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My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

But the remark was the context of a specific example.

In my example Run1 and Run2 are runs of the algorithm normally on a computer.
Your example program was also unduly complicated to go through in a forum discussion, so let me fix that.

Let's focus on two instructions: X and Y. X will involve a store to a piece of memory. Y involves a fetch from that location. No store instructions exist in between.

To give the processor something to do, let's have three registers--R1, R2, and R3. X stores R3 at memory location R1+R2. Y fetches what is at memory location R1 and stores it into R2. To illustrate something coherent going on, we'll have Y fetch what X stored. More precisely, X precedes Y, and there are no stores to the specified memory address between X and Y. Arbitrarily, I'm also going to say there are a few instructions between X and Y.

Let's also suppose this is a straightforward case, where our expected side effects are considered to be complete by the execution of the next instruction. In other words, if we do a fetch at step k into some register r, register r has the expected value at step k+1.

So let's say at X, R1 is 10, R2 is 30, and R3 is 12. So the program is supposed to store the value 12 at address 40. At Y, R1 is 40, so it's supposed to fetch what is at address 40 and store it into R2. By definition of memory on an imperative machine, R2 would be 12.

For Run2, the same thing. Only we're storing the state of all of the registers.

Now for Run3...

Between steps X-1 and X, something was put into the registers. By step X, R1 is 10, R2 is 30, and R3 is 12. The processor adds 10 to 30 and gets 40, so it takes 12 and performs a write to address 40. It turns on all of the lines, enables the bus, whatever--and 12 is supposed to go in. It does.

Then between X and X+1, everything is erased. Fine. But the registers are loaded, the opcode fetched, and everything put in, and the processor is in a particular state--the same state, mind you, that it was in for X+1 at Runs 1 and 2.

Now just prior to step Y, everything is erased, and then a fetch is performed from this cache. R1 gets the value of 40 at this fetch. At step Y, the machine is supposed to retrieve what is at memory location 40, and store it in R2. So it performs this operation. It turns the lines on, enables the bus for a read, and so forth. The value 0 dutifully flows in. So now R2 has 0 in it... assuming there's enough time to settle. And we proceed to step Y+1.

But before doing so, there's that fetch from the cache. That fetch takes R2 and puts the value 12 into it. It loads in the opcode it's supposed to load in. And now we're at step Y+1, and we're, by definition of your problem, in the same state as Run2 (and Run1) was in Y+1, within the processor.

It appears to me, that if you look at memory in terms of a black box that gives you certain guarantees, which have to be met in order to proceed through the algorithm, and take a processor's eye view, then in Run1, Run2, and Run3, the black box is performing its required duties, so the processor is not crippled in its duties.

And nothing I said here is incorrect, nor should it be controversial. Agree?
So I am saying why is this run different from the last.
Disagree. I agree that Run3 is different than Run2. You defined it differently. But I disagree that you are saying why it's different. Here's why. Here is what you are saying:
Rocketdodger and PixyMisa are saying that it is because the algorithm is self-referential or it can inspect itself or something and therefore the third physically identical run will behave differently.

I am saying, no, all that CPU sees when it processes an instruction is the register state, the instruction itself and the data item's it is asked to process.
However, the phrase I have highlighted above is true for:
  • Run1 at X-1
  • Run1 at X
  • Run1 at X+1
  • Run1 at Y-1
  • Run1 at Y
  • Run1 at Y+1
  • Run2 at X-1
  • Run2 at X
  • Run2 at X+1
  • Run2 at Y-1
  • Run2 at Y
  • Run2 at Y+1
  • Run3 at X-1
  • Run3 at X
  • Run3 at X+1
  • Run3 at Y-1
  • Run3 at Y
  • Run3 at Y+1
...because store and fetch are black box operations. The processor certainly doesn't run over to the memory and drop the value in. It just flips some wires to address something, flips some other wire to connect some register to it, and flips another wire to signal that a write should be performed. Things happen. Stuff is done. And it's "right" if and only if that black box does what memory does once you do the same thing with the read line set instead of the write one.

Now, given that your highlighted phrase is true for all of the above, I'm having problems finding out where this difference is that you're trying to point out.
It has no way of knowing or caring where that data item came from. That is what I mean by in isolation.
That's what we in the business call "the same".
So the changed data are ditched after each operation, and the cached data from the previous run is swapped in, which will of course be the same.
Yep.
So the next instruction comes along and duly processes it, just the same as if it had read from the memory item or register it had changed in the last step.
Yep.
Now you are chiming in and agreeing with PixyMisa and rocketdodger that this processor cycle is not in isolation from the rest of the steps in the program - that something will be different in this physically identical set of instructions.
Now the above sentence is so muddled and confused I can hardly make sense out of it.

Part 1, before the dash:

The processor cycle, let's say, is step Y. X is one of the rest of the steps. Y isn't in total isolation of X. What happens at Y should depend on X. If it doesn't, that means that memory is failing to supply its black box guarantees that we rely on in order to run the algorithm.

And yes, that is what I'm claiming.

Part 2, after the dash:

The set of instructions is the entire Run1. I don't know what you mean by "something". But saying that Y isn't isolated from X says absolutely nothing about Run3 being different than Run1.

Furthermore, I thought you said you were showing what the difference is.

But regardless, part 2 being completely different than part 1, and this "showing a difference" thing somehow mutating within your post into "same thing", and "set" being the same as "cycle", etc... I cannot make a lick of sense out of the aforementioned quoted text. Could you please help?
 
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Yeah I understand that.

I am not quite sure what I am thinking :) Doesn't matter anyway, since all of us agree on the important stuff.

Or else the "theory" is so confused and confusing that it falls apart on the specifics. Whatever.
 
If the system writes a location in memory as a result of calculation A, and then uses it in calculation B, in the same run, that is very different than calculation B simply being fed the pre-packaged results from calculation A in a different run. Yes, the processor doesn't know any better, but the processor isn't the full extent of the system in question.

When debugging segments of machine code, a frequent technique is to run a particular segment of code with a data value patched in instead of as a result of some other operation - perhaps because the code that writes the data hasn't been written yet. The reason we can do this is because the code runs in exactly the same way regardless of the source of the data.

That's the key to understanding how computers work. Each segment works entirely independently of the next. You can save the state of a system, reload it, or even key in the state by hand. (Impractical now, but that's how programs used to be loaded in the good old days).

The idea that a "system" "knows" where it gets its data from is just more mysticism and anthropomorphism.
 
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So it's the connection to the senses and motor system that makes the computation more powerful than a Turing machine?

Which do you think is more likely - consciousness that is involved with the universe, or consciousness that is self-contained?

I'm not frightened. I'm just surprised that there has been no inkling of new physics over the past 200 years of studying the brain.

I get a bit of a god of the gaps feeling from this.

~~ Paul

I don't think you can get away without some kind of theory. And a theory that claims not to be physics is of necessity something else - which I find mystical.
 
Why should I doubt I'm conscious? What definition of "conscious" are you using? Do you think you might be a p-zombie?

Maybe. I couldn't tell if I were, anyway.

Behaviorism has been on life support for decades

Then let me ask a question: how do you determine if another person is conscious ?

Do you think an external observer is a necessary condition for consciousness? That we are unconscious unless something is observing us?

No. What I'm saying is that you learn about consciousness and its implications from watching other humans (mainly your immediate family, earlier on). It doesn't mean you aren't conscious otherwise, only that, instead of labeling others as "conscious" by examining their behaviour in relation to yours (which should be your answer to my question above), you label yourself as "conscious" based on those same observations.
 
So you're not conscious if no external observer is around? Just to be clear, you're actually claiming this?



And nothing to do with whether I'm conscious or not. Your position has the absurd result that one falls in and out of consciousness depending on if someone leaves the room or not. You guys can't really believe this.

You know, considering that the answer to that question was further (1 line, actually) further in Dodger's post, you might have wanted to delete that part of your reply. Why you left it there after getting the answer is a mystery to me.

And if I only knew Spanish, I would not be labelling it "consciousness" either. Are Mexicans unconscious?

I stand corrected. You simply didn't understand his post at all.
 
Robin said:
Why? Run1 didn't have motor outputs. So still there is no difference.
Agreed, I'm just saying that it would be difficult to tell.

But again, am I really such a woo for thinking that maybe my conscious experience does not somehow defy the laws of physics?
How do you figure this defies the laws of physics. What exactly do you think consciousness is?

~~ Paul
 
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Robin said:
I have heard of that, it is quite fascinating. Must be horrible to experience though.
I actually enjoyed it. Each episode didn't last too long.

The problem is, say the initial run takes 9 months. It generates an apparent half second of conscious experience. No problem. But when does that half second of conscious experience physically take place?
Over the course of the nine months. But how do we know it feels like a half second of consciousness? We don't understand the mechanism that makes apparent time feel the way it does.

If you say it takes place in that nine month run then my experience of it involved pulling together information that would take many years to bring together. Does the moment of consciousness not emerge until years after the run has completed?
Does the simulation of apparent time involve consulting a real-time clock?

~~ Paul
 
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rocketdodger said:
First, run a program and save the entire state of the system at every instruction.

Then, configure some space probes (one probe for each instruction) and load them up with one of those saved states, such that each probe will run a single instruction from the original program on the state that was the result of the prior instruction during the original run.

Robin is saying that because the instructions are the same, and in the same order, as the original program, and they all operate on the same states as they do in the original program, that the program is a single instance that is now distributed throughout space.

I am saying that no, each probe now represents a separate instance of the program which happened to branch off of the orginal program when the state the probe is initalized with was saved.

Because the steps that were taken, in physical reality, to produce each of the states must also be accounted for. You can't just say "oh, I pulled this state out of thin air" because you didn't -- you ran the program to produce that state.
I'm not sure why you think you two are disagreeing.

The initial state of the processor in each probe is based on the run up to that point. If you then execute a single instruction on each processor, in order, you will produce the same results as the initial run, including consciousness.

What am I not seeing?

~~ Paul
 
westprog said:
Algorithms do it for you, though?
As I said before, none of this gives me a warm and fuzzy feeling that I have an intuitive understanding of how consciousness works. All I'm saying here is that some sort of qualion with all the difficult stuff just glued into it doesn't make me feel any more warm or fuzzy. In fact, it gives me a god of the gaps feeling.

Which do you think is more likely - consciousness that is involved with the universe, or consciousness that is self-contained?
I'm not sure I understand the choices. I think it's more likely that consciousness is a brain function.

I don't think you can get away without some kind of theory. And a theory that claims not to be physics is of necessity something else - which I find mystical.
By all means, let's stick with physics.

~~ Paul
 
I actually enjoyed it. Each episode didn't last too long.


Over the course of the nine months. But how do we know it feels like a half second of consciousness? We don't understand the mechanism that makes apparent time feel the way it does.


Does the simulation of apparent time involve consulting a real-time clock?

~~ Paul

For a human, any sense of time is bound up with interaction with the universe. It's our perceptions of the world. That's the big problem - well, a big problem with the algorithmic model, which has a sharp boundary between world and program.

Consciousness does not exist in isolation.
 
Obviously if consciousness is to be explained by physical theory, we need new physics. That's by definition, since physics has nothing to say about it at present. New physics is nothing to be frightened about.

What is wrong with organic chemistry of neurons, is it broken? Or is this a definitional thing again?

Or do you just have something else you are trying to say?
 
The transporter camera

Let's say we rig up a Star Trek transporter so that it can make a copy of an object without destroying the object. Now let's configure it so that it can make 100 copies per second.

Out in a large field, send a horse galloping past the transporter and have it make 100 copies of the horse and array them across the field. Now we have "stills" of 1 second's worth of running horse.

Here's the question: Does this series of horse copies still embody running-ness?

~~ Paul
 
westprog said:
For a human, any sense of time is bound up with interaction with the universe. It's our perceptions of the world. That's the big problem - well, a big problem with the algorithmic model, which has a sharp boundary between world and program.
It doesn't seem like a problem to me, as long as the simulation has access to all sensory input and possibly some sort of circadian clock.

Ah, what about a Turing machine with a clock?

~~ Paul
 

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