My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[westprog]

Yes, of course that is the case.

But the rabbit vs. dog thing is not an "endless side issue." It is the primary issue.

Because you, for over a year, have been avoiding the important questions -- such as "in what ways are rabbits and dogs different?" -- and focusing on the utterly stupid trivially obvious truths, such as "there is no physical process going on in a rabbit that is also not going on in a dog."

And as usual, this has to be expressed in code.

The critical assertion is not the similarity between the computer and the components. It's the equivalence between the computer and the brain which is not shared by anything else.

All I've asked is that the assertion- which is at the heart of Strong AI - that brains and computers are similar in some unique way - be justified in a physical sense. This hasn't been done, even when the ludicrous extremes of the Strong AI philosophy are extended to include "aware" devices such as thermostats.

Sometimes it's not enough to "grok" something. There comes a point when the assertions have to be backed up. If this discussion seems to go on forever, that's because the objections to the belief system of Strong AI remain unrefuted.

Which is stupid. It is just plain stupid because there are clearly many differences between rabbits and dogs. There are many physical differences, by any possible definition of the word "physical." The fact that you can't wrap your head around this "but.. but... there aren't any physical processes that are going on in one that can't be found in the other" just means that for some bizarre reason you refuse to accept that physical differences might manifest themselves on levels higher than those of the individual particle behaviors.

It has been the same pattern all along with you. Rocks vs. thermostats, rocks vs. bacteria, piles of parts vs. computers, bowls of soup vs. computers -- all of these things are clearly different from each other and nobody but yourself cares that the particles of each all display the same fundamental behavior individually because everyone else is intelligent enough to realize that behavior isn't restricted to the realm of individual particles.

The big point you are missing here - and it's the fundamental point at issue - is that it's you who are claiming a big whopping equivalence between two entirely different things - brains and computers. You are also claiming that brains and computers are different from most other things.

That's your claim. It's up to you - and by you, I mean everyone who subscribes to the Strong AI belief system - to justify it. You need to show, explicitly, what makes the operation of a brain and the operation of a computer result in the production of the same thing. You need to show how the same physical processes taking place in other objects don't result in this being produced.

It's characteristic of Strong AI that this isn't even regarded as being an issue.

The rabbit vs. dog thing is just the most glaring example of your general confusion, and that is why I am focusing on it.

I wish you would focus. I keep repeating the same simple, basic points over and over, and they are simply not addressed.

Get it?

 

[westprog]

I suggest you take it up with the people who think it's a physical process then. I tend to think it isn't.

If computation is not physical, and consciousness arises from computation, that seems to imply that consciousness isn't physical either.

I should add that I tend to think that consciousness is physical - and that hence it does not arise from non-physical processes like computation.

 

[westprog]

My rebuttal is the question of whether or not you consider life as physical or functional.

Is the difference between a bacteria and a rock physical or functional, westprog?

No, I'm not going to keep wandering off the point to some spurious analogy. If you want to talk about life, then talk about it. If you want to talk about computing, talk about that.

This endless series of non-applicable analogies have been drowning out the thread. I've spent far too long making accurate but irrelevant observations about rabbit DNA so Rocketdodger can go "Aha!".

If something can be described in terms of physical processes, then it's physical.

 

[westprog]

Ok.

Computation is a series of physical events which process information.

What is wrong with my definition?

Nothing. It's fine. But it includes everything in the universe. Unless you can find a sufficiently restrictive definition of "process" and "information".

I don't think that brains and computers are much different from rocks, cars, or bird crap for that matter. The only difference is the level of organization and complexity present, explicitly designed(by the physical process of evolution, or some guys at Intel), to process information.

The processing of information in the rock is vastly more complex than the digital operation of the computer designed by the guys at Intel. The fundamental effort in building computer components is to keep them isolated and predictable.

Of course because computers are made out of bits of rock, their operation as computers is not the only information processing they do. Every time a molecule of nitrogen strikes the case of your computer, there is an exchange of information.

It seems to me like you are on the same side of the argument as the Strong AI folks, you just don't know it!

If I remember correctly, one of the big sticking points was my insistence that rocks process information every bit as much as computers, for any objective description of information.

 

[westprog]

Westprog:

Of course I can't say whether it's used for some other purpose elsewhere. That's actually the point I have been making all along about genetic signals. I* can, however, look at a [/i]digital computer's architechture[/i] and say that it's not a analog computer's architechture.

But that is simply a description of the use to which you are going to put the two devices.

 

[rocketdodger]

Firstly you don't need to shout.

You aren't even close to comparing like with like. The DNA of a rabbit is physically different to the DNA of a dog, and they can be told apart, given a sufficiently large sample.

A digital signal is an analogue signal, so how can they be told apart? A dog is not a rabbit. Please refine your analogy so it's possible to pick some kind of meaning out of it.

You are conflating two different meanings of the same word.

A digital signal is only "analog" in the sense that all real world phenomena are continuous.

That is a different sense than what people mean when they talk about an analog vs. digital signal. In that sense, "analog" means "is used by an analog system."

Those are two very different meanings. And, everyone here thinks you are using the second meaning. If you aren't, then you might want to clear that up.

So which sense are you using in your argument here? If you are simply saying that all signals are continuous, then you are obviously correct. And in that case -- what is your point? Because all DNA is composed of only 4 bases, and yet rabbits and dogs are very different, so it does not follow that information channels that have the same fundamentals always lead to constructs that behave the same.

If you are saying that there is no way to tell whether a signal is used by a given analog or digital system, then you are wrong. They can obviously be told apart. And that is because -- surprise-- information channels that have the same fundamentals do not lead to constructs that behave the same.

And that is the big point that you seem to be incapable of understanding. All the particles in the universe have the same fundamentals. This does not imply that everything in the universe behaves the same.

 

[rocketdodger]

The big point you are missing here - and it's the fundamental point at issue - is that it's you who are claiming a big whopping equivalence between two entirely different things - brains and computers. You are also claiming that brains and computers are different from most other things.

That's your claim. It's up to you - and by you, I mean everyone who subscribes to the Strong AI belief system - to justify it. You need to show, explicitly, what makes the operation of a brain and the operation of a computer result in the production of the same thing. You need to show how the same physical processes taking place in other objects don't result in this being produced.

Oh, you mean like the physical definition of life, that allows us to say bacteria are alive while rocks are not?

Here are four definitions of life from wikipedia -- please tell me if you think any of them are what you would consider a "physical' definition:

Living things are systems that tend to respond to changes in their environment, and inside themselves, in such a way as to promote their own continuation.

A network of inferior negative feedbacks (regulatory mechanisms) subordinated to a superior positive feedback (potential of expansion, reproduction).

A systemic definition of life is that living things are self-organizing and autopoietic (self-producing). Variations of this definition include Stuart Kauffman's definition as an autonomous agent or a multi-agent system capable of reproducing itself or themselves, and of completing at least one thermodynamic work cycle.

Life is a self-sustained chemical system capable of undergoing Darwinian evolution.

 

[rocketdodger]

If something can be described in terms of physical processes, then it's physical.

Well the only criteria you have given us for "physical" is that it is found in some physics textbook somewhere.

So I just want to know whether you consider the difference between bacteria and rock -- whatever it is (I call it life) -- is a physical difference or a purely functional one.

Because obviously no physics textbook talks about such a difference. So is it your assertion that such a difference is purely functional?

 

[Belz...]

If the power supply is on a seperate shelf it is.

But then you don't have a working computer, do ya ?

 

[Belz...]

Firstly you don't need to shout.

Well, he doesn't seem to get anywhere with you by being polite, so...

 

[Dancing David]

I should add that I tend to think that consciousness is physical - and that hence it does not arise from non-physical processes like computation.

Screech, computation through the switching of electrons is physical.

Just like adding pebbles as a cow leaves the gate and removing pebbles as the cow returns represents the number of cows not in the corral.

 

[Dancing David]

But that is simply a description of the use to which you are going to put the two devices.

Nope, the design an analog computer is going to function differently that a digital computer, there was phase in CT where they were tried, they use different processes than a digital computer. They are arranged differently than those that do digital computing.

And the design architechture is different.

 

[Robin]

No, The fact that you attempted to answer a question you proposed by assuming what I meant does not mean that you can change the question a posteriori when you're told the conclusion you draw from your answer is not what I actually said.

What question are you saying I changed?

I stated my understanding of what you said and you did not correct me:

Providing a circular definition of "think" and "conscious" does not prove that consciousness creates itself.

It only proves your definition is meaningless. If someone provided a circular definition of "matter" would that prove that matter creates itself?

So instead of correcting my understanding you reply ambiguously:

Please try, it would be most interesting to see

So what were you telling me to try?

Obviously it would have been absurd for you to have been saying "try to prove that matter creates itself" since I clearly said that circular definitions prove nothing but that the definition is meaningless.

The only alternative I can see then is that you were asking me to try to find a circular definition of matter.

So what were you referring to when you said "please try"?

And do you or don't you think that a circular definition of a consciousness proves something about consciousness?

 

[!Kaggen]

And do you or don't you think that a circular definition of a consciousness proves something about consciousness?

No it does not prove anything about consciousness it is an observation about consciousness. If you want proof of consciousness you will need to go outside it and then you won't have any consciousness to prove with.

 

[westprog]

Oh, you mean like the physical definition of life, that allows us to say bacteria are alive while rocks are not?

Here are four definitions of life from wikipedia -- please tell me if you think any of them are what you would consider a "physical' definition:

Living things are systems that tend to respond to changes in their environment, and inside themselves, in such a way as to promote their own continuation.

A network of inferior negative feedbacks (regulatory mechanisms) subordinated to a superior positive feedback (potential of expansion, reproduction).

A systemic definition of life is that living things are self-organizing and autopoietic (self-producing). Variations of this definition include Stuart Kauffman's definition as an autonomous agent or a multi-agent system capable of reproducing itself or themselves, and of completing at least one thermodynamic work cycle.

Life is a self-sustained chemical system capable of undergoing Darwinian evolution.

I think that they are decent stabs at a physical definition. I dare say it would be possible to poke holes in some of them, but they seem quite well thought out.

 

[Robin]

I am saying that most of the scientific community is stuck with pre-Kantian assumptions.

Most? You know that, how? Have you a poll somewhere that shows that?

But is the philosophic community any better off?

David Chalmers, a pretty major figure in modern philosophy, thinks you can argue from epistemic conceivability to metaphysical possibility.

Talk about pre-Kantian assumptions.

Science itself is not stuck with pre-Kantian assumptions, but it is stuck with a post-Kantian limit on what it can do.

As is every single epistemic system - as I keep pointing out.

You keep talking as though this were a problem for science alone.

It can only investigate what Kant called "Phenomena", and not even everything about that.

It can't even investigate phenomena, because there is no phenomenal world or phenomenal realm - our sensations are private to each individual. I can't study your sensations and you can't study mine.

Science can only study reports of sensations - science can only study language.

Just as philosophy can only study language.

It can't investigate whatever it is that causes Phenomena. Something causes Phenomena, right?

A very pre-Kantian question if I may say so. Pre-Humean to be precise.

But even if causality were metaphysically meaningful I doubt that existence is so simple as A causes B.

At best we can say that there is some underlying order to our existence and the best we can do is to discover the meaningful questions that can be asked about that underlying order and ask them.

But the question is still open - what is it that science can't investigate that some other approach can?

 

[westprog]

Screech, computation through the switching of electrons is physical.

Just like adding pebbles as a cow leaves the gate and removing pebbles as the cow returns represents the number of cows not in the corral.

Yes, both are reasonably well defined physical processes. The problem is to try to find a definition where they are the same physical process. Any definition of computation must include the electronic version of computing along with the pile of pebbles. It must take the human being out of the picture, if it's not to be a purely functional definition. And it must exclude all the things the person defining it doesn't want to be classified as computing.

Good luck.

 

[Robin]

No it does not prove anything about consciousness it is an observation about consciousness.

It is not even an observation about consciousness.

A circular definition is meaningless and says nothing whatsoever.

If you want proof of consciousness you will need to go outside it and then you won't have any consciousness to prove with.

Do you prove things with consciousness anyway?

In any case why would I want a proof of consciousness? You are the one who seems to think we can draw metaphysical conclusions about it, not me.

 

[Robin]

I should add that I tend to think that consciousness is physical - and that hence it does not arise from non-physical processes like computation.

Under what definition of physical?

 

[westprog]

Under what definition of physical?

Physical processes are built from other, more primitive physical processes. Eventually it all reduces to matter, mass, forces, etc.

Incidentally, the fact that something involves physical actions does not make it a physical process. Shopping is not something I think can be defined in physical terms. I don't think an overdraft has a physical meaning.