World War Three Coming Soon?

[drkitten]

This comment pretends to the rather bizarre conceit that the Iranian Revolution somehow occurred spontaneously, as if fully formed from the brow of Zeus.

Not at all.

It simply points out that the Iranian Revolution can choose its foreign policy and will be responsible for the consequences of that foreign policy.

No one in Iran had any cause to expect either understanding or honor from the U.S., much less "support and friendship".

Of course not. But there's a huge difference between not being able to expect it and being able to establish policy that would earn it.

You keep talking about "Iran" violating diplomatic protocol as if it was a recognized government that had agreed to recognition and then abrogated that agreement.

That's right. That's because the de facto government is responsible for maintaining order. If it can't even do that, then it's hardly in a position to legitimately feel "persecuted" when the de jure governments act in their interests to attempt to take control of the situation and restore what they want as a form of order.

If you want to play the quid pro quo game you can't just start the narrative wherever you choose and feign ignorance of all prior history.

That's right. We are starting the narrative at a very specific point at which the Iranian government blatantly violated codes of international law.

I'm not feigning ignorance. I'm stating that everything that happened before that point is simply not relevant.

 

[quixotecoyote]

This doesn't describe my position or others I think you're directing this at - perhaps I was reading myself into the comments of others here..

There were only a couple of posters who were going right out and saying that the USA is being hypocritical by not wanting Iran to have nukes and this is bad.

That can only stem from illegitimate moral equivalency, and I stand by that.

You weren't doing that. I get that it makes sense from the Iranian government's perspective to have a nuke. I even get that the Iranian Mohamed six-pack has a lot of good reasons to hate and distrust the US. I get that they have perspectives.

Problem is, this can either be a legitimate look at history or a "wink wink, nudge nudge, the US is so bad and Iran is such an oppressed victim" kind of passive-aggressive argumentation that briefly acknowledges that Iran is oppressive but then glosses over it to bash on the free states.

Being what it is, I can't tell who really wants to focus on the Iranian perspective and who just wants to repeat it.

So it really has to be a "you know who you are" kinda thing.

 

[quadraginta]

This is a very helpful corrective and an accurate description of the history involved. If we truly want to understand how Iran got to where it is today, we need to go back further than last year or 10 years ago. I would like to note here that I do not think you are ideologically aligned with the Iranian government, nor do I think you hate America..

You would be 100% correct. It is my deep and abiding love for my country which causes my regret for some of the bone-headed stunts we have pulled, and encourages what hope I have that someday we might start to learn from our mistakes instead of endlessly repeating them.

Excellent post!

Thank you.

 

[quadraginta]

<snip>

I'm not feigning ignorance. I'm stating that everything that happened before that point is simply not relevant.

A statement like that compels my concurrence.

Your ignorance is quite indisputably unfeigned.

 

[Captain.Sassy]

I don't get the idea that all governments are interchangable from a moral perspective; if it's ok for the US or Israel or France or the UK to have the bomb, it must be ok for Iran, North Korea, or any other oppressive undemocratic regime to have it.

I think it's a better attitude to want free democracies to be strong and for oppressive thugocracies to be weak. I just don't understand justifying strengthening the oppressive because the free are stronger. To my mind, that's a bad thing.

I have a sneaking suspicion this might be in response to some things I have written.

I may have to clarify my position.

I don't think it's 'good' that Iran should have a nuclear weapon, and I don't think it's 'good' that North Korea should have a nuclear weapn, and I don't think either of these regimes are 'good'. But I do think they're rational. Trying to get nuclear weapons is a rational decision for Iran to make, given recent history in the region.

Iran and North Korea are 'bad'. Sure. But they aren't crazy, at least not in an IR sense. Crazy states don't care if they get destroyed. Bad states still care about self preservation. This means that Iran probably won't go exploding nuclear weapons in Tel Aviv the second it gets them, just like North Korea didn't shoot missiles into Seoul.

Having nuclear weapons, even 'bad' countries having nuclear weapons, doesn't mean that they use them. It doesn't even mean that they use them in case of armed conflict. India and China were nuclear armed powers and they have had periodic border clashes without blowing up their nukes. Ditto China and the Soviet Union. Ditto India and Pakistan. The existence of a simmering, low level conflict doesn't mean that as soon as one or both of the belligerents has nuclear weapons, they will immediately use them. Even if Iran continues to support Hezbollah and Hamas, the existence of this low-level conflict with Israel doesn't mean that Iran is going to give Hezbollah an atom bomb. In fact, one can imagine that a nuclear weapon would reduce the strategic value of proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah.

What nuclear weapons DO do is provide states with a safeguard, with an ultimate deterrent. A nuclear weapons says to the world "if you try to destroy me as a state, there will be a serious consequence".

So yes, we all agree that Iran is 'bad', and it's true, a nuclear weapon would make a forcible regime change in Iran harder, and yes everyone would rather see a nice, democratic, secular Iran full of happy gay people, your Captain included. But how likely is it that force would be useful in accomplishing this goal? And what is the likelihood that in trying to achieve this, you might bring about far worse consequences (further regional radicalization, civil war, a bunch of big rockets launched into Israel, etc.) than the current state of affairs?

If you bomb Iran you could set its nuke program back a few years perhaps. But they're already publicly stating they're going to take countermeasures. If you invade Iran (also if you bomb them, but to a lesser degree) then you run a serious risk of destabilizing a lately extra-unstable area that was never very stable to begin with. All in the interests of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon that, unless you *do* invade Iran, it will probably never use anyways.

The biggest potential with Iran having the bomb is the problem of terrorists getting their hands on it, or of a genuinely crazy Iranian government coming to power. I wouldn't put much money on the second worry, and as for the first worry then the US should really be more concerned about Pakistan. Pakistan is a nuclear country with a secret security establishment that has widely acknowledged links to the Taliban.

And again, even if bombing Iran could completely destroy its nuclear pogram for ever and Pakistan got rid of its nukes, you still might have problems because nuclear technology will eventually become far more commonplace than it is today.

 

[Praktik]

James Baker with Zakaria:

ZAKARIA: When you look at the Iranian problem, this has got to be one of the more difficult foreign policy challenges the Obama administration faces because, at the end of the day, these guys have a lot of cash that comes out of their petroleum exports.

BAKER: Right.

ZAKARIA: They are determined, it seems, to move along a path towards some kind of nuclear capability, and we've tried sanctions. We've tried isolation. We've tried ostracism. And now, frankly, Obama has tried some kind of engagement and some kind of offers, which I think both you and I thought was a good idea as a -- as an opening gambit.

Now, none of it is working. What do you do?

BAKER: I don't think -- well, I think it's too soon to say everything has failed. I don't -- I think you keep doing what you're doing. In other words, I think what you need to do is keep pushing for stronger sanctions and keep talking to or being ready to talk to the Iranian leadership, if they're willing to talk.

Those things -- and support the reformers in the streets. Those three things. They're not mutually exclusive. It's exactly what we did for 40 years with the Soviet Union.

We talked to them about nuclear -- we negotiated arms control agreements. We supported the dissidents in the Soviet Union. We worked hard on Soviet-Jewish emigres to get them the right to leave. We met with dissidents when we would go over there as -- as Secretary of State.

And so there's no reason why we can't do all three of those things and continue to do them.

ZAKARIA: But that was -- that was a part of a policy of containment, keeping the Soviet Union kind of in a box and pressing it.

BAKER: Right.

ZAKARIA: We didn't attack them militarily.

Would you -- would you say that you're uncomfortable with the idea of a military attack on Iran?

BAKER: Look, let me say this. Iran is a huge force for instability, not just in the region, but in the world generally, and if they acquire a nuclear weapon, it could set off a major nuclear arms race in that very difficult part of the world.

So don't under -- we don't underestimate the problem when I say what I'm about to say. I don't know that there is a military solution. Most of the people, knowledgeable people, I talk to say there is no satisfactory military solution, that a strike will delay but not prevent their acquiring a nuclear weapon.

That's not to say that you say, OK then, they should get it. But it's -- it's very questionable whether or a military solution exists.

As a matter of fact, in the last administration, it's my understanding that the Israelis wanted to strike and they came to us and they asked for bunker-busting bombs and refueling -- in-flight refueling capabilities and over-flight rides and deconfliction codes and we said, no, we're not going to do that. That's not in our interest.

Why isn't it in our interest? Because a strike that just -- that just delays will create untold -- nobody knows what the consequences of that would be, and one thing -- but one thing we do know is that would strengthen the hard-line regime in Iran at the very time that they're experiencing great domestic dissatisfaction. We ought to play on that domestic dissatisfaction.

And you'll get differing assessments of how long it will be before Iran can -- can obtain a nuclear weapon, but even a former head of Mossad not long ago, a year or so ago, said it will be three or four years. So we'll not -- you know, you never take the military option off the table, but we ought not to be rushing into that.

... because I want to make sure -- what you me arguing for is -- is the idea that deterrents can be effective. It was effective for 40 years against the Soviet Union, and I -- and I'm not at all sure it wouldn't be effective against these ayatollahs who may be -- may be flakey, but they -- but they like self preservation.

So, you know, we've got all this unused strategic nuclear capability, and I think we called them up and said it takes 30 seconds to re-aim those missiles at you. And, by the way, they're now re- aimed at you and if you so much as blink toward Israel or toward us or one of our allies, moderate Arab states, you know, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf State, we're going to -- you'll be the subject. You wouldn't like it. It will be -- it will be bad news.

ZAKARIA: So you would extend the nuclear umbrella, in a sense (ph).

BAKER: I think if we -- I think if we do that (ph) -- and that would require us then to extend a nuclear umbrella to Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf States, and I think we should do that. And -- I mean, I think that's something we ought to keep in our -- an arrow that we have in our quiver and we ought to keep it there.

Deterrents worked well against the Soviet Union. It -- I think it's wrong to simply reject out of hand that somehow deterrents wouldn't work here. So that's something I just wanted to add.

 

[JihadJane]

Iran may not have nuclear weapons right now, but they certainly seem to be working on it, Ahmanutjob's denials notwithstanding.

Does "certainly seem" constitute evidence?


To many, it certainly seemed that Saddam Hussein has a big pile of WMDs.

The comic-book approach to international relations in America is a source of unending amusement.

And despair.

And many deaths.

 

[Praktik]

Zakaria has some kind of report on Iran too:

Zakaria: The problems with the military option remain what they've always been, and it's a little alarming to see the way in which people are gravitating toward a military option, out of a sort of frustration that there isn't some magical solution here.

The military option is certainly not a magical solution. It's a very risky strategy with many potentially large, unintended consequences. A military strike would be a pre-emptive invasion of another country by the United States. It would not have any sanction in international law.

It would not be supported by the vast majority of the world, and it would only delay rather than destroy the Iranian program.

I've talked to many military experts, and we do not seem to have the ability to completely destroy a program like this, partly because nuclear technology is after all not some cutting-edge technology. This is 60-year old technology, and there are lots of people in Iran who are trained scientists.

It would also strengthen the hard-line elements within the regime, would weaken the Green Movement because they would have to come out in support of the regime, and against what would be a foreign attack on Iranian soil.

It would inflame the Middle East and make tensions rise everywhere, including the two places where the U.S. has a huge stake and tens of thousands of troops -- Afghanistan and Iraq -- and it would put the moderate Arabs on the defense. It would have the effect of radicalizing the region.

And those are pretty much the known consequences. ... Then, there's always in the business of war, the unknown consequences. What would Iran's reaction be? ... What kind of militia operations could it fund in Iraq and Afghanistan that would directly kill Americans?

 

[Praktik]

And despair.

And many deaths.

hehe lighten up there..

im talking about message board amusement here!

 

[Captain.Sassy]

Fareed Zakaria and James Baker are clearly radical leftists seeking any opportunity to undermine freedom.

 

[Pardalis]

Having nuclear weapons, even 'bad' countries having nuclear weapons, doesn't mean that they use them.

Well once they have them, they're one step closer to using them than when they didn't have them, and that is unacceptable.

When you own a gun, you're far more likely to use it then when you don't have one, right?

What nuclear weapons DO do is provide states with a safeguard, with an ultimate deterrent. A nuclear weapons says to the world "if you try to destroy me as a state, there will be a serious consequence".

So you agree they could use them now?

And what about UN treaties, resolutions and regulations? Iran signed the non-proliferation treaty, an if it gets the nuke anyway, this means the UN is worth dick.

 

[Pardalis]

@ Praktik, you never answered my question.

Tell me how you see Iran acquiring nuclear weapons playing out.

In other words, what will happen once Iran finally gets the nuke, in your opinion?

 

[Praktik]

Well once they have them, they're one step closer to using them than when they didn't have them, and that is unacceptable.

As Baker points out, the US is not completely impotent here. By extending the nuclear umbrella over potential Iranian targets it has the power to contain the threat. So, it may not be desirable, it may be a negative and it may be dangerous, but given America's capability of projecting nuclear power into Iran at a whim, it can certainly become "acceptable" in the sense that Iran will be contained.

The biggest worry from the bomb is how it will improve Iran's strategic situation and given its antipathy to the US interest, it really is THIS that worries serious decision makers. Not the specter of a nuclear first strike.

 

[Praktik]

@ Praktik, you never answered my question.

Hmmm shades of "what would you have done about Saddam", eh?

I agree with what Sassy said on the previous page, and adding in the view of Baker here adds another element which I just described above, the extension of the nuclear umbrella to middle eastern states to prevent them from seeking their own nuclear deterrents in response.

We'd see an improved position for Iran strategically speaking, and this may in fact be something of a boon in the long run as it may force some kind of broader conciliation between Iran, America and the region.

In short, not a desirable outcome but one I am increasingly convinced America will have to figure out how to manage successfully.

 

[Pardalis]

As Baker points out, the US is not completely impotent here. By extending the nuclear umbrella over potential Iranian targets it has the power to contain the threat. So, it may not be desirable, it may be a negative and it may be dangerous, but given America's capability of projecting nuclear power into Iran at a whim, it can certainly become "acceptable" in the sense that Iran will be contained.

So your solution to Iran getting the nuke is to deploy even more weapons, even an arms race? I thought you were a pacifist?

 

[Pardalis]

Hmmm shades of "what would you have done about Saddam", eh?

As I recall, your solution for Hussein was to let the Iraqis try to topple him on their own.

the extension of the nuclear umbrella to middle eastern states to prevent them from seeking their own nuclear deterrents in response.

So you want the US to deploy nuclear weapons in the Islamic states surrounding Iran? How will that be seen by the Arab world?

Or do you mean you want to give nuclear capability to Iran's neighbours, adding more nuclear states to the existing gang?

It seems you're trying to patch a hole by creating more holes.

People, it's called non-proliferation. N-o-n-p-r-o-l-i-f-e-r-a-t-i-o-n. Look it up.

 

[Praktik]

So your solution to Iran getting the nuke is to deploy even more weapons, even an arms race? I thought you were a pacifist?

?? I dont even understand this. And Im not a pacifist.

 

[Pardalis]

?? I dont even understand this. And Im not a pacifist.

Doesn't "extending the nuclear umbrella" imply that the US will need to add more bases closer to the region where it can launch nukes?

How will this pan out in the Arab world?

 

[Captain.Sassy]

And what about UN treaties, resolutions and regulations? Iran signed the non-proliferation treaty, an if it gets the nuke anyway, this means the UN is worth dick.

I value my dick a lot.

Regarding the NPT:
IANAIL
But I believe that any sanction for violating the NPT would likely need to go through the Big 5 in the security council. I doubt China and Russia will sign on for war. If the US goes to war without the UN again, this really shows the uselessness of the UN.

Also, if violating the NPT is shows that the UN is worthless then I would suggest you critically examine the statements the US has made with regards to its willingness to use nuclear weapons in a first strike against a non-nuclear adversary (Iraq, 1990).

 

[Praktik]

As I recall, your solution for Hussein was to let the Iraqis try to topple him on their own. .

I was just highlighting how similar this rhetorical trick is to that one. My thoughts on that other question are a little more nuanced than your reduction asserts. Implicit in the question is the assumption that there is no other alternative to the one you hold.

So you want the US to deploy nuclear weapons in the Islamic states surrounding Iran? How will that be seen by the Arab world?

Or do you mean you want to give nuclear capability to Iran's neighbours, adding more nuclear states to the existing gang?

Ummm they dont even have to do that. All they need is a sub in international waters. They have these things called ICBMs now that can travel thousands of kilometers and be launched without needing emplacements in Arab states, which I agree is a bad idea.

So do you think Baker is a nut for suggesting the extension of the nuclear umbrella? This is one of the most experienced American politicians around with decades spent dealing with precisely these issues. I find him infinitely more credible on this than you.

What would you do if Iran got the bomb? Leave Saudi and Egypt with the incentive to get programs of their own? Let Iranian threats go unanswered in the region and cede the Middle East to them? You condescendingly bold the term "non proliferation", without realizing that one of the aims of extending the nuclear umbrella is precisely to prevent further proliferation in answer to an Iranian nuke. See: Japan/South Korea and North Korea.

And we still haven't heard what you envision as the best way to prevent Iran from getting the bomb?