be nearly universal to all humans. At that point, it seems fairly reasonable to conclude that the thing exists unless there is a very solid reason to suppose that all humans are being deceived about the experience and a sound alternative explanation for what is causing the experience.

That reasoning sounds kind of weak, as it could also be used to argue that gods, magic and monsters under the bed exist - and indeed often is. And, all of us non-free-willers believe that we have a sound alternative explanation for what is causing the experience and a solid reason to suppose that we are being deceived.

In my case, I believe the human ability to imagine having made alternative choices has led to the illusion that they indeed can. The idea is not without precedent; for example, several humans have, independent of each other, concluded that there must be a way for humans to learn to fly.

This idea may not be shared by all the others, but they certainly have their own reasoning.

You are, I think, referring to the fact that whatever choice is made, it is not possible to determine whether you might have chosen differently if time could be rewound and then started again. We can never know whether or not the choices we make are the ones we were fated to make or if we could have chosen otherwise. Whatever you or I or anyone else chooses to believe regarding that situation, it is a matter of faith, not reason. I feel the evidence available indicates we can; you feel it indicates we cannot. Neither of us can claim certainty about our conclusion.

That much is true. These are just approximations of the universe, and any part of the logic or the assumptions could be wrong.

But still, I maintain the view that if we assume that the universe is composed of only deterministic and random elements, 'free will' cannot be defined without contradiction unless we treat as an objective entity a subset of the universe that does not exist independent of observers.

I don’t think that any “me” is an arbitrary subset of those events. Each individual is a very specific subset of those events with a clear beginning (conception or birth, depending on your POV), a clear ending (death) and a unique set of events that connects the two.

But that's simplifying things too far. Are all bodily functions associated with the individual a part of him? What about his sensory experiences? What about the things causing those sensory experiences? How about his actions, and their effect on the environment? Is this post a part of me? What about your post that I'm reading?

The beginning and the end aren't simple, either. You yourself admitted that the 'beginning' of a human could be either at conception or at birth. Only those aren't the only options. It could also be at the point when the germline cells formed in the parents. Or the point when the human gains awareness. Or anywhere else, really.

What I'm saying is that there is no clear line between 'me' and 'not-me'. And even if we forced such a line somewhere, that line would not exist independent of observation.

It seems to me that if there is no room in a materialistic universe for free will, then is no room for things like numbers, justice, beauty, etc. either. My senses indicate otherwise but perhaps none of that actually exists and this life is nothing but a dream. If you take the stance that we can't the evidence of our subjective experiences, as you indicated above, then we don’t know that the materialistic universe is real either. Philosophical musing apart, we generally trust our senses and those of our companions unless there is some cause for doubt.

You are correct; there isn't room in a materialistic universe for numbers, justice or beauty. All of those things are imaginary concepts. They are quite necessary to us; our very intellect is built upon such abstractions. But they are approximations; they describe a part of the real, material world, but not with perfect accuracy. Some even describe things that have no counterpart in the material world - for example, justice.

The idea I'm promoting is that these things can be accepted as not being real, without them losing their value. And even more importantly, they can be shared by the majority of humans, giving them a measure of objectivity. But I also think that it's important to know there is a difference between the material world and the approximations.

I don't think this idea is the same as the 'life is but a dream'-cliché, but I suppose there is some similarity. However, I'm not suggesting that our senses give us false information - just that the information is vague.

What is the contradiction you perceive? Does is have to do with the ‘independent of the universe’ criteria? If so, I agree. Any definition that includes it would be self-contradictory. Do you perceive a contradiction with the working definition I gave earlier?

Well, upon thinking about it, I've come to the result that no contradiction is required if we accept the assumption that a 'human' is a clearly and objectively definable entity. This assumption isn't true in the materialistic sense, but is a fairly good approximation, and in wide use.

So, to restate my claim, it is not possible to define 'free will' without contradiction in a purely materialistic universe without objective subsets. Such subsets cannot be derived; they have to be assumed.

We are in agreement regarding the idea that free will is as real as a mind, a dance, or a moral. On the other hand, other animals dance, think and perhaps even have morals, so I'm not sure those are entirely human constructs.

Well, whether they are or not isn't really pivotal to the point. Even if animals share them, they are still observer-dependent.

This is the problem I have with a materialistic worldview and why I tend to reject it. Saying that things like oceans, dances and free will don’t exist seems rather ludicrous to me, yet it is exactly the conclusion that a materialistic worldview leads one to. When the conclusion is ludicrous, one either must accept that however ludicrous it seems, it is true or you must reject the worldview that gives rise to those conclusions. That is as true of materialism as it is of Christianity.

I think materialism makes sense, but it's necessary to add the caveat that we create concepts that don't exist in the strict sense, and treat them as if they did. That's why we can perceive things such as oceans, dances or free will, despite them not existing outside our minds. Basically, imaginary things exist, too, although in a different sense than material things. It is sometimes useful to be aware of that distinction, but it isn't necessary for living.

And yet, that seems an accurate label for what you have described: There is no 'me' that could affect these events; any 'me' is simply an arbitrary subset of these events . What is the difference between those worldviews? They seem to me just different ways of framing the same idea about the universe and our place within it.

Perhaps they sound similar. However, as I've said, I'm not bringing in a mystical entity - there's just the material universe, which we can observe, albeit with poor accuracy, concepts we've created to describe the universe, and concepts created for other purposes that have no counterpart in the material universe. 'The greater oneness' sounds rather religious, and that is not the aim of my idea.

Rethinking your views is nothing to be ashamed of. It’s something to be proud of. I do it all the time. It’s why I visit this forum and participate in these discussions. I hope I’ve given you some good food for thought.

Certainly. Having to defend my views tends to take me further in my musings than months of.. well, musing does.

Huh? If there were no observers, atoms wouldn’t exist? I’m a bit confused by this. I thought that was the opposite of what the materialistic worldview would say. Doesn’t the materialist think that the universe would exist in pretty much the same way if there were no humans at all? What is the difference between the earth orbiting the sun and the collection of atoms that comprise the earth orbiting the sun? And why do you think counting requires more than one of the same thing?

The things we call atoms would still exist, of course. But they wouldn't be atoms; they would just be parts of the universe. The difference is that without humans to observe the Earth, there would be no reason to consider it to be a separate collection of atoms from the Sun, or any other part of the universe.

As for the counting, well, how would you define counting if you weren't allowed to have more than one of any thing?

At any rate, the way we determine whether something is objectively real in the materialistic sense is through consistent agreement with others. Our senses are imperfect, so we must rely on others to confirm that what we experience, they also experience. I may think I see a tree, feel it’s bark, eat it’s fruit, etc. But it could all be a hallucination. If you also see, feel and touch the same tree, the probability that it is a unique subjective experience gets much lower, as two people don’t generally experience the same hallucinations at the same time.

Sure. But it seems to me you're saying with enough subjective experiences we can be fairly sure that what we've touched is a tree. However, I would say we can only ever know that it is (likely) something fairly similar to the concept of 'tree' that we have.

Mathematics is a purely mental construct, but it has the same property of consistency from one person to another. One plus one always equals two. Although the symbols we use to represent those concepts may vary, it’s as consistent from one person to another as anything made of molecules. For that reason, mathematics seems to me to have a rather strong claim on being both ‘objectively real’ and non-material.

Objectively real as in 'detectable by multiple observers', yes. But not as in 'independent of observation'. I think this might be the source of most of the misunderstandings surrounding this issue; these two are often used interchangeably.

Oh heavens, you seem to me to be one of the most reasonable and rational posters in this subforum. I have enjoyed this conversation very much, but I understand your desire. Sometimes I just need time to absorb ideas and let them percolate through my head, both consciously and subconsciously. Hopefully, we can converse again in some other thread.

I'd say flattery will get you nowhere, but then here I am, writing yet another long post. In any case, it is indeed a very enjoyable discussion, even though we may not end up agreeing on this matter.

No problem. I like to explore what assumptions about the world lead to the divergent opinions. There is no alternative but to agree to disagree about assumptions which have no definitive answer. We’ve uncovered a few of those, like whether or not subsequent events would play out exactly the same if you could rewind time and whether or not specific collections of events, such as those that define a dance, a person or an ocean, can be considered ‘objectively real’ is another.

Indeed. I addressed both here; I'm quite interested to hear what you think.



ETA: Some slight modifications to my wordings, and a few corrected typos.

 

[Complexity]

Mirrorglass - Thanks for writing what I haven't had the patience to.

 

[Mirrorglass]

Mirrorglass - Thanks for writing what I haven't had the patience to.

Why, thank you. Coming from you, that's high praise indeed.

 

[Dancing David]

An amazingly patient response as well.

 

[dlorde]

I'm sorry to say it, but I really think that the main appeal of this POV is that it provides emotional comfort because of its illusion of two things: predictability, and the view of individual human beings at the center of the universe. But neither is supported by actual facts, and it has nothing to do with QM silliness.

Not entirely sure which POV you're referring to, but I did go out of my way to say that determinism doesn't mean predictability. If you could explain how you think it presents the view of individual human beings at the center of the universe, it would help - I really don't follow that at all.

The paradox of determinism is that this philosophy is actually remarkably comforting and satisfying on an emotional level. All personal responsibility for our behaviors and choices can potentially be removed, and the universe becomes a paradoxically "friendly" place because randomness has disappeared from it on any macro level as regards human beings, providing a means of giving up control on some strange level where a belief in God used to be.

It doesn't actually make any difference to us in practice if there is randomness involved, whether QM or otherwise - how could we discern it?

Also, how does the introduction of randomness resolve the personal responsibility issue ?

 

[dlorde]

In fact, if something different happened (we made a different choice), we could confidently say that we had not rewound time to exactly the same point, because something must have been different at the start.

I disagree. If random processes are involved (and it's a reasonable assumption that they are), then it's possible that a different choice might have been made. Of course, as I said before, neither of us can be certain of our conclusion.

I did explicitly state that I was assuming strict determinism. But naturally, if randomness is involved, it is possible that a different choice might be made, although AIUI the probabilistic nature of QM & the HUP suggests that QM randomness is unlikely to propagate up to macro level, just as the (to us) random movements of gas molecules don't make Boyle's Law uncertain. However, the brain does contain noise generators that can be considered to introduce randomness into brain processes, and there are many influences that interact in complex and unpredictable ways, which can appear random - if we're prepared to accept chaotic unpredictability (sensitive-dependence-on-initial-conditions) as randomness-for-all-practical-purposes.

I find that specifying strict determinism makes it easier to think about these issues, but I really don't see that introducing randomness makes any practical difference to our perception of our actions, or personal responsibility, etc. For practical purposes in this discussion, randomness can be treated as the effects of imperceptible deterministic processes (akin to the 'hidden variable' interpretation of non-locality in QM). I'm quite happy to accept that apparent randomness may be involved in brain activity, and that some may be 'truly' random (whatever that means), after all, Aspect's tests of Bell's Inequalities seem to show that QM non-locality isn't down to underlying hidden variables, but I'm interested to hear how the addition of randomness makes any significant difference to our discussion of mental activity, free will, and personal responsibility.

 

[Beth]

My apologies for the length of this post. I think I'm going to break it into parts.

Well, I'll continue this a bit further, since it seems to me a lot of this is genuine communication bypass which seems like it could be solved.

Thanks. It does seem to be building toward a pleasant agreement that we mainly discuss the matter in different terminology. Also, I had an idea for a mathematical definition of free will. It would not have occurred to me if I had not had this conversation.

The idea is that since there is no entity independent of the universe, any entity that appears to be making decisions is in fact only acting according to the physical laws of the universe and only appearing to make decisions.

This seems to be to be equivalent to claiming it is not possible for any entity within the physical universe to make decisions without violating the physical laws of the universe, thus everything that appears to be a conscious entity making a choice is not an accurate perception. Am I understanding you correctly here?

I take it you understand the idea that if the universe was fully deterministic, then there could be no free will? To make an analogy, if the universe was a single, forkless path one could not stray from, there would never be a choice to be made between paths.

However, even if we add random elements, it doesn't add free will. To continue the analogy, imagine the path did have forks, but whenever you reach one, you have to flip a coin to decide which one you enter. This way, your destination is not predetermined, and if we rewound time, the result could be different - but you still never get to make a choice.

Adding random elements doesn't add free will. It adds space in which free will could exist.

Let me try to describe what I mean mathematically. Assuming there exists some random input to the decision making process can be modeled by inserting a probability distribution function to the model at those points describing.

X_i then is a random variable representing the outcome for a particular time, t_i. We can model as a serious of Bernoulli distributions with p_i representing the probability that the individual will smoke a cigarette at time t_i.
We cannot, in fact, ever determine the true value of p_i. All we know is that the probability will vary from one time to the next.

Now consider a person who makes a decision to try and quit smoking. Whatever their own personal setting for p_i at any particular moment, they have essentially consciously decided to try and reset that series of p_i values, making the probability they will have a smoke as close to zero as they can. It isn’t easy. But some people do.

This ability to change or reset the values of that sort of internal parameter based on conscious thought is what I term ‘free will’. It isn’t supernatural, so it should be considered a compatibilist position.

Interestingly enough, when building probability models of that sort, they have a property termed ‘degrees of freedom’. Our choices are limited to what is physically feasible. I think it’s reasonable to term our choices within those limitations as free will.

Yes, well, the same can be said for all concepts: Justice, peace, tranquility, beauty, mathematics, philosophy, etc. Would you describe them all as imaginary, made up things? That argument can be made, but I think when multiple humans independently discover such concepts, it implies they have an objective albeit non-material reality that a daydream doesn't.

Yes, they are imaginary. They do not exist outside human minds, no matter how many humans believe in them. If by 'objective' you mean they can be observed by several independent observers, then you are correct, at least with a loose definition of 'independent'. Justice can be observed, and so can Hansel and Gretel. But if you mean 'independent of the observer', then they most certainly have no objective reality.

There are no observations independent of the observer, so no, I don’t mean that. Is that what you mean by 'objectively real'? If it is, could you give some example of something that can be observed to exist yet is 'independent of the observer'?

And I’m not certain that such concepts exist only in human minds. So far as I can tell, the minds containing them exist only on earth. In addition, I’m reasonably certain that should we ever contact intelligent life elsewhere in the universe, they will be acquainted the concept of counting and have names for the ordinal numbers. There was a long discussion on that previously, I think in the SMM&T forum.

I’m not sure what the point of disagreement is here. Yes, we are those processes. Yes, I believe we are able to exert some measure of control over them. I decide to move my fingers and type these words. My fingers are part of me and I can guide them. My thoughts are part of me and I can guide them (at least occasionally ). What is the conflict?

The problem is that no part of this process exerts control over it's own behaviour - for each part of you, it's processes are determined by prior events and random chance. There can be no free will because there can be no being that has free will.

Why do you feel there can be no part of this process that exerts control over it's own behavior? It seems to me that is exactly what human beings do - exert control over their own behavior. Did the mathematical model above make sense in that regard?

Of course, that's in a materialistic universe. If we act in an universe based on human experience - where a 'human' is considered an objectively definable subset of reality - then free will can exist. But I maintain that this universe isn't strictly, objectively real.

We have no way of determining what is strictly ‘objectively real’. We don’t presume that nothing is real just because we cannot make observations independent of the observer? All we can do is strive for consistency between observers. If you’re going to reject the discoveries/inventions of human minds as not ‘objectively real’, why not reject the entire materialistic universe as not ‘objectively real’. It seems to me that the concept of the self or the soul is every bit as real as a rainbow. While non-material, they are observed by nearly everyone on earth. We term rainbows illusions, but we don’t term those who claim to have seen a rainbow as delusional.

For a singular experience, yes, you’re correct. However, we’re not talking about a singular experience, but a consistent experience that appears to be nearly universal to all humans. At that point, it seems fairly reasonable to conclude that the thing exists unless there is a very solid reason to suppose that all humans are being deceived about the experience and a sound alternative explanation for what is causing the experience.

That reasoning sounds kind of weak, as it could also be used to argue that gods, magic and monsters under the bed exist - and indeed often is. And, all of us non-free-willers believe that we have a sound alternative explanation for what is causing the experience and a solid reason to suppose that we are being deceived.

In my case, I believe the human ability to imagine having made alternative choices has led to the illusion that they indeed can. The idea is not without precedent; for example, several humans have, independent of each other, concluded that there must be a way for humans to learn to fly.

It’s only an illusion in the sense that a rainbow is an illusion. I don’t object to that characterization. We have studied rainbows and figured out what causes them, perhaps we will someday do the same with human consciousness. But nobody claims rainbows are ‘nonsense’ and people are delusional to believe they’ve seen them.

This idea may not be shared by all the others, but they certainly have their own reasoning.

It seems to me your argument is entirely on terminology.

Yes, I think you are right. I am, in fact, really bothered by the demeaning words and the scorn heaped by those who think the materialistic universe is clearly all there is on those who disagree with them.

This seems long enough for now. I'll try to get a response to the rest of your thoughtful post up later.