My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[rocketdodger]

Second, could it not be the case that one type of simulation could map exactly what is simulated -- namely any mental activity? Speaking dualistically, which is wrong of course, there is no actual physical output with mental activity in the same way that there is a physico-chemical process to digestion for instance. So, while a simulation of digestion does not physically digest anything, is it the case that a simulation of thinking does not think? Or simulation of feeling does not feel? Or simulation of consciousness is not conscious?

Simply because most simulations do not produce the output that the "real-world" processes do, does it mean that this is true of all simulations? Is the argument simply over-generalized?

Yes, the argument is over-generalized.

Nobody in their right mind thinks consciousness is some kind of fundamental property of a substance (or they are just very uneducated).

What is left is relationships. This whole issue boils down to the simple question of whether consciousness is a feature of relationships between physical entities (making it dependent on the physical entities) or a feature of relationships between other relationships (making it independent of the physical entities, or information).

People like westprog think that the primary relationships might be important, for example that they might need to be between synapses of biological neurons, etc.

People like myself (strong AI supporters) think that the primary relationships are irrelevant and only the secondary and greater relationships are important.

Note that in a simulation, the primary relationships really are "simulated" while the secondary and greater are not -- they are just as real as in any other physical system. So it fits right in with what you are talking about, the question of whether a process in a simulation can still be a real process.

 

[RandFan]

People like westprog think that the primary relationships might be important, for example that they might need to be between synapses of biological neurons, etc.

That is also my understanding and I would like to note that I have on a number of occasions not given westprog his due and I have painted him with a dualist brush when that is not the case.

 

[rocketdodger]

That is also my understanding and I would like to note that I have on a number of occasions not given westprog his due and I have painted him with a dualist brush when that is not the case.

Well, no, that actually is dualism -- the only way primary relationships matter is if dualism is true. This is because everything can be reduced to particles, and why would the primary relationships between particles in a biological neuron be different than those in any other system? Under physicalism, they would not.

 

[westprog]

Dear God that I do not believe in...

Look, see this sentence from the wiki page on decidability?



That thing called "effective method" is what is informally known as a decision. If you want a mathematical definition of "decision" then just replace "effective method" with "decision." And guess what -- there is a middleman page for "effective method" that, among other things, links to pages about everything else we have been talking about here.

And if you'd said that any effective method applied by a human could also be applied by a Turing machine, that wouldn't have sounded nearly as convincing, would it? One might, if one were being uncharitable, assume that the reason for not using the term "effective method" would be that it would make your argument meaningless - because you entirely failed to establish any necessary connection between what we normally term "a decision" and the technical definition you have seemingly pulled out of mid-air.

Are you starting to notice a trend? I am. The trend is that every single time anyone provides you a resource that will satisfy your demands for "proof" of something you don't understand you reply in turn that you don't even understand the resource that will help you understand what you don't understand.

If one extrapolates this pattern, the conclusion is that you really aren't very educated at all in any of the areas of knowledge required to understand this issue and furthermore, given how easy it is to follow links in a web browser, that you don't even want to be educated in these areas.

You throw out random links which have the most tenuous connection with your argument, and leave it to other people to read through them until they've convinced themselves that you're right after all.

This is indeed a trend. You could easily have explained why an effective method was actually a decision, and that this related in some way to human beings making decisions - but either you couldn't, or you couldn't be bothered. Instead, you claimed that it was "mathematically proven" and referenced an article that used entirely different terminology, and then complained that I didn't realise that you'd meant something else.

Even if you were actually a professor handing out assignments, this would be pretty shoddy. As an argument, it's laughable.

Of course, I could be the odd one out here. Perhaps everyone else automatically assumes that when someone talks about decision-making they mean "effective method".

 

[westprog]

That is also my understanding and I would like to note that I have on a number of occasions not given westprog his due and I have painted him with a dualist brush when that is not the case.

It's not so much a question of my beliefs as what can actually be shown.

And your graciousness is appreciated.

 

[PixyMisa]

And if you'd said that any effective method applied by a human could also be applied by a Turing machine, that wouldn't have sounded nearly as convincing, would it?

Well, let's go back to the original statement:

Which, in layman's terms, means there are no known decisions -- none -- that can be made that a Turing machine cannot also make.

So, what is it, Westprog, that you are calling a "decision" that a Turing machine cannot make, and what is your evidence for this? You still haven't answered.

[Ad-hominem drivel snipped.]

 

[Darat]

Looks like scientists have managed to create qualia from electronics!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Which, in layman's terms, means there are no known decisions -- none -- that can be made that a Turing machine cannot also make.

So you are disagreeing with Conti in this paper:

http://www.idquantique.com/news/news-newscientist.htm

I'm not sure I understand what he's saying in the paper.

~~ Paul

 

[AkuManiMani]

Looks like scientists have managed to create qualia from electronics!

Thats pretty interesting. I wonder how much of human physiology can be replaced with prosthetics without them losing the capacity for sensation.

 

[Maia]

Oh, sigh. Every once in a while, I just have to pop in here. The consciousness-related discussion over on the "human spirit" forum is interesting, so I recommend checking it out. But really now... "qualia" from electronics? In the context of that article, are you kidding me? The question is being begged in so many ways that it's almost impossible to know where to begin. In fact, any attempt to define consciousness in any way does absolutely nothing but beg the question by definition no matter which position is taken. Scientists should scale back to more foundational levels of research, concentrating on the study of neural correlates of consciousness, the neuropsychology of pathological states which cause structural dissociation of personality (such as posttraumatic stress disorders), and neurological research with practical applications such as artificial limbs , instead of sitting around and wasting time on this "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin"-style silliness. RUN!! Here comes William of Ockham, and he's got a razor!

 

[PixyMisa]

Thats pretty interesting. I wonder how much of human physiology can be replaced with prosthetics without them losing the capacity for sensation.

All of it.

 

[drkitten]

Is there a proof for it? Is there even a rigorous definition for effectively calculable function?

Yes. From Wikipedia: "A function F: N → N of natural numbers is a computable function if and only if there exists a lambda expression f such that for every pair of x, y in N, F(x)=y if and only if f x =β y, where x and y are the Church numerals corresponding to x and y, respectively and =β meaning equivalence with beta reduction."

Of course, that's the definition using the lambda calculus; an equivalent formulation using Turing machines is simply that a function N → N is computable iff there is a Turing machine that will effect that calculates that function.

And there are several other definitions you can use. The Church-Turing thesis is simply that these methods are all equivalent. The proof is unfortunately too long for a forum post. And it gets into some heavy mathematics.

 

[drkitten]

Of course, I could be the odd one out here. Perhaps everyone else automatically assumes that when someone talks about decision-making they mean "effective method".

Everyone who's qualified to discuss Turing-computability does, certainly.

 

[PixyMisa]

Oh, sigh. Every once in a while, I just have to pop in here. The consciousness-related discussion over on the "human spirit" forum is interesting, so I recommend checking it out.

Well, it can't possibly be any more bogged down in nonsense than this! (He says, failing his cynicism roll yet again.)

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Scientists should scale back to more foundational levels of research, concentrating on the study of neural correlates of consciousness, the neuropsychology of pathological states which cause structural dissociation of personality (such as posttraumatic stress disorders), and neurological research with practical applications such as artificial limbs , instead of sitting around and wasting time on this "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin"-style silliness.

I don't know any scientists who aren't doing what you suggest. I know some other people who are doing other things, but I daresay most of them aren't scientists.

~~ Paul

 

[RandFan]

In fact, any attempt to define consciousness in any way does absolutely nothing but beg the question by definition no matter which position is taken.

You are suggesting that consciousness is not empirical?

Scientists should scale back to more foundational levels of research, concentrating on the study of neural correlates of consciousness, the neuropsychology of pathological states which cause structural dissociation of personality (such as posttraumatic stress disorders), and neurological research with practical applications such as artificial limbs , instead of sitting around and wasting time on this "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin"-style silliness. RUN!! Here comes William of Ockham, and he's got a razor!

Can you tell me who is wasting time and what experiments they are doing that is a waste of time?

 

[rocketdodger]

So you are disagreeing with Conti in this paper:

http://www.idquantique.com/news/news-newscientist.htm

I'm not sure I understand what he's saying in the paper.

~~ Paul

Yeah I don't understand either. Sounds like a bunch of hype and journalistic hand waving to me.

How does a true RNG improve upon Turing equivalence?

Take a system that uses a true RNG, and for every instance of a random number generated, simply create a Turing machine that features it. That is, if the first use of the RNG is like "If RNG(0) is > B, branch" you can put "If A > B move left" in the Turing machine, where A = RNG(0) (zero meaning simply the first call).

Then, it is provable that any algorithm run using the true RNG can also be run using the Turing machine. Yes, it would be much easier to have a true RNG doing the guesswork rather than randomly trying Turing machines, but in the end there is a Turing machine that would generate the same output as a single run using the true RNG.

Is this correct drkitten?

 

[rocketdodger]

Instead, you claimed that it was "mathematically proven" and referenced an article that used entirely different terminology, and then complained that I didn't realise that you'd meant something else.

I am not complaining because you didn't realize that the informal term "decision" is equivalent to the formal term "effective method."

I am complaining because you don't even bother to think. You could have sat there for a second and thought to yourself

Hmmm... well, any time a human makes what could be called a "decision" they are actually mapping the members of one set to another set, a process called an "effective method" according to this wiki article, so I guess a human "decision" really is a type of "effective method." Oh, and look at this paragraph here, where they explicitly talk about the existence of an effective method being called decidability. And ooooh, here is a page about "decision problems" in logic -- that sounds like exactly what we are talking about on the forum.

What do you do instead? You open the wiki article, hit ctrl+f, type in "decision," and when nothing is found you come back here with insults. You didn't even think to look for other forms of the word decision, and you certainly didn't bother to read even the beginning of the article, because if you had you would have seen the connection immediately.

And why do you do this? Because despite your assurances to the contrary you really are not interested in learning about this issue.

As drkitten stated, anybody qualified to discuss computability, even informally, would implicitly understand that when one speaks of a decision they are speaking of what is formally known as an effective method (which is also known as an algorithm, BTW). There simply isn't anything else that "decision" could mean. Which comes to Pixy's query about what on Earth you think "decision" could mean if you don't think it means what I said it means.

 

[Maia]

You are suggesting that consciousness is not empirical?

Philosophical attempts to define consciousness aren't doing a thing to show that it is or isn't empirical.

Can you tell me who is wasting time and what experiments they are doing that is a waste of time?

Yes. More to the point, though, I think that someone like Dennett really would begin to come across as silly in his basic arguments if he weren't debating opponents who sound even sillier. The way that the basic research is used is the bigger waste of time.

 

[RandFan]

Well, no, that actually is dualism -- the only way primary relationships matter is if dualism is true. This is because everything can be reduced to particles, and why would the primary relationships between particles in a biological neuron be different than those in any other system? Under physicalism, they would not.

I'm sorry but we don't know enough to make such a statement at this time, IMO. We don't know if there isn't something intrinsic to biological systems. The examples of weather systems are apt. Weather isn't dualism because it can't be reproduced in a computer model. It's not dualism at all. It's just that weather is the result of physical properties not replicable in a computer simulation. I don't want to debate it. We can agree to disagree.

Westprog still has his work cut out for him. He still has to tell us what that missing thing is (he has said he does't believe in a ghost in the machine).