We leave all the moral self-gratulations for what they are and continue with Buchanans revisionist Walhalla. I had to use at least 3 text liner pencils to highlight all the marvellous new insights this book has to offer.
My Anglo opponents will be delighted to learn that Buchanan discerned a few weaknesses in German policies as well in the decades before WW1. The largest in the eyes of Buchanan was Germany's naval policy. The Germans who had
obtained national unity as late as 1871 and in the decades after had no idea where to spend their abundant strength on, in their provincial 'me too' attitude, decided to build an enormous fleet, for which they had no need: die
Hochseeflotte or
High Seas Fleet. The British who needed their fleet to maintain their
Lebensraum to the tune of 25% of the planet (it is the typical Anglo hypocrisy to constantly lie about the non-existing drive of the Germans to conquer
ze wurld and at the same time grab every square meter they could lay their hands on themselves, even deep into Afghanistan, this graveyard of empires, be it British, Soviet or American) now needed to reserve a large part of their fleet to keep the German fleet in check. Buchanan deplores that it was this
Hochseeflotte that made any natural alliance between see power Britain and landpower Germany impossible.
p.18 -
The German Naval Laws of 1898 and 1900 that laid the foundation of the High Seas Fleet had historic consequences. By constructing a great navy, 400 nautical miles from the English coast, the Kaiser (not Beckenbauer)
forced the Royal Navy to bring its most powerful warships home from distant waters to build up the Home and Channel Fleets. "In 1896 there had been 74 ships stationed in home waters and 140 overseas", writes James, "14 years later these totals were 480 and 83 respectively". With the British empire stripped of its shield, Britain was forced to resolve conflicts with imperial Russia and France - the 2 powers that most threatened Germany.
Rather than enhance German security, the High Seas Fleet sank all hope of detente with Britain and pushed her into de facto alliances with France and Russia. The Kaiser's decision to challenge the Royal Navy would prove a principal factor in Germany's defeat and his own dethronement. For it was the arrival of a British Expeditionary Force in France in August 1914 that blunted the German drive into France, leading to four years of stalemate war that ended with Wilhelm's abdication and flight to Holland.
Translation: Germany had become a hindrance for Britain in its drive to conquer the world. Not that Germany had any intention of being a hindrance. Characteristic for Germany was its slimy need to get recognition from Britain as a great power, which they potentially were indeed, as far as populations numbers, land mass, talent, skill and discipline were concerned, but not mentally.They were no match for the British arrogance who had nothing but contempt for these provincials, an attitude that continued under Hitler and even endures until today (read between the lines here on this forum of the Anglo posters), where Britain has great trouble of even holding Wales and Scotland within the sorry remains of its 'empire'.
p.19 -
But the fault lies not with the Germans alone. The British were never willing to pay the Kaiser's price for calling off Tirpitz's challenge. During the 1912 Haldane mission to Germany, Britain could have gotten limits on the High Seas Fleet in return for a British pledge of neutrality in a Franco-German war.
Translation: The British were not interested in avoiding a European war, but wanted to continue their centuries old
splendid isolation (effectively: divide and conquer) policy of targetting the most powerful country in Europe, be it Spain, France or now Germany.