James Baker with Zakaria:
ZAKARIA: When you look at the Iranian problem, this has got to be one of the more difficult foreign policy challenges the Obama administration faces because, at the end of the day, these guys have a lot of cash that comes out of their petroleum exports.
BAKER: Right.
ZAKARIA: They are determined, it seems, to move along a path towards some kind of nuclear capability, and we've tried sanctions. We've tried isolation. We've tried ostracism. And now, frankly, Obama has tried some kind of engagement and some kind of offers, which I think both you and I thought was a good idea as a -- as an opening gambit.
Now, none of it is working. What do you do?
BAKER: I don't think -- well, I think it's too soon to say everything has failed. I don't -- I think you keep doing what you're doing. In other words, I think what you need to do is keep pushing for stronger sanctions and keep talking to or being ready to talk to the Iranian leadership, if they're willing to talk.
Those things -- and support the reformers in the streets. Those three things. They're not mutually exclusive. It's exactly what we did for 40 years with the Soviet Union.
We talked to them about nuclear -- we negotiated arms control agreements. We supported the dissidents in the Soviet Union. We worked hard on Soviet-Jewish emigres to get them the right to leave. We met with dissidents when we would go over there as -- as Secretary of State.
And so there's no reason why we can't do all three of those things and continue to do them.
ZAKARIA: But that was -- that was a part of a policy of containment, keeping the Soviet Union kind of in a box and pressing it.
BAKER: Right.
ZAKARIA: We didn't attack them militarily.
Would you -- would you say that you're uncomfortable with the idea of a military attack on Iran?
BAKER: Look, let me say this. Iran is a huge force for instability, not just in the region, but in the world generally, and if they acquire a nuclear weapon, it could set off a major nuclear arms race in that very difficult part of the world.
So don't under -- we don't underestimate the problem when I say what I'm about to say. I don't know that there is a military solution. Most of the people, knowledgeable people, I talk to say there is no satisfactory military solution, that a strike will delay but not prevent their acquiring a nuclear weapon.
That's not to say that you say, OK then, they should get it. But it's -- it's very questionable whether or a military solution exists.
As a matter of fact, in the last administration, it's my understanding that the Israelis wanted to strike and they came to us and they asked for bunker-busting bombs and refueling -- in-flight refueling capabilities and over-flight rides and deconfliction codes and we said, no, we're not going to do that. That's not in our interest.
Why isn't it in our interest? Because a strike that just -- that just delays will create untold -- nobody knows what the consequences of that would be, and one thing -- but one thing we do know is that would strengthen the hard-line regime in Iran at the very time that they're experiencing great domestic dissatisfaction. We ought to play on that domestic dissatisfaction.
And you'll get differing assessments of how long it will be before Iran can -- can obtain a nuclear weapon, but even a former head of Mossad not long ago, a year or so ago, said it will be three or four years. So we'll not -- you know, you never take the military option off the table, but we ought not to be rushing into that.
... because I want to make sure -- what you me arguing for is -- is the idea that deterrents can be effective. It was effective for 40 years against the Soviet Union, and I -- and I'm not at all sure it wouldn't be effective against these ayatollahs who may be -- may be flakey, but they -- but they like self preservation.
So, you know, we've got all this unused strategic nuclear capability, and I think we called them up and said it takes 30 seconds to re-aim those missiles at you. And, by the way, they're now re- aimed at you and if you so much as blink toward Israel or toward us or one of our allies, moderate Arab states, you know, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf State, we're going to -- you'll be the subject. You wouldn't like it. It will be -- it will be bad news.
ZAKARIA: So you would extend the nuclear umbrella, in a sense (ph).
BAKER: I think if we -- I think if we do that (ph) -- and that would require us then to extend a nuclear umbrella to Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf States, and I think we should do that. And -- I mean, I think that's something we ought to keep in our -- an arrow that we have in our quiver and we ought to keep it there.
Deterrents worked well against the Soviet Union. It -- I think it's wrong to simply reject out of hand that somehow deterrents wouldn't work here. So that's something I just wanted to add.